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ABSTRACT 
William Suárez II Gómez 
Cabotage: The effects of an external non-tariff measure on the competitiveness of 
agribusiness in Puerto Rico  
Keywords: Food Vulnerability; Small Island Developing States; Agrifood Supply Chain; 
Food Imports; Grain; Fresh Produce; Anti-Competitive Measures; Maritime 
Transportation; US Jones Act; Efficiency. 
Small islands developing states (SIDS) sustainability is a United Nations’ aim. Their 
markets are often influenced by external policies imposed by larger economies. Could 
an anti-competitive measure affect the food vulnerability of a SIDS? 
This research examines the effects of an external non-tariff measure (NTM) on Puerto 
Rico’s (PR) agribusinesses. It explores the effects of a maritime cabotage regulation 
(US Jones Act) on the affordability and accessibility of produce and grains. PR imports 
100% of their needs of grain and over 85% of fresh produce. PR’s food imports are 
generally from the US and the trade service is restricted to the use of the US maritime 
transportation. As a result, the supply chain of these two sectors  although different, 
are limited by the US Act that may impact the cost of food, its availability, firms’ 
efficiency and other structures of production. Using a mixed convergent design, PR’s 
agrifood supply chains were explored and analysed in relation to the maritime 
cabotage regulation.  
Oligopolistic structures and collusion between maritime transporters and local 
agribusinesses importers limit the access to data, but other internal factors also have a 
role. Fieldwork shows that while the cabotage regulation itself is a constraint, 
interaction with others NTM and the current political framework between US and PR 
are relevant. Factors such as lack of efficiency, poor innovation and a self-limitation of 
the agribusinesses firms were found. The novelty of this research is the use of mixed 
methods to evaluate the effects of cabotage on the agrifood supply chain. 
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Commission for Latin American  
CSCMP Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals  
CVS Pharmacy franchise. In the US mainland it is the second largest chain 
after Walgreens. There, CVS have more than 7,600 stores. 
CTS Container tracking system 
Dwt Deadweight tonnage 
ECORYS Ecotec Research & Consulting (global think tank) 
ELA Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico/Official name of the Puerto 
Rico’s Government  
ETA Estimated time arrival 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation, United Nations 
FCC Federal Communication Commission 
FCL Full container load 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
FEU Forty feet equivalent unit 
FOB Free on board 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FY Fiscal Year   (in PR is between 1st of July to 30st of June) 
GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFI Gross Farm Income 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
GINIc Coefficient to measures the inequality among values of frequency 
distribution (by Corrado Gini) 
GNI Gross National Income but it is used as a synonym of GNP 
GNP Gross National Product, but it is used as a synonym of GNI 
gcw gross cargo weight 
GTM Grounded Theory Method 
ha Acres (4,046.86 square meters) 
IDA Industrial District Approach/ Short name Marshallian’s Industrial 
District Approach  
IICA Instituto Iberoamericano de Cooperación Agrícola 
IMD Institute of Management Development 
ITC International Trade Centre a joint agency of the WTO & the UN 
LCL Less than a container load 
LDC Less developed country (es) 
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LNG Liquified natural gas 
LO-LO Lift on/Lift off methods; ships which are capable of loading and 
stowing cargoes on-board via lifting gear. 
MARAD  or 
MarAd 
US  Maritime Administration, a division agency of the US Department 
of Transportation that maintains the National Defence Reserve Fleet 
(NDRF) 
MAST Multiagency Support Team 
MIDs Marshallian’s Industrial District Approach. Synonym of IDA 
MIDA Cámara de Mercadeo Industria y Distribución de Alimentos de PR 
MSP Maritime Security Programme. It is administered by the MARAD 
MT Metric ton is the most common volume measure used in cargoes and 
dry bulk commodities. It is equivalent to 1,000 Kg or 2,206 pounds.  
n.m. Nautical miles 
NnTMs Non-technical measures to trade 
NTMs Non-tariff measures to trade 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PAN In Spanish it means ‘Programa de Asistencia Nutricional’, which 
translated is Nutritional Assistance Programme. 
PPP Power Purchase Per Capita 
PSI Pre-shipment inspection 
PR Puerto Rico  
PRPA Puerto Rico Port Authority 
PRPB Puerto Rico Planning Board / Junta de Planificación de Puerto Rico 
PREPA Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority 
RIA Regulatory Impact Assessment 
RO-RO Roll-On/Roll-Off cargo vessels, mainly loaded rolling cargo below deck, 
while containers are primarily stowed on deck. In high traffic regions 
container handling is carried out by on-shore gantry cranes. 
SCM Supply Chain Management 
SIDS Small island developing state or territory 
SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and/or Farmers 
SNA System National Accounts 
SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
STEM Science, technology, engineering and math curriculum programme 
TEU Twenty feet equivalent unit 
TMT Technical measure to trade 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference for Trade and Development  
US The United States of North America 
USD US dollar ($) 
US-CBP US Custom and Border Patrol 
US-DoT US Department of Transportation 
US-GAO US  General Accountability Office 
US-ITC US  International Trade Commission 
US-MarAd US Maritime Administration (see MARAD) 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0.0 Overview 
Food is one of the pillars upon which society is built. It is important as an economic 
activity due to its direct and indirect benefits. Its direct impacts can be summarized as 
the production of economic goods, a source of income for producers and workers, the 
generation of employment and a source of foreign currency (González & Gregory, 
2014). Indirectly, it is essential for health and happiness. However, farmers are price 
takers since they do not have complete control of the production process, especially in 
the short run (González, 2014). Therefore, when the ability to deliver provisions 
affects the supply chain, the food security of individuals and the nation must be the 
first priority (Hoorfar et al, 2011; Bourlakis & Weightman, 2004).  
 
Food supply chains operate in a complex, dynamic and time-critical environment in 
which product integrity is vital. The chain’s competitiveness level could be affected by 
multiple factors – endogenous and/or external – and trade policy instruments are one 
of them. Trade policies may also have a direct or indirect impact on supply chain 
competitiveness and sustainability at the firm, cluster, region or country level.   
 
Generally, it is believed that between one-third and two-thirds of enterprises’ logistics 
costs are spent on transportation (Tseng et al, 2005). Hence, the application of 
restrictive policy frameworks to this sector could increase costs early in the supply 
chain process, consequently affecting producers’ competitiveness and consumers’ 
welfare. Non-tariff measures (NTMs) in the maritime transportation sector could 
affect companies’ competitiveness, but, if other measures are limiting trade, they may 
also increase the economic vulnerability level in a market. In addition, food availability 
should be considered relevant if the NTM imposes a framework in which the access to 
food is limited by physical1 restrictions to trade. Similarly, access limitations may 
reduce product availability as a result of a lack of production or an increase in cost, 
affecting the affordability of food for people. The following sections on this chapter 
define and introduce concepts that base the stance of this research of the effects of 
                                                          
1 Such as a lack of vessels or operators, containers’ weight restrictions and so on.  
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the US Cabotage Act as an NTM, exploring the case of Puerto Rico’s agribusiness. 
Accordingly, two main research questions were formulated: 
        1. What are the effects of US Cabotage for the Puerto Rico’s agribusinesses supply 
chain? 
        2. What challenges and opportunities does the Cabotage policy present for the 
competitiveness of the Puerto Rico’s agricultural sector? 
 
1.0.1 Sustainability and food insecurity 
Von Braun (2007) argues that the world will experience at least three gigantic 
challenges in the next decades: matching the demand for food to a larger and more 
affluent population; implementing this in environmentally and socially sustainable 
forms; and ensuring that the most vulnerable countries or people are no longer 
hungry. Achieving these aims will require new forms of trade, product or system 
harmonisation, market liberalisation and trade integration in a more complex 
arrangement. 
 
Economists tend to limit the concept of sustainable development to its narrow 
conception associated with environmental aspects (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2007:p.136). In 
this respect, international trade has enormous potential to foster or frustrate 
sustainable development. Nevertheless, its original definition is much wider: ‘growth 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and 
Developments, 1987:No.27). Sustainability includes aspects of security and stability, 
cost efficiency, production economics, consumer perception and environmental 
impact (Hoorfar et al, 2011). Achieving sustainable development requires the creation 
and maintenance of wealth, which demand the best and most profitable use of 
resources to guarantee the social protection of the present as well as potential future 
citizens (Meier & Rauch, 2005:p.622). Therefore, in this sense the term sustainability 
applies to a system in space and over time. 
 
In the literature so far, agriculture vulnerability analyses are associated with failure to 
anticipate risks in the supply chain, such as contamination, the food supply chain 
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quality process, weaknesses in the capacity to trade (Peck, 2006) and climate change 
factors. As a result of climate studies and the climate’s substantial influence on food 
chain sustainability, vulnerability factors are being incorporated into the analysis of 
route distances for trade. The literature suggests that distances are proportional to 
the level of risks or threat to satisfy consumers’ needs and therefore also the 
vulnerability level (Comas, 2009).  
 
1.0.2 Non-tariff measure (NTM) issues 
Although tariff measures have been steadily declining since the mid-twentieth 
century, an increasingly diverse and creative array of non-tariff policies for trade have 
been established (Ferrantino, 2012b). The literature discussing the pros and cons of 
NTMs and the welfare effects caused by protectionist measures or barriers to trade is 
vast. However, since the beginning of free-trade agreements, different forms of NTMs 
have been documented and classified more (Friel et al, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013a). It is 
believed that those measures affect no less than 15% of the total trade and more than 
60% of agricultural products (Nicita & Gourdon, 2013). In the food sector, technical 
and/or sanitary and phytosanitary measures are common and highly complex (Beghin, 
2013).  
 
Academic publications relating to less developed countries (LDCs) regularly analyse 
the topic of NTMs on agriculture from the perspective of a lack of resources to comply 
with developed countries’ trade requirements. Generally, LDCs’ lack of technical 
personnel, appropriate technologies and sources of funding exposes them to higher 
costs of compliance and/or low production rates (Trabelsi, 2013). Nevertheless, the 
most important aspect of NTMs in the literature is related not to their use but to their 
impact.  
Every protectionist action invites retaliatory reaction. The costs of a tit-
for-tat escalation are so high that in the long run all countries are likely 
to lose from the adoption of restrictive policies ... Even when trade 
restrictions are used to curtail unfair foreign competition, they can still 
impose costs to consumers. (Economic report for the US President, in 
Barfield, 1997:p.47) 
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1.0.3 Islands with small economies and small islands developing states or territories 
In recent decades it has become increasingly common to produce goods in a number 
of geographically dispersed stages linked by international trade, hence the increasing 
interest among policymakers in addressing barriers to trade (Ferrantino, 2012b). It is 
believed that the trade policies imposed by large economies on these small economies 
in defence of market liberalisation have had negative impacts on their already-limited 
local food production (Melville, 2003). For instance, external NTMs as a requirement 
for trade are generally designed for the domestic market but are not necessarily 
suitable for LDCs’ or small economies’ realities (Stiglitz, 2010). The greater the 
incidence of these, the more exposed a country is to forces beyond its control and 
thus the more vulnerable it is. Consequently, its national agribusiness activity could 
eventually be undermined. Since the Mauritius Meeting in 2005, similar issues for 
small islands developing states (SIDSs) have been under discussion (UNDESA, 2010).  
 
The weaknesses of food chain sustainability and the high level of food import 
dependency of SIDSs could reduce their capacity to respond to food scarcity, volatility 
impacts on food prices and/or unexpected factors. Understanding the effects of non-
tariff measures on their economy may help in reducing vulnerabilities as well as in 
improving their trade access. However, the literature is apparently silent on the issue 
for the agricultural sector in the US territories.  
 
Unlike tariffs, quantifying the effects of NTMs is not easy. Their effects are indirect and 
often very case-specific or technical, and the monitoring of NTMs at the international 
level seems to be affected by poor transparency (UNCTAD, 2013a). Hence, these 
factors make it difficult to understand their implications, which is troubling for 
policymakers, trade negotiators and development agencies. It is believed that a 
number of these NTMs have raised costs and caused losses in competitiveness, acting 
as barriers to trade. Others may have excluded suppliers or goods, besides 
discouraging some sectors of the domestic market (Galvão de Miranda & Schuh, 
2008). Although the study of NTMs’ effects seems to be more present in the literature 
published in the last decades, the area associated with transportation restrictions in 
SIDSs has received less attention, particularly concerning the effects on the 
agribusiness sector. Consequently, the study of the effects of maritime transportation 
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NTMs on the competitiveness of the PR’s agribusiness’ supply chain combines angles 
that may fill the gap in the literature.   
 
One reason for the lack of research could be the relatively low economic percentage 
that the agricultural sector represents in small countries’ GDP. Furthermore, so far the 
effects of free-trade agreements on the needs of small countries’ markets seem to be 
positive, probably because the topic of food sustainability as a national aim is a 
relatively recent issue in the research community (FAO, 2011). Nevertheless, it is well 
known that GDP growth from agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing 
poverty as growth in the non-agricultural sectors (World Bank, 2012). Agriculture has 
the most direct impact on the development of other aspects of social protection, such 
as food security, natural resources and the environment, but it is clear that major 
transformations in food systems will take time and involve many trade-offs (UNSDSN, 
2014). However, any reduction in productivity growth means that more resources will 
be needed to meet the rising food demand, hence raising the cost of food and thus 
SIDSs’ economic vulnerability level (Godfray et al, 2010). 
 
In this thesis some islands (archipelagos) with small economies such as Ireland, Hong 
Kong and New Zealand were included. Although they are not classified SIDSs by the 
UN, their experiences associated to cabotage and food-supply chain were valuable in 
our analysis. Besides, there were selected by its relationship with large economies and 
the size of their agrifood markets (population, GDP and volume of containers). The 
availability of publications about cabotage was another factor.  
 
1.0.4 Defining cabotage 
The word ‘cabotage’ has a Latin etymology, derived from the French word ‘caboter’, 
associated with sailing along the coast. Basically it means transport or navigation 
along the coastal areas of a country and its territories. It is the carriage of goods and 
passengers within the coastal waters of a particular country (Bello-Olowookere, 2011; 
Liu, 2009). Its regulatory roots come from the British Empire and the Dutch Empire 
(Santos-Santos, 1997). In the eighteenth century, they established cabotage laws to 
protect their shipping between their colonies. The House of Lords, with the Southern 
Seas Act, created the first sea private monopoly to trade between Britain and 
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America. The private South Sea Company was heavily supported by the Crown and 
other important members of parliament to trade exclusively between the British 
colonies. Eventually, corruption and many other factors created a financial bubble that 
in the end affected Britain’s market.  
 
Later, in the 1950s, through US scholars in the GATT, ‘trade liberalisation’ was 
reformulated based on the theory that nations can mutually benefit from it. In regard 
to cabotage, it was restricted at international trades but not on domestics. A NTM on 
maritime transportation may have effects on trade; thus, it should be proportionate 
to its market. Small markets with limited transportation access tend to be more 
affected than bigger markets with geographic access to transport. Therefore, 
restrictions to trade imposed by larger economies may aggravate the cost to trade for 
SIDSs. 
 
1.0.5 Liberalisation 
Nations rise to power and wealth through free trade and decline when protectionism 
takes over (Bartlett, 1997:p.18). Freedom to trade was the strongest pillar of Britain’s 
general free-market policy. Germany, in the mid-nineteenth century, acted in the 
same way for its agricultural sector, and much later Japan became more economically 
integrated with the rest of the world. Nowadays, in the era of free-trade agreements 
(FTA), SIDSs such as Bahrain, Cyprus, Jamaica, Mauritius, Puerto Rico and Singapore 
have reached levels of market (NTMs) liberalisation, increasing their level of 
development (WEF, 2013b) (Table 1). Interestingly, all of them are directly or 
indirectly affected by large countries or regional economies. However, a common 
challenge is to reach levels of social protection to ensure sustainable access to 
adequate food for their citizens (FAO, 2010).  
 
Although cabotage opposes the classical economic approach of free-market forces, 
pro-liberalism countries, such as the US, see it as an acceptable tool for achieving set 
economic goals, invoking national security issues. In the last decade, various countries 
have reformulated their policies associated with cabotage. However, the vast majority 
of coastal countries with more modest economies than the US are supportive of the 
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concept that global maritime transportation competition is fair to them but unfair if 
dominance is prevalent. 
 
Table 1: SIDSs2 with high levels of market liberalisation and agricultural production in 
their GDP  
 
Extracted from: Heritage Foundation (2014), WEF (2013), and World Bank (2012). *Rank of NTM is 
between strong limits=1 to not limited at all=7. ** Rank is between excessively burdensome=1 and 
balanced=7.  
 
        
Shipping liberalism, according to Hudgins (1997), recognises the principle of free and 
fair competition in sea transport, irrespective of the flag that the ship is flying (Bello-
Olowookere, 2011). Under such policy, shippers have the right to a free choice of 
carrier: either a home or a foreign-flag vessel. On the other hand, the way in which 
forms of policy are adopted, aiming to give preference to the locals in some kind of 
discrimination against the foreigners, is called protectionism. These policies include 
cargo reservation or preference, cargo sharing, crew restrictions, restrictions to 
owners, flag discrimination, maritime subsidies and state intervention, among many 
others. 
 
‘Countries do not trade, individuals do’ (Hudgins, 1997:p.2), but to do so, good 
economic policies for competitiveness are required. In the global market era, 
countries’ economy becomes more integrated and accessibility to transport is 
required to compete but at a fair cost. Highly protected sectors, such as industry and 
agriculture, by their nature are challenging to trade, but it is their significant 
dependency on transportation that affects them more (Chase, in Vincenti, 2013; Xiong 
& Beghin, 2012). Domestic production in SIDSs is proportionally more import 
                                                          
2 Although Hong Kong and Ireland are not considered SIDS under the UN official classification, in this thesis they were included as comparative 
markets. 
SIDS
Population 
(M)
Area in 
km2
Prevalence of 
trade 
barriers*
Estimated 
GINI coef 
% of GDP in 
agriculture
General 
GDP billion 
USD
Agriculture 
GDP in 
million USD
Rank 
agriculture 
policy cost** 
Hong Kong 7.5 1,104 5.8 0.53 0.10% 263 263 4.5
Singapore 5.2 700 5.6 0.47 0.09% 274 246.6 4.9
Mauritius 1.3 2,040 4.8 0.39 3.50% 10.5 367.5 4.4
Bahrain 1.4 765.3 4.9 0.39 0.30% 34.9 104.7 4.2
Cyprus 0.307 9,250 4.9 0.31 2.30% 22.9 526.7 3.8
Ireland 4.5 70,273 4.9 0.34 1.60% 210 3,360.00     4.7
Jamaica 2.7 10,991 4.8 0.46 6.80% 14.8 1,006.40     3.8
Puerto Rico 3.6 9,104 4.8 0.57 0.80% 103 824 3.6
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dependent than that in large economies due to their natural limitations, remoteness 
and lack of farmland to produce enough raw materials. Therefore, their economies 
become more vulnerable to the costs of transportation. 
 
To be competitive, frequent identification of strength, improvement of efficiency and 
eradication of inefficiencies throughout the supply chain are required. In the case of 
local small and medium enterprises (SMEs), there is a lack of understanding of the 
factors affecting competitiveness, particularly in small island developing states (SIDSs) 
(Briguglio, 2014). Although SMEs have been acknowledged as important drivers of 
regional development due to their capacity to generate employment, they might be 
limited by NTMs to trade. Bearing this in mind, this research is particularly focused on 
the exploration of cabotage restrictiveness in maritime transportation.  
 
1.1.0 Area of research 
Internal and external factors may affect competitiveness. Regarding cabotage as an 
NTM, most studies focus on the welfare cost and a few on the market relations; little 
is said about the business environment in which chain actors operate. To analyse the 
effect of the US Cabotage Act as an NTM, this thesis considered three key elements: 
the network structure of horizontal and vertical market channel relationships; the 
supply chain, as related to the key competitive aim of any business chain; and 
governance, covering some institutional elements related to the participants (firms, 
the public sector, NGOs and third parties). The element of infrastructure was 
considered in the process too.  
 
In this exploratory research, cabotage was considered as an external regulation on 
SIDS. As a result, the political relationship between Puerto Rico (PR) and the US and 
the vulnerability of PR’s food security are also presented as the basis on which to 
study this phenomenon. It is important to clarify that this thesis does not assume a 
stance against the relationship between PR and the US. On the contrary, the posture 
presented in this thesis is to approach the phenomenon of the US Cabotage Act in 
relation to PR’s economy from the viewpoint of a better commercial relationship with 
the US market but increasing the production potential of PR from a very wide 
perspective. It is believed that the local businesses are experiencing a ‘comfort zone’, 
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making their main trades with only one market; while this provides certain benefits to 
trade, it brings higher costs and inefficient processes that affect competitiveness and 
market openness.  
 
The researcher started from the premise that PR – as an SIDS – is a nation or society 
with beliefs, culture, traditions and views that are different from those of its main, 
larger trade partner economy, which in this case is the US. As a result, this research 
focused on those elements – internal, external or cultural – associated with the NTM 
that may increase the inefficiencies at the level of firms, affecting their supply chain. 
Therefore, exploring and identifying opportunity areas may promote efficiency and 
competitiveness in the agribusiness (perishable and raw-material) importer sector not 
only to supply the internal market but also to add value to produce for other markets.  
 
1.2.0 Background 
Since 1917 the relationship between Puerto Rico (PR) and the United States (US) has 
been regulated by the Jones Act. In the 1920s the US Cabotage Act was implemented 
as an amendment to restrict access and reserve maritime trade between the US and 
its territories for US-registered carriers. Unlike other non-incorporated US territories,3 
in Puerto Rico (PR) the Jones Act only permits trade using ships operated by US 
citizens and constructed, repaired and registered under the US flag.  
 
Since NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and the current multiplicity of US free-trade agreements 
(FTAs), PR’s producers have become less competitive, and it is believed that the 
maritime transportation policy (US Cabotage Act) is one of the reasons (Irizarry-Mora, 
2011; Herrero et al, 2010; Alameda, 2002). Due to the US–Caribbean market 
openness, the domestic cabotage became a more important issue during the last 
decade (Collazo, 2012). Indeed, the scenario seems to be more relevant now as PR is 
currently struggling with an extremely high level of national debt, 14.5% 
unemployment and reduced national competitiveness (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 2014). Therefore, if the US Act is acting as a non-tariff measure, it could restrict 
PR’s domestic trade to its local maritime capacities. 
                                                          
3 American Samoa, Mariana Island and the Virgin Islands. 
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Of the US states, the last two incorporated into this nation (Hawaii and Alaska) are the 
only ones with ‘similar’ restrictions, but just one (Hawaii) is an archipelago like PR. 
Therefore, the consumerist market of 3.7 million Puerto Ricans, who import around 14 
million tonnes/year by sea, seems to be confined to using only US maritime 
transportation for its domestic trade. By value, approximately 8% of all the imports 
from the US are in the form of food and farm products. For PR this represents around 
80% and 90% annually of its national needs for food and agricultural supplies, 
respectively (Comas, 2009).  
 
PR’s national agricultural sector is diminishing, and it is believed that the cost of 
freight could be one of the problems. Although the study of the Cabotage Act’s effects 
on PR’s economy is not new, in the last five years the discussion has been central due 
to the alleged negative indirect effects on PR’s development. This thesis is the first 
study of the effect of this phenomenon on PR’s agriculture. Aligned with the main 
research questions previously formulated (1.0) the following questions were 
generated: How does an external NTM influence the small country’s food 
vulnerability? Could this measure affect SIDS sustainable development and limit the 
citizens’ right to adequate food? What impact does the Cabotage Act have on PR’s 
agribusinesses supply chain and producers? 
 
In spite of the limited coverage of SIDSs, this topic is worth researching because it 
provides complementary views for policymakers. Although the topic is 
multidisciplinary, it is important to highlight that this thesis is an exploratory 
conceptualisation of a non-tariff measure on the maritime transportation that 
allegedly affects the US offshore territories’ competitiveness. To investigate the 
effects of an NTM on the food supply chain and its various pricing puzzles adequately, 
a pragmatic stance was adopted in this thesis to allow flexible frameworks to identify 
the distortions. Whilst we do not present a particular model here, we do demonstrate 
why the cost to trade agricultural perishable produce of PR is affected by multiple 
elements that are generally associated with the Cabotage Act but not exclusive to it. 
This constitutes an implicit vital element in the case for the agribusiness sector. By 
decomposing the food supply chain’s elements, a new angle of study of the effects of 
the US Cabotage Act on PR’s economy contributes to the wider study of NTMs. Finally, 
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as an exploration of the competitive potential of SIDSs’ agribusiness, this study 
provides a new perspective on the supply chain, exploring the level of corporate 
global interaction in this traditional sector. 
 
1.3.0 Research stances 
Philosophical 
In general, the research philosophy of this thesis adheres to realism. However, 
ontologically, a critical stance of this philosophy is integrated on an epistemological 
and methodological pragmatic structure.  
 
A critical realism view considers that ‘there is a real world that exists independently of 
theories, offering a challenge to the status quo’ (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2011:p.45). 
In this research this is particularly observed in the qualitative phase. On the other 
hand, the practicality used to address research questions; experience-centred view to 
assess the particular dimensions into the phenomenon under study; and real world 
practice oriented through combining qualitative and quantitative data mixing terms or 
styles, are formally linked to pragmatism.  
 
Carter (2000) suggests critical realism may reconcile the threatened ‘divorce between 
social theory and empirical research’ (p.1). However, the methods employed for 
building and validating the conceptual framework combined deductive and inductive 
thinking. This thesis details the particularities and ethical considerations that justify 
the use of diverse approaches and valuing both objective and subjective views. The 
methodology described is consistent with the guidance on mixed methods design of 
Creswell and Plano-Clark (2011), and grounded theory of Strauss and Corbin (1990). 
 
Sustainable development 
Development is a very complex process in which as many as five structures interact: 
physical, social, institutional, knowledge and nature. They should be taken into 
account in evaluating the consequence of structures’ interaction and sophistication 
during the process of development. A sustainable development consists in a balance 
of economic development, social inclusion and environmental structure (UN, 2012; 
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Kates, Parris & Leiserowitz, 2005) and the agricultural sector is influenced by each of 
those three pillards. It is tied to progress in many other areas of development, such as 
gender equality, health, climate change, water and energy, and peace and security 
(UNSDSN, 2014). Over the past century, the level of food production has provoked – 
on average – a reduction in gross food prices, but early in this century rapid and 
sustained spikes were reported. It is believed that the rapid development of big LDCs 
will prompt more volatility and a rise in food prices in the next decades.  
 
Food chain sustainability, as a research paradigm, seeks to build diverse supplies of 
food geographically close to populated centres. It is focused on improving the local 
management of food systems rather than constraining the global food supply chains 
(FAO, 2011:p.6). The interactions of local and global food supplies should be governed 
in ways that promote fair trade and local procurement to improve the conditions for 
small and limited-resource farmers in all regions. It is believed that the costs between 
the first and the third step in the food chain could reach between 170% and 900% of 
the original price (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004; Tempest, 1996). However, this will 
depend on the NTM effect. Therefore, how do we identify the non-tariff measures’ 
effects on agribusiness competitiveness in an SIDS? Does small-country vulnerability 
analysis consider the impact of external NTMs for imported raw materials on the food 
supply chain? 
 
Vulnerability 
The term has its roots in the Latin word ‘vulnus’ which mean easily hurt. It has 
regularly known by its bidimensional acceptions: external vs. internal. In literature is 
not rare its use in topics such as social risk management, fragile ecosystems, 
susceptibility to natural disasters, supply chain analysis, agrifood contexts and also in 
economics. For instance, Briguglio (2004) assumed it to describe the needs of special 
policy approaches to effectively address the sustainable development issues on SIDS 
and islands with small economies. However, Scaramozzino (2006) applies the topic to 
analyse the limitations in food accessibility and affordability that could be provoked by 
economic and political factors. This research adopts Briguglio’s (2003: p.2) definition 
in a wide perspective as ‘proneness to harm or damage originated from external 
forces’.  
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Exploring the US cabotage on PR’s agrifood system the researcher aims to identify its 
effect and some strategies that importers and/or public institutions may adopt in 
order to reduce vulnerabilities. 
 
Competitiveness 
This term is multidimensional and spans economic, cultural, political and 
environmental factors. It is important for all national economies and businesses but 
especially vital for small economies. In chapter 4 this topic will be discussed. 
Nevertheless, this research adopts Garelli’s (2014: p.506) competitiveness definition in 
an ample view: ‘a field of economic knowledge, which analyses the facts and policies 
that shape the ability of a nation (firm) to create and maintain and environment that 
sustains more value creation for its enterprises and more prosperity for its people’.  
  
Efficiency 
 Whilst connected to productivity, both are generally agreed to be a part of 
competitiveness, albeit not regularly cited as such in empirical studies. Due to its 
multiple applications the OECD (2010b:p.17) delineates it as an optimal scale of 
operation to give an indication of whether firms are able to use the existing 
technology, resources (infrastructure, materials or people) and allocation in the best 
way. Therefore, for this research, the concept will be associated to the potential of 
improvement relative to a reference.  
 
Food insecurity 
Food insecurity levels – a problem more associated to LDCs – could raise, also 
affecting vulnerable populations in developed societies and becoming worse for those 
populations for which food access is limited (Chilton & Rose, 2009). However, basic 
elements that are intrinsically associated with food chain sustainability, such as a 
country’s consumption pattern and internal food production balance, seem to be 
useful in measuring resilience capacity (UNCESCR, 1999). Godfray et al (2010) argue 
that the patterns in food prices could be indicators of trends in the availability of food 
for those who can afford it and have access to it on the world markets. According to 
them, the balance between constant availability and price stability in the market could 
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be considered as part of the product’s sustainability. Perez-Escamilla and Segall-
Correa (2008) posit that a sustainable food supply is essential for ensuring food 
security. Using multi-form analysis, they argue that sustainable household food 
security and individuals’ nutrition security depend on local, regional, national and 
global factors and on chain integration (Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1: Distal, intermediate and proximal determinants of food and nutrition 
security  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Source: Perez-Escamilla and Segall-Correa (2008:p.16). 
 
 
According to the figure below, an increase in food prices could affect income, access 
and security. However, it could also stimulate global investment in food production to 
guarantee food for human well-being and national stability (Gordfray et al, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the integrity of food chains is no longer determined only by the intrinsic 
quality – including safety and healthiness –  of the foods but also by intangible 
qualitative aspects (e.g. sustainable development) emerging from social protection 
claims and corporate social responsibilities (Verbeke, 2011). For instance, the United 
Nations (UN, 2012:Nos.108 & 110) posits that guaranteeing access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food is one vital aspect of countries’ sustainable development. 
However, considering SIDSs’ limitations, to accomplish this will demand high levels of 
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planning, execution and liberalisation to ensure the right of access to food for their 
citizens (Monge-Roffarello et al, 2011). Any problems in food chain integrity may 
rapidly provoke distortions in the rest of the chain participants (Hoorfar et al, 2011). 
 
Food insecurity discussions have been historically more associated with sub-Saharan 
countries and more recently integrated into SIDSs’ sustainability aims. Since 2005 
SIDSs’ sustainability has remained a special topic on the United Nations agenda. Due 
to their limited resources and export base and their high level of exposure to external 
shocks, the Mauritius Strategy concludes that SIDSs have made less progress than 
other LDCs in achieving sustainable levels of development (UN, 2012:No.178). 
Therefore, more studies and coordinated actions should be executed to address the 
sustainable development challenges facing SIDSs. 
 
Agribusiness 
The term used in this thesis refers to a wide range of firm structures: food processors 
and manufacturers, input suppliers, producers that may be smallholder farmers, 
wholesalers or traders and other intermediaries in a supply chain that connects 
retailers or processors to producers. 
 
 
Case study 
PR’s efforts to develop strong, sustainable native food production have been 
practically abandoned for decades. It is assumed that the importation of food will 
always be a better and cheaper possibility, more so when production is accessed from 
LDCs, the dollar (USD) is a strong currency and there is a belief that the US will support 
its citizens. Although these aspects are not easily found in PR’s publications, they are 
not contrary to the social and economic context of its development. However, the 
global food production is changing along with the US market. It is believed that the 
current level of production is insufficient to feed the world at affordable prices (FAO, 
2015; Comas, 2012). Consequently, the more dependent countries will be highly 
restricted by the economic strategies and supply chain controls of transnational 
corporations, market instability, the reduction of producers, the increase in the 
population in more lucrative markets and the climatic changes.  
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1.4.0 Theoretical stance: Supply chain competitiveness 
Ensuring the availability of food for future generations, considering climate, cultural 
and other sociological factors must be the basis of a state’s sustainable vision (FAO, 
2010). In a globalised economy, external trade measures imposed by large countries 
or regions could diminish small countries’ native food supply chain and therefore their 
national sustainability level.  
 
Supply chain complexity has been revolutionised by market liberalisation and 
globalisation. Its evolution has resulted in a high level of interdependence between 
sovereign nations; as a consequence, no nation is totally self-sufficient nowadays. The 
notion of interconnectivity in business is important today to achieve competitiveness 
(OECD, 2011b). Insularity and/or remoteness is one factor described by Briguglio et al 
(2010:p.6) in their evaluation of countries’ dependency on international trade. 
Maritime transportation represents the most common and cost-effective method to 
supply markets, but the ratio of transport and freight costs to import is considered 
significant for competitiveness. Could systematic corporate planning provide a 
possible solution to the maritime costs of trade?  
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2011a) defines 
competitiveness as the ‘ability of companies, industries, regions, nations, and 
supranational regions to generate, while being  exposed to international competition, 
relatively high factor income and factor employment levels on a sustainable basis’ 
(Hatzichronoglou, 1996). The United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and Industry 
defines it as ‘the ability to sustain high and rising levels of income per head’. Five 
factors are identified as drivers of competitiveness: innovation; quality of 
management; quality of human capital; an enterprise culture; and discerning and 
informed consumers (DEFRA, 2002). Porter (1990) is one of the first to underline the 
importance of firms’ competitiveness through the development of strategies and 
internal structures. Other authors incorporate performance indicators such as cost, 
profitability, productivity and efficiency (Latruffe, 2010). Competitiveness would then 
be the ability to sell products that meet the demand requirements (price, quality and 
quantity) and, simultaneously, ensure profits over time to enable the firm to thrive 
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(OECD, 2010b:p.4). As a result of these approaches, it is not surprising that 
organisations such as the OECD describe competitiveness as just a net relative 
measure.  
 
Ensuring food availability to citizens is one goal that every country should accomplish, 
including SIDSs. Novel initiatives, such as greenhouse production, hydroponics, 
rooftop gardening and other innovative agribusiness, seem to be potential solutions 
to mitigate the lack of natural space for production (Gilbert, 2014). Inevitably, to 
produce at agro-industrial levels, small countries will require large amounts of imports 
of raw materials at the lowest possible cost. Due to their lack of economies of scale, 
the costs for them on the global market will tend to be higher, affecting their domestic 
resource cost ratio for exports, and onerous if the cost of shipping is not competitive. 
As a result, there will be greater risk for their domestic market’s competitiveness, 
product scarcity and/or higher prices reducing citizens’ purchasing power. 
 
Korinek and Sourdin (2009b) indicate that the higher shipping costs of grains to the 
poorest developing countries are principally due to their lack of farmland and 
remoteness from major grain-exporting countries. Shipping grains to smaller markets, 
such as lower-income countries and some net food-importing developing countries, 
has traditionally been particularly expensive, in some cases comprising up to 20% of 
the imported value. In addition, regulations and a lack of supply chain competitiveness 
could increase the cost to trade much more. Therefore, in a cabotage restrictive 
scenario, what common strategies to reduce trade costs have been implemented by 
PR’s agribusiness or food importers to be competitive? 
 
Brandon-Jones et al (2014) highlight that, to identify systemic risks, sharing 
information and optimising the supply chain’s visibility through cross-industry 
collaboration could improve the supply chain competitiveness. To be competitive, 
SIDSs’ national companies should be highly interactive globally and gain access to 
more options. It is believed that small countries’ companies without a global 
interconnection tradition between firms and suppliers are more vulnerable or at least 
less competitive. Thus, promoting high levels of intercommunication between 
producers and suppliers is one factor to improve supply chain sustainability. On the 
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other hand, countries’ trade occurs first between near markets that are 
psychologically related, and after this it could be open to others (May, 2015; Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977). Arguably, this psychological state of confidence could confine 
traditional companies to their recurrent markets rather than encouraging them to 
look for better options at the global level. Therefore, could this psychological state of 
the agribusiness producers be a limiting factor in their search for global non-
traditional options? 
 
Aspects related to less competition in the transportation time spent unloading cargo 
at the portside and a large imbalance in trade are endogenous variables that could 
affect the net cost to trade. Furthermore, the lack of competition on routes and 
remoteness are important aspects of the cost variables. These variables could be 
causal to chain analysis (CCA) affecting small countries’ trade competitiveness 
negatively, and the situation may be worse when firms are not able to build agile, 
transformable and resilient supply chains to trade (Stochniol, 2011) (Fig. 2). However, 
the literature also discusses the effects of policy instruments on trade as limits to 
competitiveness affecting the cost of goods. 
 
Figure 2: Causal chain analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kirkpatrick and George (2006: p. 328). 
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1.5.0 Research objectives 
The theoretical approaches of competitiveness, supply chain competitiveness and 
non-tariff measures are the bases for the following research objectives: 
 1. To explore if the US Cabotage could be considered as a barrier, affecting cost 
of production for the native agribusiness and livestock producers. 
 2. To clarify and quantify, if possible, how an external non-tariff measure could 
affect the food sector in a small island developing nation. 
 3. To identify areas of opportunity in the supply chain competitiveness of the 
sectors under exploration.  
 
1.6.0 Research approach 
According to the World Economic Forum (2013a), reducing the supply chain barriers 
to trade could increase the GDP up to six times more than removing tariffs. The 
agricultural sector, for instance, is well known for the level of technical measures 
restricting trade. However, if we add to this other protectionist measures related to 
transportation, it is highly probable that other segments in the chain will be affected 
too. Moreover, if these factors converge in SIDSs, the impact on their economic 
vulnerability could be significant (Briguglio et al, 2010). Therefore, in this exploratory 
study, we will analyse whether the US sea transportation policy might be considered 
as a barrier, discouraging the agricultural production in PR. Additionally, importers’ 
competitiveness strategies for dealing with the maritime costs are investigated. 
 
Secondary data were collected from multiple sources to present a multidimensional 
profile of the phenomenon and to contextualise the scenarios of PR, its agricultural 
sector and the firms under study. In addition, this study applied qualitative methods 
to the case study research through content analysis as well as quantitative methods 
through comparison cost analysis of feedstuff formulations. Primary data were 
generated, coded and analysed through semi-structured questions using the grounded 
theory method. In this process the techniques of case study, action research and 
grounded theory were applied as part of the research methodology. 
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1.7.0 Importance of research 
Previous analyses published about the effects of cabotage show data generalisation, 
presuming similar behaviour between participants, and none of them consider the 
agricultural sector. This thesis highlights differences in infrastructures, procedures 
associated with the phenomenon, cultural issues of the participants attached to the 
US systems, and lack innovation to potentiate their own market. Unlike previous 
analyses, this research identifies patterns on raw materials, in contrast to the 
container process, taking into account the areas that require more attention to avoid 
inequalities. 
 
1.8.0 Thesis outline 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The thesis general layout follows a 
sequential order to give the reader a logical structure of the multidimensionality of 
cabotage. In the first four chapters the topic is contextualised by the reviewed 
literature. The last three chapters explain the methodology and fieldwork’s findings. 
The following paragraphs detail each of the thesis chapters.  
  
In this first chapter was introduced and, highlighted the key arguments of the study. It 
presents the study’s objectives and brief outlines, the research’s philosophy and its 
theoretical stance.  
 
Chapter two describes the motivation for the topic in context and provides the 
historical background, including an explanation of why the agribusiness importers’ 
sector was chosen for the case study. The aim of this chapter is to outline the context 
of the study and to describe the motivation for the research. For this reason the 
discussion is based on a review of PR’s socioeconomic background, agricultural 
scenario and the culture within the industry investigated. 
 
Chapter three is a literature review which introduces the technical topic of maritime 
management to clarify concepts. The chapter is focused on the analysis that is 
relevant to justify the research gap. Using secondary data, various issues and selected 
case studies are analysed by applying synchronous inductive and deductive theory 
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building. The phenomenon of cabotage is contrasted with different jurisdictions in the 
US and abroad.  
 
In chapter four the approaches presented in the academic literature are explained and 
reviews of the theoretical frameworks of competitiveness in general and in 
agribusiness are presented, highlighting the supply chain. The SIDSs’ particularities are 
considered. The main concepts and approaches are analysed critically to contrast the 
key areas of literature that provide insights into the character of and influences on 
productivity and efficiency in the food chain. In addition, the non-tariff measure 
concept described in the literature and different methods and reviews of the theories 
for its analysis are explained. Limited discussion of supply chain strategies and 
developments seems to take place at the academic international level. However at the 
domestic level, the publications available are not commonly published for academic 
peer review scrutiny and focus on the issue of modelling the cost of well-being. The 
methodologies reviewed cover empirical techniques (price analysis and some archival 
research). The majority of the analyses published in the last decade use econometric 
modelling techniques to evaluate the effects of cabotage. None of these previously 
published methods and methodological approaches aims to address the supply chain 
as a problem. The complexity of the subject, entailing multiple environments, 
dimensions, elements and concepts, resulted in a research process that does not set 
any limits on the conceptual, analytical or empirical nature. The review is then 
considered to develop an understanding of the relationship between agribusiness, 
supply chain strategy and competitiveness. 
 
Chapter five outlines the research methodology applied in this thesis. The framework 
is devised in part through the ideas arising from applying the research approaches and 
in part from concepts identified in the literature review. This chapter also explains the 
approaches reviewed in the academic literature and appraises the theories or 
methods related to grounded theory (GTM). The key research questions, objectives 
and related procedures are discussed. In addition, the detailed secondary data used 
for the analysis are presented along with the sampled population, including a brief 
description of its activities. Although the research instruments used for the interviews 
to collect data are attached in the appendices, the coding used is explained in this 
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chapter (also Appendix I). Finally, the ethical protocols used and the scope of the 
study are provided. 
 
Using the primary data collected in the fieldwork, chapter six contextualises the 
external dimensions, the salient dimensions and the elements, factors and forces that 
exert an impact on the food supply chain, the efficiency strategy and its effects on the 
other chain segments. In this chapter the quantitative and qualitative data is merged 
and discussed by group of agribusinesses. The differences between domestic and 
foreign maritime transportation used by the traditional agribusiness importers in PR in 
comparison with other sectors are established. In addition, is outlined a basic profile 
of the importers and their level of dependency on US maritime services versus other 
providers. Specifically, in the context of a traditional livestock sector, four dimensions 
are explained in this section: vulnerabilities, managers’ perception of business 
competitiveness, the level of supply chain visibility and the basic strategies 
implemented to deal with the maritime transportation costs. Critically, the chapter 
analyses the conversion of implicit ideas into explicit figures aimed at capturing the 
real-world strategies and activities from the supply chain participants and generalising 
the findings of the thesis.  
 
Finally, chapter seven presents the overall research conclusions and final remarks. The 
chapter focuses on the study’s main findings from the application of the conceptual 
framework, identifies the key strengths and limitations of the research and concludes 
by making recommendations for future research. 
 
1.9.0 Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the study of this thesis which in a mixed design research 
examines the effects of an external (US) maritime non-tariff measure (NTM) on Puerto 
Rico’s (PR) agribusinesses to explore its effects on the affordability and accessibility of 
produce and grains. Some particularities (supply chain, entrepreneurship and 
innovation) of the economic sector of agriculture and the effects of NTMs were 
presented to investigate other forms of food vulnerabilities that may affect a SIDS. The 
next chapter contextualise the PR’s socioeconomic reality.   
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CHAPTER II 
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
 
2.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a summary of the 
historical–political background of PR from 1800 until the present. The colonial period 
is divided into the Spanish and the US ruling, highlighting their particularities. The 
second section focuses on PR’s competitiveness and its economic aspects more 
specifically during the last 50 years. The third section discusses the effect of the US 
Cabotage Act on PR’s economy. Finally, the last part of this chapter presents an 
overview of PR’s agriculture. 
 
With an area of 9,104 km2, Puerto Rico4 is geographically located in the Caribbean in 
the north of the Caribbean Sea, between the Dominican Republic and the Virgin 
Islands. It was discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1493. The Spanish Kingdom 
colonised and ruled PR for 400 years, but in 1898 it was invaded by the US. Borinquen, 
the smallest of the Greater Antilles, was a major military post during numerous wars 
between Spain and the other European powers (sixteenth and late nineteenth 
centuries) and was eventually used by the US to control the region5. Although its 
economy and sociology are different from those of the US, PR has been politically and 
economically associated with that nation for 117 years. 
 
PR occupies a trivial space within the academic postcolonial debates, partly because it 
is not a classic colony and it is a relatively prosperous nation with a strong national 
culture but it is not recognised as either a country or as a colony (Duany, 2009). 
However, as an overseas US territory, with a common currency, interstate commerce 
and the same environmental regulations and minimum wage, it has relatively costly 
labour and challenges to production and exporting.  
 
    
                                                          
4
 Borinquen was the native name for the biggest island. Originally, Christopher Columbus named the island St. John the Baptist, but after a few years 
it was changed to Porto Rico (Latin for Puerto Rico), which means Rich Port. During the first 30 years after the colonisation, the extraction of gold 
and other products was a substantial activity for the Spanish conquerors.  
5 The period of it was between late nineteenth century and the end of twentieth century.  
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2.1.0 Historical background of Puerto Rico’s political relationship 
Sociologically, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico should be considered as a nation 
(language, traditions, beliefs6 and other unique cultural structures) and at the 
international sports7 level it has been treated as a country since the 1930s (Rivera, 
2007). However, it is not politically recognised; hence, it is not a participant member 
of the United Nations or of many other political forums. Consequently, to understand 
the context of its development, it is crucial to look at its history, which is relatively 
unusual in relation to other peripheral nations but with some aspects of SIDSs. 
 
2.1.1 Puerto Rico under the Spanish rule 
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Puerto Rico (PR) and Cuba remained the 
last two Spanish colonies in America and served as the final outposts in its strategies 
to regain control of the continent. New parties were formed in the colonies and the 
first representative of PR8 in the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) was elected in 1809. The 
Spanish Government in PR was granted plenary power to rule the colony and mitigate 
any possibilities of rebellion. In 1815 the colonials petitioned for actions to King 
Fernando VII, who, particularly for PR, conceded a Royal Decree of Graces (‘la Real 
Cédula de Gracia’) actively to promote diversified agriculture, commerce and 
industrialisation, tariff reductions and an increase in the population (Dietz, 1989). As a 
result, openness in trade policies and migration9 were initiated. These development 
strategies produced enough to support the Spanish regional military forces there, to 
increase the revenues for the Spanish crown and to balance its administrative costs in 
the colony.10 In general, it was a positive way to achieve growth in PR’s economy as 
well as being potentially lucrative for its participants (Dietz, 1989).  
 
For the Spanish Crown, the years between 1860 and 1898 were highly turbulent. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish offshore colonies promoted the development of public 
                                                          
6
 For instance, Puerto Ricans are considered as a Latin-identity communitarian people, a Catholic Christian society that is proud of its culture. The 
majority of the population is opposed to the death penalty as a method of punishment and class or race discrimination and does not consider 
bearing firearms to be a general right. 
7 Since 1948 the International Olympics Committee (IOC) has officially recognised Puerto Rico’s Olympic Committee (COPUR). 
8 Don Ramón Power y Giralt was the first elected representative of Puerto Rico of the Spanish Parliament and the first Vice-President some years 
later. 
9
 European entrepreneurs from Spain and particularly from non-Spanish origins: Ireland and Scotland, Italy, Malta and Corsica, France, Germany and 
the Netherlands. Besides Criollos from the other colonies, they were allowed to live and invest in PR tax free for 10 years. This interest in 
potentiating the production in Cuba and particularly in PR was motivated by the instabilities in the French colonies – especially in Haiti, which until 
its independence was a very important exporter. At this time, both colonies’ production was sold in Europe and in Spanish ex-colonies in America as 
well as in the west and south of the current US, which were Spanish territories until the 1820s (Mirón-Murciano et al, 2012; Dietz, 1989). 
10 From the 1830s to the 1890s, the population grew from around 300,000 to 1 million people (Mirón-Murciano et al, 2012). 
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agencies, such as the Ministry of Treasury, the Office of Accountability, the Lottery 
Office and the Postal Service, the regionalisation of public services and better 
measures of public administration. In PR, as the supportive location for the Spanish 
Armada in America, all of these measures were implemented. As a result, a submarine 
cable was laid to improve communications by telephone, sea businesses and trans-
shipping commerce increased. In addition, the currency was stabilised, and in ports 
the customs structure was better organised (Mirón-Murciano et al, 2012).  
 
In the late 1870s, the import tariffs, wharfage, fees for storage in ports and freight 
rates for trade were reduced. Besides, the cabotage between Spain and its colonies 
and ex-colonies was liberalised or at least made more flexible. The new norms 
supported the principle of ‘easy pass-on trade’11 between the ports of the Spanish 
Crown; thus, no inspections were required for trade between Spanish territories or 
Spain and its business partners. According to Mirón-Murciano and colleagues (2012), 
these reciprocal actions were beneficial to Spain and to Puerto Rico as a colonial trans-
shipping location. On the contrary, González and Matés (2007) suggest that this action 
involved significant profit reductions for the Spanish crown. Nevertheless, these 
researchers agree that PR’s government expenses were around 4 million pesos12 per 
annum and more than 20 million in total commerce.13 
 
In the same period, two parties (the conservative party and the liberal party) in PR 
came together behind the idea of political autonomy, leaving behind the notion of 
assimilation with Spain (Bras, 2011). The liberal reforms in Spain extended to its 
colonies the right to establish a status of ‘Diputación Provincial’ (making the island an 
Autonomous Province of Spain) and paved the way for the establishment of the first 
national political movement (Dietz, 1989). Although the Puerto Rican representatives 
in the Spanish Parliament (Las Cortes) succeeded in their efforts to obtain political 
reforms, in practice the local Spanish authorities in PR were reluctant (Bras, 2011). As 
a result, some political exiles from the Spanish colonial regime (various Puerto Ricans 
among them) settled on the US mainland, particularly in New York City (Duany, 2009). 
                                                          
11 Its level of liberalisation is not clear in the available literature; however, it seems to be a primitive system of the currently well-known free-trade 
agreement (FTA).  
12 During that period the Spanish–Puerto Rican peso (SPRP) and the USD were almost equivalent.  
13 Dietz (1989:p.35) presents historical value data of the imports and exports from 1870 to 1894 (19,814,000 to 27,900,000 pesos). On average, the 
value per capita was around 30 pesos (SPRP).  
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Puerto Ricans were finally granted self-government by Spain when the ‘Carta 
Autonómica’ (a form of constitutional autonomy) was approved by the Spanish 
Parliament (Cortes de España) and signed by the Crown late in 1897. A short-lived 
experiment in plenary autonomy under Spanish rule started. A few months 
afterwards, in a democratic election, the first autonomous government of Puerto Rico 
was elected. 
 
Historians believe that, during the last decade of the 1800s, the US offered to buy the 
colonies of Cuba and PR from Spain, but without reaching any agreement the Spanish–
American War began in 1898. In this year the US annexed Hawaii. The Spanish 
colonies of Cuba, the Philippines and PR14 were invaded by the US and eventually 
legally transferred15 by the Spanish authorities. Subsequently, the territories of Guam 
and the Northern Mariana Islands were ceded. The island’s value to US policy makers 
was as an outlet for excess manufactured goods as well as a key naval station in the 
Caribbean.  
 
2.1.2 Puerto Rico under US rule 
Some authors (Rivera, 2007; Dietz, 1989) agree that many Puerto Ricans, among them 
politicians and academics, endorsed the arrival of the US troops. They suggest that it 
was thought that more liberties, better labour conditions, real democracy, more 
development and economic growth (the American dream) would follow for all. 
Nevertheless, the new power mostly articulated the interest of the absent ruling class 
as well as the interest of the local propertied classes and intermediary groups of a 
different and structured westernised society outside the mainland.  
 
Immediately, by implementing the Foraker Act, the US took control of the Spanish 
colonial apparatus in PR, designating a Military Governor and a group of advisors. The 
existing political structures of PR were dismissed, property taxes were raised and the 
currency16 was dramatically devaluated, swiftly reducing the share of power of the 
                                                          
14 Of all the Spanish colonial possessions in America, Puerto Rico is the only territory that never gained its independence. 
15
 By the Peace Treaty of Paris, signed in December 1898, the Spanish Empire surrendered its control of Cuba, ceding PR and all the small islands in 
the Caribbean and in the Pacific to the control of the US. The accession of the Philippines involved a payment of $20 million USD to Spain. These 
colonies then become US possessions.   
16 Although the Puerto Rican–Spanish peso (PRSP) was the formal currency between 1811 and 1909, in 1902 the USD was circulated in PR. The PRSP 
was totally eliminated, hence resulting in a dollarised economy. Though of equal international value, in PR each PRSP was declared to be worth only 
$0.60 USD after 1902 (Dennis, 2015).   
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Puerto Rican ‘hacendados’.17 A republican form18 of government was formally 
established by reforming the previous colonial institutions. These were not 
significantly19 different from the previous structures under Spanish rule. However, the 
Foraker Act was not only a political document but also a powerful economic 
instrument. Consequently, in 1901 the first legal case was presented under the 
consideration of the US Supreme Court. It established the first jurisprudence, defining 
PR as ‘foreign to the US in a domestic sense’,20 because the island was neither a state 
nor a republic (Duany, 2009). 
 
The first decade after the US invasion was marked by a deadly hurricane, earthquakes 
and a tsunami, dramatically damaging the territory’s economy and its society. The 
Puerto Rican agricultural plantations and a substantial portion of the infrastructure 
were devastated, and consequently hundreds of disrupted labourers migrated. 
Furthermore, PR’s most famous and lucrative products on the European markets were 
suddenly not able to be competitive because of the new tariffs imposed on trade with 
non-European partners. For instance, Dietz (1989) reports that, in the Spanish period, 
the tariff on PR’s tobacco was around 20 cents per pound; however, with the US 
control, it was significantly increased to 5 dollars (USD). Besides that, PR’s products 
were not suitable for the US consumers’ palate, which preferred other flavours 
(Bernabe, 1996). Farmers were forced to borrow from US banks at usurious rates and 
many lost their land to foreclosure (Dennis, 2015). Consequently, the land in use was 
managed on behalf of absentee owners. Eventually, the majority of the biggest 
haciendas and factories in the colony were controlled by US corporations. The once-
diversified island harvest (coffee, tobacco, sugar, fruits, etc.) was turned into a one-
crop (sugar)-dependent economy. Once the monoculture system was established, the 
imports from the US increased dramatically. The native entrepreneurial class, 
although small but becoming stronger during the Spanish time, was broken before it 
had properly developed. In addition, from the political stance, PR’s elected 
Commissioner to Washington was not allowed to participate in the US Congress. The 
                                                          
17
 Wealthy Criollos were associated with haciendas’ owners; vast areas of land were devoted to agriculture (polyculture or multiple crop), leather 
and mining production for exportation to the European and American markets (Dennis, 2015).  
18
 The form of government in which the power is divided among three branches: the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial.  
19 It is necessary to highlight that, during the last decade of the Spanish rule, the right to vote was more inclusive than that in the US; thus, this was a 
setback. Similarly, many differences should be highlighted if this new scenario is contrasted with the Carta Autonómica.  
20 US Supreme Court, Insular Cases, Downes v. Bidwell (1901). 
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Commissioner was only allowed to communicate PR’s needs through the President; 
thus, the future of PR was in the hands of the US Congress but had no voice.  
 
Internationally, the people of PR were no longer citizens of Spain or its colonies. PR’s 
citizenship was not recognised, but they were also not US citizens, so the native 
population was strictly confined to the island without the right to travel legally (Dietz, 
1989). As a result, in 1914 the recreated21 House of Representatives of PR, in a 
unanimous vote, demanded independence from the US.  
 
To appease the islanders’ wish for independence, around the time of the historical 
event of the First World War (WWI), the US Federal Government agreed to amend the 
legislation concerning PR and to incorporate some representativeness proposals. As a 
result, the US Congress replaced the Foraker legal framework by the Jones–Shafroth 
Act of 1917 (Jones Act), conceding US citizenship to PR’s residents. Therefore, Puerto 
Ricans could join the US military corps and could trade freely on the US market or 
migrate to the United States. 
 
Although between 1917 and 1930s the Jones Acts were subject to some confusive 
versions22 the framework facilitates the US economic control over PR to this day. 
Various authors (Rivera, 2007; Dietz, 1989) agree to classify the Jones Act statements 
into ‘seven judicial pillars’: 1. in any international trade agreement, PR is represented 
by the US only; 2. tariffs on trade are under the control of the US Federal Government; 
3. the US Customs ruled to guarantee the first two points and free interstate 
commerce between PR and all the US states; 4. although foreign products pay the 
tariff taxes in PR, the fees are decided by the US Federal Government; 5. the USD is 
the only official currency; 6. PR’s autonomous fiscal system and its citizens are 
excluded from paying federal taxes; and 7. the US Cabotage Act. Pantojas-García 
(1990) adds one more point by referring to the 500 Acres Act, which limits the area 
under the control of companies.   
 
  
                                                          
21 Under the Spanish rule, the people of PR were represented by a similar institution.  
22 During that period the US Congress approved, at least, three different laws nominated Jones Act, the one related to Cabotage is the one written 
by Wesley Jones, as an amendment of the Maritime Marchant Act, 1930.  
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As mentioned above, similar to the situation during the decades as a Spanish colony, 
an ‘easy pass to trade system’ between PR and US would be implemented. The US 
Customs would guarantee pillars two and four besides free interstate commerce 
between PR and all the US states. Nevertheless, unlike the concessions of the Carta 
Autonómica, PR would be represented internationally by the US Federal Government 
only. In addition, all trade between PR and the US would be transported by US-flag 
vessels. Arguably, the Jones Act ‘pillars’ do not seem to be dramatically different from 
those under the Spanish rule. However, the scenarios would change over the years.  
 
In 1922 the US Supreme Court jurisprudence23 established the non-incorporated 
territory theory. It determined that not all the rights in the US Constitution are 
applicable to PR because it is not part of the US, as the other federal members are, but 
a US possession. Therefore, ‘Puerto Rico belongs to but is not part of’ the United 
States, which means, according to Pantojas-García (2005), ‘foreign in a domestic 
sense’. Thus, in accordance with the US Constitution, the right to vote to elect a 
‘proper’ US Congress representative and/or the US President is only applicable to 
those authorised citizens who live in a member state of the US Federal Government 
(Rivera, 2007). In other words, according to González (2015, see Goodman, 2015), ‘the 
Supreme Court said that the US Constitution only applied in PR those portions that 
Congress decided, deemed necessary to apply’. Therefore, major decisions about the 
territory should be made by the US Congress and not by the elected officials of PR 
(González, 2015). However, curiously, over the years PR’s land24 was increasingly 
controlled by the US Military Corps (later in the hands of the Pentagon) (Dennis, 
2015).  
 
Pantojas-García (1990) states that, during the Great Depression (1930s), the 
expansion of the US colonial apparatus in PR was designed to maintain control. The 
territory was represented in the US House of Representatives by a non-voting 
representative who was democratically elected by the Puerto Ricans every four years. 
                                                          
23 In the US Supreme Court decision in the case of Balzac versus Porto Rico, 258 US 298, it is argued that ‘locality was what determined which 
constitutional rights were bestowed upon individuals, not their individual status as citizens’. 
24 Dennis (2015) reported that in 1930 around 13% of the whole land of PR was registered as the property of the US military forces. Eight US military 
bases had control over the island, which was particularly striking; one of them was a nuclear site or tracking station. Until 2000 PR was one of the 
most important strategic settlements in the world for the US Navy. 
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New political alliances gave way to different ideas and new parties,25 the PPD 
(Democratic Popular Party) being the most prominent. PR’s House of Representatives 
was well established and its projects generating some actions, but the Executive and 
Judicial government branches were still appointed by the US President.  
 
Capitalism, as the main source of investment, reinforces the US domination. According 
to Pantojas-García (1990), the model systematically increased dependency on the 
metropolis, enlarging its control through industrialisation, planning and social 
distribution. He suggests that this process differed greatly from that in many Latin 
American countries. While PR’s development model was for the benefit of and led by 
foreign investment, in Chile and Brazil, for instance, investment and industrialisation 
came mainly from the local bourgeoisie (p.25). 
  
In the 1940s and the 1950s institutionalisation led to PR’s development. The historical 
alliance between the new US governor in PR (Dr Rexford Tugwell) and the new 
majority elected under the PPD was a new beginning. Productive enterprises, public 
utilities, planning and statistical structures were created to govern and to provide 
social welfare (Catalá, 2013). At the end of the decade, the initial institutionalisation 
approach to transform the economy was slightly transformed into 
‘developmentalism’. PR’s industrialisation after the US invasion was initiated in the 
late 1940s. The experimental model, with some association with the Marshall Plan, 
was formulated between the USA and the new PR Government in a post-world war 
context but extended until the Cold War period.26 ‘Operation Bootstrap’27 (Operación 
Manos a la Obra), which was developed in this decade, turned PR into an export-
processing zone (export promotion to lead industrialisation), and it is thought that it 
was the first nation in the capitalist periphery to adopt this kind of development 
strategy (Dietz, 1989). Following PR’s experience, similar export-promotion strategies 
were adopted in Taiwan and Mexico (Pantojas-García, 1990). 
 
Although Dietz (2003) divides the operation into three stages, the whole programme 
was based on some local and/or federal corporate tax exemptions to the benefit of 
                                                          
25
 In 1938 by dissidents from the Puerto Rican Liberal Party and the Unionist Party, was formed the Democratic Popular Party (PPD in Spanish – 
Partido Popular Democrático) with a centre-left ideological view.  
26 According to some authors, this was extended until 2006 (Irizarry-Mora, 2011). 
27 It was PR’s creation but based on section 931 of the US Federal Tax Code created during the Great Depression in favour of US corporations.  
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foreign direct investment, free access to the US market and other supportive 
arrangements28 that were highly attractive to industrial companies. The target point 
of the industrial plan was the US market although it attracted foreign capital from 
across the globe (Vélez-Pizarro, 2011). To transform the territory’s poor living 
conditions, this strategy was designed to make a rapid change based on 
manufacturing and high-tech industrialisation as a model for the whole of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Bosworth & Collins, 2006). Indubitably, the ‘Operation 
Bootstrap’ industrialisation and modernisation plan diversified the economy and 
transformed the social framework of PR (Pantojas-García, 2014; Catalá, 2013; Irizarry-
Mora, 2011). Since then the local governments have considered the native agrifood 
sector as a marginal and less productive segment of PR’s economy.    
 
‘Operation Bootstrap’ relied on confidence in the permanence of an external policy in 
the hands of the US Congress. Apparently, it was thought that the dynamic and 
hegemonic US economy would not be affected by the rest of the globe or, if it 
changed, the US would at least preserve the legislation benefiting Puerto Rican–US 
citizens. In addition to the risk of elaborating an economic strategy on the basis of an 
external policy that was not controlled locally, the initiative did not put much effort 
into transferring the knowledge of those multinational industrial skills to the local 
producers. Consequently, whilst the economic and social developments were 
nominally led by Puerto Ricans and for Puerto Ricans, in practice they were more for 
the benefit of foreign rather than locally owned businesses. The eventual crack in PR’s 
strategy was due to two factors: the failure to encourage innovation and the limited 
knowledge transfer to the native firms to promote vertical and horizontal integration 
(Pantoja-García, 2014; Dietz, 2003). These two would catapult the native wealth, the 
local entrepreneurship empowerment and expose PR’s native companies to global 
linkages. 
 
2.1.3 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
Supported by the last two US-appointed governors in PR, in 1947 the US agreed to 
pass Law 600 (P.L. 80–362) to authorise, among others, the Puerto Rican right to elect 
                                                          
28 The US-flagged shipping is considered to be one of them.  
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its Government29 through general democratic elections and be ruled by its own 
Constitution (Rivera, 2007). In 1948 the first Puerto Rican Governor was elected 
democratically.  
 
PR’s Constitution was an advanced framework for its time and was massively 
approved by the people of PR in a general referendum. The US Congress unilaterally 
decided to eliminate various sections30 and promulgate a new version in which a silent 
‘ceteris paribus’ rules the political relationship between PR and the US. However, as a 
condition for the approval of the US Congress (Law 82–447), the Constitution would 
be under the Federal Relationship Act, which is tied to the Jones Act and the Foraker 
Act31 (Ortega & D’Agati, 2012). Since 1952 the new constitution of the Commonwealth 
of PR (in Spanish: Estado Libre Asociado, which means Free Associated State) has ruled 
the structures of government and society. Commonwealth was the political name 
given to PR in a unique form of status.32 For instance, technically Virginia, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Kentucky are commonwealths, but they have full 
membership of the Federal Government; thus, their state classification gives their US 
citizens the right to vote and have representatives in the US Congress. From a 
constitutional perspective, PR is still an unincorporated territory of the US; hence, its 
laws are submitted to the US Constitution. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the current relationship between PR and the US is a ‘suzerainty, determined by the US 
Congress’ (Rivera, 2007:p.49).  
 
 With independence the free market would disappear. With the 
statehood the federal tax collector would appear. But the premise was 
that, aside from independence or statehood, there was only the 
indignity of colonialism. Would you choose to eat your bread in shame 
or proclaim your dignity in hunger? (J. Luis A. Muñoz-Marín, 1953–54)33 
 
                                                          
29 
From early in the 1900s, all PR’s parties demanded the right for Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor and rule their destiny democratically. 
The legislative history recognises Law 600 as reaffirmation by the US Congress of the right of self-government of the people of PR. 
30
 In the original form approved in the referendum, the twentieth section of the Chapter of Puerto Rican Rights was eliminated by the US (González, 
2011). However, it is said that the inclusion of Chapter VI, section 8, in which PR’s Constitution says that ‘the general-obligation bonds must be 
repaid even before government workers receive their salaries and/or public services’, was originally proposed by the US through some of the 
Constitutional Assembly members. 
31
 From the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Chapter 7, Section 3.  
32 The US Supreme Court recognised that PR is an autonomous political entity and sovereign over matters not ruled by the US Constitution. 
However, in 2005, a US President’s Task Force on the PR’s Status found that by law PR is a US territory. In 2016, the US Supreme Court declares that 
PR is subject to the US Congress’ plenary powers under the territorial clause (Case PR vs. Sanchez Valle).  
33  Regarded as the ‘Father of Modern Puerto Rico’ and the ‘Architect of the Commonwealth’, in 1948 he was the first democratically elected 
Governor of PR. The quote was taken from Vélez-Rodríguez (2014:p. 154). 
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Interestingly, during the first 20 years of its creation, the Government of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico conducted an international exterior policy. The team of 
PR, named by the US authorities ‘our Latin American-Left-Democratic front’, 
developed collaboration agreements34 with more than 50 countries or territories, 
except for the USSR dominions (Vélez-Rodríguez, 2014). In the Caribbean between 
1962 and 1967, PR’s Government was instrumental in the eventual organisation of the 
‘little eight’ (British Virgin Islands). In this period an intense decolonisation dialogue 
was unfolding between Britain and its far-flung Eastern Caribbean possessions at the 
height of the Cold War (Cox-Alomar, 2009). Similarly, technical assistance and cultural 
and university grants to study in PR were successfully promoted globally. 
Furthermore, a strategy to promote foreign direct investments by invitation was 
initiated. Besides, political asylum was offered to various academics, intellectuals and 
politicians from the Latin globe particularly, as well as other political interventions 
(Vélez-Rodríguez, 2014).  
 
2.1.4 Bipartisanship 
In 1968 a new political party cut off the hegemonic structure of the PPD. Founded a 
year afterwards, the New Progressive Party (in Spanish: Partido Nuevo Progresista, 
PNP) advocated that PR should become an incorporated state of the US. It promoted 
the belief that statehood (total integration) would represent better economic 
development for the territory. In the elections of 1968, due to an internal division in 
the PPD after 14 years of strong hegemonic administration, a PNP Government was 
elected and implemented pro-US developmentalism to activate the territory’s 
economy (Dietz, 1989). Markets and the trade infrastructure were developed to trade 
primarily with the US, because the main target of development was to imitate it. Since 
then, the Pro-Statehood political party has been alternating governance with the PPD. 
Although differing in beliefs, forms and approaches, both parties promote the idea 
that the economic development of PR should be associated with the US. PR’s parties 
are not clearly organised along liberal–conservative lines having mixed coalitions. Both 
are supporting government economic intervention and reducing transparency in 
public accountability (Di Salvo, 2015).  
                                                          
34 The US President Truman’s Four Point Programme was basically instrumented from Puerto Rico with the hidden support of the US intelligence 
and the US Navy. 
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As an ideology, the Pro-Statehood party promotes the complete integration of PR with 
the US as a model of economic development rather than an organisational political 
form (Pierluisi, 2015). Several authors concur that that political strategy as a possibility 
for PR’s economy is based on a perception of sharing wealth and development rather 
than analyses well supported by academic research (Otero-Figueroa, 2014). Arguably, 
applying the current US federal framework to PR could signify an increase in its 
economic inequality, particularly due to the federal tax laws and other restrictions to 
trade (Segarra-Alméstica et al, 2014). For instance, it is believed that LDCs cannot 
afford or sustain the developed states’ inefficiencies if they want to achieve 
sustainable growth, a substantial capacity to change and flexibility to trade (Stiglitz, 
2010). For others, though, the example of Hawaii is enough evidence to support the 
statehood’s ideology for PR (Romero-Barceló, 2009; Badillo, 2005). Nevertheless, as a 
piece of a large federal government structure in which each of the states has to 
produce according to its resources but in the same framework designed for all, the 
particularities of PR’s development would be more asymmetric than those in the 
majority of the states (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012; Maingot, 2005). 
 
 2.1.5 US Congress’s interventions 
The ‘one-size-fits-all policy’ applied by the US Congress to PR’s economy has signified 
serious challenges, forcing the territory to copy its capitalist system (Bernabe, 2015). 
For instance, in the early 1970s, section 931 of the Federal Tax Reform was 
substituted by a new one, titled ‘Possessions Corporation Section’ and commonly 
known as section 936. It was a framework fitted to the benefit of US corporations in 
which PR had for mile square the highest concentration in all the US territories 
(Rivera, 2007). The new section amends the US Internal Revenue Tax Code to allow 
domestic offshore companies to operate tax free (by rebate) in the US territories, 
which in the case of firms in PR would mean a triple tax exemption: national (PR), base 
state (state of origin of the company) and federal. This ‘safety net’ for the US 
petrodollar crisis was approved by the US Congress as a ‘symbiotic’ benefit for the US 
offshore corporations. The strategy promoted production and growth of PR’s 
economy through tax exemption and credits for investments, increasing the average 
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salaries, infrastructure investments and businesses’ diversification (Vega-Rosado, 
2011; Bosworth & Collins, 2006).  
 
Annually, companies under section 936 reported high exports and thousands of 
millions of dollars in profits and tax credits. As a result of the increase in the 
containerisation rate provoked by trading, PR’s ports were rented and modernised for 
handling finished goods. Dry-bulk material became less important. Certainly, the Jones 
Act (cabotage) and the concentration of US firms in PR were enough reasons to hire 
only US firms. However the evidence confirms that at that time, due to the lack of 
service providers in the hemisphere, the options available for managing containers 
were US maritime companies (Guerrero & Rodrigue, 2012). 
 
Whilst PR’s external policy was diminishing, in the late 1980s, the governments of PR 
and Japan initiated negotiations. The Japanese Government’s plan was to convert PR 
into a hub centre for car parts and technical specialised support for the hemisphere. 
Nevertheless, the unfortunate public disapproval of staff of the US State Department 
in Washington provoked the Japanese to withdraw and the negotiations were 
cancelled. 
 
In the last decades, perhaps the most notorious example of the US’s particular 
intervention in PR’s economy occurred in 1996, when the Congress amended the 
federal tax breaks for domestic manufacturing firms. Section 936, the vertebral 
column of the Commonwealth’s economy that in the 1970s substituted section 931, 
would be eliminated. Its effects on PR’s industrial policy would be dramatic for the 
manufacturing sector (47%) of its economy (Dietz, 2003). Supported by important 
members of the PNP,35 who theorised that section 936 was an impediment to 
statehood, the US Congress, without considering PR’s scenario, finally decided in the 
federal interest (Rivera, 2007). Although the US Congress conceded a 10-year 
transition period, its effects began before the middle of the phasing-out term of the 
936 Act. For instance, prior to the changes – only – $38 billion /year (2004) for 
chemical exports and $19 billion /year for imports were reported. After the 
                                                          
35
 In a letter of 15 December 1995, the Governor of PR and president of the PNP, Dr Pedro Roselló, says to the President of the Internal Revenue and 
Taxation Committee of the House of Representative at the US Congress: ‘With this respect to this entire subject, however, I wish to emphasize that 
we do not advocate the retention of Section 936 as such. Instead (in a modification of the plan that I submitted to you in September), we strongly 
urge that the wage-credit incentive be preserved through the creation of a new section 45(c) of the Internal Revenue Code’ (Jiménez-Juarbe, 2015). 
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amendment, over 40 months, the sector incomes were reduced by 9% ($3.6 billion for 
exports). At that time, more than 250,00036 Puerto Ricans were considered to be 
redundant by the multinational industries (Bosworth & Collins, 2006). 
 
The response of the PR Government to mitigate the impact of this action was to 
promote development – as a big-city island – through the private sector. The private 
construction sector was actively promoted, the national planning-zone frameworks 
relaxed and urban sprawl increased. A total of 14% of PR’s economy was supported by 
the construction sector and the agricultural sector was decimated (González & 
Gregory, 2014). Eventually, this would create a structural gap in the government 
budget (García-Pelatti, 2014c).  
 
In 2006 the governments’ efforts to mitigate the effects of the 936 phase out were 
insufficient. After the amendment the US companies in PR would be treated for 
corporation tax purposes as if they were in a foreign jurisdiction. PR was no longer the 
corporate paradise in the US jurisdiction; as a result, a corporate migration abroad 
began (Pantojas-García, 2014). During that turmoil a divided government was 
democratically elected. The Executive was ruled by the PPD party and the Legislative 
and the US Commissioner were led by the PNP. Consequently, the public sector was 
practically inoperative. 
 
Although NAFTA began in 1994 and since 2006 more trade agreements have been 
signed between the US and other countries across the hemisphere, the participation 
of PR in those events has been limited. As an inactive spectator, PR’s economy has 
been negatively affected by the US FTA (Segarra-Alméstica et al, 2014). It was 
established by the Jones Act that the US represents PR at the international level. For 
decades this political framework has been unchanged whilst the world has been 
changing rapidly, and PR’s preferential access to the US markets is now shared with 
sovereign countries with flexible regulations and lower production costs. To mitigate 
the decrease in PR’s competitiveness, the Government opened commercial offices in 
some strategic places in South America. However, PR may engage in cultural 
exchanges with Peru, for instance, but it cannot negotiate with it as if it were an 
                                                          
36 It is estimated that around 20% of them had a postgraduate degree.  
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independent nation. In a memo to the Belize Government, the US State Secretary – 
Mr Collin Powell (2003) – reported that:  
 
 The Department is aware that Puerto Rican government officials have 
approached a number of countries seeking treatment normally only 
accorded to a sovereign state. The department reiterates that the US 
federal government is responsible for Puerto Rico’s foreign affairs. 
 
 
The US’s great housing bubble hit PR’s market before a recovery from the effects of 
936’s phase out (Baily & Elliott, 2009). Due to the closing of multinationals, thousands 
of people migrated to US and an excess of housing offers reduced the cash available at 
banks and thus the bank consolidation began. Once the Great Recession squeezed 
global credit after the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, the PR market received another 
blow. As a result, the Government of PR ruled by the PNP decided to implement an 
austerity strategy to reduce the deficit. Between 2009 and 2010,37 13,000 public 
servants were laid off, the property tax was raised and the prices for utilities (such as 
water and electricity) increased. The high price for oil raised the cost of all its 
derivates, especially the cost of energy in a public system that was highly dependent 
on petroleum.  
 
To compensate for the lack of federal interest, the Government of PR borrowed 
heavily (Pierluisi, 2015). Between 2000 and 2013, PR’s public debt grew at a 
compound annual rate of 7.6%, while the GNP grew at a nominal rate of 3.5% 
(Marxuach, 2013). A situation in which the national debt ($70 billion) was around 97% 
of GNP, the government’s budget deficit was around $900 million and a structural 
deficit was estimated to be $3 billion demanded multiple actions to restore PR’s 
competitiveness (Krueger et al, 2015). However, for others, the entire problem was 
provoked by the bipartisanship (national and federal) polarisation in which the parties 
are opposed one against the other rather than just a structural issue (Gutiérrez, 2015; 
Hohmann & Viebeck, 2015).  
 
Late in 2012 the large deficit in the public budget caused PR’s ‘general obligation 
bonds’ to be downgraded. In March 2013, after three months of the new government, 
                                                          
37 In around 14 months.  
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those bonds were downgraded again. The facts were complex: an actuarial deficit in 
the three biggest national pension systems was estimated at almost $35 billion, the 
aging and reduction in the population plus the national public debt are the last factors 
that added to PR’s crisis (Marxuach, 2013). In a slightly similar way to the PNP 
strategy, the new PPD Government implemented its formula to deal with the 
problem. It raised taxes on sales and services, made cuts in public pensions and health 
benefits, raised the retirement age, consolidated public agencies, froze public 
employment and closed schools. However, less than 24 months after the plan’s 
implementation, three grading rate companies downgraded PR’s credit rate 
dramatically, affecting its capacity for loan payments (García-Pelatti, 2014c).  
 
It seems that the neoliberal recipe for PR’s depressed economy created the perfect 
storm (Bernabe, 2015). PR’s current scenario could be summarised as follows: a 
reduction in public investment in a contracting economy, a reduction in public 
investment, employment and employees, more taxes for all sectors, a petro-crisis, 
limited capacity for international agreements, no right to bankruptcy or aid from the 
IMF, a high level of national debt, limited foreign direct investment, a high mobility – 
brain drain38 – and a lack of interest from the US Congress in helping to find the 
solution. Besides a weak business environment for the native producers, there is a 
lack of competitiveness, in which the majority of non-agribusiness productive sectors 
are in foreign investors’ hands (Cátala, 2015). Furthermore, it is reported that, in the 
last years, more than 400 businesses have filed for bankruptcy annually and there has 
been a reduction of 17% in commercial industrial loans and a decrease of 6% in 
personal loans (Villamil, 2013). 
 
Other interventions 
Several referendums were held from 1967 to 2012. Although Puerto Ricans regularly 
rejected both political options – independence and statehood – historically the 
interest in the latter has been raised. Blanco-Peck (2009) suggests the existence of a 
correlation between US transfers to PR and Pro-Statehood’s popularity. In the last 
referendum, 54% of voters expressed disagreement with the actual political status, 
                                                          
38 In the last 9 years, approximately 400,000 Puerto Ricans have migrated, the vast majority to the US and many to Central Florida (Dennis, 2015), 
and around 14,000 businesses have closed. 
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but this does not mean an interest in cutting the relationship with the US or a claim 
for assimilation (The Economist, 2013). Decades of political dependency perception – 
highly supported by the US and PR’s two major political parties – have created 
psychologically pro-US and conservative voters (Blanco-Peck, 2009). Gradually, Puerto 
Ricans have adopted the materialistic consumer patterns of the US, and socialmedia 
through technology seems to be helping the new form of assimilation, which is much 
faster than in prior decades.  
 
Although different US presidents have voiced their personal opinions about the status 
of PR, the standard stance is ‘let the Puerto Ricans decide’. Besides, to counter 
accusations of colonialism presented at the international level, the US has stated that 
PR is a domestic subject and has fared well economically compared with its Latin 
neighbours (Clar, 2013). As a result, some argue that, to reach a consensus on a 
solution among Puerto Ricans, a unilateral action should be imposed by the US to 
force a decision (Colón De Armas, 2015). Others argue that PR is a victim of seemingly 
uncontrollable global economics; hence, the country is in the wrong place at the 
wrong time (Krugman, 2015). For others still it is the result of years of imperialist neo-
liberal policies that did not fit the territory (Stiglitz & Medish, 2015). Consequently, 
the issue seems to be more about politics than about debt (Paul, 2015). Krueger et al 
(2015:p.1) assert that the territory is ‘now virtually shut off from normal [credit] 
market access’. Meanwhile, PR has begun a new phase, defaulting on its bond 
payments for the first time since it became associated with the US 117 years ago. It 
addition, it is believed that more studies should be conducted to analyse the 
relationship between leadership styles, entrepreneurial orientation and innovation 
and their impact on native businesses’ competitiveness and performance in PR.  
 
 
2.2.0 Puerto Rico’s economic dimension and its competitiveness 
In 1976 the Nobel laureate economist James Tobin, who was commissioned by the 
Government of PR to study its fiscal policy, concluded that, although economically 
beneficial for both sides, the restrictiveness of the political relations between PR and 
the US should be recognised (Estudios Técnicos, Inc., 2014). Three decades later, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Comisión 
40 
 
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), 2004) pointed out that the 
economic and social policies imposed by the US on PR’s economy had three negative 
impacts: 1) an indirect impact from the effects on imports and migration; 2) a direct 
impact through the frameworks required to receive US grants; and 3) a mixed impact 
from failure of the US monetary, fiscal and exterior policies to consider PR’s scenario. 
Therefore, the level of integration between PR and the US could be considered to be 
the root of the problem.  
 
As a nation, PR has autonomous taxation and control over its internal regulatory 
system, except when it intervenes in US interstate commerce or international trade 
(Table 2). Although PR is not a member of the US federal union, the Commonwealth 
has been ‘represented’ by it since 1900 in all international trade issues (Irizarry-Mora, 
2011). Accordingly, the majority of the Federal Laws are applicable there. For instance, 
maritime laws, military service, national security, customs and border policies, 
nationality, currency and some other topics are controlled by the US Federal 
Government. While not in disagreement with Porter (1990), who states that the 
‘competitive advantage of a country is not inherited but is created’, both could be 
applied in this case. Therefore, US trade policies to develop the market are designed 
for natural conditions that are considerably different from those of Borinquen39 and 
thus may affect its competitiveness and efficiency in trade.  
 
The World Economic Forum (2012, 2013b and 2014) shows that PR’s competitiveness 
ranking allows it to be the only Hispanic territory in the list of the top 30, the only 
Latin American nation in that group and the fourth in the top five SIDSs; these data are 
debatable by specific indicators. As a result, in the literature some argue that these 
methodologies are not appropriate for comparing SIDSs’ economies with big 
economies (Castro-González et al, 2013). According to Lara (2014), the methodology 
used for this international organisation is based more on entrepreneurs’ perception 
than on empirical facts. Indeed, economic growth and competitiveness should be 
considered not synonymous but complementary. 
 
  
                                                          
39 Puerto Rico’s native (original) name, before the Spanish colonisation in 1492.  
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Table 2: Basic facts about PR’s economy 
 
M=millions; B=billions; pc=per Capita. Extracted from: Instituto de Estadísticas de PR (2013); Junta de 
Planificación de PR (2013); Irizarry-Mora (2011). Relation of National Debt vs PR’s GNP.  % GNP vs GDP.  
 
 
Pantojas-García (2014) suggests that the original competitive advantages40 of the 
Commonwealth lose their value when the hidden economic strategy is based on 
exemptions rather than competitiveness in a global era. For some, the strategy should 
be focused on increasing PR’s competitiveness through productivity and reducing the 
socio-economic disparity, but for others attention to education and a more globalised 
view on business are necessary (Balmaceda, 2013). However, the following issues are 
frequently highlighted by Puerto Rican interviewees in WEF publications (2012—
2014): the high cost of energy, high bureaucracy and requirements for business, 
government favouritism towards certain groups and the cost of transportation in PR. 
Nothing is said about PR’s dependency on food imports, its food supply chain capacity 
or the linkage between native agrifood entrepreneurship and internal markets’ 
vulnerabilities or sustainability. These probably occur due to the fact that the concept 
of competitiveness is usually associated with exportation rather than other internal 
activities. Alternatively, at the academic level, it has been said that, whilst the 
agribusinesses may have potential, data available are among the most critical issues 
for its developing. Nevertheless, the lack of accurate economic data and their 
availability are issues that the territory has to solve (Krueger et al, 2015). 
 
2.2.1 Productivity 
Much of the private non-agribusiness sector relies on external capital (manufacturing 
and pharmaceutical industries) run by US companies and a tourism sector geared 
towards US citizens (Clar, 2013). The main macroeconomic indicators (Fig. 3) of PR’s 
economy are integrated with or highly related to the US economy, such as exports (%), 
                                                          
40 The literature on PR frequently identifies five competitive advantages resulting from its relationship with the US: a common currency, common 
defence, a common policy framework, the US federal tax exception and the PR’s bilingually trained society. 
Year Area km2 Population GDP 
(USD)
GDPpc  
(USD) GINI coef Life Ex. HDI Inflation Unemployment
Growth 
Rate Major Exp. Major Imp. 
2012 9,104 3.67 M 101.5 B 27,450 0.56 79.5 yrs 0.91 2.47% 14.7% 0.90% 90.7% to US 60% from US
Manufacturing
Finance & 
Insurance
Services Government Trade Transportation
Construction 
& Mining
Agriculture
National 
Debt
GNP
46.4 19.6 12.5 8.5 8 2.7 1.7 0.6 89% -30%
% GDP by 
Sectors
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direct investment, transfer payments, the interest rate, the minimum wage and work 
visas (Aponte, 2005). 
 
The public inefficiency and the bureaucratic regulatory structures demand re-
engineering. It is said that they are not flexible enough to adapt to a pluralistic, 
politically polarised, highly critical and well informed society in a post-industrial 
economy (Pantojas-García, 2014; Santana-Rabell, 1994). For some the current crisis is 
a result of the lack of public or private investments and the simultaneous reduction in 
public expenses (Colón De Armas, 2015). For others the Commonwealth’s economy 
lacks the internal power to grow due to a combination of structural elements, internal 
factors and external shocks (Lawrence & Lara, 2006). Currently, PR’s economy has 
faced a sustained recession and is ranked 213 out of 216 in the real GDP growth rate 
(Indexmundi, 2015). According to the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico 
(2015), the inflation rate was recorded in July as minus 0.30% and on average —data 
from 2006 to 2015— as 2.58% (Estudios Técnicos, Inc., 2014), but the cumulative 
inflation rate was 15% (WG-FEGP, 2015). 
 
Figure 3: PR’s real GNI per capita vs. its GDP per capita since 2000           
    
Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
Whilst PR could be considered as a very open economy, the regular government 
strategy to attract investments is focused on the US market (Pantoja-García, 2014). 
Besides, the nation seems lack the funds to run its own Government and to invest in 
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native development; thus, it is continuously dependent on FDI41 (Irizarry-Mora, 2011). 
The trade between PR and the US amounts to over $60 billion dollars annually, but 
approximately $15 billion are received from the US in grants and transfers.42 
Consequently, PR’s market could be categorised as an inward US-oriented economy, 
in which the government policy attempts to achieve development by stimulating the 
domestic (US) oriented industry but sacrificing the native import substitution 
industries. 
 
The Commonwealth framework for trade is designed to accomplish the US 
parameters; hence, over 70% of PR’s external trade is with the US market (Puerto Rico 
Institute of Statistics, 2014). PR’s production, although in a positive trade balance of 
between $12 and $19.8 billion (2012 and 2014, respectively), is in the hands of the 
foreign sector. A substantial percentage of its exports are pharmaceutical products, 
medicinal drugs and medical devices, the majority of which are produced by foreign 
companies in PR (Fig. 4). Arguably, as a result of the capital flight, a substantial portion 
of this wealth is not reinvested locally to promote private employment or to expand 
PR’s economy. According to Catalá (2015), PR’s foreign capital performance (profits, 
interest rates, etc.) is estimated to be $36,052.2 million (FY, 2014), of which around 
83% is profit outflows by direct investment. For instance, the drugstore sector is 
dominated by two US companies Walgreens and CVS, which literally control PR’s 
market, diminishing the native community’s drugstore system (Herrero, 2014). 
 
As in PR with ‘Operation Bootstrap’, US pharmaceutical firms have invested since the 
mid-1990s in two large offshore centres, also considered as small economies: Ireland 
and Singapore. These two countries ‒ well known for their efficient maritime 
transportation ‒ offer intellectual property rights protection, an adequate 
infrastructure, highly qualified (and English-speaking) workers and favourable 
corporate tax policies (Boring, 2012).  
                                                          
41 The estimation (in USD) of the FDI in PR’s economy has not been undertaken by the PR Planning Board or any other governmental  agency since 
1984. 
42
  More than 70% of the US transfers to PR’s economy are for salaries and marginal benefits, such as social security, veterans, medi-care and 
unemployment insurance, and rebates by the PR’s rum and coffee taxes in the US (Irizarry-Mora, 2011). Since 1917 the taxes on PR’s rum exported 
to the US have been rebated to PR. This measure benefited the rum production in US territories. Due to the fact that PR was the biggest rum 
producer (particularly Bacardí, Serrallés, Captain Morgan (now in USVI) and other distilleries), the rebate became an important percentage of its 
income. For instance, in 2010 the rebate was $434.1 MM (USD). However, in 2007 the law was amended and the USVI initiated a strategy to attract 
rum producers to its territories. These actions affected PR’s income, reducing the US rum rebate by $130 MM (USD) per year (Banco Interamericano 
de Desarrollo, 2013). In 2012 the US rum rebate to PR was $224 (USD). Further US federal transfers, although they may vary, are estimated to make 
up 14% of PR’s public annual budget. Principally, these funds are used for specific activities, such as infrastructure and municipalities. In the last 
decade, the average of US grants to the Commonwealth of PR was $3.4 BB (USD) per year (Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico, 2015).   
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Figure 4: Puerto Rico’s exports 
 
Source: Puerto Rico Institute of Statistics, data of 2014. 
 
 
PR’s competitiveness between the 1960s and the 1980s showed high levels of 
productivity and employment, boosting its GDP with the transformation of its 
economy from agriculture-based production to manufacturing (Dietz, 2003). Since the 
mid-1970s, its economy has developed more in parallel with the US economy, but it 
was in 2006 that PR’s downturn started and it has been much steeper and prolonged 
than that in the US (Fig. 5). From a historical view of PR’s average annual growth rate, 
in comparison with some LDCs, it is notable that, since the oil price recession in the 
1970s, the average percentage of the annual (in decades) growth rate has been falling 
(Table 3). However, in an income per capita analysis (in PPP), PR shows twice the 
income of some contrasting countries, but this is not the case if it is compared with 
states of the US. Thus, PR’s economy as a case study could be evaluated as a US 
territory, as a graduated LDC, as a high-income LDC or as a developed country but in 
all these cases as an SIDS that is highly influenced by an external large economy 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2014). 
 
PR’s public sector is commonly perceived as huge and paternalistic, but, according to 
Catalá (2015), the real problem is that the native entrepreneurs are feeble and highly 
dependent on the Government; thus, there is a limited level of self-innovation mixed 
with a very conservative vision to avoid risks. However, it is believed that, in addition 
to the capacities to trade and the national entrepreneurs’ ability to promote local 
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business, it is necessary to consider secondary factors that affect the level of new 
businesses’ activities or at least their capacity to produce sustainably.  
 
Figure 5: Real GNP growth in PR and the US 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2014:p. 5). 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of the average annual (%) growth rate of real GDPpc and income 
(PPPpc in USD) between 1955 and 2009 
 
Note: In the 1980s and 90s Arkansas ($7,586, $16,817) and Mississippi ($7,076, $16,497) were the 
states of the US with the lowest PPPpc. Source: Dietz (2003:pp.18 & 20) and World Bank (2014). In 2009 
Puerto Ricans had a median household income estimated to be $18,314 (Hernández et al, 2014) and in 
Mississippi it was $36,646. 
 
PR’s economy has been in contraction since 2006, and this is verifiable by the 
reductions in the country’s population, employees, house construction and hence 
gross national product (Fig. 6). According to Villamil (in García-Pelatti, 2014a), due to 
the new global reality, in which the US is losing its capacity of influence over the global 
economy, PR’s politically limited scenario for trade may increase its domestic 
inequalities. Efforts towards the integration of regional economies may be the way 
forward. However, to accomplish this, a more complex and selective supply chain 
FY
1955—1959 8.7 677$                2.5 232$                4.6 718$                6.0 455$                
1960—1969 10.1 2,145$            9.8 629$                6.4 1,481$            5.8 915$                
1970—1979 8.9 5,026$            14.1 2,358$            12.4 4,757$            13.8 3,332$            
1980—1989 7.7 9,833$            13.3 7,239$            3.1 6,281$            4.0 4,870$            
1990—1999 2.6 13,747$          5.7 12,519$          1.7 7,826$            0.3 7,449$            
2000—2009 0.8 20,850$          4.7 23,658$          1.8 11,869$          3.4 10,388$          
Puerto Rico South Korea Mexico Brazil
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system at the global level will be required. Therefore, in a global economy, PR should 
enhnace innovation, a high level of national competitiveness and entrepreneurship. 
 
Figure 6: PR’s gross national product – real percentage change (2007–2013) 
 
Extracted from: Junta de Planificación de PR (2013).  
 
‘Socio-cultural and political constraints’ may confine entrepreneurship and hence a 
country’s capacity to grow the national economy (Leibenstein, 1968). For example, the 
lack of global exposure of the native SMEs is an inconvenience because it limits the 
development of their competitiveness skills. Additionally, it is believed that, in the 
most dynamic economies in the global market, the national entrepreneurs’ 
innovations play a vital role (CITA). Nevertheless, in the case of PR, the whole system 
of the market, public policies, TV programmes and the educational curriculum seems 
to be aligned with the US structure and regularly focuses on the US framework for 
business. Consequently, a proper Puerto Rican entrepreneurial and innovative society 
is not yet well developed (De Hoyos-Ruperto & Figueroa-Medina, 2011). Pantoja-
García (2014) argues that, whilst Puerto Ricans are debating the political status and 
lobbying against themselves in the US Congress corridors, the rest of the less 
developed countries are taking the lead to produce efficiently and to facilitate trade. 
Indeed, the national pattern – Government and/or entrepreneurs43 – is to prefer the 
status quo rather than to incorporate different approaches or innovate (Catalá, 2015).  
 
Academic research related to PR’s economy, business environment, national 
competitiveness and market openness is scarce in the literature, in contrast to other 
                                                          
43 For instance, Pérez (2015) reports the recent issues with Uber’s Company pilot plan in PR and the local taxi’s drivers’ union. 
47 
 
SIDSs, such as Malta, Bahrain, and Singapore and two other small open economies 
such Ireland and Hong Kong. Curiously, at the international level, academic 
publications on PR are related more to highly technical discoveries in sciences than to 
its capacity to conduct business or attract businesses (Krueger et al, 2015). Although 
the PR Planning Board provides timely releases of the nation’s economic statistics, the 
methodologies used have not been updated following international guidelines, such 
as the System of National Accounts (SNA) (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011). This 
has resulted in measures that are difficult to compare with the estimates for the rest 
of the globe. For example, the World Bank and the World Economic Forum are 
practically the only global economic institutions that include some data on PR, but for 
some indicators the available data are insufficient or not provided. This means that, at 
the local level, PR is limited to collecting, producing and analysing information to be 
included in those global institutions’ statistics or there is a lack of interest in publishing 
it. However, it is possible that the level of interventions of the US institutions in PR 
may indirectly reduce the access to information of the local government.  
 
2.2.2. Population and socioeconomic disparity 
Various economic factors contributed to the trend for Puerto Ricans to leave the 
agricultural sector between the 1950s and the 1980s. For instance, in the urban areas, 
they had better access to public services, higher wages and more diverse job 
opportunities. Besides, the lower minimum salaries in farming and the ineligibility to 
receive transfer payments for food assistance and housing subsidies for workers 
making an income may have discouraged the availability of labourers in native 
agribusiness. Other factors, such as the perception and image of agriculture as 
undeveloped work, the tough conditions of the fieldwork and discouraging traditional 
(public and private) messages about working on farms, may have played a negative 
role too (González & Gregory, 2014).  
 
The Director of the Puerto Rico Statistics Institute, Dr Mario Marazzi, states that it is 
estimated that the cost of living in PR is around 13% higher than the average cost of 
living in the US. According to Marazzi, the cost of groceries in PR is around 23% higher 
than the average of these goods in the US. The average monthly cost for utilities in PR 
is $234.81, which is considerably higher than the overall US average of $159.21 
48 
 
(NUMBEO, 2015). On the other hand, despite similar conditions and regulations, the 
costs of medical services in PR are 45% lower than those in the US but much higher 
than in Canada, UK and Japan (Nuevo Día, 2014). During 2012 and 2013, the health 
sector accounted for around 12% of the GNP, which represents approximately $3,300 
per capita per year (Departamento de Salud, 2014). 
 
The Commonwealth’s population has fallen more in the last three years than in the 
whole first decade of the 2000s (Fig. 7). Projections suggest that the population will 
continue to fall by 1% a year, which is 10 times faster than in Japan (WEF, 2013b). The 
net population growth in 2013 was 7,000 people (Velázquez-Estrada, 2014). The level 
of international migration to PR is lower as a result of the application of the US 
immigration laws (Clar, 2013). Currently, it is estimated that there are more Puerto 
Ricans living on the US mainland than in the Commonwealth: around 5 million Puerto 
Ricans live on the US mainland and 3.6 million in the territory (Austin, 2015). In the 
last year,44 the net estimation45 of outmigration from PR to the US was 74,000 people. 
This amount is approximately 2% of the territory’s population. The profile of these 
outmigrants is estimated to have a mean age of 28.5 years and 35% are single and 
never married, 52% unemployed and 51% with post-secondary studies (Velázquez-
Estrada, 2014). 
 
Figure 7: PR’s population since 2000 in millions  
 
Source: Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (2015). 
                                                          
44 In this case the data period of the study was fiscal year (FY) 1 July to 30 June. 
45  The estimated data are between 5,800 and 6,300 Puerto Ricans per month. 
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The Department of Labour and Human Resources of PR (2013) estimates that around 
930,000 people that work in non-agricultural jobs, 76,000 of them in manufacturing. 
The rate of labour participation is around 40%, which is considerably lower than that 
in the US (68%). Ruiz (2014:p.106) argues that this rate, although related to public 
welfare aid, is more a problem of demand than a problem of supply, because in PR the 
employment generated by the private sector is limited and very specific. However, 
others suggest that high salaries46 and local labour regulations to the benefit of the 
employees are the core of the problem (Krueger et al, 2015). 
 
According to PR’s Department of Labour and Human Resources (2014), around 
169,000 people are unemployed, which is 6% less than for the same period in the 
previous year. The US Department of Commerce (2015) reports that 46.1% (1.3 
million) of the population of PR is living below the level of relative poverty (US 
parameters), a reduction of 3% in comparison with 2000 (Bishaw & Fontenot, 2014). 
This percentage is 30% more than the US federal average (Santiago, 2015). The vast 
majority of Puerto Ricans below the relative poverty level are receiving some public 
aid or are eligible to receive it (from the US, PR or both). It is estimated that in 2014 
38% of the whole population was receiving some public aid. Of the PAN47 participants, 
58% were female, 31.6% were less than 18 years old, 20% were (college or university) 
students, 9% were people with disabilities and 0.3% were homeless. Besides, it is 
estimated that 64% of those who live in relative poverty in PR have not completed 
secondary school (Fernández-Pabellón, 2014). Approximately 33% of PR’s population 
under the US parameter for relative poverty live in metropolitan cities, and the others 
are distributed between suburban towns and rural areas in the countryside.  
 
As an example of the relationship between education and salaries in PR, López-Alicea 
(2015) estimates that the average cumulative salary in 35 years of working was 
around $250,000 for a secondary-school diploma employee. In the case of an 
associate degree employee (a college titled, 2-year diploma), the average cumulative 
salary is estimated to be $540,000; for a non-high-technical bachelor degree (4-year 
university diploma) it would be around $800,000 and for a high-technical bachelor 
                                                          
46 Opposing this point, Dube and Zipperer (2015) suggest that the current minimum wage in PR is also less consequential than during the 1980s, 
because at that time around 44% of PR’s workers were affected by the minimum wage, but by 2010 this share had fallen to around a third. 
47 In Spanish this is ‘Programa de Asistencia Nutricional’, which in translation means Nutritional Assistance Programme.  
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degree (4–5-year diploma) the average estimated is $1,100,000. The average for 
master’s degrees and doctorates is $2,250,000 (López-Alicea, 2015).  
 
2.2.3 Education 
According to the World Bank (2014),48 the literacy rate in PR is 92%. However, Disdier 
et al (2012)49 posit that on average the rate is higher than 95% among participants 
between 18 and 54 years old. Apparently, big gaps exist between academia and the 
needs of ‘productive sectors of the industry’; thus, it is thought that more integration 
of both sectors could be beneficial for PR’s competitiveness (Ruiz, 2014; Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, 2012). At the university level, PR has 85 campuses 
distributed across the main island. The public sector includes 18 institutions and the 
private sector consists of 67 academic centres or campuses. In 2012 around 85% of 
the students at the university level received some public grants or aid to study (no 
loans).  
 
Business administration programmes are regularly provided in the majority of the 
universities in PR. Nevertheless, only one campus of the University of Puerto Rico 
(public) has a (small) programme50 specialising in agribusiness (bachelors and 
masters). In the year 2000, the Inter-American University (a private university) 
founded the first and only Competitiveness Institute in PR. In 2008 the Pontifical 
Catholic University of PR (private) founded the first and only bachelor degree 
programme in business with a major in maritime logistics. Currently, other 
programmes to study logistics or supply chains in business are not offered. Since 2001 
the local policy makers in the agricultural sector, have shown some concerns about 
the lack of a strong basis in administration and entrepreneurship among farmers.  
 
2.2.4 Infrastructure 
PR’s media include a free press, some of which are independent and others politically 
aligned. Newspapers (local, national and from the US mainland) are easily accessible, 
some in both official languages.51 Radio (over 80 stations) and television (over 20 free 
                                                          
48 At the international level, this is the last rate available. 
49
  The literacy rate is highly correlated with age. Disdier et al (2012) conduct research in PR with more than 6,000 participants. The group over 55 
years old shows the lowest level of literacy (87%). 
50 Annually fewer than 20 students are admitted to this programme.  
51 Spanish and English 
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channels) are easy to obtain. The system is regulated by the FCC (US Federal 
Communication Commission). Around 20 Internet service providers on the main island 
keep costs competitive, using diverse systems52 either wireless or landline. It is 
estimated that in 2014 86% of Puerto Ricans aged over 12 had at least one mobile 
phone, 62% of which are reported to be smartphones or iPhones, and 86% of users 
state that they access the Internet through their phone. Furthermore, it is estimated 
that 58% of the population access the Internet by a personal device at least once a 
day. Of the population with annual salaries over $30,000, 100% are frequent Internet 
users versus 44% of the population with annual salaries under $14,999 (Estudios 
Técnicos, 2014).  
 
The nation has 11 airports, 3 of which are international (San Juan, Ponce and 
Aguadilla), but only San Juan handles over 5,000 flights per month and 8 million 
people (in transit) per year. The national transportation network can guarantee that 
all points in PR are no more than 3 hours from an airport or seaport (PRIDCO, 2015). 
 
PR has 11 maritime ports but currently 9 are active. The main one is located in the 
capital, San Juan, and is the only port in the north of the territory. The port of San Juan 
is ranked in the top 20 for container movement in the US. In the south the major 
seaport is located in Ponce and is the most recently designed with the deepest 
draught (15.2 m or 50 ft) of all (Puerto Rico Port Authority (PRPA), 2015). In Chapter 6 
more detailed data of these facilities is presented and contrasted.   
 
Power and water are widely available on the island, with even isolated rural villages 
receiving electricity and running water. In the case of the water supply, the AAA (the 
Spanish acronym for the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority), which is a public 
corporation, follows the US standards (AAA, 2015). Over 97% of the population is 
connected to the main water system (Rivera-Arguinzoni, 2015). Regarding electricity, 
PR produces more power than needed and thus is self-sufficient in power production 
consuming almost 6 megawatts produced by 4 power centres (PRIDCO, 2015). A total 
of 70% of the electric power is from imported oil. The rest is generated by liquefied 
natural gas (LNG), coal, hydroelectric, wind power and solar cells. So far PREPA (the 
                                                          
52 It could be by satellite, under-sea and broadband or fibre optics. 
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Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority) has been the only distributor of power on the 
island and is the largest public corporation.  
 
In the list of the top five US territories for higher utility costs, Alaska and Hawaii take 
the first two places followed by PR (Morales, 2015). However, the reasons for this 
overpricing are not explained in the publication. Previous analyses of this issue for PR 
are not available, but some believe that it can be attributed to the cost of transport 
and the lack of maintenance and updating of the national infrastructure (Imbert, 
2015). Since 2012 PREPA has faced serious liquidity challenges, but in August 2014 the 
corporation entered a restructuring agreement with major creditors (Austin, 2015). 
Due to the new US environmental regulations, PREPA needs $2.3 billion to modernise 
its operations and stabilise its finances. Currently, the average cost per kW/hr is 
around $0.25, which is high in comparison with that in the US mainland jurisdictions 
(Fig. 8).  
 
Figure 8: Cost of energy (kW/h) in US jurisdictions (2012) 
 
Extracted from: US Energy Information Administration (2015); Instituto de Estadísticas de PR (2013). 
Residential electricity prices in fraction of US dollar per kilowatt hour. *2011 data.  
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2.3.0 Outlining Puerto Rico’s agrifood industry 
According to the list of prevalence of trade barriers published by the World Economic 
Forum (2013b:p.478), PR is classified as 23/148 and the US 53/148, so the former is in 
a position that is less restrictive to trade (4.8 and 4.5, respectively). It is believed that 
the vast majority of non-tariff measures (NTMs) applied in PR are also external or 
imposed by the US rather than endogenous or established by PR’s Government. 
Unfortunately, data of distortive regulations for PR’s agriculture or analysis of the 
effect of producers’ incentives measured as the nominal rate assistance (NRA) to farm 
output conferred by domestic price support, are not available. 
 
Due to the lack of funds for public investment, its internal devaluation and the 
urgency of creating jobs in the rural areas to respond to the high levels of 
unemployment53 and emigration, the Government of PR and some economists 
currently view agriculture as a potential sector to activate the rural economy (Lara, in 
García-Pelatti, 2014b). Enhancing rural entrepreneurship, increasing local production 
and promoting fresh produce in an import substitution policy may help the national 
internal economy (Vélez-Pizarro, 2011). 
 
Vega-Rosado (2006) states that the two most competitive industrial sectors in PR are 
health care and food. She highlights that for an industry it is easier to move one 
production line to another country than to move the complete value chain to 
manufacture a product. However, after the FTAs between the US and various 
Caribbean countries (CAFTA-DR) were signed in 2006, the conditions for native 
agribusiness producers have changed. The ‘advantage relationships’ for trade 
between PR and the US have diminished and hence also PR’s competitiveness, 
allegedly, as a result of the maritime regulatory framework (MIDA, 2015; Senate of 
Puerto Rico, 2015).  
 
It is said that shipping goods to and from PR costs considerably more than shipping to 
and from the other Caribbean islands, and this imposes an important cost on Puerto 
Rican businesses, dampening the economy’s competitiveness (Federal Reserve Bank 
                                                          
53 Between 2011 and 2014 the unemployment national rate was between 13.4 and 16.2 (Estudios Técnicos, Inc., 2014). However, although they 
depend on the municipalities and regions, at the rural level the unemployment rates could be higher than 23%. 
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of New York, 2012:p.23). The limited publications that analyse this issue in PR’s 
shipping are focused on contrasting the container costs but not by sectors. Villamil 
and Pagán (2014) state that imports of a large proportion of goods from the mainland 
could be affected more by the Cabotage Act than goods with less volume. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence to support these arguments has not been provided 
so far. The US General Accountability Office (USGAO) report (2013) is the most recent 
federal study about the Cabotage Act’s effects on PR’s economy and the topic of 
agriculture is not considered. The USDA (2003:p.1) reports that:  
 
Beyond the challenge created by restricted choices in transportation 
modes, the opportunity for farmers and ranchers in such geographically 
isolated States and Territories to access transportation services is 
further reduced by infrequent or inconsistent service availability from 
existing carriers, especially in terms of air transportation.  
Puerto Rico stands out as an exception to this general rule, because it 
has successfully managed to transform itself into a major distribution 
centre for merchandise moving to and from other islands within the 
Caribbean Basin, and has been able to attract a sufficient volume of 
trans-shipment cargo to sustain competitive interest from 
transportation carriers.  
 
Publications using empirical or retesting methods to validate procedures are limited in 
the literature. Partisan discussions rather than academic peer reviewed studies have 
affected the analysis of cabotage. Over a dozen well-known proposals to develop PR’s 
agriculture have been written since the 1950s, highlighting the technical aspects of 
the production processes to the farms and the farmers (González & Gregory, 2014). 
None of these proposals, particularly those written between 1993 and 2012, explore 
cabotage’s influence on the native food supply chain or on the agribusinesses.  
 
Among agricultural scientists it is said that formal strategic planning of PR’s agriculture 
(mid-term or long-term) does not exist; hence, the agricultural policy is a reactive one, 
lacking goals, vision and recommendations for sustainable development. In a similar 
way, publications or academic research about the food supply chain’s competitiveness 
are rare in PR. Consequently, an agricultural sector with the potential to drive and 
contribute to the growth and development of PR’s economy seems to be limited by 
day-to-day management with a narrow, insular view. 
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SIDSs and transitional economies, in proportion, import large amounts of raw 
materials (Jung & Kim, 2012), and these apply on PR. The official figures from 2006 
show that an estimated 83% of all food groups in fresh and frozen forms (except fresh 
milk, bananas and plantains) consumed by Puerto Ricans were imported. It is 
estimated that three years later the Commonwealth food imports had increased to 
85% (Comas, 2009), a similar percentage to Hong Kong or Singapore, where the level 
of food imports is around 90%. More than 90% of PR’s exports and more than 60% of 
its imports are traded with the US (Fig. 9).  
 
Figure 9: Percentage of PR’s food imports by country 
 
Sources: PRPB (2015) and Comas (2009). 
 
 
Given that only four maritime companies (Table 4) have control of transfers between 
PR and the US, the cost of transportation appears to be challenging for the native 
agriculture and food sector. Due to political relations, the topic has an ideological 
perspective; hence, no consensus exists about the Act (Santiago, 2012).  
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Table 4: Maritime routes between PR and the US 
 
Legend: Miles=nautical miles, Twk=twice a week; FtN=fortnight, N/A=not available; *during this 
research the firm shut down its operations (2015).                        Source: Comas (2009). 
 
 
The agricultural sector in PR has lacked attention since the mid-1970s. Today PR’s 
agriculture contributes 0.79% of the GDP or around $700 million per year, of which 
55% is from animal production (Table 5). In comparison with similar small economies – 
such as Singapore (0.09%), Ireland (1.6%) and Hong Kong (0.1%) – the percentage of 
PR’s agriculture contribution seems to be relatively high. On the contrary, PR shows a 
lower performance considering factors such as restrictions to trade, inequality levels 
(GINIc) and the cost of agricultural policies to access food.  
 
Table 5: PR’s GDP and agricultural GDP between 1990 and 2012 
 
Source: González and Gregory (2014:p.5). Data from Gross Farm Income, PR Department of Agriculture, 
Agricultural Statistics Office, Junta de Planificación de PR – ‘Informe Económico al Gobernador’ – and 
Puerto Rico Institute of Statistics.      
 
PR’s geographical location is, at least, no different from other SIDSs in the region, 
totally dependent on maritime transportation showing also large imbalance in 
agricultural goods trade (FAO, 2006). Setrini (2012) suggests that the 
Commonwealth’s producers find themselves squeezed between the low cost of 
industrial producers in the US and that of low-wage producers in the Caribbean and 
Latin American countries. For instance, the agricultural minimum wage in the US, as in 
Companies Routes Journey (days) Miles Trips
Pensauken (NJ)-SJU 8 1400 weekly
Jacksonville (Florida)-SJU 6 1119 weekly
Miami-Jacksonville-SJU 7 1434 weekly
Trailer Bridge Jacksonville-SJU 6 1119 Twk
Elizabeth (NJ)-SJU 4d 4h 1400 weekly
Houston (Tx)-SJU 5d 5h 1745 FtN
Jacksonville-SJU 3d 4h 1119 Twk
Everglades (Florida)-SJU 3d 4h N/A N/A
Jacksonville-SJU 4 1414 weekly
Elizabeth (NJ)-SJU 4 1400 weekly
Jacksonville-SJU 4 1119 Twk
Everglades-SJU 3d 4h 1073 weekly
Houston-Tampa-SJU 7 1849 FtN
Crowley
Sea Star
Horizon*
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
Gross Domestic Product (BB) 30.6 42.6 61.7 82.8 96.3 100.2 102.0
Agricultural GDP (MM) 434.1 318.4 407.3 499.3 553.2 795.6 813.0
Agricultural GDP/GDP (%) 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8
Years
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PR, is $2.75 (per hour) more than it is in Costa Rica. In comparison with the Dominican 
Republic, that amount is the equivalent to 10 hours of work.54 Furthermore, its 
regulatory framework for the environment and for workers – protection, security and 
rights – may elevate producers’ relative costs in comparison with competitors (Setrini, 
2012).  
 
Whilst subsidies may support PR’s agriculture in dealing with its differences in the 
market, Setrini (2012) argues that native producers and the system are promoters of 
‘junkies to subsidies’ rather than promoters of innovation or transforming processes. 
Other forms of competitiveness should be identified to potentiate production, 
because competitiveness by ‘price only’ is not the only method. However, PR’s 
agriculture has some characteristics of a competitive market. Firstly, its openness is 
high as is the rivalry between international products and native producers (WEF, 
2013b). Secondly, the local infrastructure permits native distributors to make ‘just-in-
time’ purchases, thus giving fresh products more days on the shelf (Setrini, 2012). 
Thirdly, the number of producers (around 11,500) and buyers is relatively large in 
contrast to the internal market. For instance, in 2012 the Puerto Rican food 
consumption expenditures were estimated to be $8.93 billion, making up 14.64% of 
the total consumption expenditures ($2,400) per capita/year in food) (González & 
Gregory, 2014).  
 
PR’s agrifood data are regularly presented by total sales rather than volumes of 
production. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that, if the production is 
decreasing but without changes in gross farm income, the available public data show 
the effects of a price increase rather than a real sustainable development (Fig. 10). 
                      
Currently, the farm size area and the sales values on average are small. The average 
size of PR farms has increased by 26% (from 34.3 to 43.2 acres), but between 2007 
and 2012 their number decreased by 16%. In addition, although around 72.4% of farm 
business tenure is individually owned by locals and 89% is legally organised, individual 
business corporate farming accounts for less than 4% (González & Gregory, 2014). 
 
                                                          
54 Resolución No. 2/2013 Ministerio de Trabajo de la República Dominicana, June 2013.  
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Figure 10: PR’s food consumption (imported vs. local) (%) and farmland availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Junta de Planificación de Puerto Rico (2015), Departamento de Agricultura (2012), USDA-NASS 
(2015) and Comas (2009). 
 
 
The factor of aging is an important one when PR’s agribusinesses are described. The 
average age of PR’s farmers is 60, and 70% of them are over 56 years old. The 
substitution rate, with a new generation of producers who are more technologically 
knowledgeable, seems to be limited.55 Additionally, it is estimated that 75% of PR’s 
farmers are in the group of annual sales of $10,000 or less (González & Gregory, 
2014). 
 
The Commonwealth’s agriculture is highly susceptible to external shocks56 and highly 
regulated by the same sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as the US. Besides, it 
is highly exposed to natural conditions (hurricanes, overflows, etc.) and a low level of 
added value in native production. These factors, according to González and Gregory 
(2014), have been detrimental to PR’s production over the last twenty years, 
particularly for crops –vegetables and root produce. For instance, in comparison with 
the 1990 production, in 2012 the production of plantains and bananas decreased by 
55.4 and 208.4 million units, respectively. Using a representative group of vegetable 
crops as a parameter, González and Gregory (2014) estimate that in 2012 the area in 
use decreased by around 770 acres when compared with 1992. Nevertheless, these 
data may not be a good indicator due to the fact that improved technology – 
hydroponic, aeroponic, aquaponic and so on – may reduce the area of production 
                                                          
55 It is believed that although young farmers have more scientific and technological knowledge, they have very low entrepreneurship backgrounds, a 
lack of resources (land available to produce, credit for loan or money savings) and a poor young farmers’ public programme (González & Gregory, 
2014). 
56  The US Interstate Commerce Act restricts Puerto Rico’s capacity to impose restrictions on the US produce.  
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without having significant effects on the amount produced. However, the production 
and particularly its pricing in PR are highly influenced by the US prices and greatly 
affected by the climate seasons.  
 
In the case of coffee, once the most famous Puerto Rican commercial product in 
Europe, its production seems to be more traditional than commercial. Different 
factors have decimated the production and the scenario seems to be extremely 
threatened by the recent US regulations. Currently, the Federal Court of District in PR 
is considering a case that requires farmers to pay workers a fixed minimum salary per 
hour rather than a higher payment but based on the weight picked by the workers 
(Cobián, 2014). 
  
The number of farms dedicated to fruit crops has been declining for the last two 
decades to almost half of the 1992 level (Departmento of Agricultura, 2012). For 
example, pineapple production in 1990 was around 50,000 tonnes, but in 2011 the 
production was only 2,500 tonnes. In 2011 the production of oranges and avocados 
together was 121 million units (per fruit) less than in 1990. Nevertheless, a reduction 
in farms is not necessarily a reduction in acres of production, which is particularly the 
case of papayas and mangos. Although the area (acres) of production of oranges 
seems to be relatively stable, the area dedicated to producing papayas and mangos 
increased by around 40% in the period between 1998 and 2011. However, the gross 
farm income (GFI) for mangos in 2011 shows a reduction of 69%.  
 
Comparing PR with Hawaii, the Hawaii archipelago’s area is 7,500 km2 bigger with a 
third of PR’s population. However, in cropland, PR shows 150,000 acres more (USDA-
NASS, 2015). Nevertheless, from 1997 to 2012, both US territories lost almost 300,000 
acres of farmland (González & Gregory, 2014). The majority of PR’s agrifood exporting 
products have not been produced by its native agriculture as in Singapore. Regularly, 
PR’s production is achieved by mixing raw materials from foreign countries and then 
exported principally to the US.   
 
Since CAFTA-DR, although the imports of raw materials into PR have increased, 
domestic production levels have decreased, particularly in the livestock industry (Fig. 
60 
 
11 and Fig. 12). A more dissagregated assessment facilitates better understanding of 
the situation.  
 
Figure 11: Livestock local production in million pounds of meat (2006–2010) 
Source: Departamento de Agricultura (2012). 
 
 
Animal production, as a subsector, exhibits the highest gross farm income (GFI), 
contributing a total of $423.3 million in 2011 (González, 2014). However, in the last 
decade, the number of dairy farms has decreased by 14% and production has 
decreased by 4%. Nevertheless, the milk sector has the highest GFI with $237.1 million 
and a share of 30.0% of the total available PR agricultural GDP (González & Gregory, 
2014).  
 
Broiler production, on the other hand, has suffered a dramatic impact in the last 
decade: 66% of the factories have closed and with them many producer have 
disappeared. As a result, the 2011 data show total production of 41.3 million (kg) of 
poultry, which is 9.9 million (kg) less than in 1990. In 2011 the local production 
accounted for only 25% of PR’s per capita consumption of poultry which is 
approximately 46.7 kilograms a year, it. Since 2008 the only poultry-processing plant 
operating in PR has been Pilgrims’ Pride, a US-based corporation that was recently 
acquired by the Brazilian JBS S.A. A similar pattern is apparent in the egg sector, for 
which the market is estimated to be 50 million dozen per year. Production in 2011 was 
11.7 million dozens in contrast to the 27 million dozens produced in 1998. In the last 2 
years with data available (2010 and 2011) the sector income decreased by 5.07% and 
3.01% per annum, respectively.  
 
61 
 
Figure 12: Relative production of meat (pounds) vs. price of beef (USD) in PR 
 
 
Legend: p= preliminar, S= drought, I=flooding, O= tropical depression, Hx=hurricane(s).  
Source: González and Gregory (2014:p.19). 
 
 
According to the USDA-NASS census (2008) in 2007 PR had 1,513 swine farms, but in 
September 2014 this number was dramatically reduced to an estimate of 160 farms. 
However, the per capita consumption of pork has been increasing, and although it has 
a seasonal pattern, the national average is around 55 pounds (22.73 kg/year). 
According to González and Gregory (2014), by contrasting the years 1990 and 2011, it 
can be estimated that in general the entire native meat production experienced a 
reduction of around 80 million pounds (36.36 million kg). 
 
2.3.1 The native grain importing sector: Animal feed mill production in Puerto Rico  
PR’s grain-importing sector is broken down into animal feed manufacturing and flour 
milling and baking. Animal feed industries as a production system in PR consist of four 
basic activities: grain buyers’ resale, grain transformation, product trading with 
wholesalers and retailers and the sale of secondary products to consumers. In general, 
these are the first basic echelons in the agrifood chain of animal production.  
 
Some sectors of animal production for meat are more grain-dependent than others. 
Other factors, such as land and grass limitations, the type of production (extensive vs. 
intensive) and the climatic conditions (seasonality) may affect their level of grain 
dependency. Non-ruminant production, particularly poultry and swine operations, are 
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classically highly grain dependent. According to their digestive apparatus, both species 
are classified into the group of farm animals with a simple system.57 The farm animals 
included in this group are commonly species that are less demanding of space to grow 
but have a low level of yield (food/meat rate) during growth in natural conditions (not 
man-made supplemented). Thus, in an intensive production system, their nutritional 
requirements demand a strict balance in diet to enhance the natural metabolism and 
increase their natural yield. Farm species in the group of complex digestive systems 
are less dependent on grain than those of the simple system. Farm animals in this 
classification are equines and cuniculi (rabbits). In the group of ruminants – beef and 
dairy cattle, goats and sheep – the level of grain dependency is lower than that of 
farm animals classified into the group of complex digestive systems. However, it 
depends on the production system and cropland available.  
 
Animal production is the strongest agricultural sector in PR and the most dependent 
on grain imports. It is well known that between 50% and 70% of the production costs 
in this sector are for animal feed (Austin, 1981). In the last decade, the number of 
grain-importing companies in PR has been reduced by bankruptcy and consolidation. 
It is believed that it has been highly affected by the grains’ volatile costs and by the 
impact of the costs of trade between the US and PR. Additionally, in the livestock 
industry, it is expected that, in the next years, more local companies importing grain 
for animal feed will disappear. Promoting efficiencies in the agricultural sector has not 
been a priority due to the fact that the agricultural sector nowadays accounts for less 
than 1% of PR’s GDP and its capacity to export food is practically non-existent. As a 
result, the literature is silent regarding PR’s agribusiness supply chain competitiveness. 
 
Before the animal feed product is consumed, various processes are undertaken in the 
chain. They include grain producers at the farm level, grain elevators and sellers, 
transporters, surveyors and receivers, inspectors, regulators and other secondary 
activities associated with them (Morgan, 2000). For each of these processes, some 
buyers are searching for a combination of low prices and high quality. It is believed 
that price is the most traditional factor used in this business. Commonly, animal 
producers are not well informed about the technical–nutritional requirements of their 
                                                          
57 This refers to the digestive anatomic classification. 
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animals, but they are highly aware of the costs for their own business. Consequently, 
farmers searching for lower prices for animal feed may ignore the importance of 
quality to the detriment of their animals’ yield. Similarly, feed mill agribusinesses are 
focused on low-cost materials rather than improving efficiency through innovation 
and technology (Chavarría et al, 2002).    
 
During this research the dairy and swine farmers’ sectors through the PR Farm 
Association, denounced the low quality and higher costs of the animal feed produced 
in PR. They demanded a revision of the regulatory frameworks for the quality of 
animal feed by PR’s Department of Agriculture. They recruited an independent 
international expert to evaluate the quality of the products (CyberNews, 2015). 
  
The agrifood sector regularly needs to restructure its value chain and update its 
production processes to meet changing consumer preferences and the requirements 
for efficiency in processing and retailing products. Due to its natural limitations and 
internal and external particularities, every country has to develop systems to optimise 
its resources and minimise its costs. As a SIDS, PR faces challenges in trading efficiently 
and in securing access to food at competitive prices (FAO, 2011). As a result, a study of 
the agrifood supply chain system could identify inefficiencies in the various activities 
involved to modify or develop more sustainable production processes. There is no 
single, common, generic rule for achieving competitiveness. Every nation is different 
and its environment is the result of a combination of circumstances, on which policies 
and human effort have their impacts (Garelli, 2014). As a consequence, any public 
economic measures adopted in relation to trade or to improve competitiveness 
should consider the goal of sustainability (Ballarin, 2005). However, what if the 
domestic trade of a SIDS is subjected to policies whereby its own economic 
sustainability is affected by another economy that limits productivity? What if an anti-
monopolistic policy falls into an oligopolistic collusion, limiting firms’ efficiency? 
 
2.3.2 The native fresh produce importers’ sector in Puerto Rico 
Similarly to some of the smallest Caribbean nations but unlike Jamaica, the Dominican 
Republic and Cuba, PR imports around 85% of its food needs. Its food imports depend 
on volatile export markets, which are susceptible to periodic market access 
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disruptions and external regulations. Around 70% of this amount is imported from the 
US markets, and almost 92% of it from the Port of Jacksonville in Florida (Comas, 
2009). PR’s market dependence on imported food may entail several dangers, 
beginning with the fact that in a national emergency the population would not be able 
to feed itself. Climate change, with more frequent and severe events, can seriously 
affect the supply of food available on the global market. Additionally, the natural 
geographical limitations and the alleged overpricing in transportation should be 
considered.  
 
The majority of the fresh-produce importers in PR are native-family agribusinesses. 
Although few in number, they supply almost 75% of the imported produce to feed the 
total market. The remaining 25% is from transnational companies that focus on 
processed products rather than fresh goods. Unlike grain, the vast majority of the 
imports are transported in containers, refrigerated or controlled climate storage units. 
Academic publications about these topics in PR are uncommon; thus, a basic outline 
of their operational information is provided later in this thesis. 
 
These agribusinesses are totally dependent on the maritime transportation companies 
and are limited by a plethora of regulations. Whilst these imply extra costs that may 
affect the supply chain, they may not necessarily be asssociated with cabotage. 
However, such a scenario may present opportunities to analyse the connection 
between them. By exploring the US Cabotage Act as an external NTM, we could 
identify inefficiencies in the supply chain, potentialities, robustness and vulnerabilities 
in the process of trading food in PR’s market. The analysis may contribute to the 
discussions about how to encourage a more sustainable and socially just agriculture 
industry. 
 
2.4.0 Conclusion 
Resource efficiency is one of the important challenges that SIDS and other trade 
regions should be facing. In a context of high price volatility for agricultural 
commodities, promoting competitive and sustainable agriculture has become a real 
challenge for the agrifood sector. It is not a secret that European and some US agro-
industries are under huge pressure from emerging countries on the global market 
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(Courlex & Dedieu, 2013). The rise of emerging economies and the upgrading of their 
industries have increased competition for natural resources globally and resulted in 
export restrictions on raw materials in the production value chain. Restrictions on 
exports have led to scarcity of raw materials (ECORYS, 2011:p.5). Some small 
economies and SIDSs have been more affected by the higher costs on food imports. 
Particularly for the CARICOM members, over the period 1991–2006, generally the US 
import market for fresh (non-processed) crops has not been competitive (Lowe & 
Davis, 2007).  
 
PR’s economy is highly influenced by the US economy. Although its infrastructure, 
political stability, dollarised economy, free access to the US markets and absence of 
direct US taxes may be considered as strengths, PR’s economy is in recession and 
submerged in debt. Various social problems have arisen in addition to its small sector 
of native entrepreneurs; hence, in the short term, the scenario for PR looks 
precarious. PR’s agrifood system could be described as an unsustainable one 
(Weisskoff, 1985). Nevertheless, it appears that PR’s agricultural sector has growth 
potential, and some believe that import substitution based on the principle of food 
security is a feasible option to generate jobs in the rural regions, increase the GNP and 
promote rural entrepreneurship by endogenous development.  
 
In the literature, the US Cabotage Act has not yet been directly assessed as a NTM. 
Whilst its effects are on domestic trade only, this legislation may act as an external 
NTM limiting PR’s interest in developing its agribusiness into sustainable production. 
Neither aspect is considered in the literature studied. Exploring the Cabotage Act’s 
impact on the native agrifood sector may help to identify some factors that could 
affect the food availability or the native agribusinesses’ stability and areas of 
opportunity under the local (firms’ or government) control. In the next chapter the 
activities associated to cabotage will be discussed and contrasted.   
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.0.0 Introduction 
Having contextualised the PR’s socioeconomic scenario, the following chapter 
discusses other factors that may affect local agribusinesses’ operations. Maritime 
cargo is the basis of the trading system to move high volume of raw material and 
containers, but the high level of volatility in maritime costs has been detrimental to 
food importers, particularly in SIDSs, small economies and low-income countries 
(Korinek & Sourdin, 2009b). This chapter discusses concepts of maritime economy, 
shipbuilding and management, elements of sea trade, and associated issues on the 
maritime transportation that justifies this research. Scenarios of sea cabotage policies 
at the international (Hong Kong and Singapore), domestic (US – Hawaii, Alaska, Guam) 
and local (PR) levels are presented. Additionally, due to the fact that the maritime 
liberalisation of New Zealand58 is a well documented case, it is contrasted with PR’s 
experience.  
  
3.1.0 Maritime economy and policies  
Depending on location, transport costs vary between 8% and 13% of import values 
(Márquez-Ramos et al, 2007). Few studies focus on sea transport costs for the supply 
chain process from the origin. Subsidies, shipbuilding restrictions, foreign direct 
investment restrictions and other types of elements may act as barriers limiting 
foreign trade and investments (Lewis, 2013). For instance, cabotage policy can be 
implemented through measures that exclude foreign shipping or crews from the 
country’s coastal trade (Liu, 2009). In the form of protectionist measures, many 
activities associated to the sector such as shipbuilding, technological advances or fleet 
renovations might be affected and eventually the freight rates. 
 
Since the World Trade Organization (WTO)59 was created, multilateral rules have been 
set to support international trade and arbitrate in disputes among member nations 
                                                          
58
 Currently is the only small developed economy archipelago that in the last decades has implemented 
a complete maritime liberalisation process.   
59
 Since 1995, it is the intergovernmental organisation which regulates international trades, replacing 
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trades (GATT) initiated in 1948.  
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acting as an international trade forum court (ECORYS, 2009). However, finding 
appropriate formulas to negotiate maritime transportation liberalisation is not easy 
when many countries reserve this kind of transportation for national-flag ships (WTO, 
1996). Moreover, the existence of ‘grandfather clauses’ for the original contracting 
parties of GATT/WTO, freight agreements and the level of confidentiality between 
transporters and importers, adds challenges to this topic (Liu, 2009). Arbitrage 
mechanisms created by and for the member nations of the WTO were developed to 
facilitate foreign trade. However, when domestic trade is affected by domestic rules, 
those mechanisms are useless.  
 
3.1.1 Tariff reduction is not enough 
The reduction or abolition of tariffs not only enhances countries’ trade but also has an 
impact on trade directions and hence fleet development (Meersman, 2009). Between 
2008 and 2011, trade patterns were extended and the world fleet grew by 37%, but 
between 2011 and 2012, shipping companies claimed that freight rates were often 
unprofitable (UNCTAD, 2012:p.xiv). Operators attempted to make savings through 
greater economies of scale by investing in large-capacity ships in the tanker and dry-
bulk market segments. To benefit, countries need major investments in port 
infrastructure and multi-modal operational systems. The exponential growth in 
throughput is the consequence of globalised seaborne trade, but the fall in transport 
costs over time plays a key role and ports require greater efficiency (Denktas-Sakar & 
Karatas-Cetin, 2012; Musso, 2009). 
 
Although tariff measures have fallen considerably over the past decades, maritime 
transport costs have risen slightly overall in ad valorem terms. Using data between 
1991 and 2007, Korinek and Sourdin (2009b) posit that maritime transport volatility 
contributed substantially to the sharp rise in the prices of agricultural products. 
Volume and remoteness factors are also important variables. However, the costs of a 
profitable business in the shipping sector are heavily dependent on the balance 
between the supply and demand for shipbuilding capacity. Therefore, to achieve 
efficiency and cost reduction, the optimisation of space for transporting products 
should be considered. 
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In the last decade, the level of containerisation has increased substantially with the 
influence of the Asian market trade. Not only does the growth of merchandise trade 
have an impact on container trade but also the existing trade imbalances are mirrored 
by the maritime container flows (Meersman, 2009). In fact, the World Bank and the 
United Nations measure countries’ economic activity by the number of metric tonnes 
or containers in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) imported and exported. For the 
transportation of raw material (e.g. grains), containerisation is much less frequent 
than the utilisation of dry-bulk vessels for high volumes of goods. Nevertheless, both 
systems are tied to a regulatory framework, which is usually more sophisticated for 
agricultural goods. Although containerisation in agriculture has increased dramatically 
since the mid-1980s, an estimation of the costs of trade should consider the 
differences in management by products and their particularities. 
 
Hopman and Nienhuis (2009), state that cargo prices will remain under pressure since 
shipbuilding continues to be seen by some governments as an attractive employment 
sector. They also argue that changes in design and efficiency and larger capacities to 
transport are of more interest for the Asian markets. They estimate that in 2025 the 
consolidation of industries related to maritime transportation for competitiveness will 
be imminent (Fig. 13).  
 
Figure 13: Main parameters for the future of ports and shipping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
  
 
Source: Hopman and Nienhuis (2009:p.28). 
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For instance, in terms of freight shipping, Maersk Co. led the way in 2012, with sales of 
over 60 billion USD. In March 2014 they owned 248 ships and held about 15% of the 
global cellular fleet (Statista, 2015). 
 
How could this possibility be negative for the economy of small islands and/or SIDSs? 
Could the port stakeholders’ supporters (e.g. employers and operators), infrastructure 
and regulations affect the SIDSs’ vulnerability? How can SIDSs avoid oligopolistic 
structures in a scenario of shipping company consolidation? To answer these 
questions, study efficiency in the value chain and business collaboration is requiered. 
 
3.1.2 Factors that may affect trade by maritime transportation 
The analysis and reduction of transport costs is quite a complex issue. Meersman 
(2009:p.1) posits that plenty of factors influence maritime trade costs and could have 
an impact on countries’ trade pattern (Fig. 14). As an example, short-sea shipping is 
different from deep-sea traffic; thus, container traffic and liner shipping are totally 
different industries from bulk traffic. 
 
Figure 14: Factors affecting maritime trade                                 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
              
Source: Meersman (2009:p.3). 
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Productivity is highly affected by regulatory systems, and in the case of shipbuilding 
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(presented below) is the total price of the shipbuilding highly influenced by the unit 
labour cost per hour of construction. Today, low-wage countries such as the 
Philippines seem to favour this kind of production. Vietnam and Ukraine are looking 
for a space too. However, China and South Korea have the dominion (Tables 6 and 7).  
 P= [(M * R+I+F+C) x (1+r)-S] * E 
P=price;  
M=man hours spent by the main contractor;  
R=hourly rate of the average worker;  
I=costs of the subcontractor; 
F= financing and insurance costs;  
C=capital costs;   
r=profit margin;  
E=exchange rate. 
S=subsidy (ies) 
 
Table 6: Deliveries of new major shipbuilding and countries where ships are built 
(2011 data) 
 
 Extracted from: UNCTAD (2012:p.49). 
 
Table 7: Countries’ fleet and its tonnes (dwt) 
 
Extracted from: UNCTAD (2014:p.34ss). 
 
A century ago shipbuilding was dominated by Europe, with a world market share of 
80% dominated by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. For various reasons, 
Vessels China
Rep. of 
Korea
Japan Philippines
Rest of 
World
World 
Total
Tankers 7,613        11,370      4,764        -            617           24,365      
Bulk carriers 26,719      11,678      11,656      1,658        1,290        53,001      
Container and other passenger 4,291        11,794      2,921        3               2,418        21,427      
Offshore and other work vessels 986           1,008        26             -            1,032        3,052        
Total 39,609      35,850      19,367      1,661        5,357        101,845    
Country
No. of 
ships
dwt
Foreign flag as 
% of total dwt
Cyprus 355 12,716     52%
Hong Kong 610 26,603     30%
Ireland 79 773          67%
Malta 33 585          24%
Marshall Islands 34 614          26%
Mauritius 7 101          8%
New Zealand 20 222          66%
Singapore 2,120      74,064     45%
Trinidad and Tobago 5 7              14%
USA 1,927      57,356     85%
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including the decrease of the European shipping fleet, lack of investment, poor labour 
relations and an inability to increase productivity levels, their dominance was 
gradually eroded and partially replaced by continental Europe and Scandinavia 
(UNCTAD, 2013b). In the early 1970s Japan and Europe dominated the world market 
with a combined share of some 90%, but at the same time South Korea entered the 
stage. Korea offered lower wages than Japan or Europe and chose to position 
shipbuilding as a strategic industry (Donga, 2015). Just as Japan did before, a carefully 
planned industrial programme was successfully initiated, leading to a world market 
share of 25% by the mid-1990s and a world first position as of 2005. Then China 
entered, rising rapidly to over 20% of global ship deliveries (ECORYS, 2009).  
 
It is believed that the US’s domestic ocean-going fleet shrank between 1950 and 1975, 
and various writers argue that this was a result of the Jones Act but more notably 
after NAFTA (Fig. 15). The costs associated with operating restrictions have risen and 
widened the gap between foreign and domestic rates. In 1979 the US built roughly a 
tenth of the world’s commercial vessels, but today it accounts for less than 1% of the 
market (SEA Europe, 2013). In 2011, according to UNCTAD (2013d), around 39% of the 
gross tonnage delivered was built in China, followed by shipyards from South Korea 
(35%), Japan (19%) and the Philippines (1.6%). The rest of the world, mostly Vietnam, 
Brazil and India, accounted for only 5.3% of the gross tonnage. More than half of dry-
bulk carriers were built by China, while South Korea had a 55% share of container and 
other dry-cargo ships (p.7). It is believed that in 2012 the top 20 leading maritime 
operators accounted for approximately 70% of the total container capacity deployed. 
The 3 largest companies are based in Europe, while 6 of the remaining top 10 are 
based in Asia (UNCTAD, 2013c). As a result, shipping businesses are no longer the 
exclusive domain of rich countries. Maritime transportation companies are more 
globalised than before. Their ships are built in country W, manned by the nationals of 
country X, flagged in countries Y and Z, repaired in country J and make deliveries to 
countries D and H. This new reality has benefited the LDCs that participate in 
liberalized markets, finding niches in which they can be part of the supply chain of 
maritime transport service provision. 
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Figure 15: Total waterborne commerce in the US, 1970—2009 (million short tonnes) 
   
Source: US Army Corps of Engineers (2009) Waterborne commerce of the United States (part 5), 
national summaries. In: Alameda & Valentin (2012: p.31). 
 
Smith (2004) states that in 1984 US crew costs in domestic maritime transport were 
typically 2.5 times more than those of European crews and over 6 times those of the 
LDCs. The costs to build a ship in the US were estimated to be 3 times those of 
building comparable vessels in a Japanese shipyard. In the US the operational cost is 
another factor to be analised. For domestic US operators, these costs could be twice 
those of foreign operators (Table 8). Indeed, if we look at Hopman and Nienhuis’s 
(2009) analysis, the man hours spent in the US versus foreign countries could be an 
important factor to be considered in their cost analysis for services.  
 
Table 8: Operational daily expenses (USD) differential: US vs. foreign containerships 
 
Extracted from: USITC (2007:p.98).  Data were collected by USDoT-MarAd in 2005. A qualitative analysis 
is presented in USDoT-MarAd (2011). Costs may varied by type and size of vessel.  
 
 
Since the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) in 2006, minimum requirements have 
been established for almost all aspects of working conditions for seafarers, including 
Exp. Category US flagged
Foreign 
flagged
Difference
Crew 12,705             2,940               9,765               
Fuel 4,410               3,045               1,365               
Maint. & repair 2,310               1,470               840                  
Insurances 13,335             13,335             -                  
Other 1,500               1,400               100                  
Total 34,260$                22,190$                12,070$                
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conditions of employment, hours of work and rest, accommodation, recreational 
facilities, food and catering, health protection, medical care, welfare and social 
security protection. It is believed that around 50% of the global 1.2 million seafarers 
were covered by the MLC agreements (UNCTAD, 2013c). 
 
Other aspects that have an impact on services are the fuel costs, which represent 
between 20% and 60% of the operational cost, insurance and environmental 
regulations (UNCTAD, 2012). While shipping costs vary significantly across countries 
and commodity types, an UNCTAD (2010b) study shows that an increase in oil prices 
raises the transport cost for all types of cargo and containerised goods but it would be 
related to regions. They estimated elasticity range between 0.19 and 0.36, thus a 10% 
of increase on the Brent crude oil price would increase container freight rates from 1.9 
% to 3.6 %.  
 
Fuel consumption management may involve a range of strategies, such as speed 
management through slow steaming, routing optimisation or selection of the most 
economical options, and technology-based solutions (Vivideconomics, 2010). 
Consequently, in a globalised system, new designs and competition for the market 
may promote new options for green-efficient technologies. Hopman and Nienhuis 
(2009) report that, in the Dutch shipping market, the introduction of alternative 
propulsion systems using low-emission technology seems to be profitable and 
companies might have strong economic motivation to operate ships efficiently. 
However, if transformation investments change the cost benefit relationship with the 
operators it could limit its execution. 
 
Stochniol (2011) shows how the application of market-based measures to greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHG) from international maritime transport provoked an increase in 
the costs of shipping food. He posits that the environmental policy proposed, 
estimated to be less than $3.00 for every $1,000 value of imported food 
(approximately 0.3%), seems to be a relatively low cost to potentiate positive changes 
in ships’ GHG emissions as well as being profitable for the shipowner. However, his 
study demonstrates that the application of this measure would have major effects on 
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vulnerable countries, particularly those that import a significant proportion of their 
food supply. 
  
The cost of transport is the price of a service, and it is determined by supply and 
demand (Sánchez et al, 2003). However, the cost of shipping is also affected by 
various other factors that may influence the market. Studies, conducted by Márquez-
Ramos et al (2011), Djankov et al (2010), Korinek and Sourdin (2009a, 2009b), 
Martínez-Zarzoso et al (2004), Sánchez et al (2003), Micco and Pérez (2002), Clark et al 
(2001) and Hummels (2001), aim to identify the determinants of trading costs, 
especially transportation. Since the introduction of FTAs, external trade between 
countries can depend on a wide range of variables based on reciprocity and maritime 
transportation available between them is an element to consider (OECD, 2014; 
Márquez-Ramos et al, 2007). The two countries’ GDP, their psychological attachments 
(such as sociological, cultural and language), the regulatory framework, common 
agreements, security (war), the volume of trade, accessibility (shipping distance) and 
the factor of time affect the cost of shipping (Burns, 2015; Korinek & Sourdin, 2009a; 
Martínez-Zarzoso & Wilmsmeier, 2008). These variables may affect transport 
conditions (i.e. refrigerated transport, sizes and weights of containers) and the 
number of maritime lines available to access a specific market, therefore affecting  
natural competitiveness (Clark et al, 2001). 
 
Psychological attachments  
Corporations are poorly equipped to deal with dilemmas that are fundamentally 
cultural, social and moral rather than technical or operational. While cultural 
differences between some markets may seem not to be significant, ignoring them may 
present a high to trade. Aspects such as the colour of packaging, the products’ 
ingredients, cultural values and beliefs demand particular attention in manufacturing 
but transport may involve other evaluations. Cultural proximity and a shared history 
may provide a perception of closeness other than geographical proximity (Márquez-
Ramos et al, 2007). For instance, regionalism in the language or slang may represent a 
big challenge to business; as a result, countries with the same language have more 
probabilities of negotiating than countries with different communication codes.   
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Another aspect to consider is the value of time and a country’s business norms, 
particularly when marketing across borders. Some markets in the Middle East, Africa 
and Latin America do not have the same conception of time and accuracy as other 
regions (Boundless, 2015). Similarly, the perception of other qualitative aspects, such 
as beauty, hygiene, responsibility and service, may vary widely among cultures. These 
may represent serious inconvenience for those without a contingency plan. 
 
For example, the use of international metrics to trade commodities might be 
challenging in markets that preserve regional (antique) measures rather than adopting 
standard international systems. It is believed that, currently, more than 40 countries 
have no official standardisation systems to measure; thus, this basic element may 
represent a risk for those who trade with them (ISO, 2015). The importance of basic 
requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics to be used consistently for 
ensuring that materials, processes and services are fit for their purpose are issues not 
only of human security but also of business and profits. Whilst standardisation of 
products may affect some aspects of countries’ diversity, basic frameworks have to be 
agreed by those conducting business. 
 
Regulatory framework 
Business norms also vary from one country to the next and may present challenges to 
trade, particularly for foreigners who are not familiar with the frameworks of the host 
country. As the proportion of foreign to domestic trade increases, so does the 
frequency of business negotiations between people from different countries and 
cultures and thus the level of confidence among them (Adler & Graham, 1989). 
Financial instability, a lack of security, piracy, corruption and smuggling affect the 
business environment and hence trade. However, policies associated with control, 
besides those for environmental and workers’ protection and SPS restrictions, 
although possibly limiting trade flexibility, may also guarantee some levels of 
reciprocity between traders and consumers (Beghin, 2013). 
 
Volume to trade 
This factor is particularly complex in evaluating the cost of maritime transportation. 
For instance, the size of vessels on a route is greatly associated not only with their 
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volume capacity but also with their cost of maintenance. Often, the bigger the vessel 
is, the lower its operational costs are. As an example, Mázquez-Ramos et al (2007) 
report that the operational cost of a 2,500 TEU vessel is 50% less than that of a vessel 
with a capacity of 800 TEU. However, this applies only if the ships are carrying at full 
capacity or conducting a more or less complete round trip in accordance with the 
expected frequencies. 
 
Korinek and Sourdin (2011) suggest that in maritime transportation the relationship 
between time and volume tends to be inversely proportional. In fact, greater volumes 
in cargoes are not easy to manage, because they require enormous ships to transport 
and so far their velocity rank (at super-slow steaming) is between 8 and 16 knots, 
which is much lower than the standard average of 23 knots. With the combination of 
recession and climate change emissions, maritime companies are moving to adopt 
‘slow steaming’ to save fuel. Allegedly, this ‘super-slow transit’ reduces fuel 
consumption and GHG emissions by 30% and saves money for the companies. For 
instance, in 2010 Maersk’s fuel savings were estimated to be more than $100 million 
since it began its ‘go-slow’ (Vidal, 2010). However, this implies logistic considerations 
on the side of the importers, who have to deal with the perishability of products as 
well as maintaining safe levels of inventory for their business. 
 
The value-to-volume ratio, particularly in raw materials and agrifood produce, means 
that larger amounts reduce the transport costs per unit. Precisely due to their low 
value to weight, larger amounts of raw materials and agrifood produce lead to a 
reduction in the cost per unit, but they are voluminous and relatively expensive to 
transport (Korinek & Sourdin, 2009b). However, in the case of grain and container 
ships, freight rates are relative insensitivity60 of fuel cost (bunker C) (Vivideconomics, 
2010). Consequently, it does not allow significant reductions in the import cost. 
Nevertheless, in dependent markets with limited alternative of suppliers, consumers 
will recurrently absorb the differences in the price per unit of the product.   
 
                                                          
60 According to Vivideconomics’s 2010 estimation, the elasticity of the grain freight rates to the fuel price is around 0.20, and in the case of 
container ships it is around 0.10. This estimation applies to Panamax ships. Lower dwt vessels show higher sensibility to – effects on – their freight 
rates.  
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Márquez-Ramos et al (2007) posit that, when the trade balance is negative, the 
pattern shows high freight rates for shipments transported on the leg of the trip with 
a larger amount of traffic. Considering the round trip as the total amount charged, this 
leg must compensate for the relatively reduced income to be raised on the return trip, 
when part of the capacity of the vessel will inevitably be used for repositioning empty 
containers (p.8). In the case of PR, this particular aspect, documented by Frankel 
(2002), could be misunderstood if it is analysed by traffic only without considering the 
volume of trade. The rates of the southbound routes (from the US to PR), with less 
traffic but overcapacity, are twice those of the northbound routes (from PR to the US).  
 
Time and accessibility 
Shorter distances entail lower costs and more trade (Sánchez et al, 2003). Limâo and 
Venables (2001) estimate that additional distance over the original route base, the 
transportation cost may increase by $380 per each 1,000 km. To balance costs, each 
additional day in transit may reduce the volume of trade. Uncertainty in shipping time 
reduces confidence in clients but may also provoke dramatic effects on the supply 
chain, particularly in the weaker echelons. Hummels (2001) argues that a lengthy 
shipping time – particularly due to distance, logistics, inspection protocols and/or 
infrastructure – means that goods depreciate before arriving at the market. Shipments 
of fresh produce and livestock are highly sensitive to time because of their 
perishability and product life. Some authors believe that an increase in the time of 
transit reduces bilateral trade by more than 5% and leads to a reduction in trade 
values (OECD, 2014). Therefore, delays in transit, handling goods and port 
management may represent a logistic problem to traders that may increase costs 
(Korinek & Sourdin, 2009b). Inefficiency in goods management seems to be common 
in countries with higher shipping costs (Burns, 2015). Delays provoked by obsolete or 
inadequate infrastructure, inefficiency of labour or systemic factors (controlled by the 
firm) may represent extra costs for importing firms and eventually an increase in 
consumers’ costs.  
 
Although the geographical location of countries cannot be modified, the effect of 
distance can be lessened by improving the infrastructure, transit and destination 
countries’ efficiency (Martínez-Zarzoso et al, 2004). Accessibility is also an important 
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component of trade competitiveness. Countries’ interconnectivity in terms of 
transport, communications and deliveries, can be measured through the supply 
capacity put at the disposal of given markets by regular shipping services (UNCTAD, 
2013c). 
 
Port logistics and infrastructures 
The logistics services in ports and their infrastructures play a very important role in 
which the previous factors interact. Novianti and colleagues (2015:p.58) identify six 
indicators of logistics performance: the ‘clearance’ process (customs); the 
transportation and infrastructure; the ease of obtaining competitive shipping prices 
and shipping scheduling; logistics competence and service quality – including 
warehousing; the tracking and tracing facility; and timeliness. In a more complete 
form, the World Economic Forum (2013c) recognises nine indicators distributed 
among four categories (Fig. 16).  
 
Figure 16: Supply chain barriers to trade 
 
Note: The Global Enabling Trade Report identifies nine pillars; this is an extended list including several 
sub-pillars as tested in a separate survey, but in this table they are gathered into four major sections 
identified by colours. Source: World Economic Forum (2013c).  
 
For instance, a significant component of logistics services is a well-developed and 
accessible information system. The level of intercommunication technology, its 
quality, its coverage and secure capacity to store and process data electronically 
promote efficiency and are vital for the security of the maritime transportation 
services (Wilmsmeier & Pérez, 2005). High-quality logistics services improve the 
competitiveness of a country’s exports by reducing the costs of transporting goods – 
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especially for countries that are disadvantaged by distance from major markets 
(Korinek & Sourdin, 2011:p.5). In addition, countries generally trade more with those 
that have similarities in the quality of logistics services (Burns, 2015). On the other 
hand, customs procedures, tracking and tracing services and inspection (before, 
during and after docking) all add more challenges to this process.  
 
Korinek and Sourdin (2011) estimate that the time required to complete both 
importing and exporting procedures affects trades. Every extra day needed to prepare 
goods for exporting and importing reduces trade by around 4%. They state that an 
extra day that goods spend at the border has a greater negative impact on trade flows 
than an extra day spent at sea delivering a container of goods. The costs of logistics 
procedures might be affected by technical aspects, such as the need for a harbour 
pilot, SPS inspections, red-tape (custom brokers) protocols and port congestion 
(OECD, 2014; Sánchez et al, 2003).  
 
Burns (2015) asserts that inefficiency in port logistics or in the supply chain and 
obsolete or inappropriate infrastructure may represent serious disadvantages and 
higher costs. The lack of secondary maritime services to complement maritime 
transportation structures, such as ship maintenance and repair technicians, docking 
and mooring maintenance, pier security, container management, also affect the 
processes. Various authors suggest that investments in logistics services and 
infrastructure, such as the number of cranes, the  maximum draught and storage 
areas for origin and destination ports, can enhance trade and further investments, 
both local and foreign too (Burns, 2015; Márquez-Ramos et al, 2007). In general, the 
impact of the port infrastructure and efficiency in ports, whilst differing by industry, 
reduces the cost of trade (OECD, 2014).   
 
Generally, certification requirements, particularly the verification of products’ 
conformity with technical regulations, are a major concern for the surveyed exporters, 
regardless of the destination for their product (Mimouni et al, 2009). At the same 
time, obstacles to trade in relation to traceability requirements, tolerance limits for 
residues and contaminants and inspections of restricted substances tend to increase 
delays. Commodities requiring special conditions for their transport, such as 
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refrigerated cargo, bear an increased price not only for transportation but also for 
inspection protocols (Márquez-Ramos et al, 2007). For instance, fumigation 
procedures could be requested before cross-border transactions of goods to control 
pests and to prevent the transfer of exotic organisms. Branch and Robarts (2014) state 
that in the case of the carriage of grains the documentation required on cargo ships 
should be in accordance with the regulations of the International Code for the Safe 
Carriage of Grain in Bulk.  
 
Many other protocols and inspections might be established by countries including: 
recognition of arrivals, x-ray inspections, procedures for crew identification, cleaning 
holds before and after carriage and health protocols. All of these may add delays to 
processes and increase costs. Whilst not all of them are directly associated with 
cabotage restrictions, many of the procedures or policies developed were created 
indirectly to implement the countries’ preferences through cabotage. 
 
 
3.2.0 National preferences through cabotage policies  
Historically, nations have invoked their sovereign rights and trade preferences. 
Countries tend to discriminate or restrict the movement of passengers, services, 
providers, crew, technicians and/or goods within their borders. Although the historical 
justification for these restrictions has been national security, the clear intent of many 
cabotage regulations, particularly those affecting the transportation of goods by 
water, is to protect local industries and labour interests (WEF, 2013a:p.48). 
 
As previously mentioned (Chapter 1), cabotage is associated with sailing between 
capes or along the coast. It has roots in the British and Dutch Empires (Santos-Santos, 
1997) to protect their shipping between their colonies. Currently, every country with a 
coastline has regulatory frameworks to restrict sea trade (Table 9). Therefore, the 
Cabotage Act might be considered as a NTM on sea transportation.  
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Table 9: Summary of national flag preferences in domestic trade 
 
Extracted from: USDOT (2001:p.4). 
 
 
Parameswaran (2004:p.60) states that ‘cabotage restrictions effectively exclude 
foreigners from entering the [domestic] market and represent discriminatory 
protectionist practices based on grounds of nationality that treat foreign maritime 
service providers less favourably than domestic ones’. Others argue that cabotage 
laws are designed to guarantee the participation of the country’s citizens in its own 
domestic trade (Okoroji & Ukpere, 2011). This may include employment, national 
defence, and other socioeconomic purposes (USDoT-MarAd, 2001:p.2). Although 
trade globalisation is directly linked to the globalisation of transport itself (OECD, 
2003b), market intensification and integration will require a more complex, liberalised 
way to manage competitiveness in the supply chain. Therefore, ‘cabotage policies 
Country  Cabotage
Fleet 
Subsidies
Crewing 
Requirement
Ownership 
Restriction
Domestic 
Construction 
Provisions
Reflagging 
Restrictions
United States Y P Y Y Y Y
Argentina Y P Y Y - P
Australia Y P Y - - -
Bahamas Y Y Y Y - INP
Brazil Y Y Y Y Y Y
Canada Y - Y P - P
Chile Y P Y Y - Y
China Y P Y Y - Y
Honduras Y - Y Y - INP
India Y - Y Y - INP
Israel - - - - - INP
Japan Y Y Y Y - P
Kenya - - - - - INP
Mexico Y Y Y Y - INP
Panama P - - - - -
Russia Y Y Y Y INP INP
Saudi Arabia Y - - Y - INP
Singapore - - - - - INP
South Africa - - - - - INP
Uruguay Y - Y - - INP
EU Members P P P P - Y
Belgium - Y Y - - -
Cyprus - - - - - INP
Denmark P P Y Y - P
Finland Y - Y Y - INP
Ireland P P P - - -
Netherlands P Y P Y - INP
Malta P - P - - P
United Kingdom P P Y - - -
Y=Yes;  —=No;  INP=Information Not Provided;  P=Partial;  SIDS in Bold
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could be the most restricted form to trade’ (Parameswaran, 2004:p.348) in maritime 
transportation by reducing market openness and limiting goods’ mobility to domestic 
services. 
 
In the European Union (EC Regulation 3577/92), cabotage laws on trade have been 
partially relaxed by requiring member countries to liberalise their prevailing policies 
among themselves. For the EU the topic is not exclusive to maritime transportation, 
because it includes all cargo-carrying trade within these countries. Therefore, since 
the regulation was approved, their markets have been open (fully open since 1998) to 
vessels owned by companies based in fellow EU member nations, but not for six 
member countries. Those countries (Belgium, Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) had no cabotage restrictions 
before the EC Regulation; thus, they preserve their previous status (OECD, 2003a). 
 
At the international level, despite the best efforts of some countries, the maritime 
service negotiations in the Doha Round have not progressed any further than previous 
attempts in the period of the built-in agenda (Brooks, 2009). More than 50 members 
issued a Joint Statement on the Negotiations on Maritime Transport (van Grasstek, 
2013:p.346). Following the meeting in Qatar in 2001 and subsequent meetings in 
Mexico (2003), Hong Kong (2005), France (2005), Germany (2007) and Switzerland 
(2008), the Doha negotiations remain uncertain in 2014. Cargo reservation schemes 
and investment limitations are other forms of NTMs that are highly related to this 
topic (OECD, 2003b) but are especially preserved and supported by the US (Hearn, 
1970). Nevertheless, in general, countries looking for competitiveness have adopted 
new strategies to deal with those policies, but in SIDSs only a few could be highlighted 
(Cyprus, Malta and Singapore). 
 
Cabotage policies are recognised as being important for many countries and thus 
politically sensitive restrictions are applicable to the movement of goods within their 
borders. Whilst the restrictions are based on national security concerns, their 
domestic supply chain could be preserving inefficiencies, affecting their 
competitiveness (WEF, 2013a). It is believed that cabotage liberalisation may reduce 
the cost of production. Therefore, its relaxation might mean savings on imported 
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goods and on intermediate inputs, which would be beneficial for the whole supply 
chain (Novianti et al, 2015).  
 
UNCTAD (2013d) reports that in 2012 the nationality of the owners of more than 70% 
of the world’s gross tonnage was different from the nationality of the flag state, which 
means that the ship is ‘flagged out’. As more and more registries are competing for 
business, the traditional distinction between ‘national’ and ‘open’ flags of registration 
has become less common due to the mode of ‘sharing flags’, which is much more 
common than a decade ago. However, in some important jurisdictions, this mode is 
limited, which may affect trade costs due to restrictions on fleet availability.   
 
Economists in the US argue that the costs of regulations, especially from cabotage 
protection, are substantial (Stiglitz, 2012 in Hansen, 2012a; Smith, 2004; Hufbauer & 
Elliott, 1994). Different approaches to calculating welfare costs by relaxing cabotage 
restrictions in the US diverge and are estimated to be between $200 million and $9.8 
billion. Largely mirroring those of the US relaxing estimations, China’s cabotage 
regulations could reduce costs by some $500 to $700 million and $1 billion in 
inventory by trans-shipping instead of rerouting (van Grasstek, 2013). Nevertheless, 
there is a debate concerning which items should be considered cabotage costs, 
because it is believed that the data traditionally collected may include shipping costs: 
the cost of loading and unloading at ports, insurance premiums, port fees, the cost of 
labour and fuel, the service tariff, towboat services and various other charges that 
may vary among countries and/or traded commodities (Novianti et al, 2015). 
Therefore, due to the differences in the data collected by countries, the estimates of 
the shipping costs attributed to cabotage, might be associated to but not exclusive of 
it. 
 
Since 2000 several nations have further considered the relaxation of their 
international relay regulations, particularly growth markets in which an efficient 
infrastructure is the key to future developments. In Brazil, for example, foreign-
flagged vessels only operate in cabotage, but port support and maritime support 
navigation are allowed when chartered by a Brazilian shipping company provided that 
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there are no Brazilian-flagged vessels available, if it is a matter of public interest or if 
the foreign vessel is being chartered as a substitute for a vessel owned by the Brazilian 
shipping company under construction at a Brazilian shipyard (Bello-Olowookere, 
2011). Although some authors posit that the Brazilian institutional framework in place 
has acted as a causal factor in strengthening the bureaucratic roles of maritime 
transportation and logistics, its cabotage protocols are less restrictive than those of 
the US (Ng et al, 2013). For example, while the adoption of an electronic freight 
system is positive, it fails both to reduce red tape and to invest in the necessary 
supporting information and communication technology infrastructure. As a result, 
various global agribusinesses experience multiple delays each week when government 
servers’ crash, allegedly affecting companies annual efficiency of its truck fleet by 4%.  
(WEF, 2013c).  
 
A different example in Asia is the case of South Korea. Its Government abolished 
trans-shipment fees and relaxed the cabotage rules in 2003 to make its ports more 
attractive as a regional northern hub for containers. A month after the liberalisation, 
various foreign shipping lines had entered the market, providing competition and 
reducing rates for shippers (Bello-Olowookere, 2011). Similarly, India allows a foreign 
cruise vessel calling at more than one Indian port to sail without obtaining a license 
(Hackston et al, 2005). In 2005 it modified the Merchant Shipping Act to allow foreign 
vessels to move containers between Jawaharlal Nehru and Mumbai. In 2011, 
inaugurating the port of Vallarpadam as a free-trade zone, India initiated the use of a 
high-scale trans-shipped system. Around 70% of the exports and imports of India are 
trans-shipped abroad, many through the ports of Sri Lanka, Singapore and Dubai. As a 
consequence, India is now not only focusing on relaxing its cabotage policies but also 
seeking efficiency in its domestic supply chain (Krishnakumar, 2012). A more recent 
analysis particularly for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) indicates 
that the transport service sector’s openness may reduce the transport costs of 
imports (Novianti et al, 2015). 
 
Four of the five small economies highlighted in the list above have full or partial 
liberalised maritime policies for trade. The Bahamas is the exception (Table 20 above). 
It is believed that their level of maritime liberalisation is related to their level of 
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competitiveness. However, the literature does not mention much about the topic in 
SIDSs or small islands economies in comparison with others.  
 
Some supporters of cabotage policies sustain their arguments in relation to the 
importance of controlling maritime emissions and other potential environmental 
effects. New specifications for new vessels could be enforced by the intervention of 
public agencies. High specifications, such as having a high intake of refrigerated 
containers, double-hull fuel tanks and the ability for the main engine to be run on LNG 
as well as normal bunker fuel, are part of the projected designs (Container Team, 
2013). However, this may also explain some of the price differentials, especially if the 
costs of raw materials and labour are not in a competitive market. The US regulations 
for crude tankers also require cross-agency interventions, for instance the Maritime 
Security Programme and the Environmental Protection Agency, which may imply 
some mechanisms or requirements for fleet renovation or security controls. 
 
The effectiveness of cabotage in preserving employment and national fleets has been 
questioned. Cabotage regulations have been relaxed within the European Union (EU) 
and elsewhere without obvious downside costs. Therefore, in view of the benefits that 
followed domestic liberalisation in other economic sectors, it is suggested that those 
countries that have cabotage restrictions should consider removing those provisions. 
Even if it is not politically feasible to achieve full liberalisation immediately, serious 
consideration should be given to setting a time frame for such liberalisation, with 
access initially given to OECD member countries (OECD, 2003a). Although Greece,61 
Italy and Spain initially rejected any proposals for full liberalisation, the EU is following 
a programme for eventual full liberalisation (Parameswaran, 2004). For decades, the 
European shipowners’ associations have been supportive of the inclusion of 
movements and repositioning of equipment as regular business as well as labourers 
between the Western European countries. However, in America, specifically in the US, 
the situation is very different from that in the EU. 
 
 
  
                                                          
61 In regard to this topic in Greece, please refer to Giannopoulos and Aifandopoulou-Klimis (2004). 
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3.3.0 International experiences in maritime cabotage 
Before the Confederation in 1867, Canada had some form of protection to reserve its 
domestic activity first for British Commonwealth and eventually to Canadian-flag 
ships. Until the 1950s only registered Canadian ships with all applicable duties paid 
had unrestricted access to engage in coastal trade activities. Eventually, the 
contraction in importance of the Commonwealth, the emergence of the OECD and the 
extension of sovereign rights to the outer edge of the continental shelf provoked the 
transformation of policies on related activities in waters under Canadian jurisdiction 
(Hodgson, 2007). The last legislation is based on the 1992 version but after NAFTA and 
other international cases of relaxation in maritime regulations. In 2004 the Canadian 
registered fleet constituted only 6.5% of the size of the US-flag fleet, while the 
Mexican fleet was 2.8% the size of the US fleet (UNCTAD, 2005). However, the 
pressures of the US Cabotage Act dictate a unique situation that seems to limit 
Canadian trade; moreover, those interventions seem to be inappropriate when the US 
is seeking unilateral relaxation of the rules by Canada (Hodgson, 2007). The researcher 
concludes that ‘the present cabotage regime has effectively constructed a barrier 
between domestic and international operations, to the point where ships positioned 
and qualified to operate in one regime are unable to participate in the other’ (p.30). 
Clearly, the policy regime is large and stable enough to sustain healthy commercial 
operations but not for vulnerable economies. However, if Canada unilaterally opens 
its market to foreign-flag participation due to its geographical position, it would be 
likely to result in significant US-flag carriage invasion controlling the Canadian 
domestic market without reciprocity to its own carriers (Hackston et al, 2005). 
 
3.3.1 Hong Kong 
Hong Kong’s archipelago consists of more than 200 islands, a total area of 1,104 km2 
and around 7 million citizens. Easily62 connected to mainland China, the port 
contributes around 1.3% to its GDP and provides around 88,000 jobs (Yi, 2014). The 
maritime framework of its container terminal is currently established by China under a 
policy of ‘one country two systems’ of cabotage regulations. It has benefited from the 
port framework which ensures that it remains a key player in the market. As Hong 
Kong is a special administrative region of China, carrying cargo between mainland 
                                                          
62  The shortest distance between Hong Kong and mainland China is approximately 20 nm by sea (less than 2 hours), and by land it is no less than 18 
miles. 
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ports and the city is not subject to cabotage and the port has long been preferred by 
foreign carriers as a trans-shipment hub for cargo to or from mainland China (Knowler, 
2015a). The Chinese cabotage laws prohibit foreign-flagged vessels from moving 
cargoes from one mainland coastal port to another. However, Hong Kong is 
considered a foreign port for these purposes; hence, rather than being direct 
competition for China’s ports, it has developed a complementary relationship among 
them (Wee, 2013). Besides, one of the top twenty biggest container operators in the 
world (OOCL) is based in Hong Kong (UNCTAD, 2014:p.40). 
 
Some foreign maritime companies (particularly Maerks Lines) have appealed to China 
to liberalise its cabotage policy. Apparently, Hong Kong Port’s high-sea traffic and 
volume cause serious delays for private companies affecting their competitiveness 
(Knowler, 2015a). In 2013 Beijing announced that it would permit Chinese carriers to 
ship, using international cargoes, but only between Shanghai and some other national 
ports. The vessels could be flagged abroad but registered with the Chinese transport 
ministry. This would be a pilot programme to boost trans-shipment in the Shanghai 
free-trade zone to promote its port as the busiest in the world but also as an 
international shipping centre. Nevertheless, it is believed that cabotage relaxation in 
other ports, while attracting a large amount of trans-shipment from other ports in 
China and abroad, might compromise other ports’ competitiveness as trans-shipment 
centres, particularly those in Hong Kong and Shanghai (Shen, 2015).  
 
The Chinese strategy in progress seems to allow those cargoes previously registered as 
Hong Kong flagged, while those registered in other Chinese destinations should apply 
to be considered eventually. Although currently foreign cargoes are practically 
excluded from China’s domestic coastal trade, in a hypothetical case of total 
relaxation of China’s cabotage its fleet63 number and strength would be the logical 
way to supply goods to themself (Shen, 2015). However, recent developments suggest 
that the cabotage rule might be gradually relaxed; thus, the Hong Kong Government is 
apparently considering enhancing the handling capacity of the existing container 
terminals and related infrastructural facilities (Yi, 2014). 
 
                                                          
63 It is estimated that, of China’s owned vessels, around 12% (200 tdw) and 63% are flagged overseas (Shen, 2015).  
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3.3.2 Singapore 
Galbraith (2014) states that, in the late 1990s the Port of Singapore was managed by a 
highly complacent and self-satisfied team. Certainly, it was in charge of the primary 
container-shipping hub in Asia and the vast majority of the cargo was transhipped to 
other destinations, so it was too successful to worry about particularities besides 
being highly profitable. Despite this scenario, Galbraith suggests that, new price scales 
were imposed, increasing the costs of the shipowners and the port management in 
Singapore, apparently without a proper analysis. Years later the biggest Maersk Line 
developed a rival port at Tanjung Pelepas in cooperation with the Malaysian 
Government. Evergreen Line acted similarly in Taiwan. Within a very short time, a 
portion of Singapore’s container throughput disappeared to the Malaysian territory. 
Currently, around 8 million containers are shipped through Tanjung Pelapas and other 
amounts by Evergreen in Taiwan. Nevertheless, in 2014 Singapore still remained the 
headquarters of two (APL and PIL) of the top twenty biggest container operators in 
the world (UNCTAD, 2014:p.40).  
 
Singapore’s hegemony in the region is continually being undermined by challenges 
from rival ports. The new Government in Indonesia has signalled that one of its 
primary tasks will be to develop the port of Djakarta as a regional container hub. 
Besides, India and Sri Lanka seem to have similar interests. Consequently, it is clear 
that maritime transportation and ports are very powerful and shipping is a dynamic 
sector on which trade depends. Countries’ economic development requires a high 
level of flexibility in their business frameworks and a continued reinvention capacity.  
 
3.3.3 New Zealand 
According to Hackston and colleagues (2005:p.15), New Zealand is an instructive case 
in which cabotage restrictions were substantially liberalised in 1994. An archipelago 
with a relatively small economy, a population of only 4 million people and a relatively 
limited number of maritime vessels (21 ships operated by 9 companies), it decided to 
allow foreign entry into its coastal trade as part of much broader initiatives to improve 
the competitiveness of its national economy (Brooks, 2009). It is believed that the 
objective of the New Zealand Government’s dramatic action of cabotage relaxation 
was carefully designed to promote competition but without a substantive reduction in 
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its domestic fleet. Reports of the time show that the use of foreign vessels for 
domestic movements was minimal if not non-existent. A reduction in the 
transportation rates occurred after the entry of foreign maritime transportation 
companies. For instance, the freight rates for coastal containers fell quickly after 
liberalisation. The southbound rates in dry-container movements dropped by up to 
30% (from NZ$1200–$1500 to $950–$1000, respectively), but the reduction in the 
northbound rates was much smaller (Liu, 2009). Furthermore, it is reported that the 
freight rates for grain produced in the south and consumed in the north fell from 
NZ$90 to NZ$40 per tonne, which is certainly beneficial for the annual return on grain 
for southern (domestic) farmers. Apparently, this pattern of reductions was not the 
case for refrigerated containers64 (Liu, 2009). However, the reason or theories for it 
are not presented in the literature reviewed.  
 
Unfortunately, along with the wide-ranging deregulation introduced by the 
Government, it appears that the previous good practice of gathering statistical data on 
domestic marine transportation was abandoned (Hackston et al, 2005:p.16). 
Consequently, the most important publications found related to qualitative 
considerations based on stakeholder input and limited quantitative information. It is 
thought that data gathering was conducted during a very short period after the 
cabotage liberalisation (3 months). Consequently, Hackston and colleagues (2005) 
suggest that this short time was not sufficient to explore New Zealand’s changes.  
 
A few important points to consider in the evaluation of liberalised maritime services 
are the impact on the freight rate of changes in fuel prices and currency fluctuations. 
The literature is clear about the sensitivity of maritime transport services to the world 
prices of fuel. In the case of currency fluctuations, the domestic industry must pay for 
fuel and charter fixed costs65 that could be higher than those for foreign firms because 
of their more flexible scenarios for trade (Hackston et al, 2005). Similarly, taxation and 
compliance costs may differ dramatically between domestic and foreign maritime 
firms, which might affect the Government’s revenues. 
 
                                                          
64
 Also named reefer, which is an intermodal (shipping) container that is refrigerated for the transportation.  
65 The data presented by Hackston et al (2005) are 9% in fuel and 19% in charter fixed costs as regular cost bases for New Zealand’s domestic 
maritime firms. 
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Liu (2009) reports that those opposed to the relaxation argued that its costs would be 
high, exerting an impact on employment opportunities and equity in employment 
conditions and negatively affecting New Zealand’s GDP, balance of payments, regional 
development, environment and national defence. Besides, it is argued that the tax 
environment faced by the domestic shipowners gives an unfair advantage to foreign 
vessels. In addition, foreign seafarers are not subject to New Zealand’s laws and thus 
are free of taxes. According to the sectors opposed to the cabotage liberalisation, all 
these aspects together would make the NZ domestic maritime firms uncompetitive, 
resulting in insolvent companies and eventually reducing the number of dedicated 
coastal operators. Similar arguments have been presented in the US by domestic 
maritime organisations to justify the maintenance of the Cabotage Act that has ruled 
since the 1920s. 
 
 
3.4.0 The US Cabotage Act  
The US has protected its transport sector since the late eighteenth century. The Naval 
Act of 1794 was passed by the US Congress on 27 March 1794 and signed by George 
Washington, establishing a permanent standing naval force of the United States of 
North America, which eventually became the present-day US Navy (Allen, 1909). After 
the colonies’ independence, the participation of foreign ships was practically 
forbidden in the domestic market (USITC, 1991). The US discouraged the use of 
foreign sea transportation imposing tariff and weight taxes in widely discriminated 
forms. The current cabotage prohibition of foreign vessels is covered in section no. 27 
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (46 USC 883), also commonly referred to as the 
‘Jones Act’, named after its author, the US Senator Wesley Jones. The Act was also 
initially related to the offshore US territories66. 
 
Traditionally, due to its nature, maritime transport has been relatively open to 
competition. Unlike the majority of countries, the US cabotage policies led to a 
combination of laws to protect domestic trade. The law requires all domestic maritime 
cargoes transported by water between two domestic ports to be carried by US 
citizens. This applies to owners, operators, builders, repairers and the vessel crew 
                                                          
66 From the east coast via the Caribbean: Panama Canal, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands. Besides, from the west coast: Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, the 
Philippines, American Samoa, Northern Mariana Island and the Marshal Islands. 
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(Parameswaran, 2004). For instance, all officers and no fewer than 75% of the crews 
of vessels engaged in cabotage must be US citizens, with the remainder being lawfully 
admitted foreigners (Goure, 2011). 
 
Very few exceptions to the Cabotage Act have been identified through history: for 
instance, during the First World War and other catastrophic events (Bloomberg Views, 
2013); after the independence of the Philippines; an exception was made for the 
Virgin Islands, American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands; a partial exclusion 
was made for Guam and Alaska; and in 1981 the last partial exclusion was made for 
Puerto Rico’s cruises only in the tourism sector. The Act also provides mechanisms for 
other very particular exclusions, such as the ones applicable to empty vessels at sea,67 
the US rescue68 or seizure69 of foreign-flagged vessels constructed outside the US 
during a war, by bilateral transfer70 and other much more specific71 scenarios (e.g. 
environmental issues72, 73), which are included in the Merchant Marine Act (Alameda 
& Valentín, 2014). In addition, there are several federal regulations that are associated 
with domestic marine activities linked to the Cabotage Act. For instance, the Dredging 
Act (46 USC 55109), Towage Act (46 USC 55111) and Salvage Act (46 USC 80304) cover 
specific activities, as their names indicate. The Nicholson Act of 1950 (46 USC App. 
251(a)) regulates the use of fishing vessels. Section 446 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (also 
known as the Smoot Hawley Tariff) (19 USC 1466) imposes a 50% ad valorem duty on 
repairs to US-flag ships performed in a foreign place. Clearly, the main objective is the 
complete regulation of maritime transportation in all the US (mainland and territories) 
ports.  
 
In 1991, the US International Trade Commission (USITC) estimated the output and 
employment effects for downstream sectors. In agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
production, the output reduction is estimated to be $141.2 million, while employment 
was reduced by 1,065 full-time jobs. In the mining and oil sector combined, the 
reduction was estimated to be $329.8 million and 1,014 full-time jobs. They further 
estimated that an annual direct subsidy of $619 million was required to sustain the 
                                                          
67 Title 46 U.S.C. §55107. Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/55107 
68
 Title 46 U.S.C. §12107. Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/12107 
69 Title 46 U.S.C. §12112. Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/12112 
70
 Title 46 U.S.C. §55106. Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/55106 
71 Title 46 U.S.C. §55108. Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/55108 
72 Title 46 U.S.C. §55105(b). Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/55105 
73 Title 46 U.S.C. §55113. Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/55113 
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domestic Jones Act shipping services. In addition, using indirect calculation methods, 
the protection costs of the Cabotage Act for the US economy are estimated to be $5.9 
billion (USITC, 1991:pp.1–2–11).  
 
Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) estimate that the net cost of the Cabotage Act for the 
whole US economy was $1.1 billion. The USITC, in its reports of 1991 and 1995, states 
that the annual impact was around $9.8 billion and $2.9 billion, respectively (USGAO, 
1998). UNCTAD recognising the difficulty of calculating the value of maritime 
transportation in its 1995 report estimated that freight accounted for approximately 
5% of the total value of imports. Two years later, the US Department of Commerce 
Census Bureau (USDoC Census Bureau, 1997) reported that the value of US federal 
subventions to the shipbuilding industry (only) attributed to supporting the Jones Act 
costs for freight was $479 million annually.  
 
Using data from 1996, the USITC estimated that the economic cost of the Jones Act 
was as much as $1.3 billion in that year and its removal would result in a 22% 
reduction in the price of shipping (Smith, 2004). In 2002, using the data of ocean-
borne cargoes the USITC estimated that liberalisation of the Cabotage Act, could cause 
around $700 million dollars in welfare change for the US economy (USITC, 2011; 
Smith, 2004). However, van Grasstek (2013) reports that the WTO’s estimation of cost 
to the US economy was just $200 million, although it is not clear whether these data 
consider inland shipping or ocean-borne cargoes only.  
 
Although economic studies are more opposed to rather than in favour of the US 
Cabotage Act, both sides offer estimations using different approaches. For instance, 
the Transportation Institute (2013), an organisation supported by the US maritime 
sector, published a comparable table using data from 2011 (Table 10), arguing that the 
Act supports around 80,000 employees and provides $2.6 billion dollars of annual 
income for the US Government. 
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Table 10: Total operational and capital investment impact of the Jones Act in the 
shipping industry on the US economy in 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct contribution of the Jones Act to the shipping industry in 2011 
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers. In: Transportation Institute (2013). 
 
 
In the literature the most common justification for the US Cabotage Act is based on 
national security. Those in favour argue that the Act guarantees sea transport supply 
and equipment to US troops during wars overseas (Jewell, 2013). The US Department 
of Commerce (2001:p.81) states in a public testimony: ‘the Act serves the interest of 
the US because it provides a fleet of sealift capable vessels, a workforce of 
experienced and knowledgeable people and a shipbuilding industrial base that can be 
used to protect American economic and military security’. Similarly, Goure (2011) 
posits that, without the Jones Act, ‘massive subsidies to the US maritime industry 
would be required to cover the exorbitant prices for naval vessels’. He also argues that 
repealing the Jones Act would cause the whole US economy and the transportation of 
critical military cargoes to be dependent on foreign-owned and/or foreign-flagged 
Direct 
Impacts
Indirect 
Operational  
Impacts
Indirect Capital 
Investment 
Impacts
Total Impacts
Employment 82,040 382,850 13,550 478,440
Labour Income   ($MM) 7,213 $20,970 $768 $28,952
Value Added      ($MM) $12,060 $32,456 $1,229 $45,745
Output               ($MM) $34,261 $55,647 $2,632 $92,540
Tax Impact         ($MM) $2,580 $7,022 $274 $9,876
Employment 36,200 45,760 82,040
Labour Income     ($ BB) $2.40 $4.80 $7.20
Value Added        ($ BB) $3.00 $9.10 $12.10
Output                 ($ BB) $7.40 $26.90 $34.30
Taxes                   ($ BB) N.A N.A $2.60
Shipbuilding and 
Repairing
Total Direct 
Contribution
Water 
Transportation
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vessels at great expense to US national security. Furthermore, he suggests that, by 
using inland waterborne transportation, shippers save around $10 per tonne over the 
cost of shipping by alternative modes, resulting in $7 billion annual savings 
nationwide. However, no data or calculations are provided to support these 
estimations. 
 
The Military Sealift Command (2004) argues that half of the mariners used to crew 
government-owned vessels come from the commercial merchant marine. It also 
alleges that, in the absence of a robust and effective domestic maritime industry, they 
would be dependent on foreign shipyards and vessels to meet the nation’s ongoing 
needs for military transportation (The West Coast Sailor, 2013). Goure (2011:p.17) 
asserts that ‘via the inland waterways, a terrorist could reach America’s heartland and 
many of its largest and most important urban centres’. In fact, it is said that is by 
preserving its current sea-power that the US influence has never been more important 
for its security (US Sea Service, 2007). 
 
Supportive editorials in financial publications over the last five years, advocating 
maritime liberalisation in the US, are common (Box 1). For instance, Bloomberg Views 
(2013) argues that two sections of the Jones Act should be dismantled. Firstly, the 
requirement that ships used in domestic trade must be built in the US should be 
removed. Secondly, foreign shippers should be allowed to compete in the US. 
Similarly, in Forbes Magazine Pavlo (2012) claims that US maritime companies 
operating under the Jones Act represent a small, organised and close-knit group, to 
act in some cases in clear violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In the same way, it is 
reported that for North Carolina livestock farmers it is cheaper to import grain from 
Argentina and Canada rather than from their southeastern US state neighbours (Blom-
Hill, 2013). 
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Box 1: 40,000 tons of New Jersey salt, stuck in Maine 
Authors: Kilgannon, C. & Santora, M. (2014) The New York Times 
FEBRUARY/  The road salt supply at the Marsh Street Salt Pile at the Port of Newark can 
be several stories high; at the moment, with intense demand, it is nearly empty. New 
Jersey officials are calling it a maddening winter’s tale: how the raging forces of nature 
and a nearly century-old maritime law have clashed and managed to strand a 40,000-ton 
load of road salt in a waterfront depot in Searsport, Me. 
The salt is sorely needed in New Jersey, where salt sheds are down to their final grains 
and a shortage has grown so acute that local officials have contemplated closing roadways 
and curtailing public bus routes. State officials had come up with a partial solution by 
arranging for a vessel that would not run afoul of the federal law to retrieve a portion of 
the marooned salt. But a winter storm in New England forced that vessel, a barge, to seek 
shelter in Providence, R.I., officials with the New Jersey Department of Transportation 
said. 
//.....// 
The New Jersey Transportation Department bought the salt earlier this month to 
replenish its stock, which has been consumed by a barrage of snowstorms. Even one of 
the state’s largest depots, a site in Port Newark run by International Salt, has nearly run 
out. So when International’s staff said they had a spare stockpile in Maine, state officials 
pounced. 
State officials said they arranged on Feb. 7 to buy the salt and ship it immediately to Port 
Newark on a vessel that had just unloaded its cargo in Maine and would have delivered 
the entire load to New Jersey by last weekend. But then officials learned that the 
maritime law, which was passed in 1920....  
Officials applied for the waiver on Thursday, but the Department of Homeland Security 
has not yet ruled. Such waivers are issued infrequently — limited ones were granted after 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy to expedite fuel shipments — but New Jersey 
officials argued that the state was facing a dire situation. Some municipalities, officials 
said, were being forced to seek alternatives, including mixing sand into rock salt and using 
a briny mixture similar to pickle juice as supplements. 
The Jones Act was pushed through Congress after World War I by Senator Wesley Jones of 
Washington.... 
 
 
3.4.1 Administrative structure and data availability 
In the 1950s the US Maritime Administration (US MarAd, 2015) was created by the US 
Congress as part of the US Department of Transportation. Currently its annual budgets 
are dedicated to promoting US competitiveness (89%), environmental sustainability 
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(3%) and other organisational (7%) goals (USDoT, 2015). In fiscal year 2015, the agency 
requested $406.8 million to fund activities supporting ships and shipping, port 
operations, vessel operations, national security and strategic mobility, ship disposal, 
the environment, safety and education. The US MarAd has registered74 164 vessels, 
52% of them Jones Act eligible. The US Merchant Marine Academy and States 
Maritime Academies are under its control. Furthermore, the programme of Capital 
Assets Management related to water transportation, Maritime Environment and 
Technology Assistance and Ship Disposals are programmes under its management.  
 
US MarAd is associated with Home Land Security,75 US Customs and Border Protection 
(US-CBP), US Department of Defence and many other programmes, particularly Food 
Aid and the Maritime Guarantee Loan. It should be highlighted that the Maritime 
Security Program – administered by US MarAd – ensures the maintenance of a 
(private) commercial fleet capable of supporting a US presence in foreign commerce 
while also ensuring the military’s ability to obtain assured access to these commercial 
vessels, intermodal facilities and mariners. Annually, around $3.1 million are paid in 
public funds for each of the 60 (private) ships enrolled in the programme (US DoT, 
2015). Arguably, the Jones Act subsidies to the benefit of the US domestic maritime 
firms are voluntary; however, the direct public payments granted per private vessel 
under the programme are very attractive. For instance, for the maritime firm Matson 
in Guam, that benefit is an important consideration. Guam is one of its principle ports 
of call in the Pacific but also remains a major US military base (Container Team, 2013). 
 
US CBP has direct responsibility for enforcing the Jones Act and may grant waivers of 
the requirements only in the interest of national defence. Once US CBP has received a 
request for the use of a foreign vessel for a domestic trade, it must seek US MarAd’s 
advice before making a decision by law (46 U.S.C. § 501). US MarAd’s role in the 
waiver process is to canvass the domestic shipping market to locate suitable coastwise 
qualified vessels and then to inform US CBP of the results. If a US ship is located and 
available, no waiver is needed. The protective umbrella erected for US sea shipping is 
complex in nature and has been designed to be preserved (Gruendel, 1980). As a 
                                                          
74 The data were collected from the official Maritime Administration website, Flag Fleet Summary, published on 9 October 2015.  
75 Particularly two agencies: the US Coast Guard and the US Transportation Security Administration, both under the Home Land Security 
organisational umbrella.  
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result, even strong federal agencies, such as the US General Accountability Office (US 
GAO, 2013), admit that, due to the lack of data available, their recommendations are 
limited.   
 
The data collection on cargoes in tonnes and their purchase value is generally a 
combined activity between US Coast Guard, US MarAd and US Department of 
Commerce. Additionally, state servants posted in every domestic port in US territory 
may collect data according to their internal regulations, particularly for the 
Department of Treasury. However, freight rates and the costs of trade are not under 
the control of any US agencies, because by law that decision is considered to be 
protected as the right of a business relationship between the importer and the service 
provider. Consequently, the data on costs associated with freight are not published, 
but they are under the control of the private maritime transportation service 
providers. In addition, industrial importers may consider the negotiation of rates as 
part of their competitive advantage; thus, the information is considered to be 
sensitive or a corporate privilege. 
 
3.4.2 Cabotage and agribusinesses 
Frankel (1982) posits that the application of the US Cabotage Act to the colonies (early 
in the twentieth century) was initially requested by the US colonial landlords 
(‘Hacendados’) to maintain a captive market under their control. Another view of the 
interest in preserving the antique Spanish form of cabotage was to ensure 
participation of the native shipping companies in coastal shipping and to protect them 
from foreign competition. However, during the US colonial period, the historical data 
available show only one local (PR) shipowner, whom we suspect was not robust 
enough to survive the US tariff imposition early in 1900.  
 
Frankel (1982) also argues that a group of farmers in the southwest of the US was the 
first group claiming cabotage exclusion in recent years. In 1996 a unified group of 
strong associations in the US agricultural sector demanded changes to the Act. As a 
result, many agribusiness owners argued that the Cabotage Act undermines their 
ability to compete with foreign producers (Piggott & Goodwin, 2002).  
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As a result, a study about the effects of the Jones Act on US agriculture was published 
in 2002 by Piggott and Goodwin. Using a spatial model, they focus their research on 
the impact of the cost of soybeans (only) in North Carolina (NC) as an importer state 
to satisfy local demand. They performed simulations for the NC soybean producers, 
estimating their welfare loss to be $1.7 million dollars. Furthermore, they reveal that 
the costs to NC soybean producers are outweighed by other benefits received by the 
soybean producers who export into NC. The study concludes that the reduction in cost 
could stimulate trade and have some positive implications for producers’ welfare. 
 
In 2003 a coalition of southeastern farmers’ associations – the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, American Soybean Association, National Corn Growers and United 
Soybean Board – commissioned a study from Promar International. It concludes that 
an exemption from the Jones Act, for bulk feed ingredients, would be helpful but 
would not fundamentally alter the situation due to the inland combination of 
transport required for trade (Promar International, 2003).  
 
The Dairy Farmers of Canada in 2011 also demanded changes to the transpacific 
partnership agreement between the US and Canada, specifically the US cabotage 
restrictions (Doyle, 2011). The American Farm Bureau (2014:p.20), in a recent 
publication, reports the approval by majority vote of a resolution for repealing the 
Jones Act, advocating no restrictions regarding the quantities or vessels on which a 
commodity is shipped between US ports. However, Piggott and Goodwin (2002) and 
the USDA (2003) are, so far, the only publications after NAFTA showing procedures or 
data to sustain their views, but no publications on this topic exist after CAFTA-DR. 
 
3.4.3 Cabotage and climate change 
Risk of delays (distance, sinking)  
Lorenzo (1999) states that the continued operation of old and ageing vessels is the 
most commonly cited issue in countries without a liberalised cabotage policy, 
particularly those that have benefited from domestic shipping services. According to 
him, this is highly associated with cargo service standards as well as inefficient 
operations. The risk of maritime accidents is higher in outdated ships, resulting in the 
loss of lives, property damage and dramatic environmental hazards (Box 2).   
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Commonly the complaints of shipowners/operators revolve around conditions or 
factors that allegedly inhibit them from delivering the kind of services 
demanded/expected by their clients (Lorenzo, 1999). Considering the capital-intensive 
Box 2: It’s extremely rare for large ships like ‘El Faro’ to disappear.  The Coast Guard believes the 
missing cargo ship sank in the Atlantic Ocean with 33 people aboard. 
 By: Graham, D. A. (2015) The Atlantic News.  
 
October// El Faro—a 790-foot cargo ship whose name means “lighthouse”—has apparently sunk 
in the Atlantic Ocean, the U.S. Coast Guard believes. 
Rescuers have been searching for the container ship, which was in the path of Hurricane Joaquin, 
since the crew last made contact Thursday morning, saying El Faro was listing but the situation was 
manageable. The vessel was carrying 33 people—28 Americans and five Poles—and while 
searchers have found debris they believe came from the ship, they haven’t found the vessel itself 
or any survivors. One body has been found. 
While nautical disasters remain a fact of life—everything from missing sailboats to deadly 
catastrophes like the Costa Concordia’s sinking or recent ferry disasters in Asia—it is exceptionally 
rare for a large ship like El Faro to disappear. 
How rare? An analysis of vessels greater than 100 gross tons by the insurance giant Allianz found 
that in the past 10 years, from 2005 to 2014, only six ships were reported as “missing/overdue”—
or, in other words, lost. Three were in 2005. There were none reported in 2011, 2012, 2013, or 
2014.  
This isn’t to say that ships don’t sink. In 2014, 49 ships “foundered,” which includes sinking or 
submerging—the largest category of ship losses. But often those are cases where ships sink with 
some warning, and most or all of the crew can be rescued. The second-largest category is ships 
that ran aground. (An excellent 2008 wired story goes inside the world of ship-salvage crews that 
try to right these vessels.) It’s not an illusion that shipping seems safer these days. The number of 
total losses has decreased over the last decade. 
And no ship lost in 2014 in any method—foundered, wrecked, or otherwise—was as large as El 
Faro, which was built in 1975 and was 790 feet long with a gross tonnage of 31,515. The biggest 
cargo ship lost last year was 12,630 gross tons, and while eight of 20 crew members died, that was 
in a collision—not a disappearance. The Caribbean, where El Faro is missing, also sees 
comparatively few losses versus the South China Sea, the Mediterranean, or the British Isles. 
It’s far too early to know what went wrong with El Faro. It’s not uncommon for cargo ships to lose 
containers in heavy seas, but sinking is. Allianz lists several risk factors for ships: overreliance on 
electronic navigation; understaffed or undertrained crews; and structural weakness. El Faro was 
much older than the average container ship worldwide, which is just under 11 years old, but her 
owner told the AP the boat was in good condition and suited to rough weather….” 
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nature of their business, the absence of limited financial assistance and incentives as 
well as the lack of better port infrastructure and facilities might be additional 
constraints for them. Among these conditions is the country’s level of bureaucracy 
and protocols. The lack of flexibility to respond immediately to business opportunities 
is due to restrictive government regulations and related bureaucracy. 
 
...nearly all of the containerships and several of the barges used by these 
carriers [in the domestic market of PR] are operating beyond their 
average expected useful life, which is about 30 years for a containership 
and about 27 years for a barge. (USGAO, 2013:p.6) 
 
 
In other different scenarios of climate change risk, Blom-Hill (2013) reports a case in 
which the company Hancock Lumber in Maine (US) could not find a domestic ship to 
transport its product from Maine to PR. As a result, the company was forced to truck 
lumber to Florida (around 1,600 miles approximately, 23 hours by road) and barge it 
from there. Whilst absurd, it seems not to pose much of a problem for non-perishable 
goods. However, we discoverthat cases like this are much more common in PR’s food 
supply chain than the single case presented by Blom-Hill. In the case of fruits and 
vegetables, this scenario may imply additional costs for product preservation 
(humidity and temperature, gas), less time to handle the produce, a reduction in the 
product’s shelf life, greater perishability and thus less time for consumers’ use. 
Therefore, consumers pay for a short-life product. 
 
Ports and climate change  
Ports and coastal facilities are vulnerable to a range of manmade and natural threats, 
with grievous potential effects on the human and economic security of a nation. It is 
believed that, due to the climate change effects in the following decades, ports’ 
infrastructure could be seriously affected by the rise of the sea level, extreme weather 
events and changes in precipitation. All these expected scenarios may increase 
countries’ level of vulnerability, particularly for SIDSs’. 
 
Given the increase in the sea level and the temperature projections, it is expected that 
the coastal assets of small islands (e.g., corals, mangroves and sea grasses) would be 
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at great risk (Mimura et al, 2007). Consequently, the increases in the risk insurance 
appraisal of maritime transportation could add more costs. Besides, port 
infrastructure in developing regions with low adaptive capacity would be affected 
(UNCTAD, 2013c). For instance, in 2012 Hurricane Sandy in the US East ports (NY and 
NJ) generated economic damage estimated between $30 and $50 billion (Craft, 2012).  
Therefore, ports are potentially vulnerable to extreme weather events, and SIDSs with 
limited maritime infrastructure would be at high risk; hence, ensuring the climate 
resilience of ports is critical for those nations. The strategic importance of ports for 
trade and the current interdependency of the global supply chain demand, in both 
developing and developed countries, are undeniable; accordingly, critical 
consideration of their infrastructure and a risk assessment of the potential effects of 
climate change are vital (UNCTAD, 2013c).  
 
Food supply chain in SIDSs 
SIDSs exhibit highly divergent levels of development but face relatively similar 
challenges in terms of economics. Traditionally, they have depended on subsistence 
and cash crops for survival and economic development (Mimura et al, 2007). SIDSs are 
inherently economically vulnerable due to their remoteness and insularity, 
susceptibility to natural disasters, limited institutional capacity, limited ability to 
diversify, strong dependence on a narrow range of exports and high import content, 
particularly for strategic goods such as food and fuel, the prices of which have 
exhibited high volatility (Briguglio et al, 2006). Briguglio’s economic vulnerability index 
(2010) catalogues SIDSs on the premise that a country’s susceptibility to external 
shocks, its degrees of economic openness, export concentration and dependence on 
strategic imports but it not said much about access to food.  
  
SIDSs food trade has depended on preferential access to major developed-country 
markets, which are slowly eroding (Mimura et al, 2007). Additionally, due to the 
climate change impacts, projecting more uncertainty in the environmental conditions, 
agriculture and food security would be negatively affected. However, the result of 
these disruptions also would affect the maritime transportation sector and with it 
multiple other dependent sectors and services.  
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The logistics performance (Fig.17) for the vast majority of SIDSs seems to be 
significantly worse than that in other countries with similar levels of development. 
Meanwhile, the trend towards urbanisation and increased dependency on food 
imports (Table 11), may affect those countries raising other issues associated to health 
such as the access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food (UN, 2010).   
 
Figure 17: Comparative logistics performance in SIDSs 
 
Source: World Bank Logistic Performance Index, 2010 and 2014.  
 
 
 
As previously mentioned, an important portion of the cost of food is associated with 
the transportation cost. Additionally, the volume of goods is an important factor to 
reduce the cost per unit in maritime transportation. Nevertheless, internal logistics 
inefficiencies may affect the cost rates thus analyses to optimise transport and 
management are essential, particularly for temperature-controlled perishable goods. 
Markets that are highly dependent on perishables at any given time are easily affected 
by food price volatility and the extra costs for services using refrigerated containers. 
However, it seems that markets with high maritime transport competition show a 
reduction in the cost of trade as well as a reduction in the cost of containers (Castro-
Gonzáles et al, 2013). 
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Table 11: SIDSs and small economies’ total agricultural imports in 2012 and their level 
of vulnerability 
 
Extracted from: World Bank (2012) & USDoC Census Bureau (2015). Data at July 2012. 
*Puerto Rico's extracted from Departamento de Agricultura (2011);   N/A=not available data;   TEU=containers in scale of twenty-
foot equivalent unit. Using Briguglio et al's (2010) schemas, 1= worse case, 2= best case, 3=self made. Ratio: relation % TEU in 
food and agriculture per capita. **Percentage of the total TEUs classified as food for domestic use. *** Percentage of the total 
TEU classified agriculture raw material for domestic use. 
 
 
 
In comparison with the other countries presented above, Bahrain (.04), Ireland (.06) 
and Mauritius (.08) show the lowest ratio in agricultural imports per capita (TEU); 
thus, their national production to sustain their population seems to be less vulnerable 
than that of Singapore (.23) and the Bahamas (.66).  In the case of Singapore, its level 
of food imports (TEU) might not be exclusive of local consumption, hence affecting its 
ratio. Additionally, its economic design is called by Briguglio’s (2010) ‘paradoxical 
schema’ because although it shows high economic vulnerability, the nation has 
‘nurtured’ a high economic resilience through the adoption of policies, 
interconnectivity and logistic practices enabling them to mitigate its natural weakness. 
Hong Kong shows similar patterns but data on twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) by 
sector are not available so far. However, it is estimated that the vast majority (approx. 
90%) of food imported by Hong Kong are from China’s mainland (Kong, 2013). In this 
scenario any external policy imposed by China could provoke political and/or social 
tensions affecting Hong Kong’s market and thus its food insecurity level. 
  
Higher prices for refrigerated cargoes are not unique to this market or the global 
maritime shipping industry. They are probably a consequence of the lack of 
competition for food importers in this particular market segment. The low availability 
of efficient reefer containers may affect the cost of transporting fresh produce. 
Additionally, agricultural commodities produced in LDCs do not always satisfy the 
Country Resilience Index
Vulnerability 
Index
Population Total TEU
% Food 
Imported**
% Agriculture 
Material Imp.***
Estimation of TEU 
Agriculture+Food
Ratio          
Imports:Population
Singapore3 0.974 0.971 5,200,000 32,421,602    3.3 0.4 1,206,083.59    0.23                     
Hong Kong3 0.877 0.713 7,500,000 23,100,000 N/A N/A - -
Jamaica1 0.42 0.922 2,700,000 2,079,585 18.1 1.2 401,359.91       0.15                     
Ireland2 0.845 0.371 4,500,000 1,918,317 13.6 0.9 278,155.97       0.06                     
Puerto Rico* N/A N/A 3,600,000 1,423,192 22.3 3.3 364,337.15       0.10                     
Bahamas N/A 0.63 372,000 1,236,690 19.0 1.0 247,338.00       0.66                     
Mauritius3 0.509 0.632 1,300,000 417,467 21.6 2.4 100,192.08       0.08                     
Bahrain N/A N/A 1,400,000 318,743 14.9 0.8 50,042.62          0.04                     
Cyprus3 0.526 0.84 307,000 307,060 17.5 0.9 56,499.04          0.18                     
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expectations of consumers in more advanced markets with respect to the desired 
quality and thus have less access to more advanced containers (Verkerk et al, 2007).  
 
According to the Global Agricultural Productivity Report (Global Harvest Initiative, 
2015), the current rate of the agricultural productivity growth is only 1.72%, whereas a 
rate of 1.75% annually is needed to meet the demands of a growing population that 
will reach 9.7 billion in 2050 (p.8). However, the FAO estimates that one-third of food 
produced is lost or wasted along the pathway from production to human 
consumption. Therefore, multiple factors of inefficiency are affecting the food supply 
chain, increasing the cost of food and restricting the access to food, particularly in 
SIDSs. 
 
One example of the effects of supply chain interruption is Hawaiian livestock farmers 
(Hawaii Cattlemen’s Council, 2007). Beef and pork producers in Hawaii are highly 
dependent on US-flagged vessels to transport animal feed and genetics to the US. 
Allegedly, due to the lack of US-flagged vessels prepared for this, they are limited to 
trading live animals from their land to the West Coast of the US, affecting their 
business and local production. A report of the Hawaii Senate documents these 
allegations (Senate of Puerto Rico, 2015).   
 
 
3.5.0 US Cabotage Act from the view of US offshore territories 
US offshore territories are a type of political division that is directly overseen by the 
Federal Government. By contrast, the states share sovereignty with the Federal 
Government and their representation in the Federal Congress is proportional to their 
population. Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Northern 
Mariana Islands and American Samoa are US offshore territories. The first two are 
incorporated territories or states and the others unincorporated territories. All of 
them are considered as domestic markets for economic purposes. Only one has a 
natural land connection with the mainland (Alaska) and only two have a population of 
over 1 million people (Puerto Rico and Hawaii). Nevertheless, the last three were 
excluded from the Cabotage Act. According to a report of the Senate of Puerto Rico 
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(2015),76 the cabotage exemption of the US Virgin Islands was legislated as part of the 
purchasing agreement with the Danish Government. In the case of American Samoa, 
apparently its exemption was the consequence of a partnership agreement between 
the US, Germany and the UK in 1899.  
 
Since 1920 a few amendments in favour of the US offshore territories have been 
realised. Total exclusions of the Cabotage Act were applied only to the US Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands.   
 
The loss of said (cabotage) exemption would have a devastatingly 
negative effect on the economy of the territory – we are totally 
opposed to such a concept. (John Harding, Director of Virgin Islands 
Port Authority; US Congress, 1989) 
  
... the infamous Jones Act created a monopoly for Seattle shipping 
companies that served Alaska, keeping prices for imports and exports 
artificially high ... The Jones Act represented one expression of the 
problem that Alaska was in the control of absentee interests. (Ernest 
Gruening, Ex-Governor of Alaska; see Ascott, 2004) 
 
Vessels constructed outside the US but flagged in the US are allowed to trade 
between Guam, Kingman Reef, Midway and other US ports.77 However, this is not the 
scenario for Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, where all vessels travelling between their 
ports and the US mainland have to comply with the original regulations. Hansen 
(2012b) states that: ‘on these three domestic non-contiguous jurisdictions of the US 
their geography imposes an exclusive reliance on ocean shipping and federal maritime 
laws require vessels engaged in the non-contiguous trades be built in the US’. 
Furthermore, he argues that ‘the prohibitively high cost of new construction at the 
major shipbuilding yards on the US mainland nearly precludes all new ship orders’. 
Thus, an ageing fleet of ocean-going deep-draught ships makes ship replacement a 
critical economic issue. In addition, the US Cargo Preferences Act is required to 
transport food for welfare and other programmes.   
 
During the past century, the special access that those US jurisdictions have had to the 
US market has brought new forms of prosperity. However, after NAFTA and the 
                                                          
76 The case of American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F. 2d 1156, 1166–69 (D.C. Cir. 1978) may provide more data about these US 
possessions.  
77 Title 46 U.S.C. §12111. Available from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/12111 
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current multiplicity of US FTA, these advantages have become less competitive, and it 
is believed that the Cabotage Law is one of the reasons (Alameda & Valentín, 2012; 
Brackins, 2008; USGAO, 1988).  
 
The Jones Act’s influence on the price level has been part of the political discourse in 
Alaska (USDA, 1986). Its effects on the costs for industries dealing with speciality 
goods shipped to and from Alaska have been debated since 1921. The USGAO (1988) 
estimates that building vessels in the US increases the cost of transportation with 
Alaska by $163 million per year. Indeed, before NAFTA it is believed that this was the 
area that was most heavily affected by the Jones Act for transporting goods produced 
in the contiguous US (Jackson & McKetta, 1986).  
 
Studying the state of Hawaii, independent consultants estimate that Hawaiian 
residents pay an additional $1 billion per year in higher prices because of the Jones 
Act. This amounts to approximately $3,000 for every household in Hawaii (Ward, 
1997); thus, it is believed that Hawaiian families require a budget 40% higher than 
their counterparts in a typical mainland US city (Box 3). 
  
In 2015, congressmen of Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and PR presented together, in a 
common cause, a petition for a Cabotage Act exemption to the US Congress and 
President Obama. Nevertheless, arguably, the data to support their claims seem not 
to be totally compelling (Estudios Técnicos, 2013; USGAO, 2013; Caribbean Business, 
2012; Boyd, n.d.). 
 
In 2003 the USDA, in agreement with the University of Hawaii, studied the effects of 
the maritime transportation challenges in their agricultural sector. Hawaiian 
transportation service providers, agricultural producers and shippers were 
interviewed. The study concludes that: ‘ranchers in non-contiguous US States and 
Territories, especially for Hawaiian agricultural producers, indicate that there are 
several transportation barriers’ reducing their competitiveness. Later, the Hawaiian 
Cattleman Council published a manifesto in 2007 stating that the ‘Jones Act’ must be 
reformed at least to allow for a limited exemption for livestock. However, so far, after 
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NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, no publications with data to support those arguments have 
been found. 
 
Box 3: Claiming against the US cabotage  
Author: Zimmerman, M. (2012) The Hawaii Reporter. 
 
DECEMBER/  Most Hawaii residents haven’t heard of the Jones Act, but one Hawaii 
lawyer and several business owners say the 1920 federal shipping law has a major 
negative impact on virtually every resident and business in the state, and they are 
challenging the law in U.S. District Court. John Carroll, an attorney and former state 
lawmaker, has filed a class action suit against the federal government on behalf of his 
clients. They maintain the Jones Act violates the Commerce Clause by restricting 
shipping between states to American-owned and manned ships and thereby hurting 
businesses and residents by inflating the cost of goods. The issue is hotly debated 
among Hawaii’s political elite, but largely ignored by the general public. 
   
Carroll and his plaintiffs [...] hope to educate the public about the detriments of the 
Jones Act, which some experts argue increases the cost of living in the islands by as 
much as one third. 
  
“The most important issue for me is [....]// Carroll maintains the class action lawsuit 
should be considered as Hawaii’s “revolution”… “to obtain economic freedom from 
monopolistic domination of shippers who face no competitors.” 
  
Carroll said the impact of the Jones Act is so severe, that the state of Hawaii is denied 
access to about 90% of all available shipping in the world. He also blames the Jones 
Act for destroying Hawaii’s agricultural economy. “Hawaii dairies, poultry farms, 
vegetable production, even banana plantations have declined or been eliminated 
because of the intolerable costs of farming and shipping in Hawaii,” Carroll said. “The 
cost of agricultural production is prohibitive, not only because of the cost of fertilizers, 
herbicides, and farm implements, but also the cost of outbound shipping of locally 
grown fruits, livestock and ornamental plants to any destination other than the West 
Coast of the continental United States...” 
  
 
3.5.1 Puerto Rico and the US Cabotage Act 
The study of the effect of the US Cabotage Act on PR’s economy is not new. In the 
literature available, the oldest publication on the matter is from 1953; however, 
Collazo (2012) discusses an earlier document from 1940 between the President of the 
PR Senate and his counterpart in the House of Commons: 
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Steam maritime companies – an effective monopoly under the US 
cabotage – block our economy based on fetching and carrying goods to 
PR or from PR. These companies are the equivalent, but in a most 
grievous way, to the Middle Ages taxes for the right of crossing a 
bridge, whose owner only allows those who pay to pass.78 (Extracted 
from: Letter from Luis Muñoz Marín to Antonio Ramos Antonini, 1940) 
 
 
Eastman and Marx (1953) evaluate the US tariff barriers to PR’s offshore sugar cane 
shipping and the welfare cost to Puerto Ricans. They conclude that the fleet costs in 
PR are lower than those in the Virgin Islands. A later descriptive study conducted by 
the Commonwealth of PR (ELA, 1964:p.44) to evaluate the economic strength of PR’s 
maritime industry concludes that the technical level and professionalism of the US 
maritime transportation gives security and stability to PR’s market, ensuring 
efficiency. However, the study ends by supporting the cabotage exemption (p.45). 
Clover and Harris (1965)79 explore some methods to alleviate Puerto Ricans’ welfare 
costs but preserve the Cabotage Act, but, in their conclusion, the question of the 
impact of maritime service costs is not answered. In the same year, two more studies 
were published. Gaetán (1965), for example, presents a basic legal analysis of the 
trade relationship between PR and the US but without making specific 
recommendations. Pesquera (1965), on the other hand, posits that the freight costs of 
the maritime transportation companies in PR, due to their lack of routes, are designed 
to cover their operational inefficiencies rather than to promote trade.  
 
In 1970 the first manifesto by PR’s agricultural sector advocating amendments to the 
US Cabotage Act was documented (El Mundo, 1973). The only academic publication 
about the effects of the US Cabotage Act on some products in PR’s food sector is that 
by Quiñones-Domínguez (1990). Although the research does not offer clear 
conclusions for the food sector, it establishes the limitations of access to information 
and the secrecy in the management of statistics by the maritime sector and the US 
agencies. According to Herrero and colleagues (2001), all of these studies between the 
1950s and the mid-1990s, although demonstrative of the interest in the topic, are not 
widely discussed and do not consider FTA’s scenarios. 
                                                          
78 Translated by the author. 
79 The only copy available does not include the Appendix section; thus, their methodology and data cannot be verified.  
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Other grass root initiatives by different professional associations asking for PR’s 
exemption are available in the archives, but the majority lack data to support their 
arguments (Rochet-Santoro, 2014; Collazo, 2012). During the mid-1990s, considering 
Singapore’s experience, the Government of PR launched an initiative to build the 
biggest port in the Caribbean in PR. Eventually, the proposal was also supported by 
the US Government. Although the construction started relatively quickly, the different 
political views on maintaining the Cabotage Act as a bond between the US and PR 
delayed the project. Afterwards the neighbouring countries of Jamaica, the Dominican 
Republic and Cuba announced plans to create mega-ports in their own regions, and PR 
stayed behind in its aspiration (Blom-Hill, 2013).  
 
From 1995 to 2010, only four academic studies about the topic were published. 
Rosado-Dávila (2002) discusses the freight cost effects on PR’s exports, and Alameda 
(2002) and Vélez-Loyselle (2002) focus on the impact of the US cabotage on PR’s 
mega-port. In PR’s Congress the topic has been presented for study in at least ten 
legislative projects.80 These initiatives show an interest in the issue, but, due to the 
political debate that the topic generates between Puerto Rican parties, no actions 
have been taken. In 2012 the USGAO conducted research in PR about this topic. 
Although during the process the participation was substantial and some economists 
presented findings, the USGAO (2013) limited its publication to a qualitative 
bibliographic study and no significant recommendations were provided. The report, 
while lacking of recommendations, said that cabotage may obstruct PR’s business 
formation and sourcing decisions (p.20). In reaction to this vague report, since late 
2013 the Senate of PR has conducted hearings to collect complementary information 
and challenge the USGAO’s findings. The report was published in late 2015 (Senate of 
Puerto Rico, 2015). 
 
Using econometric data but different methodological approaches, only three items 
published in the last five years study the welfare cost impact of the US Cabotage Act 
                                                          
80 Legislative projects presented in Puerto Rico’s Senate and/or House of Representatives: RKC-35, 1994; RC 2067, 1997; RC 0436, 2001; RC 1604, 
2006; RC 5549, 2006; RC 0055 and RC 5549, 2009; PS 1688, 2010; RKS 0059, 2012 and RS 237, 2013. 
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on PR’s economy (Alameda & Valentín, 2014; Estudios Técnicos, 2013; Herrero81 et al, 
2010). Although these publications are available for everyone on the Web, so far none 
of them have been published in formal academic journals or submitted to 
international scrutiny.  
 
Arguably, the operational costs of vessels under the US flag in cabotage or foreign 
trade are significantly higher than those of foreign-flag vessels in similar trade (USDoT-
MarArad 2011; Frankel, 2002). Overcapacity is an important issue in liner shipping, 
because capacity costs (storage factor) are determinant of liner shipping freight rates 
(Jansson & Shneerson, 1986). Industry overcapacity will thus restrict the carriers’ 
ability to maintain sufficient revenues to cover the high fixed costs that prevail in this 
industry (Fusillo, 2002). Due to the level of food production, this scenario is not 
problematic for the US, but what does it mean for PR’s reality? 
 
Jewell (2013:p.1) states that ‘modifying the Jones Act for PR could result in critical 
consequences for the US merchant marine, the American shipbuilders, the US national 
security and perhaps even the disappearance of US-flag vessels from the Puerto Rican 
trade’. He argues that this would create a ‘negative impact on the US merchant 
marine and the shipyard industrial base that the Jones Act protects’. Similarly, the 
president of the Navy League,82 Mr Marc Thornberry, expressed the institutional 
rejection of any changes in the cabotage regulations to favour PR’s economy. He 
asserted that ‘making flexible cabotage on PR may affect the US economic stability 
and its national security’ programme (Delgado, 2015). However, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (2012) reports that the impact of the Jones Act on PR is the basic 
element of the higher cost of shipping affecting business competitiveness. The report 
states (p.13), ‘it costs an estimated $3,063 to ship a twenty-foot container of 
household and commercial goods from the East Coast of the US to PR; the same 
shipment costs $1,504 to nearby Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) and $1,687 to 
Kingston (Jamaica)—destinations that are not subject to Jones Act restrictions’. 
                                                          
81 An early version of this study was previously presented in 2001 to the Federal and International Affairs Commission of PR’s House of 
Representatives (Herrero et al, 2001).  
82 The Navy League is an organisation associated with the US maritime transportation corporation, which represents 40,000 workers in this sector. 
One of its missions is to inform the US Congress of the need for strong sea services supporting the US Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and US-flag 
Merchant Marine and volunteer its time and money to advocate the sea services. 
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Nevertheless, the report does not provide references, fieldwork or the methodology 
used to support the statement.   
 
Alameda (2002) posits that the design of PR’s economic development since the mid-
1800s has been based on seeking foreign direct investment rather than diversified 
strategies. Consequently, although domestic production and native entrepreneurship 
have been historically weak, the cost of imports per capita from the US to PR is 
calculated as $6,500/year. Using data from 2000, he estimates the cost of the 
Cabotage Act for the whole economy of Puerto Rico to be between $300 and $500 
million. Besides, he argues that more than 60% of PR’s imports are raw materials 
($25,400 million) and around 13% is food ($1,800 million). However, his study does 
not provide the methodology used.  
 
For some, the restriction on the use of maritime transportation in PR’s trade seem to 
be a harmful intervention of the US on the economy, which is limited by its nature, 
resources and volume of trade (Clar, 2013). For the last five years, the well-being cost 
of the Cabotage Act for PR’s economy has been estimated by some, but without any 
agreement or particularisation. Arguably, econometric models to estimate its effects 
are useless or inaccurate because the available data may have multiple variables, 
none of which are related to the phenomenon (Estudios Técnicos, 2014; Irizarry-Mora, 
2011). As a result, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2014) suggests a temporary 
– five-year – exemption of PR from the Cabotage Act, as supported by other 
researchers (Ruiz, 2014).  
 
Herrero and colleagues (2010) estimate the costs of the maritime transport in 2000 to 
be $1,512 million or 88% of the total transport costs in PR’s external trade ($1,718 
million). According to them, the excess price paid by Puerto Ricans due to the 
Cabotage Act is estimated to be $426 million for that year. However, the estimations 
in the study by Herrero and colleagues are made using the cost data of one container 
size at the TEU scale. The problem is that in PR the container size for trade is wider 
than the international level (20’, 40’, 45’ and 53’); thus, the costs may differ (Estudios 
Técnicos, 2013). Considering this, Alameda and Valentín (2014), using historical data 
from between 1971 and 2012 and a slightly different approach from Herrero et al 
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(2001), estimate the impact of the Jones Act on PR’s economy to be between $400 
million and $1.09 billion (Table 12). 
 
Table 12: The Jones Act’s impact on Puerto Rico’s economy (fiscal years 1992–2012) 
Legend: M=import of merchandise; PM=implicit price deflator for imports; (3) relative importance of US 
in PR trade commerce; (4) relative importance of rest of the world in PR trade commerce; Jones impact 
estimated in million USD. Extracted from: Alameda and Valentín (2014: p.39-40).   
 
 
Estudios Técnicos (2013), a private firm commissioned by the Maritime Alliance to 
analyse the Jones Act’s effects, states that, since not all the relevant factors are 
included in the cost–benefit calculation, quantifying the economic impact of the 
Cabotage Act on PR’s economy is a speculative exercise. It argues that foreign 
maritime transport companies have a different level of technical sophistication, which 
is lower than that of the US maritime companies; thus, their standards are not 
comparable. Nevertheless, using a different approach and 2012 data, they estimate 
the total transportation costs to be $1,017.5 million, and 69.2% of these are maritime 
costs. When including data from the Maritime Alliance, they estimate the Jones Act’s 
cost for PR’s economy to be $155 million (p.8). 
Differential
Relative 
US Value
Differential 
to US
Differential 
btw            
US and RW
Jones Act 
Impact 
M PM XPR+MPR 3x (1-2) 4x(3x(1-2))
Equation 1 Equation 2 (3) (4)
1992 31,955.27 30,152.55 1,802.73 0.793 1,429.47 0.586 837.52
1993 31,823.59 29,891.10 1,932.49 0.785 1,516.30 0.569 863.19
1994 32,749.69 30,802.12 1,947.57 0.786 1,531.03 0.572 876.13
1995 34,356.46 32,307.42 2,049.04 0.780 1,598.98 0.561 896.57
1996 34,396.53 32,107.82 2,288.71 0.763 1,746.72 0.526 919.43
1997 35,626.43 33,094.29 2,532.14 0.761 1,927.28 0.522 1,006.53
1998 38,046.73 35,651.57 2,395.16 0.780 1,868.61 0.560 1,047.02
1999 41,594.47 38,826.18 2,768.29 0.759 2,100.14 0.517 1,086.37
2000 43,239.98 40,504.51 2,735.47 0.746 2,039.57 0.491 1,001.85
2001 46,222.67 43,774.68 2,447.98 0.749 1,833.27 0.498 912.57
2002 46,923.24 44,340.84 2,582.40 0.739 1,909.11 0.479 913.61
2003 49,509.82 46,860.23 2,649.59 0.721 1,911.41 0.443 846.37
2004 51,451.40 48,614.63 2,836.77 0.671 1,902.14 0.341 648.74
2005 51,271.55 48,494.28 2,777.27 0.690 1,915.65 0.380 727.04
2006 51,869.58 49,294.92 2,574.66 0.693 1,782.98 0.385 686.48
2007 53,271.21 50,131.64 3,139.57 0.655 2,057.32 0.311 638.95
2008 53,473.72 50,447.87 3,025.85 0.630 1,905.98 0.260 495.16
2009 53,353.14 50,075.64 3,277.50 0.617 2,022.66 0.234 473.85
2010 54,895.51 51,246.04 3,649.47 0.614 2,239.70 0.227 509.33
2011 56,122.68 52,405.38 3,717.30 0.607 2,254.94 0.213 480.79
2012 58,003.60 53,748.30 4,255.31 0.584 2,486.30 0.169 419.1
FY
Estimated Values
(1-2)
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Cruz and associates (2014), in a basic analysis of transportation costs using data 
collected by the Puerto Rico Planning Board (PRPB), suggest that on average the costs 
are 1.75% of the annual total imports and exports. For them, the Cabotage Act is not a 
burden for the PR’s economy but an advantage. They propose that the framework for 
trade ensures PR’s access to the US market, which helps PR’s security, resulting in 
competitive advantages. They also affirm that the majority of the publications 
available on this topic are based not on empirical studies but on purely economic and 
ideological interests. However, the analysis by Cruz and colleagues (2014) could be 
judged according to the same rule, because the authors do not consider differences in 
supply chains, infrastructure, management costs or social impacts. 
 
Following a different approach, a legal view of this topic is presented by Collazo 
(2012), who argues that the Cabotage Act’s impact on PR’s economy could be 
considered a violation of Puerto Ricans’ human rights by the US. He posits that, due to 
the high level of trade between PR and the US, the US violates international trade laws 
by imposing a protectionist measure diminishing the Puerto Ricans’ human right to 
trade. Furthermore, he hypothesises that the Act was completely designed to benefit 
the US, and due to the lack of political representation of the people of PR in the US 
Congress, the application of the Act to PR’s economy is based on ‘generic consent’ 
without any democratic participation of the citizens. Nevertheless, his analysis is not 
sustained by data. 
 
3.5.2 Oligopolistic structure issues  
The trends, growing demand and supplies as well as the expansion of trade, 
infrastructure and connectivity are increasing container ship sizes, which will 
eventually reduce the number of carriers per country. These optimisation patterns 
could benefit shippers’ costs and translate into lower freight to the benefit of trade. 
However, ‘it could also squeeze out smaller players and result in an oligopolistic 
market structure’ (UNCTAD, 2013c:p.1). Kujal and Ruiz (2009) suggest that a subsidy 
towards a domestic monopoly shifts its reaction function, increasing its profits rather 
than its efficiency. Other authors posit that imposing output subsidies is not a robust 
policy in this context (François & Manchin, 2007).  
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It is not uncommon for monopolies and oligopolies to provide key infrastructure 
services in both developed and developing economies. Particularly, SIDSs’ markets are 
highly exposed to these kinds of structures, principally due to their market limitations. 
Krishna and Itoh (1986) suggest that, in oligopolistic protection schemes, it is clear 
that companies have different behaviour according to their market structure. For 
instance, in competitive markets restrictions can affect the equilibrium only by being 
restrictive, because in some senses they alter the demand and/or supply conditions.  
 
Occasionally oligopolistic structures may emerge through the predatory behaviour of 
the firms themselves; their dominion is often established through some legislation, 
policies or public subsidies. The combination of monopoly power and public structures 
regularly produces a low-performance form of service, non-competitive rates, 
inadequate offers and a lack of innovation or investments. Consequently, the 
competitiveness of the market or country is undermined (ITC, 2012:p.10).  
 
In the case of the US Cabotage Act, it may restrict some conditions of the domestic 
monopoly. For example, the building, assembling and part repairing of US-flagged 
Jones Act vessels or ships should be carried out in the US territory, which limits 
maritime transporters to a reduced number of service providers. Therefore, in the 
case of offshore US territories (incorporated or not), the restriction might be 
considered double. To trade between the US ports, only US-flagged vessels should be 
used, and in the case of damage, vessels should be repaired by those exclusive service 
providers. Although these restrictions are applied to the whole nation, only two of the 
50 states and all of the US territories83 are not directly land connected to the 
mainland; thus, the vast majority of their supplies are transported by sea or crossing 
foreign countries (the case of Alaska).  
 
In January 2014 the Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico denounced the 4 maritime 
transportation companies in PR for not being supportive of the shipbuilding industry 
in the US due to the fact that the only 5 ships steadily used to trade between PR and 
the US have been in service for more than 30 years. In addition, in the case of the 
                                                          
83 So far, the only exception is Washington, DC. 
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barge-vessels, their age is between 14 and 42 years in service. This transport facility is 
clearly of limited use for defence and national security. In an ideal scenario in which 
the fleet serving PR’s market is renovated, the cost of shipbuilding in the US could be 
triple the cost of similar transport in the international market. Whilst it is expected 
that a new fleet would bring new technology and hence more efficiency than the 
actual ships, the high cost of building in the US would certainly be included as part of 
the cost of trade. Consequently, the PR’s market would be financing a private business 
to sustain US national needs (MIDA, 2015). 
 
3.5.3 Racketeering in oligopolistic structures. Corporate corruption and maritime 
cartels 
Countries may carry out political and structural reforms to liberalise protocols or 
facilitate processes promoting competition in the domestic market to improve the 
business environment. Enhancing transparency can also facilitate the attainment of a 
collusive equilibrium among competitors or result in non-coordinated anti-
competitive effects (OECD, 2010a). However, powerful multinational or strong firms in 
some critical services may fix or raise prices when the competition is small and/or a 
LDC or the market is not strong enough to stop their actions legally without negative 
effects on the country’s citizens (Box 4). 
 
 A price-fixing overcharge occurs when income or wealth is transferred from buyers to 
the members of the cartel that occurs as a result of an overt collusive agreement 
(Connor, 2010). Maritime transporter oligopolies may develop cartel behaviour. In the 
form of cartels, some suppliers may create pseudo scarcity of goods and/or 
overcharge their clients (ITC, 2012). Connor (2010) estimates that at international 
levels cartels overcharge their customers on average by about 31% and are about 65% 
more effective in raising prices than domestic cartels.  Similarly, Chen and colleagues 
(2013) posit that shipping dominance creates lack of competition on trade routes that 
lead to overcharging strategies. It may affect the most dependent firms or national 
economies negatively. Although the US Cabotage Act was not directly promoting it, 
the lack of international participants limit competition, where in scenarios of 
consolidation of maritime providers while perhaps more efficient; less in number and 
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in positions of dominancy.  However, these patterns are not easy to validate and it is 
more when the data available is controlled by the maritime firms.  
 
Box 4: Sea Star exec convicted on price-fixing. 
Author: CB Online Staff. (2013) The Caribbean Business. 
 
JANUARY/ Frank Peake, president and chief operating officer of Jacksonville-based Sea 
Star, was indicted in November 2011 in a conspiracy investigation targeting two 
shipping companies that had already netted five other shipping executives and has led 
to more than $46 million in fines. 
Sea Star agreed in November 2011 to a $14.2 million fine and pleaded guilty to one 
felony count of conspiring between May 2002 and April 2008 to fix prices on cargo 
moving in and out of PR. The company issued a statement apologizing to its 
customers, and noted the agreement provides that the US Justice Department 
(USJOD) would not bring criminal charges against its parent companies, Saltchuk 
Resources Inc. and American Shipping Group Inc. 
Peake was convicted of price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, which carries a 
maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. Peake is 
the sixth shipping company executive convicted in the sprawling case. Horizon Lines 
executives Gabriel Serra, R. Kevin Gill, Gregory Glova and Alex G. Chisholm, and Sea 
Star’s Peter Baci previously pleaded guilty. Baci, a former Sea Star senior vice 
president was handed a four-year prison term for antitrust conspiracy, which is 
reportedly the longest prison sentence for a single antitrust charge. 
“The coastal shipping price-fixing conspiracy affected the price of nearly every product 
that was shipped to and from PR during the conspiracy,” said Bill Baer, assistant 
attorney general in charge of the USJOD’s Antitrust Division. “[Peake’s] successful 
prosecution shows that the division will hold accountable high-level executives who 
perpetuate these crimes.” 
In August, Jacksonville-based Crowley Liner Services Inc. pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to pay a $17 million criminal fine for its role in the conspiracy. Horizon Lines 
was sentenced to pay a $15 million criminal fine in March 2011... 
Kraft Foods, Kelloggs, Coca-Cola, Frito-Lay, Quaker Oats, Sears, ConAgra, Nestle, Frito-
Lay, P&G and trucking companies are among the plaintiffs in two lawsuits filed against 
Sea Star and Crowley in federal court last April. The plaintiffs [...]//  
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The maritime sector is associated with infrastructure. It is also characterised by highly 
fixed expenses and inefficiencies. Their business profitability is based on a very low 
income per unit transported and economies of scale. Consequently, they can develop 
strategies in their internal structures to control expenses. Pittman (2009) describes 
two trends that counteract structural measures to enhance competition. The first is 
firms’ consolidation, in which large transnational firms absorb or reduce competition. 
He suggests that this may potentially harm SIDSs because the new conglomerate may 
replace the local operators, hence controlling prices, affecting the local business and 
basing its decisions on the parameters of profits associated with the developed 
markets. Consequently, producers (importers or exporters) might be forced to pay 
whatever the port’s firm charges because of the absence of other options (US 
Department of Justice, 2014). In this case such alternatives might be other ports firms, 
but they might also be other types of customers. 
 
The second trend identified by Pittman (2009) is more related to bulk traders, where 
the transportation lines have been vertically integrated or include the ownership and 
operation of container terminals, excluding other service providers from the use of 
their port terminal. However, due to the cost of the vessels’ maintenance, profitability 
requires constant traffic; thus, smaller producers (importers or exporters) in the grain 
sector, for example, are limited. As a result, renting vessels for long-term contracts (3 
years or more) at fixed prices is a common practice. In the case of reefer intermodal 
containers, the agreements are by volume (number of containers) per year. The last 
cases although not necessarily violating competition, in some senses are mechanisms 
that reduces the number or obstruct the entry of new service providers. 
 
One way to create competition between maritime service providers is to break down 
relevant concessions and create multiple port terminal facilities with different 
operators for different terminals within the port (ITC, 2012). In this case competitors 
as well as business users can always notify authorities of any anti-competitive 
behaviour, because in the end they will also suffer the negative consequences 
resulting from it. However, as presented in the cases above, this is not easy for SME 
businesses to manage, particularly when the access to terminals is managed by 
transnational firms in which the priority is given to their own cargoes or discriminatory 
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terms are applied to the former. In addition, the experience of New Zealand suggests 
that the real competition in maritime sea service providers starts when more than 
four firms are freely disputing the same market (Burns, 2015).  
  
3.5.4 Are the unions part of the problem or the solution? 
Since maritime transportation has become more technical over the last few decades, 
port traffic has risen fast enough to offset the fact that each container requires fewer 
man-hours to unload. Similarly, fewer workers are needed on board, but there is a 
widely held perception that a crew in a ship is more like that on a cruise ship rather 
than a small team of hard workers engaging in risky activities moving a heavy cargo 
vessel through the open sea. Due to the risk and underestimation of the seafarers’ job 
since the mid-nineteenth century, labour unions have been occupied by social 
dimension concerns, looking after working conditions, health and safety issues and 
sailors’ professionalisation. Unions’ fights, particularly in developed countries, have 
promoted, raised and standardised the level of working conditions and labourers’ 
rights. The elimination of the worst forms of child labour and equal pay for equal work 
may be considered victories of the unions. Similar trends are developing in LDCs, but 
for a few, the implementation of more measures for transforming working conditions 
and the right of workers is necessary.  
 
In the US, the magistrates have ratified that they expect unions to act reasonably for 
both sides in offering a balanced grievance and refusing to act on the plaintiffs’ terms 
when its actions are not representative of its members.84 However, in the last 
decades, this has not always been the case. For instance, seafarers’ unions’ claims in 
the US seem to be more focused on salaries and marginal benefits for their members 
than the fights promoted in the past. Consequently, as presented earlier, US seafarers’ 
salary (and benefits) on average is twice the average of countries with a similar cost of 
living.  
 
According to Blom-Hill (2013), the support of unions is the bond that maintains the 
survival of the Jones Act in the US. She documents the number of organisations that 
were supporters of the Act, such as the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, 
                                                          
84 Presented in Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666F.2d 202, 208 (Former 5th Cir., 1982). 
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the International Longshoremen Association (ILA) and the Warehouse Union, the 
Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, the American Maritime Officers, the International 
Organization of Masters Mates and Pilots, the Seafarers International Union, the 
Marine Engineers Benefical Association (MEBA) and the Inland Boatmen’s Union. In 
coalition they make a strong force since the Department of Defence – particularly the 
Navy – reinforced its discourse on national security statements. Curiously, this is a 
case in which the maritime companies appear to be in favour of the unions’ claims.  
 
As demonstrative of their power, disputes between unions and maritime providers 
have provoked serious interruptions to the economy of the coastal states in the US. 
For example, in February 2015 the unions declared a lockout of the dockworkers in all 
of the 29 ports of the US west coast85 until their proposals had been accepted by the 
maritime providers (DePillis, 2015). This dispute between the employers and the long-
shore union was described as the worst in recent US history in terms of delays and 
consequences for carriers and shippers (Vitasek, 2015). It is estimated that the impact 
on costs during the nine months of this labour conflict was around $7 billion, leading 
to spoiled goods and understocked shelves. Although the issue was solved after 
months of differences, for some it is a matter of time. The fact is that contracts come 
up for renewal every five years, and the recurrent disagreements with the unions have 
existed for decades. For instance, Vitasek (2015) summarises the dramatic conflicts of 
2008 in which the employers locked out long-shore workers, creating regional chaos 
for 11 days. Unlike in 1971 the strikes lasted for 134 days, the effects were less 
dramatic because the dependency of maritime transportation to trade was lower. 
While the unions have performed well in horizontal organisation across all the US 
ports, they are failing in organising, training and supporting efficiency skills in their 
members rather than being a tighter bottleneck to commerce. Therefore, carriers 
operating under an open registry (not tight to the Jones Act) have the flexibility to hire 
crews from around the world and can therefore avoid the higher costs associated with 
US crews (USGAO, 2013). 
 
Apparently, a lack of efficiency and issues of lading are recurrent in maritime shipping 
as well as in inland transport. Trucking associations are confronting problems in 
                                                          
85 From the port of Bellingham in Washington State to the Port of San Diego in California. 
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dispatching containers to inland destinations. Although new ships are more efficient, 
with a bigger capacity to transport a much higher number of boxes than regular 
vessels, the lack of space to unload them is creating disruptions for the supply chain 
participants. A few ports report a lack of drivers, because many of them have stopped 
working at the port as they cannot make enough pickups to earn a living. In addition, 
the processing of shipments or the maintenance of port equipment delays the new 
receipts. Apparently, ‘there’s no real consistency on who is hauling what cargo and 
where it’s going to go’, states Weston Labar, director of the Harbour Trucking 
Association (DePillis, 2015). Another issue concerning container carriers is related to 
the availability of functional chassis in ports. It is relatively common for these services 
to be under third-party leasing companies and not under the port’s management 
providers. Consequently, the responsibility for storage and maintenance shifts from 
them to the shippers, causing inconvenience to service providers, particularly those 
that truck big boxes off the docks. The mentioned examples provoked supply chain 
disruptions that eventually raised the costs of products, affecting consumers.  
 
 
3.6.0 Conclusion 
This review of maritime management and cabotage shows its complexities and its 
needs of research. Differences between the US restrictions and various countries were 
presented. So far, the EU is the only trade bloc of significance that has embraced the 
virtual elimination of restricted access to cabotage among member states. Changes 
are taking place in Asia that expected to eventually lead to actions in similar 
approaches of the EU, but it in the US seems stagnated. 
 
Those markets that have relaxed or liberalised their cabotage policies did so in the 
interest of promoting trade in marine services, improving transportation efficiency 
and aiming to achieve flexible forms of trade. In general, the majority of the 
exceptions in the cabotage policies in the countries contrasted are based on allowing 
foreign-flag vessels market entry, but the flag of convenience is also now becoming 
common. These initiatives occur due to the lack of motivation of their domestic 
maritime companies to address their internal deficiencies, provoking negative impacts 
on their own domestic markets.     
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The theory of a free market to promote competition is the basis supporting the 
majority of the econometric analyses about cabotage, but difficulties in accessing data 
are recurrently mentioned due to the fact that they are protected under the right to 
conduct business. It is clear that, since cabotage was legislated in the US, the 
administrative system associated with it has evolved dramatically through a vast 
number of policies, agencies, programmes and protocols with huge budgets to 
influence the market. We suspect that US people are not aware of the effect of the 
Act on their economies because its cost and inefficiencies are easily diluted in the 
massive economy and gigantic population. However, the examples of cabotage in 
islands with small economies show policies liberalised or more relaxed unlike the US 
cabotage framework.   
 
In the case of PR, although various authors (Clar, 2013; Rivera, 2007; Alameda, 2002; 
Herrero et al, 2001) suggest that the US Cabotage Act is an anti-competitive NTM for 
PR’s economy, none of them demonstrate their argument by using an international 
method of classification. Other authors (Cruz et al, 2014; Estudios Técnicos, 2013) 
suggest that the US Cabotage Act maintains a competitive advantage for PR by 
enabling it to access one of the biggest markets in the world and at the same time 
helping national security. However, others (Jewell, 2013; Transportation Institute, 
2013) consider the Act as restricting trade at the domestic level but arguing that its 
(discriminatory) cost effects are direct and fairly distributed among the native citizens 
– as the price for security – hence it is an internal issue to be decided by them rather 
than an international matter.  
 
A recurrent theme among PR’s researchers is the need for the Government to collect 
more useful information to determine practices and enforce competition on its 
market rather than to rely on the private multinational companies that are the 
beneficiaries of current practices. Nevertheless, little has been said about the 
inefficiencies in the supply chain structure of commerce and internal factors related to 
cabotage that may affect PR’s agribusiness competitiveness. The theory that supports 
the research problems under study is described in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
4.0.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the concept of maritime management was explored 
considering various scenarios of sea cabotage policies. This chapter reviews the 
approaches presented in the academic literature, to establish the theoretical bases for 
this thesis. Aspects of competitiveness in general, competitiveness in agribusiness and 
supply chains in a small island economies and/or small developing state or territories 
(SIDSs) are analysed critically in relation to their influences on the efficiency of the 
food chain. Furthermore, the non-tariff measure (NTM) as a concept is developed, 
along with its classifications and its effects on the supply chain, trade and costs, 
especially for the agrifood sector. The complexity involved in measuring NTMs’ effects 
on the supply chain is discussed.  
 
4.1.0 Theoretical outline 
To describe how external policy measures affect the development and productivity of 
the agribusiness sector in Puerto Rico, this thesis considers the views of different 
interests. The aim is to explore the problem that is perceived to be affecting the 
country’s development and its supply chain, using various theoretical perspectives. 
The figure below outlines the topics that will define our theoretical framework. Three 
main topics were identified (Fig. 18) and analysed in the following sections.  
 
Figure 18: Flow chart for the analysis of technical barriers to trade 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
Although this research is focused on the effect of maritime policy on trade in domestic 
agrifood markets, the concepts cannot be clearly understood without a framework of 
firms’ competitiveness. Firstly, the concepts of competitiveness and productivity are 
defined and contrasted to allow application of some principles to analise the 
agribusiness sector in general and the reality of SIDSs more specifically. Three 
frameworks (Porter’s diamond, the industrial district approach and the sustainable 
product chain) are proposed in the literature to evaluate competitiveness and 
productivity in agribusiness. They are discussed to provide the basis of our theoretical 
overview.  
 
Secondly, the concept of a supply chain and its relationship with competitiveness in 
agribusiness are presented to open the discussion on trade policies to non-tariff 
measures more specifically. Theoretical descriptions, the effects on supply chain 
competitiveness and some common methods to measure them are revealed.  
 
Reforms in the regulatory structures for trade play complementary roles in enhancing 
competition to give consumers and businesses non-discriminatory access to a wider 
selection of inputs. Consequently, market liberalisation is the approach commonly 
used in the literature to analyse the topic of maritime cabotage policies. However, in 
this thesis the phenomenon is explored as an ‘external non-tariff measure’ for 
imports, focusing on its effect on the agribusiness supply chain’s domestic market of 
an SIDS.  
 
 
4.2.0 Firm base competitiveness frameworks for agribusiness productivity 
Small states tend to be highly exposed to external economic shocks because of their 
inherent characteristics, mostly associated with trade openness (Briguglio et al, 2008). 
Their very high level of dependence on importation, their small domestic markets and 
the limited availability of natural resources demand high levels of efficiency. While 
competitiveness does not simply refer to low prices or cheap labour, in the food 
sector, anti-competitive policies could increase the cost of business by their indirect 
effects on the supply chain, affecting domestic productivity. Low productivity may 
eventually affect the national economy and its ability to withstand external shocks 
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(Briguglio, 2014). For instance, poor performances in the food supply chain may 
increase the cost of food, induce produce scarcity or dislocate the activities of other 
sectors in the domestic economy. Besides, SIDSs, particularly those located in remote 
areas, face additional disadvantages associated with transportation costs and 
uncertainties relating to the delivery of industrial supplies. The characteristics of small 
states, associated with exposure to economic shocks and competitiveness constraints, 
pose serious limitations for their economic development. However, identifying the 
supply chain inefficiencies in the agrifood sector is an important step in building 
domestic resilience and developments to guarantee the citizens’ access to food. 
 
4.2.1 Competitiveness and productivity 
Trade theorists and policymakers have ignored trade costs until recently (Ferrantino, 
2012b). As tariffs on trade have fallen, it is apparent that trade costs are important 
obstacles that are not simply determined by geographical or commodity 
characteristics. Policy frameworks, internal and/or external, may affect the 
competitiveness level of a firm, cluster, city, nation or region. Barriers to imports can 
limit firms’ access to the goods and services needed to compete locally, regionally 
and/or internationally. Therefore, it is theorised that more liberal trade policies allow 
firms to benefit fully from international networks to produce in different ways (OECD, 
2010a). 
 
In the literature there is no agreed definition of competitiveness. However, during the 
last two decades, there has been a sudden increase in interest in the concept from a 
variety of viewpoints, and it seems that there are a wide range of definitions or 
analyses of this term (Atkinson, 2013; Gorton et al, 2013; Balkytė & Tvaronavičienė, 
2010; Pitts & Lagnevik, 1998). Competitiveness can be analysed at the level of the 
whole economy, an individual sector or industry or the supply chain. Although there is 
an agreement that the only meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national 
level is productivity (Porter, 1990), a set of factors determine this at the firm, cluster, 
industry and country levels (Schwab, 2012). Therefore, competitiveness as a system 
refers to the analysis of productivity as a phenomenon but at different points: meta, 
for example human capacity building; macro, for example social security and 
development policies; meso, for instance natural resources and infrastructure; and 
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micro, for example transportation costs, firm advantages or innovation and cultural 
issues (Rojas & Sepúlveda, 1999). 
 
Competitiveness as a topic of analysis has its origins in the classical economic theories, 
such as Smith’s absolute advantages theory (eighteenth century) and Ricardo’s 
comparative advantage (nineteenth century). Several authors stress that 
competitiveness is measured under the assumption of an ideal world of no 
government intervention, such as free trade or an open market. This is what 
distinguishes it from competitive advantage (OECD, 2010b). According to Peña-Vinces 
(2009) many classical economic theorists define competitiveness considering only 
international trade capacity or export performance. Competitiveness studies 
published after the 1960s incorporate new theories of domestic supply and demand, 
product, product life specialisation or differentiation and scale economies (e.g., 
Krugman, 1979). However, those theories are not enough to explain competitiveness 
in the globalisation era.  
 
It is well documented that many countries have prospered without abundant natural 
resources while many resource-rich countries are not so well developed. Thus, the 
original theories based on competitiveness as a function of capital, labour and natural 
resources seem to be limited (Cho & Moon, 2005). Atkinson (2013) posits that 
competitiveness relates only to the economic health of a region’s or nation’s trade 
sectors, defining health as jobs and the amount of value that firms add to the 
purchased inputs of production. According to him, the true definition of 
competitiveness is ‘the ability of a region to export more in value added terms than it 
imports’ (p.2). On the other hand, Krugman (1994) argues that competitiveness is 
another term for productivity. He posits that it is a measure not only of jobs and trade 
but also of economic growth and other dynamic entrepreneurship activities that allow 
a sustainable environment of well-being for participants – clients, firms, employees 
and employers, clusters or nations. 
 
Porter (1985 and 1990) develops one of the most valuable theories to explain the 
competitiveness of firms and nations. Using new paradigms, named the five forces 
(Fig.19) and the competitiveness diamond, he criticises the limitations of formal 
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economic models of competitiveness, stating that they may capture only those 
aspects that can be solved mathematically thereby reducing the multidimensionality 
of the phenomenon (Magretta, 2012). His framework aims not to declare an industry 
or nation as attractive or unattractive but to gain insights into firms’ performance, 
value chain and factors for trade. Porter’s first model shows the five forces that affect 
the competitive environment of a small business and the ‘diamond’ of factors86 that 
affect a nation’s competitiveness and its industries. Additionally, he posits that a 
nation’s prosperity is dependent not on its endogenous factors but on its capacity to 
innovate, recreate and update. Porter (1990:p.19) states that ‘environment’ means 
more than geographic location with its infrastructure and history, because ‘as long as 
the local company remains the true home base by retaining effective strategic, 
creative and technical control, the nation still reaps most of the benefits to its 
economy even if the firm is owned by foreign investors or by a foreign firm’. However, 
if the limitations are on the business environment, both domestic and foreign firms 
would face the same ‘given constraint’ to trade.  
 
Figure 19: The five competitive forces that determine industry profitability87 
 
Source: Porter (1985:pp.5–6). 
 
Other important factors related to competitiveness and productivity are the way in 
which managers and workers are trained, the nature of the company’s important 
customers, the nature of related and supporting industries and the role of national 
                                                          
86
  These factors are: conditions; firm strategy, structure and rivalry; demand conditions; related and supportive industries; and government and 
chance. 
87 This version was modified by its author in 1998 by adding two new concepts – government and foreign direct investment – and combining his 
original five-forces framework and the diamond in one diagram.  
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and local government (Pitts & Lagnevik, 1998:p.18). Cho (1994) states that, although 
Porter’s model is valuable, it does not consider at least two other highly influential 
factors in competitiveness capacity: human–labour–political (HLP) factors and physical 
factors that affect the domestic demand for trade. Barney (1991) posits that Porter’s 
model assumes that firms have the same resources or access to implement their 
strategies for competitiveness. Weihrich (1999) concludes that, although Porter’s 
model is a useful framework for analysing the economic environment, it does not 
require government policymakers to develop responsible alternative strategies that 
create and maintain a competitive advantage for their nation. For him Porter’s model 
is mainly descriptive and does not necessarily result in the formulation of alternative 
strategies.  
 
Plenty of studies undertaken since the publication of Porter’s theories evaluate firm 
and national competitiveness using his models, in research related to market 
resources and capabilities, market demand conditions, local suppliers and 
complementary industries, and firm characteristics (Berger, 2008; Snowdon & 
Stonehouse, 2006; Weihrich, 1999). The study of competitiveness is a multifaceted 
concept that leads to a proliferation of definitions. As a result, in the last decade, 
various institutions have redefined competitiveness. For instance, the International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD, 1996:p.42) defines competitiveness as 
‘the ability of a country to create added value and thus increase national wealth’, 
implying that, although the GDP and productivity are highly related to 
competitiveness, its definition cannot be reduced to the mere notions of them (Cho & 
Moon, 2005). In 2014 the IMD incorporated other criteria and dimensions to evaluate 
competitiveness (Fig.20). Similarly, the World Economic Forum (1996:p.19) defines 
competitiveness as ‘the ability of a national economy to achieve sustained high rates 
of economic growth, as measured by the annual change in gross domestic product per 
person’. Nevertheless, it redefines it as a ‘set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country’ (WEF, 2012: p.4).  
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Figure 20: The IMD competitiveness cube 
 
Source: Garelli (2014:p.499). 
 
Competitiveness becomes the productivity with which a firm, cluster, nation or region 
utilises its human, capital and resources (Porter, 2012). Productivity ultimately 
depends on the microeconomic capability of the economy, rooted in the 
sophistication of companies (both local and subsidiaries of multinationals), the quality 
of the national business environment and the externalities arising from the presence 
of clusters of related and supporting industries (Porter et al, 2008:p.51). Porter’s 
definitions of competitiveness merge systematic and systemic elements that in 
management should promote sustainable growth (Garelli, 2014:p.497). For instance, 
systemic elements are those that are more related to the value-added logistical 
integration system based on technologies for greater productivity and efficiency. On 
the other hand, systematic elements are those that show clarity of the policy 
framework for conducting business. Facts and policies together define the strategy 
and the freedom of action of a nation to establish the right competitive framework, 
conceived from a long-term perspective and to sustain more value creation for its 
enterprises (IMD, 2014).  
 
Competitiveness is ultimately about raising the prosperity of people, which can be 
defined as a mix of income, standard of living and quality of life, thus reducing 
inequalities (Garelli, 2014). Porter theorises that a rising standard of living at the 
national level depends on the capacity of a nation’s firms to achieve high levels of 
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productivity and to increase productivity over time (Huggins & Izushi, 2012). Although 
nations’ and/or firms’ goals evolve with their level of development and their 
perception of prosperity, access to food, shelter and education for the population are 
basic priorities as mechanisms for national self-protection.  
 
The concept of self-sufficiency in food is no longer synonymous with food security. 
Currently, completely self-sufficient nations are practically non-existent due to the 
liberalisation of markets. Through better interconnectivity of markets and more 
distribution channels for trade, access to food has been enhanced (Slone et al, 2010). 
Market proximity and openness, infrastructure and new technology raise more 
opportunities for trade to the benefit of less developed countries. However, it should 
not be forgotten that companies form the basis of the economy and are direct 
creators of wealth. In the case of access to food, companies’ efficiency level and 
market competitiveness are related to the agricultural sector’s dependence on 
imported inputs, national food security and the security of energy supplies (Hubbard 
& Hubbard, 2014). Therefore, the elements of competitiveness that are explored in 
this thesis are focused on domestic policies and their effects on supply chain efficiency 
and the nation’s food production. 
 
4.2.2 Firms, small countries and competitiveness 
Similar operations with identical products, technologies and processes can perform 
very differently in different countries or different regions in the same territory. This is 
simply because the political context or business condition is different. Coining an idea 
from Schumpeter’s theories (Fajnzylber, 1988; Schumpeter, 1934), it can be said that 
the attitudes of entrepreneurs or negative impacts on their capacity to produce could 
be detrimental to internal markets. Consequently, an improvement in the 
macroeconomic environment will be merely ‘cosmetic’, or superficial, if it is not 
accompanied by factors such as policy, infrastructure, markets and efficiency (Ballarin, 
2005:p.8).   
 
Economic activities require resources such as materials, land, water, energy and 
accessibility (ECORYS, 2011). In remote and SIDSs’ markets, the management of these 
resources is challenging and they may be either, very scarce or absent and hence 
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imported. Consequently, the capacity to be harmed by external shocks is generally 
higher than in other countries (Briguglio, 2014). Besides, the paucity of public 
resources, such as government, infrastructure, technology, finance and markets, may 
affect efficiency, increasing the costs of trade. Therefore, companies in SIDSs need a 
high level of efficiency in their domestic production, particularly those related to the 
food sector.  
 
Domestic food producers sustain the nation’s supply chain. They can help to reduce 
vulnerability to food scarcity. This may be important when the most common 
interpretation of low self-sufficiency is that the country is dependent on imported 
foods and that undermines food security (Hubbard & Hubbard, 2013:p.143). 
Furthermore, the market structures in SIDSs’ scenarios may affect their internal 
competitiveness due to the fact that consumers represent a captive market for 
companies. If an external policy that limits the firms’ capacity to trade is added to this 
structure, then these elements together will reduce efficiency early in the chain and 
may provoke distortions for companies, consumers and the food security of the whole 
nation.  
 
While it is true that a high level of competitiveness in all areas is improbable and 
weakness in one domain may be compensated by strength elsewhere, analyses of this 
topic in the SIDS agribusiness sector are relatively uncommon. In the literature a 
competitive sector is defined as: 
One in which companies improve their performance by increasing 
productivity through managerial and technological activities and offer 
better quality or lower priced goods and services thereby expanding 
demand for their products, but also as a sector with the capacity to 
generate domestic growth. (Manyika et al, 2010:p.10)  
 
 
Applying this definition to SIDSs’ agrifood markets, a sustainable competitive 
advantage appears to be highly challenging in open-market conditions. Generally, 
agribusinesses in SIDSs have limited comparative advantage due to their remoteness, 
lack of natural resources to produce high volumes, extra cost of transport for exports 
and in some cases the scarcity of the labour force. Additionally, elements that are 
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more related to firms’ consolidation and lack of modernisation in the agribusiness 
sector do not follow the patterns of modern industrial high-value-added sectors. 
 
The challenges of climate change and the volatility of food prices could present 
difficulties regarding access to food. Although issues of food security are normally 
associated with low-income countries, in the last decade some high-income countries 
have become increasingly concerned about ensuring an adequate supply of food for 
their citizens (Hubbard & Hubbard, 2013:p.142). Theoretically, better access to 
markets, openness to trade and balanced supply and demand may sustain the 
population’s needs. However, some authors advocate domestic food production as a 
safety net to guarantee the right to food of a population (Balkytė & Tvaronavičienė, 
2010).  
 
Several researchers argue that smallholder farmers enjoy some advantages over large 
commercial farmers as a small business may generate better-paid jobs in rural areas 
(Hinrichs & Charles, 2012). Organisations of small producers may stimulate national 
entrepreneurship and eventually some access to the international market (Thapa & 
Gaiha, 2014). In SIDSs the production of smallholder farmers and medium-sized 
agribusinesses is generally intended to supply the domestic market. For instance, 
animal feed grain importers using the international market to buy raw material may 
sustain a whole chain of domestic livestock production. Similarly, traders of fruits and 
vegetables supply retailers, supermarkets and other domestic companies. Both 
agribusiness examples should fully exploit all their resources, efficiency and 
competencies to affect as little as possible the capacity of production of the other 
chain segments. Otherwise, their effects would have an impact on small and medium-
sized producers, eventually increasing their production costs and the costs of 
consumers. Therefore, avoiding failure in open-market conditions requires efficiencies 
and innovation in the products’ transformation or, on the contrary, choosing to 
change business. 
 
Competitiveness analysis encompasses policies, strategy, structure and other fields, 
such as human resources, corporate culture and consumer behaviour (Garelli, 2014). 
For instance, some policies can require changes to the value added in production due 
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to their uniqueness in protecting the environment or embracing sustainability, but 
others can reduce firms’ capacity to trade and productivity, affecting the rest of the 
supply chain. Additionally, competitiveness at the national or enterprise level requires 
a global perspective and holistic point of view including efficiency, choices of 
resources to be transformed, infrastructure and the business environment (Evans, 
2014; Tuna, 2014; Gorton et al, 2013). For example, importers’ efficiency may have an 
impact on the rest of the food chain, especially in limited markets such as those in 
SIDSs. If trade policies affect efficiency early in the chain, the domino effects could 
influence the competitiveness of the SMEs negatively. For that reason, this thesis is 
focused on the systemic element of productivity, analysing how domestic food 
security could be affected by an external policy on the modus operandi of the 
agribusiness sector in an SIDS. 
 
4.2.3 Frameworks for evaluating agribusiness competitiveness  
Chapela (1997) states that in agriculture there are three groups of problems: 
competitiveness issues, a lack of supply chain integration and macroeconomic policy 
defects. Certainly, a plethora of models to evaluate competitiveness have been 
published in the literature. In the agricultural sector, a number of studies are available 
on specific components of competitiveness, for example productivity or efficiency. 
However, Gorton and colleagues (2013:p.8) argue that competitiveness research in 
the European food industry largely ignores social and environmental costs and 
benefits. The literature is relatively limited in the analysis of other factors that affect 
competitiveness, such as food supply chain segments and trade policies (e.g. non-tariff 
measures), but in the case of SIDSs it is very small. This research aims to contribute to 
the debate on the effect of non-tariff measures on the efficiency and competitiveness 
of the agribusiness supply chain.  
 
Considering competitiveness as one of the root topics generated from our analysis, 
three main business structures were derived from the data: firms, clusters and 
collaborative or joint ventures. As a result, this section develops an explanation of 
some theoretical frameworks relating to the agribusinesses explored. 
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In the mid-1990s a few important Latin American agricultural institutions proposed 
their own methodological frameworks for analysing competitiveness. The Instituto 
Iberoamericano de Cooperación Agrícola (IICA) was the most active, proposing a 
simple system for private and public agents in their decision making (Jaffé, 1993). This 
framework is based on three root elements: firm, government and external or 
independent hard-managed factors (Fig.21). IICA’s publications highlight how the 
space–site–localisation factor has an impact on food supply chain competitiveness. 
Similarly, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 1997) estimated that a firm’s or 
nation’s competitiveness is conditioned by factors agglomerated into four dimensions: 
internal, sector, systemic and microeconomic development level. Although the two 
institutions differ in their explanation and definition of the complexity of 
competitiveness in agriculture, their suggestions for promoting it are similar. 
However, it is clearly recognised that agribusinesses are highly sensitive to the 
availability of resources and highly influenced by the environment, and their 
operations may have significant social impacts.  Whilst the use of the IICA’s framework 
is well recognised in Latin American competitiveness studies on agriculture, it is highly 
influenced by other competitiveness theories (Chavarría et al, 2002; Bourgeois & 
Herrera, 1996; García, 1995). Porter’s competitiveness frameworks (Fig. 19 above and 
Fig. 22 below) have been popular since the early 1990s and are highly quoted by the 
researchers of productivity in agribusiness (Dlamini et al, 2014; Topolansky-Barbe et 
al, 2013; Lowe & Davis, 2007; Venturini & Boccaletti, 1998). 
 
Productivity is the prime determinant in the long run of a nation’s standard of living. 
The productivity of human resources determines wages and the productivity of 
physical assets may determine the return that capital investments earn for investors 
(Huggins & Izushi, 2012:p.9). As shown in the IICA’s figure (21) and in the figure below, 
three common factors are recognised that affect the structure of competition at the 
industry level and ultimately influence the competitive position of the firm, cluster or 
nation. Certainly, the profitability of agrifood products is highly influenced by demand 
conditions, the regulatory environment and by support industries. However, the 
elements associated with efficiency in logistics should be considered because once the 
internal factors are recognized and assessed the firms may take advantage of the 
external ones. 
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Figure 21: IICA framework of factors that affect competitiveness 
FACTORS
Firm internal Government External/Independent
Strategic
Environment to do 
business
Prices at global market
Products Currency rates
Demand and offer 
conditions
Technology Taxes and fees Impacts on trade equality
Trainings Basic salary
Impacts on trade 
environment
R&D Policy to trade
Production costs Tariff and NTM
Strategic alliances
Trade agreements and 
regulations
Supply chain
Reseach and 
development policy
Human capacity building 
policies
Strategic alliances
 
Source: Rojas et al (2000:p. 12). Translated by the author. 
 
 
Porter’s diamond framework (Fig.22) is regularly mentioned in analyses of industry 
innovation and cooperation as forms of competitive advantage. On the other hand, 
Mugera (2012) argues that Porter’s (1998) five-forces perspective is one of the two 
theoretical frameworks that are more commonly used in management research to 
analyse sources of competitive advantage. He states that Porter’s perspective 
highlights a competitive advantage as a position of superior performance that a firm 
achieves through offering cost/benefit advantages (p.12). Similarly, Lado et al (1992) 
assert that Porter’s models also attribute competitive advantages to the external 
environmental factors that a firm must respond to, such as barriers to competitors’ 
entry, product differentiation and other requirements related to cost. Arguably, 
Porter’s frameworks for evaluating competitive advantages are paradigms that are 
more focused on firms’ or clusters’ traditional strategies rather than a link between 
strategies and/or internal resources to achieve a competitive advantage (Wright et al, 
1994). Thus, Porter’s frameworks seem to be flexible and useful approaches to 
evaluating agribusiness productivity or efficiency for traditional agro-industrial 
structures. However, Gorton et al (2013:p.8) posit that agrifood competitiveness 
studies rarely adopt a specific approach to supply chain analysis. In Latin America Ruiz-
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Torres et al (2015) report an even greater scarcity of publications on supply chain 
quality management. 
 
Figure 22: Porter’s diamond framework 
 
Source: Porter (1990:p.127).  
 
Basically, a competitiveness analysis covers whatever the market requires: openness 
to international trade, competence of participants through product differentiation, 
cost optimisation through technological innovation or logistics and a favourable 
environment supported by the government through stable macroeconomic policies 
(Traill & Pitts, 1998). Some agribusiness studies also include the capacity to sell goods 
in the market under fair competitive conditions because it may translate into people’s 
well-being (Rojas & Sepúlveda, 1999; Fajnzylber, 1988). Additionally, competitiveness 
analysis of industries that are highly affected by climate change due to their need for 
seasonal and perishable products should consider their level of vertical coordination 
to achieve a high level of efficiency. In the literature it is argued that adhering to the 
environmental regulations through non-tariff policies may enhance companies’ 
competitiveness and encourage technological development (ECORYS, 2011:p.24). 
 
Agribusiness supply chain competitiveness analyses are regularly focused on 
quantitative indicators but qualitative variables can be useful for evaluating other 
aspects that may affect firms’ performance (García, 1995). Qualitative analyses to 
evaluate entrepreneurial activity, supportive factors at regional or national levels and 
access to information have been given more consideration in recent Latin American 
agribusiness analyses (Pini-Rosales et al, 2012). They are included to a great extent by 
companies in the evaluation of their internal efficiency in supply chain segments. 
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Recent studies of firm competitiveness also tend to include the social conditions in 
which the product is traded. Consequently, competitiveness in agriculture should be 
studied through the eyes of sustainable development in which the dimensions of 
economic, socio-cultural, environmental and policy implications converge (Rojas et al, 
2000). 
 
Venturini and Boccaletti (1998) posit that the presence of internationally competitive 
supplying industries or related industries is the third broad determinant of a national 
advantage in Porter’s diamond but it is also highlighted in Porter’s five-forces 
framework. Close working relationships with sophisticated suppliers help firms to 
apply new technologies and allow quick access to information, innovation and insights 
as well as cost-effective inputs to obtain greater efficiency. In the case of SIDSs, these 
are often very limited-size markets and the high cost of investment may represent a 
heavy barrier to new participants or make it less lucrative for foreign direct 
investment. As a result, monopolistic or oligopolistic structures could emerge with 
impacts on some dimensions of firms’ or nations’ competitiveness. Policy makers 
could develop instruments to the benefit of a limited group of firms’ participants. 
Indirectly, these actions would affect the business environment by limiting 
competition and eventually discouraging innovation and modernisation activities. 
Subsequently, the paucity in technological investment and limits on the types of 
assistance given to supportive partners will eventually increase the country’s level of 
vulnerability to external shocks. 
 
Pitts and Lagnevik (1998:p.23) state that the resources of a region are commonly 
based on unique historical conditions or are in socially complex interactions88. These 
interactions may increase the level of complexity in the study of agribusiness supply 
chains. For that reason and due to its similarities to and differences from Porter’s 
framework, the industrial districts approach (IDA) is included in this discussion of 
theoretical bases (Table 13). Although not as well known as Porter’s frameworks, the 
IDA is another relatively common theoretical paradigm used for the analysis of 
agribusiness competitiveness.  
                                                          
88 Among others, these interactions could be between a group with economic commitment and/or between the government and industry. 
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Table 13: Differences between IDA and Porter’s (1990) diamond 
Aspects Porter Industrial District Approach 
Point of Departure Global Local 
Theoretical Base Economic theory Multidisciplinary 
Nature of Cluster National in a global context Regional in an international context 
Methodology Economic context Socio-economic context 
Driving Forces of 
Competition 
Rivalry Rivalry and cooperation 
Source: Pitts and Lagnevik (1997:p.30). 
 
Brasili and Fanfani (2006) assert that the IDA became an important tool to analyse the 
roles of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the remarkable economic 
performance of Italy during the mid-1980s. This approach is attributed89 to Becattini, 
who allegedly rediscovered and adapted it from Marshall’s cluster concept, which is 
useful for describing different patterns of development of SMEs belonging to certain 
districts with respect to bigger enterprises. The IDA framework illustrates that, despite 
existing in the same country, environmental differences may change not only the type 
of product specialisation in the same firms but also their structure, socio-economic 
context, relationships between national and international markets, productivity and 
efficiency of production (Brasili & Fanfani, 2006:p.3). Pitts and Lagnevik (1997:p.24) 
state that one characteristic of firms to be analysed through the IDA is their capacity 
to evolve jointly and dynamically, with a process of mutual adaptation to changing 
socioeconomic conditions. Other studies of competitiveness in the Italian agricultural 
sector consider the IDA as a valuable analytical method to evaluate geographical 
agglomeration effects in agribusiness (Toccaceli, 2015; Becattini et al, 2009). Indeed, 
agglomerations of companies that are closely interconnected, specialised and co-
located in a specific place have been the subject of empirical observations and 
research over the years. The IDA is basically designed for specialised production of 
related firms in that scenario. 
 
The IDA could be a logical thought in the study of agribusiness competitiveness in 
SIDSs due to the fact that in SIDSs the main port is generally established in the main 
city or closer. Many importing companies are agglomerated there for two main 
reasons: the volume of businesses and population – which in the case of PR represents 
                                                          
89 The Marshallian industrial district (MID) plan originates the IDA core as a theoretical framework for explaining SMEs’ capacity, persistence and 
diffusion in dealing with external economies and changes in business atmosphere (Becattini et al, 2009). 
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a third of the nation – and the access to a more dynamic maritime infrastructure. 
Therefore, a ‘prima facie’ study of the agribusiness importers’ sector in a SIDS could 
consider this approach to analyse its competitiveness by geographical agglomeration. 
For that reason, it is considered necessary to include the IDA as an alternative 
paradigm for evaluating competitiveness (Fig.23). However, we must highlight that the 
distribution of PR’s grain-importing sector seems to be more complex. Although they 
have cross-business interaction and intercompany relations or cooperation and 
common interests, 50% of the animal feed producers are located in different 
municipalities and thus have dissimilar site conditions.  
  
Figure 23: The industrial district approach (IDA) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Pitts and Lagnevik (1998:p.25). 
 
Arguably, the IDA has strong similarities to economic cluster analysis. Porter et al 
(2004) state the importance of ‘cluster thinking’ in rural economic development. For 
them a ‘cluster-based approach’ is an essential tool for involving the private sector 
and an ‘overarching organisational structure’ for economic development. It is 
generally believed that economic clusters in less developed areas show poorer 
performances than those in developed regions, but they argue that more research is 
worthwhile to gain a better understanding of the social and business interrelations. A 
geographical agglomeration of companies or ‘industrial clusters’, which include their 
suppliers and service providers and associated institutions in a particular field, could 
be linked by externalities and complementarities of various types in a web that is 
complex to analyse (Porter & Ketels, 2009). 
TRENDS 
Structures 
Products 
Markets 
Technology 
Capacity 
Investment 
SUPPLY 
Cost 
Productivity 
Innovation 
International    
     Competition 
DEMAND 
Purchasing Power 
Demography 
Needs 
Brand Identity 
GOVERNMENT 
Local Government 
National Government 
European Community 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Socio-economic Relations 
Key Actors 
Network Relations, Contracts 
Division of Work and Specialisation  
139 
 
 
According to Toccaceli (2015:p.2), the ‘clusters’approach and MIDs (or IDA) are 
neither synonyms nor concepts conceived in same scientific context or with reference 
to identical economic and societal environments, although they have common roots’. 
Contrasting the Porter and IDA frameworks, although both involve building up a good 
picture of firms, the IDA starts from the region, the companies and the society in the 
zone considering services and other cross-interactions. On the other hand, Porter’s 
approaches view the situation from economic ties rather than socio-economic 
regional interaction, which is the origin of the IDA. However, Pitts and Lagnevik 
(1998:p.25) state that one of the main strategic weaknesses in the use of the IDA as a 
tool for the analysis of agrifood industries is that local systems cannot easily spread to 
or be replicated in other areas. Clearly, some successful policy conditions or business 
traditions cannot be transferred, nor the differences in infrastructure or service 
providers. Therefore, to explore an issue using a more qualitative, although less 
explicit, approach, Porter’s frameworks seem to be more flexible in adapting to 
multiple discussions, industries or scenarios. 
 
The most common competitiveness factors in the literature discussed previously are 
market, infrastructure and government. Albeit in different interactions with other 
indicators – external or internal – it is clear that the weight of these three concepts is 
important in competitiveness analyses at the firm, cluster, regional or national level. 
Considering that, Gorton and colleagues (2013) propose a new conceptual framework 
(Fig.24) to evaluate sustainable competitiveness in the agrifood supply chain. Their 
approach is centred on four elements – market level, modular, relational, captive and 
hierarchical – which interlinked, may define their relationship or at least offer an 
understanding of the governance of the supply chain.  
 
A sustainability trend in products and practices is currently promoted in developed 
markets because consumers are more conscious of climate change implications. At the 
firm level, companies are more aware in the analysis of the environmental factors that 
may affect it supply chain. However, that is not necessarily the case with other factors 
such as the level of firm’s dependency on external providers, percentage of products 
imported from a narrow group of suppliers with highest risk assessment, 
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infrastructure and access inneficiencies, that may affect it delivers from its origin to its 
final market. Perishables are highly affected by climate and might be affected by all of 
these factors, implying risks for the supply chain and therefore markets’ vulnerability. 
Consequently, the natural environment, market openness and domestic efficiency are 
factors that should be considered in the analysis of the agrifood supply. 
  
Figure 24: Conceptual framework for analysing sustainable product chain 
competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Gorton et al (2013:p.36). 
  
 
Gorton and colleagues (2013) develop an outline of the relationships of elements and 
determinants of competitiveness in agriculture (Table 14). For the purpose of this 
thesis, the focus is on the external determinants of government interventions (policy 
regulations) and their effects on investments in infrastructure (in our case controlled 
by firms) that seem to be significant for the efficiency of the agribusiness supply chain.  
 
Tuna (2014) posits that government policies can both act as barriers to entry and 
support competitiveness. Referring to Skuras and colleagues (2006), Tuna (2014:p.20) 
emphasises that ‘there is little or even a negative relation between government’s 
supports, technical efficiency and competitiveness on the level of the food sector’. 
Unlike the other approaches discussed, the IDA is the only framework that explicitly 
considers the European Commission, a foreign policymaker, as an example of an 
external government that may exert an impact on competitiveness. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to theorise that large regulatory institutions could affect the 
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competitiveness of a market by imposing generic policies without taking into account 
the nation’s particularities. 
Table 14: Determinants of competitiveness in agriculture 
Endogenous determinants 
(controlled by firms) 
External determinants 
(beyond the firms) 
 Size of the business  Factor endowment (e.g. resources in 
labour, capital and land) 
 Legal status (ownership)  Consumer demand 
 Factor intensity (e.g. capital–labour ratio 
and land–labour ratio) 
 Government intervention 
(e.g. policies, regulations, taxation) 
 Product specialisation vs. diversification   Research and development 
 Production and marketing practices  Investment in infrastructure 
 Structure of factors of production (land, 
labour and capital) 
 Firm location 
 Characteristics of (farm) labour 
Source: Gorton et al (2013:p.29). 
 
In the literature the effects of trade policies imposed by large economies affecting the 
exports from less developed countries (LDCs) are not rare. Some policies could limit 
the market liberalisation and base their application on environmental and/or 
consumers’ protection standards (Beghin, 2013). Other regulations are associated 
with protecting traditions, culture and infant companies or niche markets. However, 
several policy measures concerning maritime transportation in some markets could 
restrict trade, not only affecting firms’ competitiveness but also increasing market 
vulnerabilities. For instance, trade limits on the use of liberalised transportation 
services could constrain the offer to a small group of suppliers that, in an oligopolistic 
structure, could provoke an increase in trading costs and eventually products, 
reducing the purchasing power of consumers. In this example, trade policies and 
business structures interact, affecting consumers. Nevertheless, if to that business 
environment the climate change effect is added onto the supply chain plus importers’ 
lack of efficiency, undoubtedly an increase in costs would affect the ‘relationship 
between agents and domains’ more and thus the nation’s well-being. 
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4.2.4 Competitiveness and supply chains 
Constraints to supply chain development are generally related to market access, 
capabilities and institutions (Trienekens, 2011). Indeed, access to markets (local, 
regional and international) allows continuous trade and growth, but its capacity will 
be limited by the resource availability, infrastructure and regulatory or normative 
business framework (Meier & Rauch, 2005). Strong linkages to food producing regions, 
both domestic and foreign, assure a steady flow of raw agricultural material and 
processed and fresh food into the markets, but it is accessible when it is 
complemented by infrastructure (Coyle et al, 2004). Nevertheless, pressures on 
resources are increasing, and if the current trends continue with respect to the growth 
of the global population, the more intensive use of the world’s resources will put 
pressure on the security of the supply (Matopulos et al, 2015; Hubbard & Hubbard, 
2014).  
 
SIDSs, for instance, tend to be inherently prone to external shocks, over which they 
have very little or no control (Briguglio et al, 2008). Thus, their food security and 
market practically rest on their structural openness to trade and domestic firms’ 
efficiencies. Although there are five principal modes of transport – air, road, rail, 
water and pipeline–, to supply these geographically limited markets external arrivals 
by air or sea are obviously the two most common alternatives. However, to 
complement islanders’ needs, the most cost-effective mode of transport is by sea. In 
this scenario its disruption can be costly and damaging, affecting not only firms’ 
competitiveness capacity but also the other elements (echelons) of the chain and 
finally the consumers.  
 
The agrifood supply chain for produce transformation is one of the highest levels of 
value added, focusing on safe and good quality products. A wider definition, 
attributed to Porter, asserts that a supply chain is the activity when value is added by 
improving information and control, coordinating related activities and optimising the 
total costs across multiple activities (process) to reduce enterprise transaction costs 
rather than sub-optimising logistics or other functions (Chadist, 2012:p.26). On the 
other hand, Trienekens (2011) associates value added with a change related to 
quality, costs, delivery times, delivery flexibility, innovativeness and other aspects of a 
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product. For both researchers, the size of the value added will be decided by the end-
customer’s willingness to pay. In the agrifood sector, the value chain or value added 
may involve different secondary processes related to sub-sections, multi-processes, 
sub-standard products and waste. Agrifood products often face large uncertainties; 
thus, contractual agreements and partnerships are critical to their value added and 
distribution (Ruben et al, 2007).  
 
Matopoulos and colleagues (2015:p.219) argue that the majority of work conducted in 
the supply chain context either ignores the availability of natural resources as a 
potential supply chain risk factor or, when it does not, fails to recognise the 
implications and links of resource efficiency for the supply chains’ overall competitive 
advantage. Supply chain distortions can and should be measured with wide-ranging 
forms due to their impact across the production process. Chadist (2012) highlights 
that the supply chain measure are vital to efficiency through their effects on business 
organisation and its costs, financial metrics performance, its reputation, competitive 
position and internal capacity. However, direct procurement and improvements in 
production, transport and supply chain technologies make it possible to identify 
accurately the operational risks that could potentially have an impact on supply 
chains’ modus operandi as well as the suppliers that may favour the value chain’s 
competitiveness (Mangan et al, 2012). In fact, it is well known that multinational and 
transnational companies consider these factors when moving production to places 
where costs are competitive (WEF, 2013a, 2009). Nevertheless, this is not necessarily 
the case for traditional small–medium domestic importing companies, which should 
also consider those other segments of the entrepreneurial chain that are associated 
with them.  
 
Typically in the literature the concept of a supply chain refers to the set of buy–sell 
interactions (sourcing, buying, transporting, making, transforming, selling, distributing, 
etc.) as goods and/or information flow, from raw materials through production to the 
final retailer and their consumers (Emmett, 2005). Mangan and colleagues’ (2012) 
definition of this term refers to a network of organisations that are involved through 
upstream (supplier end) and downstream (customer end) linkages in the different 
processes and activities that create value. Clearly, in supply chain studies, it is 
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recognised that products rather than isolated elements involve active processes, such 
as sourcing agricultural produce from farmers or selling products to farmers in 
accordance with firms’ profit-seeking model. Products and/or producers interact with 
other elements of manufacturing or services, such as raw material availability, 
infrastructure and equipment, storage, product management or handling, and 
transportation. The study of disturbance elements that affect products’ distribution 
tends to assess multiple control points that may need multidisciplinary approaches 
(Velasco-Sánchez, 2013). Indeed, the literature associated with supply chains 
encompasses a number of key flow processes, such as the physical flow of materials, 
information and resources, to help with the operability (Denk et al, 2012; Pini-Rosales 
et al, 2012). Therefore, the purposes of supply chain management are to create value, 
enhance efficiency and satisfy consumers.  
 
As in the studies of competitiveness discussed previously, supply chain research in 
agriculture should be multidimensional (Fig.25). Various authors propose integration 
as a requirement if the level of uncertainty with respect to the timing, volume and mix 
of orders is high (Van Donk & van der Vaart, 2005). Nevertheless, the question should 
be ‘how can the location of the problem be identified?’  
 
Widely varied methodologies may cover empirical techniques (case/field study, 
survey, archival research, action research, etc.) or modelling techniques (optimisation, 
simulation, systems, etc.). For instance, Van Donk and van der Vaart (2005) investigate 
the level and scope of integration that can be achieved in a supply chain dominated by 
shared resources. Accordingly, they use a variety of data-gathering techniques, such 
as process mapping, semi-structured interviews, studying and observing procedures 
and analysing production-related data as recorded in the company’s information 
systems. The use of empirical methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, to 
evaluate supply chain management is more common currently than before but 
apparently less frequent than expected in agribusiness supply chain studies. However, 
Teuteberg and Wittstruck (2010), in their review of academic publications about this 
topic, report that almost 48% of them do not explicitly mention their research method 
for exploring the phenomenon and an important portion of the others show 
multidisciplinary approaches. 
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Figure 25: Food chains’ basic opportunities for intervention 
 
Source: World Economic Forum (2009:p.12). 
 
The concept of supply chain management is a relatively new one, and more recently 
multidimensional approaches associated with productivity have been used for its 
analysis, in which the old term of logistics is substantial. Although it is believed that 
the word logistics has its roots in the Greek empire (λογιστικοϛ), there is some 
consensus that it was adopted by the English language in the nineteenth century. 
Principally, it is thought that it was incorporated by its military application with regard 
to the organisation of moving, lodging and supplying troops and/or equipment. 
Currently, small–medium companies with a logistics division, associate it with trucks 
and sheds. 
 
The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP, 2013) defines 
logistics as that part of the supply chain process that plans, implements and controls 
the efficient–effective flow and storage of goods, services and related information 
from the point of origin to the point of consumption to meet customers’ 
requirements. Mangan et al (2012) posit that logistics involves at least eight rights: 
getting the right product, in the right way, the right quantity and right quality, in the 
right place, at the right time for the right consumer and at the right cost. Thus, it 
means more than trucks or sheds, but in the case of perishable goods, logistics 
requires careful consideration of its efficiencies. 
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Porter (1985:p.39) identifies five categories of primary activities involved in industrial 
competition, all of which are dependent on the industry and its strategy. He states 
that each category of primary activities, to some degree, plays an important role in 
adding competitiveness to the firm’s processes but more to identifying strengths and 
effectiveness. The categories proposed are inbound logistics, associated with 
receiving, storing and disseminating inputs to the product; operations, activities 
related to transforming inputs into the final form; outbound logistics, associated with 
collecting, storing and physically distributing the finished product; marketing and 
sales, inherent in providing a means by which buyers can purchase the product and 
inducing them to do so; and service, actions that enhance or maintain the value of the 
product by attending to the customers’ needs. 
 
In agribusiness, these elements, in addition to many other biotic and/or abiotic 
factors, may directly or indirectly make the supply chain more complex and increase 
the vulnerability level, demanding strategic and precise logistics to minimise the risks 
and impacts on competitiveness (Beilock, 1988). Qu and colleagues (2010:p.6904) 
note that the use of ‘analytical target cascading’ is an effective method for resolving 
supply chain configuration problems, because it is the number of autonomous stages 
and links between these stages that define the complexity. Analyses to evaluate the 
complexity of the chain and its elements are not only vital at the firm level but might 
also be useful in exploring national food security vulnerabilities further. Decomposing 
the supply chain may allow the identification of ‘bottleneck’ segments that destabilise 
or discourage productivity to develop strategies or innovations that promote 
efficiencies, reducing domestic vulnerabilities and encouraging businesses (Ferrantino, 
2012a). A methodology named ‘supply chain design decomposition’ developed by 
Schnetzler and colleagues (2007) consist of an axiomatic matrix design for 
systematically analysing the process of transformation structured in four clusters: 
intelligence, design, choice and implementation. Their methodology tries to develop 
new supply chain strategies or improve existing ones. 
 
Porter (1985) posits that, to diagnose firms’ competitive advantage, the study of their 
value chain is the basic tool, because for him the essence of strategy is inherent in the 
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firms’ activities. He argues that the level of integration defines the division of activities 
between a firm and its supplies, channels and buyers (p.55). To measure its efficiency 
and performance, it is necessary to take into account the fact that control is no longer 
based on ownership only but rather on networking across interfaces. Gousia-Banu and 
Venkata-Rao (2015) suggest that many management failures have been attributed to 
the lack of a system to bind various sub-systems within geographically widespread 
enterprises. Thus, to evaluate the effects of a policy on the supply chain, it is 
necessary to decompose it to identify the weaknesses in its sections or fractions 
(echelons).  
 
Some authors believe that the concept of competitiveness in supply chains is 
substituted by management because it is associated with efficiency (Velasco-Sánchez, 
2013; Lozano-Rojo, 2002). As conceptualised today, supply chain management (SCM) 
implies high levels of optimisation and performance through the participating 
elements, resulting in competitive advantages. Although in the literature it is clear 
that SCM is intrinsic to a long process of materials’ transformation into a finished 
product, its main objective should be validated over the whole process with a 
continuous search for inefficiencies to optimise costs (Radanliev, 2014). SCM aims to 
improve the competitiveness of the chain as a whole by integrating organisational 
units (echelons) along the chain and coordinating materials, information, 
transportation and financial flow efficiently to fulfil the firms’ needs (Kilger, 2015). 
Therefore, SCM is a cross-functional activity from a truly process-based perspective 
and is not limited to one functional area considered as a strategic factor to enhance 
competitiveness (Govindan et al, 2015; Mangan et al, 2012). 
 
Competitive strategy related to the supply chain is another challenge for 
organisations. Van Hoek (1998) argues that companies are no longer units in a 
competitive battle; supply chains compete with each other. For him the supply chain 
management perspective is a view of the customer rather than just a control based on 
networking the integration of processes across functional, geographical and 
organisational interfaces (p.187). For this reason he believes that real firm logistics 
optimisation is based on the notion that sub-optimisation at one point in the logistics 
organisation is permitted as long as it contributes to the overall optimisation. From a 
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supply chain view, this will be expanded across all of the interfaces at the chain-wide 
level. Thus, the ‘bottleneck’ in one section of the chain may represent direct or 
indirect efficiencies for the other echelons.  
 
Radanliev (2014) summarises the most common problems attributed to the supply 
chain in four groups of skills: (1) anticipating the demand for a product, market 
standards and influencers, product variety and life cycle; (2) constant research on 
internal and external factors; (3) focusing on the supplier or customer and the level of 
integration; and (4) considering trust and commitment or interdependence and 
organisational compatibility. Generally, all of them are highly associated with 
conditions of poor information flows and a fragmented supply chain. Kunaka 
(2011:p.24) sustains that, although this flow is the first barrier to overcome to achieve 
competitiveness, improvements in information and technology innovation will allow 
adjacent steps in the value chain and hence greater integration of the firm’s supply 
chain. Wognum et al (2011) posit that from a supply chain perspective, the complexity 
and challenges in the agrifood sector are more demanding because it is characterised 
by increased imports and exports, dependency on transport at the global level and 
sourcing of seasonal, perishable, highly regulated products. Planning practice in food-
processing industries is often not easy to accomplish, because to be efficient they 
must balance production with flexible performances. Furthermore, uncertainty 
increases the need for more supply chain integration, while shared resources (e.g. 
transportation) limit the possibility of reaching a high level of integration (van Donk & 
van der Vaart, 2005). In summary, the formulation or design of a supply chain strategy 
must also anticipate operational capabilities through internal competencies. If there is 
a lack of such capabilities, the strategy must consider inter-organisational integration 
in combination or cooperation with other operations (Pérez-Franco, 2010). 
 
Rojas and colleagues (2000) analyse the competitiveness of the food supply chain by 
evaluating a group of firms with primary production to distribution at the industrial 
level (Fig.26). They posit that, in the agrifood supply chain, three groups of factors 
should be accounted for because of their influence on businesses’ competitiveness. 
Firstly, there are sectoral factors, which are variables highly controlled or influenced 
by the firm’s decisional context and producers such as: those related to management, 
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the organisational structure, technological and cooperation activities to promote or 
optimise competences and network strengthening. Secondly, there are systemic 
factors, which are external economic elements that affect the firm or its business 
environment, such as access to finance and the institutional or technological 
infrastructure (internal and external) that affects the firm’s innovation or 
diversification. Thirdly, there are non-economic factors, such as social (culture, 
religion, education and family economic structure) and political factors (trade 
agreements and legal differences). According to Rojas and colleagues (2000), although 
these factors do not directly consider other elements that may affect the firm – such 
as the international context, sustainability and public corruption – they are the bases 
for an analysis of the firm’s supply chain competitiveness at the domestic level.  
 
Figure 26: Model of a productive food supply chain 
Environment 
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Source: Original by Rojas et al (2000:p.29). Translated and adapted by the author.  
 
About the sectoral elements associated to firms’ resources, Barney (1991) includes all 
assets, capabilities, organisational processes and other controlled by the firm that may 
improve efficiency. To highlight its importance Barney develop a (VRIO) framework in 
which the elements of (V) valuable, (R) rare, (I) costly to imitate and (O) organised to 
capture value, in tangible and intangible form of resources, are considered due to its 
potential to affect or sustain competitiveness (Fig. 27). Thus, to enjoy competitive 
advantage the firm must implement asynchronous strategies, routinely take more 
advantage of its resources and focused on its heterogeneity-immobility assets in 
comparison to its competitors (Barney, 1991). However, in an industry in where firms 
have the same resources and implement similar strategies of efficiency the first 
movers may enjoy a sustainable competitiveness, otherwise it is hard to achieve.  
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Figure 27: VRIO: sources of sustained competitive advantage 
 
Adapted from: de Sousa et al, 2010, p. 305. 
 
 
For these researchers (Barney, 1991; Rojas et al, 2000) those firms with the highest 
level of organisation to capture value, interrelationship between their echelons, and 
with identified limitations besides a high level of innovation, will show the greatest 
possibilities of competitiveness if their planning and priorities to improve their 
infrastructure are focused on consumers. Additionally, they suggest that firms with 
higher levels of innovation in the process of product transformation have a basic 
competitive advantage if they consider inefficiencies related to transportation, routes 
and other aspects at the port level. Therefore, we must conclude that ‘the strength of 
a chain lies in its weakest link’: the real challenge is to identify it. 
 
From a brief look at the literature on global value chains, the interaction of the 
previously mentioned factors is characterised by falling barriers to international trade 
due to decreasing tariffs and the lowering of subsidies and price support. 
Simultaneously, some increases in firms’ consolidation and/or concentration in all the 
links of chains can be observed (Wright & MacCarthy, 2011). Furthermore, new 
technologies for communication and changes in transportation costs seem to be 
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positive in facilitating the interactions between chain participants (Mangan et al, 
2012). Arguably, the standardisation of processes and the improvements in 
communication technology, rather than firms’ integration, have been more positive 
for SMEs than for multinational firms (Gereffi & Lee, 2012). However, LDC producers 
are confronted with asymmetric power relationships in a race that has an impact on 
the distribution of costs and benefits over the chain participants. 
 
Transportation, for instance, is an element that may affect all three groups of factors 
mentioned by Rojas et al (2000). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) suggest that large hidden 
costs to trade, particularly in transportation, may explain most of the discrepancies 
between cost model estimates and trade statistics. Radelet and Sachs (1998) posit 
that countries with high shipping costs show much less economic growth than those 
with transport advantages. Indeed, those distortions could be due to inefficiencies in 
the supply chain or trade policies. However, we are of the opinion that they are due to 
both.  
 
In an agrifood supply chain, there are some specific characteristics that differentiate it 
from other chains and directly interfere with its performance (Table 15). Climatic 
events and market or supply chain distortions may increase the real cost of 
transporting a product, affecting consumers. For instance, grains are generally the 
starting point of the food chain and agribusinesses in many economies, but as a high-
volume/low-cost perishable agrifood good it is affected by high ‘transport cost 
sensitivity of freight’, thus affecting consumers’ purchases. Although freight transport 
is an integral part of SCM and represents an increase in the product’s basic cost, it is 
regularly regarded as a non-value-added activity. Cargo transport plays a vital role in 
the supply chain and, if properly managed, may induce efficient production and 
effectiveness, thus affecting the firms’ competitive advantages (Burns, 2015). 
 
Currently, the transportation of agricultural products and other comparatively high-
volume/low-cost freight, in general, show increases in size (volume), value and 
distances travelled. More processed food or ready-to-cook products are traded. 
Furthermore, many food producers, rather than transporting bulky products, now 
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tend to trade and add value to the product near to the point of production. In 
addition, an increase in competition regularly forces companies to reduce their costs. 
 
Table 15: Specific characteristics of an agrifood supply chain 
Seasonality in the availability of raw 
materials 
Perishability of the final product  
Seasonality in consumption and 
production 
Behaviour and preferences of consumers  
Perishability and variability of the 
quality of raw material  
Sensory properties of the product  
Quality and safety of food  Necessity for transport and storage 
condition  
Dependence on the natural conditions 
of farm products  
Consumer preoccupation concerning the 
method of production 
Source: Pini-Rosales et al (2012:p.3). 
 
Due to the fact that the rate per kilo transported is generally inversely proportional to 
the consignment weight, high volumes of produce may mitigate sensitivity to 
transportation costs (Fig.28). According to Mangan and colleagues (2012), higher-
value goods are better able to absorb the transportation costs imposed by having to 
move freight over distances. Consequently, this may affect the cost of trading 
agricultural products in low-volume markets and may exacerbate vulnerabilities for 
SIDSs. Due to these limitations, companies’ participation is reduced and thus the 
competition between them.  
 
Figure 28: Relationship between rate per kilo and consignment weight 
 
Source: Mangan et al (2012:p.125). 
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In agribusiness the potential for losses in the logistics system is particularly high for 
perishables. They are very sensitive to time, climatic conditions and handling. The 
journey, distances or days travelling from the port of origin to the destination are 
crucial in determining the basic conditions of weather, storage and other needs 
(Beilock, 1988). Some agrifood commodities are more susceptible than others, such as 
green-leaf produce. For instance, for lettuce, even with expedited handling from field 
to store, it is common for retailers to discount or discard between 6% and 20% of each 
shipment due to quality degradation over time. On the other hand, apples can be 
stored in a controlled environment for a month without complexity. In both cases 
many variables could be involved, but regulations and inspections have considerable 
importance. 
 
Ruben and colleagues (2007) summarise the critical interfaces between agrifood 
supply chain dimensions (Table 16). They identify how the interaction between those 
elements may affect the chain’s performance. In the matrix the first element under 
consideration is the channel choice. According to these authors, this is the process by 
which a product or service is made available for use, intermediate and/or final 
consumption. They posit that its analysis requires a broad view of how the actors in 
the chain bridge the gap between the echelons, because it implies total planning, in a 
mix of processes searching for the optimal result for the entire chain. Consequently, 
the number of echelons, their performances, the channels’ integration and the type of 
institutional (firms’) governance regime may affect the chain’s efficiency levels 
because they are variables with strong effects on costs. 
 
Supply chain management in agricultural products has received more attention lately 
due to issues related to public health (Schanbacher, 2014; Ahumada & Villalobos, 
2009). Issues that are more associated with traceability, quality and authenticity are 
part of a new holistic approach to the food chain integrity strategy (Hoorfar et al, 
2011). Similarly, health-conscious and better-informed consumers who want to have 
accurate information about the farming, marketing and distribution practices used to 
bring the agricultural products to the shelves of the neighbourhood supermarket have 
emerged (Ahumada & Villalobos, 2009). This complexity is critical in the case of 
perishable agricultural products. 
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Table 16: Critical interfaces between supply chain dimensions 
  Performance is influenced by: 
Having an 
effect on: 
Channel choice Governance 
regime 
Quality 
performance 
Value-added 
distribution 
Channel 
choice 
  
Transaction costs 
and risk 
management 
Standards, 
labels and 
branding 
Sorting and 
delivery 
contracts 
Governance 
regime 
Vertical 
integration and 
trust relationships 
 
Quality 
enforcement; 
monitoring, 
control and 
sanctions 
Market 
differentiation 
and collective 
action 
Quality 
performance 
Subcontracting or 
outsourcing: 
integral quality 
control 
Quality assurance 
and certification 
  
Economies of 
scale and scope: 
location choice 
Value-added 
distribution 
Market 
competition and 
dedicated 
suppliers 
Bargaining 
opportunities 
and power 
relations 
Co-innovation 
and      co-
operation 
  
Source: Ruben et al (2007:p.15). 
 
 
The supply of agrifood consumer products may demand sophisticated systems among 
the supply chain. These may increase the cost of products, and in some scenarios 
infrastructure investments and/or changes in trading protocols are needed. Although 
the trend for liberalised markets for trade has strengthened, it has been accompanied 
by a higher level of public scrutiny for the food supply chain practices and produces. 
As a result, more regulations and policies are being developed. The new standards 
may affect the design and operations of the already-complex supply chain 
management. These must be taken into account by firms in their analysis of demand 
potential and consumer behaviour. Whilst it is true that markets potential in relation 
to external elements90 may have implications for transaction costs, the improvements 
in efficiency, productivity and purchase conditions may help to reduce their effects 
(Zúñiga-Arias & Ruben, 2007).  
 
  
                                                          
90 Such as resource scarcity, trade barriers and geographic distance. 
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4.3.0 Policy instruments affecting competitiveness in agribusiness 
The concept of competitiveness has evolved incorporating variables measured by 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. The analysis of policies or regulatory 
instruments becomes important in providing a proper business environment and 
flexibility for trade. Gorton et al (2013:p.12) state that competitiveness depends on 
well-functioning public and private institutions, their infrastructure and a stable 
macroeconomic environment. Tariff and non-tariff measures are policy instruments 
that may enhance or limit these elements by their effects on firms’ supply chain and 
their competitiveness in trade. This research is focused on the effects on trade of a 
non-tariff measure as a policy instrument. As a result, this section of the theoretical 
framework defines and classifies the concepts but also presents some paradigms 
identified in the literature and used analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Non-tariff measures for trade 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) indicate that, due to the hidden costs of trade, the 
costs associated with cross-border trade, even between well-integrated countries, are 
higher than those that can be explained by distance and traditional policies. Non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) influence these costs. They could be defined as policy instruments 
related to trade, concerning labelling or packaging requirements, content or product 
traceability, micro-policies and macro-policies that by their particularity imply an extra 
indirect cost for businesses and/or changing the quantities traded or the prices or 
both or all of the above (Beghin, 2013; Nicita & Gourdon, 2013; Mimouni et al, 2009). 
Fisher and Serra (2000) define NTMs as barriers whereby the minimum standard 
exceeds what the planner would adopt if all the products were domestic. Their 
framework makes it possible to enhance the effect of a standard (rule) in the presence 
of non-beneficial externalities, taking domestic welfare into account. Generally, NTMs 
that exert an impact on trade are more associated with exporters than importers (Reis 
& Farole, 2012). Despite their effects on competitiveness, NTMs seem to be 
increasingly used to regulate international trade; hence, their study becomes more 
significant and the need to update data even more important.  
 
Deardorff and Stern (1997) assert that trade policies need to be contextualised 
because nations may differ in the ways in which they manage public ownership, the 
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concept of monopolisation and the regulation of economic activity. Understanding 
those differences should help in analysing how public trade policies can interrupt the 
interests of producers. In some countries NTMs may act as a ‘Damocles sword’, 
damaging their own competitiveness and making it difficult for domestic producers to 
access critical inputs in a timely manner and at the right cost. NTMs are policies, 
regulations or procedures that ‘generate a wedge between the domestic and world 
prices of one or several traded goods or services’ (Cadot et al, 2012:p.10). Unlike 
tariffs, quantifying the effects of non-tariff measures is not easy (Rivera-Batiz & Oliva, 
2004). The relevant information is often hidden in legal or regulatory documents or 
protocols that are generally established by public policies but also sometimes 
beneficial for a small group of private companies. The access to data is limited and, if 
collected, data are commonly not centralised; thus, multiple technical agencies 
intervene, looking for specific related elements but without considering the whole 
phenomenon. These issues make the collection of data on NTMs a very resource-
intensive task. Moreover, their effects are indirect, often very case-specific or 
technical, and their monitoring at the international level seems to be affected by a 
paucity of transparency (UNCTAD, 2013a; Beghin, 2006; Coughlin & Wood, 1989). 
Hence, these factors make it difficult to understand their implications, which is 
troubling for policymakers, trade negotiators and development agencies.  
 
In the literature related to international trade, the argument that restrictions on trade 
generally have costly national consequences is not rare. Throughout history, examples 
of protectionist policies imposed by empires on their colonies or against enemy 
territories have been the origins of some of the current regulations on trade. In the 
last century, protectionist promoters argued that regulatory frameworks, currently 
named non-tariff measures (NTMs), were provoked as a control measure after the 
reduction or elimination of the tariff mechanism in trade (Deardorff & Stern, 1997). 
Although it is not clear when they were named non-tariff measures or when their 
study as a research topic on the international market began, Coughlin and Wood 
(1989) state that restrictions on international trade in the form of NTMs dramatically 
multiplied in the 1980s. Laird and Yeats (1989) identify that in 1966 only 25% of 
imports in the major developed countries were affected by NTMs but by 1986 the 
percentage of impacted products rose to 48%. It is believed that the protectionist 
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pressure increased in part due to the trade imbalance in the US market, but some 
supporters also assert that it was a consequence of the increase in international trade. 
Certainly, trade grew rapidly between the 1990s and the 2000s, driven by a mix of 
technological and policy changes. Consequently, some academic institutions and 
international organisations intensified their interest in NTMs on trade.  
 
In 1994 UNCTAD started data collection to develop and classify tariff and non-tariff 
measures using its customized Coding System of Trade Control Measures (TCMCS). 
Later, in collaboration with the World Bank, the data became accessible to 
researchers through new software named TRAINS. UNCTAD’s prototype classification 
consisted of six core categories: 1) price control measures; 2) finance measures; 3) 
automatic licensing measures; 4) quantity control measures; 5) monopolistic 
measures; and 6) technical measures. With the Sao Paulo Consensus in 2005, it was 
agreed that the method of experts’ meetings would develop the methodologies, 
classifications, and quantification of development impacts of NTMs. The Multi-Agency 
Support Team (MAST) paved the way in Geniva for global consensus building on the 
interest in studying, defining and classifying NTMs as well as facilitating an 
understanding of their effects and an awareness of such measures among less 
developed countries (LDCs). 
 
While tariffs have been reduced since the GATT/ WTO interventions, NTMs continue 
to limit access to markets. Penello-Rial (2014) believed that in some cases NTMs’ 
effects on a market could be higher than tariff for trade. Imposing unobservable costs 
on trade through NTMs may be the protectionists’ political answer to tariff reduction 
(Beghin, 2013; Mohan et al, 2012). In fact, it appears that governments have been 
more creative in the last three decades, with a plethora of justifications defending 
their right to impose limits on trade. As a result, market access negotiations in 
merchandise trade at the multilateral (bilateral, regional and so forth) level commonly 
cover changes to tariffs and non-tariff measures. However, studies show slow 
advances in that direction. Nicita and Gourdon (2013), analysing a group of products 
affected by NTMs, contrast their type and percentage for the years 1999 and 2010. 
They report an increase in three of the four groups of NTMs considered (technical 
measures, price control and other measures), the most significant being the group of 
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technical measures to trade (TMTs), which showed a 15% increase (37% in 1999 and 
52% in 2010). Cadot and colleagues (2012) indicate that, independently of the region, 
TMTs are the most-used form of NTMs, especially in Asia and Latin America, where a 
large number of quantitative restrictions (mostly in the form of licensing) are 
implemented.  
 
4.3.2 Non-tariff measures in supply chains 
The cost behaviour of activities cannot be understood without simultaneously 
examining the costs of the imports used to produce them and their linkages during 
making (Porter, 1985:p.89). Regulatory issues may affect cost behaviour in the logistic 
and supply chain process. The effect of supply chain barriers may differ between 
companies and industries and depend on product characteristics, such as time 
sensitivity or perishability (WEF, 2013a:p.4). Basically, a supply chain consists of at 
least three players, namely the supplier, the manufacturer and the customer. 
However, it may be much more complex when the supply chain is extended to include 
wholesalers, traders or distributors, and service providers (Hasachoo & Kalaya, 2013; 
Mangan et al, 2012).  
 
Historical examples of production fragmentation may date back to ancient times. 
Currently, it is a method of production that is practically widely adopted, and policies 
on NTMs may have implications to trade. NTMs may lead to higher domestic prices 
than would have been observed in their absence but also may cause losses in 
competitiveness by acting as barriers to trade (Ferrantino, 2006). According to 
UNTACD (2013a:p.1), in practice NTMs ‘have the potential to substantially distort 
trade’. Specifically, some NTMs may involve quantitative import restrictions, variable 
import charges, minimum import prices and discretionary licensing, all maintained or 
limited through state-trading enterprises or agencies (Laird, 1998). Others may 
exclude suppliers or goods, besides discouraging some sectors of the domestic market 
(Galvão de Miranda & Schuh, 2008).  
 
Some NTMs have effects on supply chain procedures, which may increase the chain’s 
cost to business. Nevertheless, it seems that this kind of analysis is relatively limited in 
the literature. For instance, companies may respond to delays and unreliability by 
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holding additional inventories, which may imply higher inventory costs, storage space, 
costs for energy and so forth (WEF, 2013a). Highlighting this, Fugazza (2013) argues 
that, from the producer point of view, compliance costs may include fixed costs of 
upgrading the equipment and/or practice codes, obtaining certification, altering 
marketing strategies and so forth. Additionally, Cadot and associates (2012) state that 
restricting access to key inputs and intermediate products, as well as the multiple 
complex procedures for importing, for instance, may cause delays or more costs to 
firms, hurting small and medium enterprises. Stone and colleagues (2015) suggest that 
the effects of some NTMs are also influenced by the relationship between the inputs 
produced by different firms. One of the methods that can be used to analyse their 
effects on the agrifood system is the analysis of the supply chain (Hasachoo & Kalaya, 
2013). Indeed, different types of NTMs associated with different stages in the 
movement of goods or accumulated in long supply chains may imply more complex 
trade-distorting effects for goods produced in a fragmented manner than for those in 
vertical integration (Ferrantino, 2012b). 
 
Some SIDSs have developed strategic initiatives to reduce the potential cost effects of 
NTMs on trade in their production process. This action has made Singapore one of the 
most open economies in the world (WEF, 2013b). On the contrary, in publications of 
LDC case studies, arguments about the negative effects on trade provoked by NTMs 
imposed by some larger economies are not rare (Mohan et al, 2012; Nardella & 
Boccaletti, 2004). Besides, in some cases, formulations of NTMs’ may discriminate 
against a country’s trading partners. Laird (1998) postulates that NTMs are: costly to 
administer, costly to consumers, inefficient ways of creating jobs and lacking 
transparency. Nevertheless, the elimination of an NTM without a comprehensive 
analysis could be disastrous if it does not take into account its multi-dimensional 
nature (Cadot et al, 2012). 
 
Beghin and Bureau (2001) posit that those NTMs that restrict trade by chance while 
correcting market inefficiencies and addressing legitimate concerns to protect 
consumers should not be qualified as barriers without analysis. From the producer 
point of view, these types of NTMs may facilitate the technical measures enhancing 
import demand rather than penalising foreign suppliers through higher costs (Xiong & 
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Beghin, 2012). On the consumers’ side, however, a technical measure may increase 
the demand for imports if the measure is informative (Fugazza, 2013), but the 
product’s new price may also affect consumers’ purchasing power. The work of 
regulators should be in parallel with competition policy through promoting access and 
restricting the ability of incumbent firms to exercise market power to the detriment of 
rivals and ultimately consumers (Banda et al, 2015). Consequently, the 
implementation, elimination or improvement of NTMs should be based on supporting 
sustainable firm competitiveness. 
 
4.3.3 Non-tariff measures classifications 
Currently, it is argued that differences exist between NTMs and non-tariff barriers, 
particularly because the latter generally operate as a discriminatory process imposed 
by governments to favour domestic over foreign suppliers (UNCTAD, 2013a). Beghin 
(2013) states that some NTMs are useful if not imminently necessary for the market 
function, particularly across borders in aspects that may affect consumers’ health and 
safety. It seems that some NTMs’ frameworks make it possible to enhance the effect 
of a standard (rule) in the presence of non-beneficial externalities, taking into account 
the domestic welfare. As a result, the motivation, complexity and effects of these 
policies are wide and different, as are the approaches to understanding them (Cadot 
et al, 2012). 
  
Coughlin and Wood (1989) conduct a supply and demand analysis to identify and 
organise NTMs by type and effects on trade. They classify them indirectly into two 
basic groups: marginal measures and hard measures. In their opinion, those measures 
related to marking, labelling, content identification, packaging and product traceability 
may cause marginal effects on trade. These kinds of NTMs or regulations, although 
adding costs, are not generally discriminatory and have reasonably low compliance 
costs and thus relatively minor effects on trade (Nicita & Gourdon, 2013:p.1).  
 
For Coughlin and Wood (1989), NTMs for trade such as quotas, voluntary export 
restraints (VER), trade restraints under the multi-fibre arrangement (for textiles), non-
automatic import authorisations (TMT equivalent) and variable import levies (at 
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customs) are considered in the group of hard measures. In the literature it is believed 
that, in comparison with the first group, these last five measures have much more 
significant effects because they are designed to reduce imports. Thereby, the quotas 
and VER are the most frequent forms of measures to directly benefit domestic 
producers. Arguably, their effects are relatively easy to measure and tend to be less 
complex to quantify (Husted & Melvin, 2013). Cadot and colleagues (2012) categorise 
those five instruments previously mentioned as quantitative non-tariff restrictions and 
the others as technical regulations (e.g. product SPS measures). Currently the use of 
quotas and VER is declining significantly since most of them were made illegal by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules (Nicita & Gourdon, 2013).  
  
Roberts and associates (1999) classify NTMs by their effects on welfare reduction or 
welfare enhancement. They use three broad goals for technical measures to restrict 
trade: 1) to protect the economic interests of producers, 2) to protect the health and 
economic interests of consumers and 3) to protect the national environment. Through 
these outlooks, the requirements might also be divided into risk reducing or non-risk 
reducing. Hasachoo and Kalaya (2013) present a 2007 version of NTM classification 
developed by Worasakyothin and Tiranutti for the ASEAN Secretariat. According to 
them, their proposal was arranged in five classes: 1) para-tariff measures (e.g. 
customs/import surcharge), 2) price control measures (e.g. variable charges), 3) 
finance measures (e.g. advance import deposits), 4) monopolistic measures (e.g. 
having a single channel for imports) and 5) technical measures (e.g. product 
characteristics, quality or safety). However, considering the multitude of NTMs, other 
authors categorise them by groups and/or systems such as: 1) price and quantity 
control measures, 2) threat measures (e.g. anti-dumping), 3) sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) technical measures on trade and 5) other categories (such as 
quotas, subsidies, restrictions on post-sales services, measures related to intellectual 
property rights and rules of origin) (Husted & Melvin, 2013; Vancauteren, 2013; 
UNCTAD, 2010a).  
  
The Multiagency Support Team (MAST, 2009) launched the collection of NTM data in 
seven pilot countries starting in 2008, and in 2010 a classification following a 
hierarchical ‘tree’ design was adopted (Cadot et al, 2012). Interestingly, after some 
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amendments and clarifications, the last classification version was officially published 
in 2013 by the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (Fig.29). The 
tree/branch figure categorises the non-tariff measures into two main sections: import 
measures and export measures. These sections are then divided into technical 
measures to trade (TMT) and non-technical measures (NnTM) conformed by 16 
chapters or classes (between letter A and letter P). Nicita and Gourdon (2013) assert 
that the idea within the categorisation was to group measures with similar purposes.  
Currently, the collected database contains NTM information from more than 50 
countries, which include over 25 LCDs, the European Union and Japan (Cadot et al, 
2012). However, in this thesis it is demonstrated that a cabotage measure in not 
clearly classified in the NTMs list by its multidimensional effects or interactions with 
others NTMs.  
 
Figure 29: Classification of non-tariff measures 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, in UNCTAD (2013a:p.4). 
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The increase in costs resulting from applying an NTM may affect not only the 
exporting country but also businesses and consumers in the importing country or 
region. For instance, a relatively new concept of NTMs named ‘localisation barriers’ 
(which could be categorised as NnTM-J or distribution restrictions) are a range of 
measures that favour the domestic industry at the expense of foreign competitors in 
restrictions imposed on input markets by a mode of local content requirements (Stone 
et al, 2015). ‘Localisation barriers’ are an example of the complexity of the policy 
structure that surrounds the firms in a cluster or region; thus, analyses of such policies 
should consider their multidimensional effect. Non-tariff measures for trade – 
technical and/or non-technical standards – may create supply chain difficulties, such 
as the certification of foreign production facilities. For example, sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures may affect or inhibit trade by requiring every shipment 
to be inspected, rather than using risk profiling and technology (e.g. X-rays) for 
inspections, reducing the time and number of interventions (Cadot et al, 2012). 
 
Historically, agricultural produce has been at the core of the debate on NTMs and 
their reduction is one of the main areas for further market access negotiations in 
traded goods. More than ever before, research studies on regulatory mechanisms 
associated with complex logistics activities are considering its effects on productivity, 
safety and quality (Beghin, 2013). Plenty of research studies analyse the effects of 
TMTs related to the agribusiness sector. In agrifood goods the effects are more 
obvious because of their high degree of sensitivity to the climate, transport and SPS 
conditions. Management of these products tends to has higher cost and complexity 
due to its perishability, their susceptibility to rejections and other costly precautionary 
regulatory measures (Reis & Farole, 2012). Indeed, high levels of responsibility to 
guarantee product quality to consumers may not necessarily be protectionist, but 
competitiveness is the challenge. 
 
According to Nicita and Gourdon (2013), SPS measures and TMTs in practice often 
result in diverting trade from LDCs, where production processes and certification 
bodies may be insufficient, or they represent a higher cost of compliance, thus 
affecting their competitiveness negatively. However, they notice that simple questions 
regarding which policy measures are imposed by whom or which types of measures 
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are faced by products cannot be answered in the vast majority of cases because of the 
lack of adequate data. The classification (Fig.29) presented above, developed by the 
UNCTAD, simplifies data collection and is an endeavour to achieve standardisation 
(Fig.30). However, as previously discussed, in most cases there is not one central 
national repository agency of NTM data.  
 
Figure 30: Description of the chapters in the NTMs classification  
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013a:p.3). 
 
 
Policies affecting trade are often promulgated by different regulatory institutions, 
agencies and in some cases governments, making this an exhaustive challenge, plus 
the risk of omission or inaccuracies in the data scrutiny. This research shows how the 
Chapter A
on sanitary and phytosanitary measures refers to measures affecting areas such as restriction for substances and 
measures for preventing dissemination of disease. It also includes all conformity assessment measures related to food 
safety, such as certification, testing and inspection and quarantine.' 
Chapter B on technical measures refers to measures such as labelling and other measures protecting the environment, standards, on 
technical specifications and quality requirements.' 
Chapter C classifies the measures related to pre-shipment inspections and other customs formalities.' 
Chapter D
group of contingent measures implemented to counteract particular adverse effects of imports in the market of the 
importing country, including measures aimed at "unfair" foreign trade practices, contingent upon the fulfilment of certain 
procedural and substantive requirements.' 
Chapter E
on licensing, quotas, and other quantity control measures groups the measures that are intended to limit the quantity 
traded, such as quotas. It also covers licences and import prohibitions that are not SPS- or TBT-related.' 
Chapter F
groups price control measures implemented to control or affect the price of imported goods in order to, inter alia, support 
the domestic price of certain products when the import prices of these goods are lower; establish the domestic price of 
certain products because of price fluctuation in domestic markets, or price instability in a foreign market; or to increase or 
preserve tax revenue or other measures (para-tariff) that increase the cost of imports in a similar manner.'
Chapter G
on finance measures refers to measures restricting the payments of imports, for example when the access and cost of 
foreign exchange is regulated. It also includes measures imposing restrictions on the terms of payment.' 
Chapter H
refers to measures affecting competition. These measures grant exclusive or special preferences or privileges to one or 
more limited groups of economic operators. They refer mainly to monopolistic measures such as State trading, sole 
importing agencies or compulsory national insurance or transport.' 
Chapter I
on trade-related investment measures groups the measures that restrict investment by requiring local content, or 
requesting that investment should be related to exports in order to balance imports.' 
Chapter J on distribution restrictions refers to restrictive measures related to the internal distribution of imported products.' 
Chapter K refers to the restriction on post-sales services, for example: restrictions on the provision for accessory services.' 
Chapter L contains measures that relate to the subsidies that affect trade.' 
Chapter M
on government procurement restriction measures refers to the restrictions bidders may find when trying to sell their 
products to a foreign Government.' 
Chapter N groups restrictions related to intellectual property measures and intellectual property rights.' 
Chapter O on rules of origins the measures that restruct the origin of products, or their inputs.' 
Chapter P
on export measures groups the measures a country applies to its exports. It includes export taxes, export quotas or export 
prohibitions, etc.' 
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phenomenon under study could act as a multidimensional NTM and thus may relate 
to different chapters in the UNCTAD figure. 
 
From the producer point of view, Fugazza (2013) states that a major difference 
between measures falling into TMTs and other NTMs is the existence of compliance 
costs that do not translate straightforwardly into production costs. According to him, 
the negative effects will be on exports, consumption and eventually welfare. Cadot 
and associates (2012) posit that TMTs are the category of NTMs that have the greatest 
effect. They estimate that approximately 30% of products and trade values are 
affected by TMTs and another 15% receive an impact from SPSs. The second-largest 
category of NTMs is quantity or volume controls, which affect around 16% of products 
and 20% of trade. According to them, the third group is led by non-technical measures 
to trade (NnTMs), affecting approximately 20% of trade and products. Finally, one of 
the least-used forms of NTMs is price control measures, which applies to 5% and 2% of 
trade and products, respectively (Cadot et al, 2012). 
 
4.3.4 Measuring a NTM: Quantitative and qualitative forms 
NTMs could generate categories of economic effects that are not prima facie trade 
cost effects, although they may translate into an impact on prices and quantities 
(Beghin, 2006). Ferrantino (2012b) proposes decomposing the supply chain to study 
the movement of goods to estimate or identify the effects of NTMs (Fig. 31). He states 
that ‘ideally, one would follow a typical exported good from its location of production 
through multiple steps in the process of shipping and delivery’ (p.1).  
 
Figure 31: Traded goods’ prices along the supply chain 
 
 
 
       
 
                                                               
 
 
 
                                                                    Source: Ferrantino (2012b). 
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With a simple decomposition, it may be possible to identify the inefficiencies in the 
chain, but oligopolistic structures or a lack of transparency could complicate the 
analysis. Subsequently, whilst the literature shows multiple possibilities, some 
quantitative methodologies to estimate NTMs’ effects may include inventory 
measures, the computation of price gaps and/or the estimation of ad valorem 
equivalents (Nicita & Gourdon, 2013). 
 
Quantitative analyses 
Rivera-Batiz and Oliva (2004) note that the two most frequently used quantitative 
methods to measure NTMs are the ‘frequency ratio’ and the ‘coverage ratio’. These 
methods consist of calculating the proportion of products covered by one or more 
NTMs and the proportion of trade value, respectively, but both methods are 
calculated based on the tariff classifications. However, Rivera-Batiz and Oliva (2004) 
posit that these two methods by themselves do not capture the intensity of the NTMs’ 
dimensions set by the country.  
  
Fugazza (2013) describes the ‘frequency ratio’ as an index that accounts for only the 
presence or absence of an NTM and summarises the percentage of products affected 
by one or more NTMs. For instance, the ‘frequency ratio’ - as a percentage - could be 
calculated by identifying its tariff classification number of goods affected by a 
particular NTM.  Nevertheless, one disadvantage of it is that it does not capture the 
relative importance of the different tariff categories. The ‘coverage ratio’ may correct 
this inconvenience by weighting the tariff classification by volume of import. Using the 
‘inventory approach’, Nicita and Gourdon (2013) state that ‘coverage ratio’ seems to 
measure the importance of NTMs to overall imports.  
 
For Cadot and colleagues (2012), a ‘coverage ratio’ that is relatively higher than a 
frequency index can be explained by two factors: the import composition and/or the 
level of NTMs on high-traffic products. First, it refers to the frequent importing of 
larger volumes of products for which NTMs are more extensively used, for instance 
agricultural products. Regarding the second factor mentioned, they associate it with 
consumer protection. It is believed that, to analyse the NT-TMT (C) or pre-shipping 
inspection, these two basic methods are easy to manage and valuable if the data were 
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collected accurately. Shipment inspections (pre and/or post) are widely used in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the USA, the EU and Japan, while in other regions they seem to be 
limited to food products, textiles, apparel and footwear. Both empirical methods 
(frequency and coverage ratio) to evaluate NTM are frequently mentioned in the 
literature. However, to evaluate the effects of a NTM on the maritime transportation, 
it application seems limited due to the fact that all goods in the vessel are equally 
affected by cabotage.  
 
Another method to measure the effects of NTMs reported by Rivera-Batiz and Oliva 
(2004) is the price comparison or price gap measure (implicit tariff rate). It is the 
difference between the price of a good produced domestically and the price of an 
imported perfect substitute good. An alternate method for assessing the impact of 
NTMs is to estimate quantity gaps. Both methods may provide useful information for 
welfare cost analyses (Deardorff & Stern, 1997). However, Ferrantino (2012a) states 
that these procedures are useful when ‘the NTM is absolutely prohibitive, so that no 
prices are observed, or when the product is highly differentiated, hence that unit 
values are either not observed or lack information’ (p.3). Besides, serious conceptual 
and data problems are likely to arise in estimation because it assumes perfect 
substitution between imported and domestic goods (Fugazza, 2013). 
 
According to Fugazza (2013:p.9), the main objective in the quantification of NTMs is to 
produce price effect estimates and translate them into ad valorem equivalent 
measures (AVEs). Kee et al (2009), using cross-country econometric analyses, develop 
a method to estimate the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs organised in a 
restrictiveness index. For Fugazza (2013) the AVE alone, while useful, may show half of 
the story and not necessarily reflect a restrictive quantity of NTMs’ effect. Cadot et al 
(2012) consider that, to address the effects of NTMs to trade on legitimate goods, a 
fully fledged cost–benefit analysis would be helpful, more so if the intention of the 
analysis is to reach a consensus with interested parties for a reduction in restrictions 
to trade. Thus, the ideal empirical analysis of NTMs’ effects should provide estimates 
of both quantity and price effects to allow for proper qualification and identification of 
their impact (Fugazza, 2013).  
 
168 
 
In the study of quotas as NTMs, the use of tariff-equivalent estimations, equilibrium 
analysis and elasticity analyses is shown in the literature. Besides, some gravity 
models and other econometric methods to analyse prices and trade flows are also 
used to estimate NTMs’ effects (Xiong & Beghin, 2012). To analyse the rise in price as 
a result of NTMs’ implementation as quotas, Roberts et al (1999) distinguish the 
economic effects of the regulations using three different classifications according to 
their effects on welfare reduction or welfare enhancement. Theoretically, their system 
provides frameworks for exploring the possible effects of the barriers on economies, 
such as (p.2): 
 
1. The regulatory protection effect, for example the rents to the domestic 
sector. 
2. The supply shift effect on the domestic supply induced by the compliance 
cost. 
3. The demand shift effect arising from new information that increases the 
consumer demand for the product. 
 
Through these outlooks, requirements might also be divided into risk-reducing or non-
risk reducing. Roberts et al (1999) also argue that the price wedge method is the most 
appropriate for measuring trade volume effects, suggesting that this process should 
be part of the cost–benefit analysis for companies and policymakers. Fugazza (2013) 
affirms that quantitative estimations of the NTMs’ effects through price wedge 
analysis or similar methods, could be applied to the study of voluntary export 
restraints, variable levies on imports, government procurement regulations or other 
measures with the objective of deliberately limiting the imports of a specific good. 
However, Deardorff and Stern (1997) clearly affirm that this method is valid only 
under the assumption that the imported goods are perfect substitutes for domestic 
goods.   
 
Ferrantino (2006) suggests that ‘handicraft’ and complementary methods to estimate 
and compare the prices of goods under the influence of NTMs are successfully applied 
in the literature. For instance, the use of the price gap method for the analysis of 
transport costs theoretically may be helpful for cost estimation since the CIF and FOB 
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prices do not include tariffs. However, the quality and amount of information required 
makes them impractical to use for broad comparisons across products, industries and 
countries (Ferrantino, 2012b). On the other hand, using the same method but with 
Japanese apple imports, Calvin and Krissoff (1998) estimate the cost of tariff and 
technical barriers (tariff rate) for equivalent apples (i.e. the same variety, grade and 
size), also accounting for the cost of transportation. Furthermore, for some NTMs the 
use of ‘shadow price’ analyses has become relevant, especially in cases in which 
governments purchase local products to balance the market (Deardorff & Stern, 
1997).  
 
In the literature another relatively common method for measuring NTMs’ effects is 
systematic cost–benefit analysis. Do the social benefits of higher product quality and 
safety or service compensate for the costs of imposing the regulation? Indeed, the 
OECD’s publications since the late 1980s highlight the importance of policies’ cost–
benefit analyses prior to implementation. Non-tariff policies are no different; thus, 
some analyses to answer the previous question should be conducted to evaluate the 
extra cost that taxpayers and consumers will pay and to validate the legitimacy of 
regulations in specific economic sectors (Arrow et al, 1996). These last arguments are 
specific to environmental and health regulations and do not consider the effects of 
regulations on trade mobility. However, how can the costs of an imposed external 
standard established for almost a century but without other comparable scenarios be 
estimated? 
 
Although for all those methods the availability of information is crucial, the data for 
trade flow analysis are regularly more accessible than other data. The drawback of 
these quantity and price measures is that they reflect the interaction of supply and 
demand rather than NTMs’ properties themselves (Fugazza, 2013). Nevertheless, 
regulation costs have different effects on SME firms or small countries in comparison 
with large firms or countries because they are more aware of measure the before and 
after effects of the NTM’s implementation (Galvão de Miranda & Schuh, 2008). 
Moreover, regulations may modify the structure of competition in some sectors, 
affecting mark-ups and product viability (Beghin & Bureau, 2001). Box-checking 
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approaches may miss important issues that only detailed fieldwork base analysis can 
explore. Standard quantitative approaches may be limited in scope and problematic to 
validate in the evaluation of the multidimensional effects of NTMs on domestic 
imports. That may be the case in markets limited by a paucity of information, affected 
by larger economies and/or controlled by oligopolistic private structures.   
 
Qualitative analyses 
The most common qualitative challenge in NTM analysis is classifying a law or 
regulation into an appropriate category. Most countries do not have a repository of 
NTMs or analyses associated with their effects on trade. Recognising that as a fact, the 
MAST initiative carried out surveys and/or face-to-face interviews to evaluate NTMs’ 
effects in some countries to identify potential ‘bottlenecks’ and burdensome 
frameworks for business (Mimouni et al, 2009). For instance, tariff rate and quotas 
(TRQs) for agricultural products are often administered through an import-licensing 
procedure (Cadot el al, 2012). However, the paucity of the interagency 
synchronisation in policy promulgation and regulatory frameworks may complicate, 
contradict or make redundant some processes in the supply chain, thus affecting the 
business environment. For example, one of the most frequent concerns of the private 
sector, particularly of SME, is poor interagency communication and coordination. 
 
Kirkpatrick and Parker (2007) postulate that the core component of the framework of 
regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is it method-analysis to help policymakers 
establish the likely and actual consequences of proposed regulation. The first step is 
to consider the cost of regulation alone, then to undertake a cost–benefit 
consideration and finally to determine how the regulation can contribute to the public 
objectives. Kirkpatrick and Parker (2007) state that this framework, which contributes 
to public regulation analysis, should consider the three basic pillars of sustainable 
development: economic, social and environment. 
 
 Using the regulatory impact assessment (RIA) framework, Cadot et al (2012) redesign 
a flowchart that is useful for analysing NTMs (Fig.32). Their scheme is designed to help 
the review of existing measures as a response to specific demands from countries 
struggling with the legacies of complicated parameters. Their proposal is structured to 
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analyse the phenomenon by the use of mixed methods. Besides, they argue that a fair 
analysis of NTMs and their improvements will require a sustainable institutional set-
up. In addition, they suggest representativeness, broad participation and good 
analysis to ensure continuity in the process of improving the trade competitiveness of 
firms as the business environment evolves and the stock of regulations grows (p.5). 
 
Figure 32: NTM toolkit flowchart 
 
Source: Cadot et al (2012:p.5).  
 
 
Another qualitative form to identify the effects of NTMs is a schematic analysis of the 
principles of efficiency. The OECD Trade Committee identifies six ‘principles of 
efficient regulation’ to help in assessing the extent to which regulations are both 
economically efficient and promote a friendly business environment (Kleitz, 2001):  
 
 1. Transparency and openness of decision making;  
 2. Non-discrimination;  
 3. Avoidance of unnecessary trade restrictiveness;  
 4. Use of international standards as a basis for regulations;  
 5. Recognition of equivalent foreign measures; and  
 6. Use of competition principles.  
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Using some parameters to explain and analyse every one of the OECD principles for 
efficient regulation, Cadot et al (2012) add a further three to the list:  
 7. Use of regulatory impact analysis (RIA) to assess the need for new 
regulations and to review the impact of existing regulations. 
 8. Administrative simplification to minimise the administrative burdens on 
firms in complying with regulations.  
 9. Ensuring the quality of conformity assessment procedures. 
 
In the literature it is not clear how these principles were developed or used by a 
schematic qualitative analysis. Deighton-Smith (in OECD, 2011a:p.36) reports that, in 
the last decade, the majority of OECD members have applied this framework for most 
of the analysis of their new regulations because RIA is based on benefit/cost analysis. 
It is said that in practice a dichotomy exists in the responsibility between RIA and 
competition policy analysis because coordination in the conduct of these two is often 
insufficient. However, whilst Kleitz (2001) highlights that these exercises may not be 
valid in all cases or scenarios among countries, these practices are worth 
consideration in the context of national efforts to evaluate some NTMs.  
 
4.3.5 Anti-competitive and non-technical NTMs 
According to Cadot and colleagues (2012), the process for a given NTM requires that a 
trading partner must demonstrate a rule violation at the WTO level. The importing 
country must then show that the measure falls within the policy objectives, that the 
application of the measure does not discriminate arbitrarily between countries where 
the relevant conditions are the same and that it takes relevant differences into 
account. However, in the case of small territories that are highly affected by 
regulatory frameworks imposed by a large economy, the access to international 
forums is limited or absent. Similarly, the possibilities to negotiate concessions with 
large economies on their frameworks or agreements to redesign regulations among 
trade are issues that are not related exclusively to the sovereignty of countries but are 
also linked to their market capacity and resources. 
 
The term ‘competition policy’ refers to the measures that governments take to 
suppress or deter anti-competitive practices and promote the efficient and 
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competitive operation of markets. Therefore, anti-competitive NTMs (ACMs) are 
practices that undermine the business environment and consumers’ welfare. They can 
occur locally, nationally, regionally or internationally by public interventions as well as 
by private interest. ACMs may involve government actions that empower some 
private interests to obtain or retain artificial advantages over their rivals (Abbott & 
Singham, 2013:p.26). It is believed that the majority of anti-competitive practices in 
LDCs are directed against other businesses rather than against final consumers (WTO, 
1999). Certain practices (Table 17) – infrastructure monopolies and undue buyer 
power in distribution chains and cartels – particularly affect businesses’ capacity to 
trade, limiting their success. However, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ answer to the 
question of how best to deal with ACMs; thus, they need to be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis (International Trade Centre (ITC), 2012). These rules often stretch 
beyond national frontiers; in that case and for this thesis the term ‘external NTMs’ is 
proposed. 
 
Table 17: Some anti-competitive practices that affect LDCs’ business environment 
Practice  Definition Potential adverse impact on LCD 
suppliers 
Cartels Price fixing or market allocation 
arrangements between suppliers. 
Raise prices or reduce the availability of 
the industrial inputs or infrastructure 
services needed to market a product. 
Abuse of a dominant  
Position 
Dominant firm practices that 
extract high profits from users 
and/or exclude potential 
competitors. 
As above. Can also prevent new 
entrepreneurs from entering a market 
dominated by an entrenched supplier. 
Anti-competitive 
mergers 
Combining of two or more firms to 
create a monopoly or dominant 
place. 
Can reduce the supply, raise the prices 
of necessary goods and/or make abuse 
of a dominant position more likely. 
Anti-competitive 
vertical market 
restraint 
Contractual or similar arrangements 
between firms at different levels of 
a production chain that limit 
competition or entry by new 
suppliers. 
As above. Arrangements can form a 
barrier to export market penetration by 
developing economy businesses. 
Source: ITC (2012:p.3). 
 
Abbott and Singham (2013) categorise these ACMs, which artificially alter the cost 
base, as being among the most harmful between competing firms because the effects 
of their cost change on market shares may be large and thus work immediately on 
trade flows. Recognising that competition promotes efficiencies, increasing 
productivity as an essential pace for economic growth along with increased 
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employment and consumers’ well-being, the OECD developed its Competition 
Assessment Guidance. 
 
Further competition assessment proposed by the OECD (2011a) is based on a 
‘Competition Checklist’. This checklist provides the framework for qualitative analysis 
that is useful for policymakers to mitigate or avoid potential competition problems. 
The general idea of this paradigm is to mitigate or reduce potential harm to 
competitiveness (at the firm, cluster, regional or national level) whilst continuing to 
achieve the desired policy objectives. The system is based on four questions or 
categories of questions. If the answer to any of these is affirmative, then it means that 
the policy may affect some angles of competitiveness and the policymaker should 
consider the effects of the proposal. The OECD (2011a) Competition Checklist 
question categories are: 
 
 1. Are there limits on the number or range of suppliers?  
 
In this category the OECD suggests reflection on the risk of market power by reducing 
rivalry. Indeed, as argued earlier in this chapter in relation to competitiveness 
schemes, a reduction in suppliers may diminish competition or collusion among 
participants, thus increasing their opportunity to raise prices.  
 
  2. Are there limits on the ability of suppliers to compete? 
 
This reflects on how the regulation can affect the ability of suppliers to compete in 
different ways, reducing the intensity of the dimensions of rivalry and affecting the 
consumers’ access to goods by cost–price, information or variety. Additionally, it could 
be about how this policy may limit firms’ innovation capacity, cause a lack of intensity 
in production or impede the entry of new firms to compete.  
 
 3. Are there reductions in the incentives for suppliers to compete? 
 
This encourages reflection on the possibility that the proposed regulation may 
promote or facilitate coordination between suppliers and its effect on reducing 
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consumers’ willingness to buy. In this case the suppliers may feel comfortable 
competing less vigorously or adopting cartel-like behaviour. Generally, firms’ cartels 
are harmful because they restrict output and raise prices, promoting their mutual 
interest rather than considering consumers’ well-being.  
 
 4. Are there limits on the choices and information available to 
customers? 
 
The OECD (2011a) considers that limits on consumers’ choice can be harmful to 
competitiveness, because suppliers may feel discouraged from satisfying consumers’ 
needs by delivering high-quality produce at a fair price. The same may occur for 
services to trade, such as transportation. Reducing the mobility of customers by 
limiting offers, allowing high ‘switching costs’ or limiting the access to information 
may enable companies to take advantage of consumers’ inexperience. Regarding the 
information published by suppliers, in some scenarios this may indirectly provoke 
‘cartel-like behaviour’ further if the information is not gathered primarily by the 
government to support consumers with some frequent general statistical data. 
 
Certainly, this basic competitive assessment may suggest a deeper and more 
comprehensive analysis of the regulation to classify it properly as an anti-competitive 
measure. Accordingly, Deighton-Smith (in OECD, 2011a:p.35) proposes the use of the 
RIA framework discussed previously. Indubitably, the access to data and adequate 
information to validate each of these questions properly or to apply the RIA is a major 
challenge. Most existing policies have not been subject to this kind of assessment, 
principally due to the lack of well-founded information. An additional critical issue is 
to identify which policies are priorities in the way of competitiveness.  
 
Increasing transparency and improving regulations through the market are important 
to facilitate the predictability of the business environment globally. Multiple 
international trade agreements serve as a check against subtle forms of protectionism. 
Attending to firms’ and countries’ claims, some international forums associated with 
trade (the OECD, WTO and UNCTAD) provide guidelines on regulation evaluation, 
requesting greater transparency. At the level of firms, tracing and sustainability 
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requirements are pushing them to more consciousness of their products and more 
value for the data – with the aim of improving their logistics – to make savings. 
Substantively, trading rules at the global level require non-discriminatory treatment. 
Although governments are allowed to preserve their level of protection, the paucity of 
valid data is still a core problem in validating them. 
 
4.3.6 Sea cabotage and its multidimensionality 
The maritime transport services policy framework can be under both domestic and 
international regulations (OECD, 2011a). Similarly, services can be classified into 
different types, such as navigation, shipping or freight, access to ports, auxiliary 
services and interface services (e.g. between land and sea transport) in one or multi-
modal ways. Many other facets related to sea transport as an economic activity, such 
as seafarers’ or maritime-related labour policies, shipbuilders’ regulations or 
subsidies, port administration efficiency or management, auxiliary port services and so 
forth, are important considerations in the analysis of anti-competitive measures in the 
maritime sector (Liu, 2009). Each of these services is organised in different and 
complex forms and a plethora of regulations is leading the process related to them 
(Mangan et al, 2012). Some are classified as technical measures (TMTs) and others as 
non-technical measures (NnTMs). As mentioned previously, the most common NTMs 
in the agribusiness literature are related to TMTs, but, indirectly, the NnTMs in 
maritime transportation may also have an effect on them that could distort the 
product’s cost, its availability and the firms’ competitiveness.   
 
Since the mid-1990s policymakers have been more interested in cabotage or 
regulations directly associated with maritime transportation to phase them out 
gradually or amend them in other cases to reduce the costs to trade by market 
openness. Despite retaking the ‘Mare liberum’ discourse to raise global trade, a slow 
or no change has occurred in the topic of cabotage since the Uruguay Round. 
However, albeit with different scenarios, New Zealand and the member states of the 
European Union are two well-documented cases of change in these policies. Currently, 
countries such as Brazil and China are considering reforms, but that is not the case for 
the USA.  
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 Could it affect the food security in a small island developing country? 
There are many references demonstrating that restrictiveness on trade in services and 
investment incurs high costs and trade liberalisation can lead to welfare gains 
(Hoekman & Primo-Braga, 1997). In general, particularly for LDCs, the elimination or 
transformation of anti-competitive measures has potentiated their production level 
and trade. On the other hand, it is suggested in the literature that less mature markets 
tend to be more vulnerable to anti-competitive practices (ITC, 2012:p.5). Dutz (2002) 
posits that some reasons for this may include high ‘natural’ entry barriers due to an 
inadequate business infrastructure, inefficient distribution channels, asymmetries of 
available information and the strength of their credit markets.  
 
Maritime cabotage may have effects on the technical efficiency of shipping services. In 
the literature the liberalisation theory opposing cabotage is based on the benefits of 
better maritime services through market competition. It is believed that in open-
shipping trade, larger and more efficient ships operating on global routes will replace 
small and inefficient ships. It is thought that openness to competition will improve the 
service of the maritime domestic sector (Liu, 2009). However, this specific argument 
may represent a big challenge for small markets in which trade is limited by 
infrastructure, low-yield unloading and low cargo volume, thus making them less 
attractive from the point of view of the shipowners, whose ultimate goal is to 
maximise their profits. Moreover, the maritime transport companies available to serve 
these small markets, organised in monopolistic structures or engaging in cartel-like 
behaviour, may limit national firms’ flexibility and hence their competitiveness. 
Therefore, exploring the effect of anti-competitive measures on maritime 
transportation – the primary point in the food supply chain – seems to be a basic 
requirement to enhance SIDSs’ competitiveness and vital for territories that are 
affected by external policies designed for a market different from theirs. 
 
 
4.4.0 Conceptual model  
Yin (2003) concedes that for some topics ‘existing works may provide a rich theoretical 
framework for designing a specific case study, while in other situations, the 
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appropriate theory may be a descriptive one’ (p.29).  He posits that in some cases ‘the 
existing knowledge base, may be poor and/or the available literature, will provide no 
conceptual framework’ (p.30). However, in order to achieve a basic structure, the 
analysis of a case study would take the form of an exploratory research.  
 
Due to the lack of previous publications evaluating the relation between 
competitiveness-agribusinesses - supply chain and NTM in a SIDS, integrating these 
routes at once is complex. Additionally, the need to understand the current 
‘operational processes’ relevant for the analysis on the effects of cabotage on the 
agribusinesses supply chain, may increase the challenge. In order to provide a 
conceptual framework that integrates the research gaps and the findings from the 
reviewed literature and in context, the following diagram (Fig.33) summarise our 
research approach (1.6).  
 
Figure 33: Research conceptual model  
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4.5.0 Conclusion 
The developed countries have much to gain from a more integrated 
global economy, and they have much to gain from reducing their 
distortionary policies. Certainly, they can sustain and afford the luxury 
of their inefficiencies. However, the LDCs cannot if they want to sustain 
growth.  (Stiglitz, 2000:p.453)  
 
 
From the macro to the micro level, it presented the topic of competitiveness, supply 
chains, NTMs and their basic characteristics, the classification of anti-competitive 
measures (ACM) and how to measure their economic effects and finally maritime 
cabotage as a multidimensional NTM.  It may distort markets, affecting the volume 
and costs of trade but also anti-competitive practices may imply more constraints on 
consumers’ well-being (ITC, 2012).  However,  a change or elimination of them ‘is no 
strong reason to expect their effect on growth to be quantitatively similar to the 
consequences of changes in trade volumes that arise from, for instance, reductions in 
transport costs or increases in world demand’ (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001:p.264). Other 
variables should be considered. 
 
The relationship between policy instruments and the supply chain will depend on the 
host country and its external characteristics, notwithstanding openness may not 
always be conducive to productivity. Those at the firm level will have an effect on 
growth and competitiveness and thus on the country’s resilience. Growth and welfare 
are not synonyms; thus, some trade policies may have positive effects on well-being 
without affecting the rate of economic growth. As a result, in any case of analyses of 
the relationship between trade policies, growth and their welfare implications, the 
empirical results regarding this link (positive or negative) must be treated with 
caution. 
 
The preceding discussion provided an overview of the focus of this thesis. Besides, a 
theoretical conceptual framework was provided justifying the use of multi-criteria 
analysis to evaluate a NTM. The next chapter explains the methodology applied to 
explore the effect of the maritime cabotage phenomenon on the agribusiness trade 
between the US and PR. 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology applied to building and validating the 
conceptual framework. It includes the justification for the methodology, details of the 
methodology, ethical considerations for the research and for the data collection 
process and conclusions.  
 
The data collection relies on multiple sources of evidence to explore the Cabotage as a 
NTM phenomenon. Predetermined theoretical schemes were considered. The 
researched topic presents a scenario that includes multiple variables of interest 
generated from the data; therefore, the exploratory process required multiple sources 
of evidence to validate the interacting elements. Details are provided to address 
questions associated with sample reliability and validity. The collection process is 
described and the units of analysis are included. The data check processes are 
described, including the recording techniques and data transformation.  
 
Finally, various research approaches designed for specific strategies were considered. 
A general overview and description of the research paradigm and the approaches are 
outlined, based on the existing literature and field experiences. 
 
 
5.1.0 Research questions and objectives 
As presented previously (Chapter 1) two research questions were formulated to 
explore the effects of the US Cabotage Act as an NTM on PR’s agribusiness. 
        1. What are the effects of US Cabotage for the PR’s agribusinesses supply chain? 
 
        2. What challenges and opportunities does the Cabotage policy present for the 
competitiveness of PR’s agricultural sector? 
 
To fill the gap in the literature, these research questions will be answered using the 
OECD assessment for competition principles (OECD, 2011a, 2011b), mentioned in the 
181 
 
Chapter 4 (4.3.5). Besides, a reflection of food sustainability (affordability, availability 
and quality) will be considered in addition to the analysis of the internal and external 
factors associated to the phenomenon under study.   
 
The research objectives were separated into areas of research and relate to 
formulating a strategy to analyse the effects of a NTM on the food supply chain in a 
SIDS. 
 1. To explore if the US Cabotage could be considered as a barrier, affecting cost 
of production for the native agribusiness and livestock producers. 
 2. To clarify and quantify, if possible, the effect of an external non-tariff 
measure on the food sector in a small island developing nation.  
 3. To identify areas of opportunity in supply chain competitiveness for the 
sectors under exploration.  
 
 
5.1.1 Research paradigm and dimensions 
This research takes a pragmatic type in a heterodox economic framework. In terms of 
philosophical orientation, it applies critical realism and asserts the nature of reality is 
independent of human existence; thus, the reality can be understood and verified 
through sensory perception and rational thought (Guba, 1990). The approach applied 
is similar to realism but with built-in scepticism and self-awareness. There are also 
ethical and axiological qualities associated with the research paradigms but this 
section is reserved for the methodological particularities used in this thesis (Table 18). 
This research relied on multiple sources to reduce the distortions in the research, 
analysis and interpretations. 
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Table 18: Research dimensions and descriptors 
 
 
5.1.2 Research design and strategies  
The topic of cabotage was explored in a context of time (after free-trade agreements), 
space (SIDSs) and culture (traditional production). This research combines sustainable 
development aims (UNSDSN, 2014) on the bases of food security, theories of 
economic vulnerability (Briguglio, 2003) and supply chain competitiveness (Porter, 
1985) to analyse the effects of the US Cabotage Act as a non-tariff measure on PR’s 
agribusinesses.  
 
The case study method91 is the most basic scheme for the needs of this research. In 
this respect, Voss and colleagues (2002) present three main points that must be 
evaluated in selecting the case study method to conduct research, and this research is 
framed in all of them, namely: a) the phenomenon can be studied in its natural 
environment, b) to respond to questions about ‘why, what, how’ with an 
understanding of the nature and complexity of the phenomenon as a whole and c) 
when little is known about the research topic (Pini-Rosales et al, 2012). Therefore, 
considering the information available associated to the phenomena, a mixed research 
was designed based on the premise that an exploration is needed because ‘measures 
or instruments are not available or inconclusive, the variables are not clear or 
                                                          
91
 It was also applied in the Literature Review.   
Purpose of the study Exploratory and theory building
Type of investigation Pragmatic
Paradigm bases Critical realism theory
Research design Mixed method- convergent    (Appendix A)
Extent of researcher’s 
interference
 Case study, action research
Study setting  Field study
Sampling design  Non-probability, snowball sampling
Data collection methods  Methodological and data triangulation
 Primary data: Dec. 2014 to Feb. 2015
 Secondary qualitative data: Feb. to April 2015
 Secondary quantitative data: 2005 to 2014
 Qualitative primary data: GTM
 Secondary qual. data: content analysis
 Quantitative secondary data
Study Dimensions Descriptors
Unit of analysis
Time horizon
Analysis
 Organisational level/ small and medium 
traditional agribusinesses
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unknown, and there is not a clear guiding framework associated to’ the phenomenon 
under study (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: p. 86).  One purpose of this research 
includes illustrating the multidimensions of cabotage particularly in topics not 
considered by previous publications. Consequently, this design includes a qualitative 
component prioritized during the analysis steps. However, by the limited time to 
collect data and the sample’s availability, the data (qualitative and quantitative) were 
collected concurrently in one visit to the field (Appendix A). Collecting the two forms 
of data will bring a better insight into the problem. Nevertheless, the exploratory 
component was developed through the grounded theory method. After the 
qualitative analysis, a sequential quantitative design was developed to estimate costs 
per sector of production. The rationale for this approach is that the qualitative data 
would help to elaborate on the particularities of the phenomenon and also on the 
quantitative results. Therefore in Chapter 6, the quantitative and qualitative analyses 
are merged and discussed by agribusiness group. 
 
Accordingly, through semi-structured interviews the researcher decomposed the 
initial steps of the supply chain process and by secondary economic data contrasted 
the maritime trade logistics (foreign vs. domestic), their costs and effects. At the end, 
the researcher combined complementary quantitative and qualitative results to 
develop a more complete understanding of cabotage.  
 
The interacting elements associated with the phenomenon under study (Brandon-
Jones et al, 2014) as a potential limitation to the competitiveness of the importing 
companies were explored. Their effects on the native agribusinesses, particularly the 
sectors of fresh produce and grain for animal feeding, were taken into account. For 
instance, it is believed that the limitation of options to transport grain for animal feed 
has a negative impact on grain costs and on the sequential segments of the supply 
chain. As a result, the country’s level of economic vulnerability could be limited, hence 
diminishing the possibilities for sustainable development from the perspective of food 
security. The process of relating topics in the literature and outlining the themes is 
summarised in the following table of research gaps (Table 19).   
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Table 19: Issues discussed and outlined by the authors 
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Alameda (2002)      X X   X       
Alameda and Valentín (2012)  X   X X   X     X 
Alameda and Valentín (2014)  X   X X   X     X 
Anaya-Oviedo (2012)        X     X   X    
Bello-Olowookere (2011)     X X   X       
Blom-Hill (2013)      X         X X 
Bloomberg Views (2013)      X X   X   X X 
Brackins (2008)      X     X X X X 
Branch and Robarts (2014)        X   X X X   
Brooks (2009)       X   X X X   
Burns (2015)        X X X X X   
Castro-Gonzáles et al (2013) X     X   X     X 
Clover and Harris (1965) X   X X   X       
Collazo (2012)     X X   X   X X 
Comas (2009)   X       X     X 
Cruz et al (2014) X   X           X 
Denktas-Sakar and Karatas-Cetin (2012)       X   X X X   
Dlamini et al (2014) X X     X       X 
Doyle (2011) X X X     X     X 
Eastman and Marx (1953) X X X   X X     X 
Estudios Técnicos (2013)  X   X X   X   X X 
FAO (2011)  X X       X X   X 
Federal Reserve Bank of NY (2012, 2014) X   X X   X     X 
Frankel (2002) X   X X   X X   X 
Galbraith (2014)     X X   X   X X 
Giannopoulos and Aifandopoulou-Klimis (2004) X   X X   X X     
González and Gregory (2014) X X     X       X 
Gorton et al (2013) X X             X 
Hansen (2012b)      X X   X     X 
Herrero et al (2001, 2010) X   X X   X 
  
X 
Hubbard and Hubbard (2014) X X             X 
Jackson and McKetta (1986) X   X   X X     X 
King (2014) X   X   X X X X   
Korinek and Sourdin (2009a, 2009b, 2011)       X X X X X X 
Krueger et al (2015) X   X X   X     X 
Lawrence and Lara (2006) X   X X X X       
Lewis (2013) X   X     X     X 
López-León (2015)   X X X   X     X 
Márquez-Ramos et al (2007)       X   X X X   
Martínez-Zarzoso et al (2004) X     X   X X X   
Meersman (2009) X     X   X X X   
Micco and Pérez (2002) X   X X   X X X   
MIDA (2015) X   X X   X     X 
Novianti et al (2015) X     X   X X X X 
Okoroji and Ukpere (2011) X   X X   X X   X 
Pavlo (2012) X   X     X     X 
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Quiñones-Domínguez (1990) X X X     X     X 
Romero-Barceló (2009)     X X   X     X 
Rosado-Dávila (2002) X   X X   X       
Sánchez et al (2003) X     X   X X X   
Santos-Santos (1997) X   X     X     X 
Stiglitz and Medish (2015) X   X     X     X 
Stochniol (2011)   X     X X     X 
Vega-Rosado (2011) X     X   X     X 
Villamil and Pagán (2014) X X X X   X     X 
 
5.1.3 Generating theory 
First assumption: 
 1. The literature states that competition is basic to price reduction and 
innovation. Firms’ strategies and activities, infrastructure and methods are used to 
become different from rival companies (Porter, 1990). 
 
Second assumption: 
 2. The notion of vulnerability is widely applied in different contexts of social 
and risk management (Briguglio, 2004) as well as for the analysis of food insecurity 
(Løvendal et al, 2004). Food vulnerability considers the limitations in food accessibility 
and affordability that could be provoked by internal or external economic and political 
factors (Scaramozzino, 2006). 
 
Third assumption: 
 1. Case studies and open or semi-structured interviews are valid and useful 
methods of obtaining data regarding how managers apply new practices to their 
strategies, while data-gathering and triagulation approach can be applied to capture 
different viewpoints (Silverman, 2011). 
 
Having collected the data, it was grouped into three dimensions: internal, external and 
cultural. Through a NTM, all dimensions may affect competitiveness (World Bank, 
2011). For instance, the first two dimensions were segmented into hard infrastructure 
and soft infrastructure. Hard infrastructure indicators refer to the physical 
infrastructure. They were considered to measure the level of development and the 
quality of ports, equipment and draught, access roads and information technology and 
communications. In turn, soft infrastructure indicators include border efficiency 
186 
 
measures (such as time, cost and the number of documents required for import 
procedures) as well as regulatory and business environment procedures.  
 
5.2.0 Qualitative stance through the grounded theory method (GTM) 
GTM is a research approach that was developed in the late 1960s by Glaser and 
Strauss. It consists of the ‘design to develop a well integrated set of concepts that 
provide a thorough theoretical explanation of social phenomena under study’ (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990:p.5). The method is suitable to ‘produce meanings and concepts used 
by social actors in real settings’ to develop new theories based on empirical data. This 
method consists of systematic yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analysing 
qualitative data to construct theories that are ‘grounded’ in the data themselves 
(Charmaz, 2006). 
 
GTM consists of several steps: collect data, code, compare and categorise the sample 
and eventually develop and generate a theory (Walker & Myrick, 2006). It is erected 
on two core concepts: ‘constant comparison’ and ‘theoretical sampling’ (Suddaby, 
2006). ‘Constant comparison’ involves simultaneous collection and data analysis in 
combination with an induction and deduction processes to test the field findings for 
confirmation (Sauders et al, 2007). Theoretical sampling, means that the data 
collected are chosen in accordance with the theory constructed (Denk et al, 2012). 
Additionally, the approach assumes that data and theories are not discovered but 
constructed by the researcher and the participants in the exploratory process 
(Charmaz, 2006). 
 
From the data collected, the key points are marked with a series of codes, which are 
extracted from the text (Allan, 2003). The coding process entails sorting the data into 
concepts, aggregated into categories, and establishing a relation of concepts and 
subcategories. The unification of all the categories around a core category represents 
the core phenomenon under study (Suddaby, 2006). The codes are then grouped into 
similar concepts to make them more workable. 
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Along with other qualitative data analyses, GTM seeks to organise the data gathered 
to establish a new form of view through an interactive process and a well-defined 
process of data analysis from basic description to conceptual ordering (Hocke, 2014; 
Radanliev, 2014; Denk et al, 2012). According to Lozano and Huisingh (2011), it is a 
very useful method for exploratory research because it explains the way in which 
people resolve their central concerns, regardless of time and space (Allan, 2003). 
Therefore, the exploratory character of the research, due to the lack of knowledge 
and theory in the field, justifies the methodology selected.  
 
The logic of the GTM calls for the emerging analysis to direct data gathering in a self-
correcting, analytic, expanding process (Charmaz, 2006). In addition, this method 
allows the constant collection and analysis of data from the beginning of the study to 
the end, allowing the researcher to move in an area as unknown and as subjective as 
human motivation (Hocke, 2014; Suddaby, 2006). Furthermore, GTM interviews are 
used to tell a collective story, not an individual tale, in a single interview (Charmaz, 
2006; Allan, 2003). Therefore, by interviewing 17 firms, it is possible to collect data 
that could be used for developing a theory that explains the effects of the Cabotage 
Act on PR’s agribusiness. However, the researcher is obligated to be reflexive about 
what the participants bring to the study, what they see and how they see it (Charmaz, 
2006).  
 
 
5.3.0 Secondary sources  
The sources included historical and earlier publications relevant to the research area. 
Principally, the secondary quantitative data used were collected from government 
reports and semi-government publications. In this regard, the official data on imports 
were obtained from the External Trade Statistics of PR developed by the PRPB 
Governor’s Office. The maritime trades included in this database show more than 
445,000 transactions of goods by code, their volume and their value for the years 
between 2008 and 2014. Several reports from the PR Department of Agriculture and 
the US Department of Agriculture were used to validate the historical categories. 
Publications of the Port Authority of PR provided some information. Various reports 
from the US Maritime Administration were consulted to analyse the costs of services 
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to trade (e.g. fees, inspection costs, requirements, procedures, etc.). Other data were 
obtained from the reports of the US General Accountability Office, the US 
International Trade Commission and the US Department of Commerce. These reports 
were available on the official websites of PR and the US. Tthe secondary qualitative 
data analysed were the hearings of PR’s Congress Senate Special Commission 
(between January 2014 and May 2015) interviews about the effects of the Cabotage 
Law on PR’s economy (SR 237) and anti-monopolistic affairs (RC 1205 and RC 437). 
 
Basic data on the international market value and cost estimations were collected and 
analysed from official websites, such as the OECD, IndexMundi and PROCOMER in 
Costa Rica. Data from the US Grain Council regarding the grain sector, such as origins, 
amount and variety, and loading and shipping protocols in the US and foreign 
countries, were used. 
 
As part of our literature review earlier researches in the form of textbooks, journal 
articles, newspapers, a few theses, professional and magazine reports, which were 
mostly available via the libraries of the University of Bradford and the University of 
Puerto Rico, were revised. The historical archives of the Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín 
were consulted  
  
The projections of Alameda and Valentín (2014) and Estudios Técnicos (2013) were 
used as basis on which to evaluate and contrast our findings. Nevertheless, it is 
important to clarify that the two studies are designed to evaluate the impact of the US 
Act on the whole economy of PR using different approaches and reach dissimilar 
conclusions. In addition, both studies use strictly econometric analyses, avoiding the 
particularities (e.g., technical, logistic and management issues by product) normally 
required in analyses of the agricultural sector.  
 
All of these sources were useful in providing a general understanding of the topic to 
clarify the gaps as well as the theoretical framework to approach the phenomenon 
under study. The study of the literature was helpful in developing a theoretical and 
conceptual framework on non-tariff barrier effects as the basis for the analysis. In this 
respect, for the analysis of NTMs, two approaches were considered by the researcher: 
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the trade-oriented approach (Maskus & Wilson, 2001) and the welfare perspective 
(van Tongeren et al, 2009). Following the welfare approach to NTM analysis, this 
research incorporates the topics of sustainability, economic vulnerability and national 
competitiveness.  
 
For the trade-oriented approach, the data on grain imports analysed were for the 
period after CAFTA-RD, which is after 2006. The method of price comparison was 
applied to identify and measure the difference in the costs of transport of imported 
grains, through a theoretical exercise of feedstuff formulation. Due to the lack of 
suitable data to validate the feedstuff formulation by sector, this research could not 
offer a complete cost analysis for the livestock sector. However, by understanding the 
difference in the costs of sea transportation (foreign vs. US flagged), the researcher 
estimated some costs of the Cabotage Act for PR’s livestock sector. A comparative 
exercise was also presented by containers but considering the distance in nautical 
miles (n.m.). 
 
5.3.1 Secondary data segmentation 
The process started by initially gathering and reviewing the mentioned secondary data 
sources to confirm the validity of the research questions. The analysis of historical 
documents resulted in the identification of the facts needed to reconstruct the 
historical evolution of the practical problem in the selected case study. These included 
historical reports (from the late 1940s, mid-1950s, early 1960s and some publications 
from the 1970s and some others from the 1980s onwards). Limited statistical data 
were available on the subject. Three types of secondary data collection were applied 
at this stage, including documents and archive records.  
 
 1. Secondary data collected from multiple sources to present a 
multidimensional profile of the US Cabotage Act activities in the context of the lack of 
sovereignty as a political issue in Puerto Rico.  
 
Fewer than 15 publications analysing the topic were found for the period between 
1956 and 2008; 4 publications consider the issue of the US Cabotage Act using 
classical trade theories for the whole economy of PR through econometric models and 
190 
 
trading generalisations. None of them considers the use of qualitative analysis or 
observational fieldwork by specialised sectors such as the food and agricultural sector. 
Neither performance concepts nor supply chain or infrastructure considerations are 
exposed in the publications available. However, the only publication available that 
considers a specialised sector was commissioned in 2012 by the PR Industrial 
Development Company (PRIDCO) of the Government of Puerto Rico. Their analysis 
focuses on the fuel cargo Cabotage Act liberalisation for PR’s domestic trades.   
 
 2. Secondary data collected from the hearings and depositions of US Congress 
and PR’s Congress. These gave us access to historical data to learn how the public 
policy institutions planned to address the issue locally. Similarly, more than 30 
institutions participated by expressing their opinion about the US Cabotage Act’s 
effects on PR’s economy. Furthermore, 3 academics showed different econometric 
analyses demonstrating disagreements about the methods and analysis used to 
estimate the welfare cost for the local citizens. The hearings were also useful in 
validating the limited discussions of PR’s vulnerabilities to food security, the effect of 
the US Cabotage Act on the island’s food supply chain, the local food sector’s 
capabilities to trade globally and its port infrastructure.  
 
 3. Secondary data collected on the factors that cause competitiveness of the 
agribusiness internal market. These were necessary to understand the relationship 
between the formulation of the US Cabotage Act as a NTM and the agribusiness 
supply chain. As a result, the effects on the smallholders and medium livestock 
producers, underlying factors or capabilities and overall competitiveness of the 
agribusiness importers’ strategies of the participants involved were explored. 
 
The secondary data analyses were based on Ritchie and Lewis’s (2003) categories: 
description, comparative research, restudy or follow-up study, reanalysis, research 
design and methodological advancement, verification, and teaching and learning. The 
most applicable of these was reanalysis of qualitative data. We believe that it 
permitted a new interpretation, research questions, research perspectives and 
reflective tools implemented during the analytical process of the existing data. This 
research combined all of the secondary data to explore the available information 
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related to the research questions and the primary data generated by the interviews 
prior to proceeding with theory generation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The secondary 
data collection stage was supported with primary data collection. 
 
New variables associated with supply chain management and the importers’ 
perceptions were generated by primary data using semi-structured interviews and 
discourse analysis. The subsequent segments describe the study design, covering the 
sampling strategy, the data generation methods, the analytical approach and the 
ethical issues to take on board 
 
5.3.2 Time horizon 
The research was performed as an ongoing process starting in December 2013 and 
finishing in December 2015. Fieldwork and interviews were performed between 
December 2014 and February 2015.     
 
 
5.4.0 Sampling and interviews 
Maxwell (1997, p: 87) defined purposive sampling as a type of sampling in which, 
‘‘particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important 
information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices’’. In the 
process of ensuring coverage of the sample data, this investigation focused on the 
agrifood importers firms. The main concern addressed in the theory building was the 
diversity of the sample population. The theory-building process was not focused on 
representing a large population; instead, the main concern was the display of the 
variability that is present in the larger population. To address this concern, the 
investigation continued into the richness of the cross-industry sector and the sample 
population’s representativeness to determine whether the sample was sufficient to 
build a commendable theory. 
 
The qualitative component of this thesis was based on information obtained via 
interviews to explore the perception of the importing companies’ competitiveness in 
relation to the Cabotage Act. Interviewing owners, presidents, CEOs, managers, 
company’s accountant and technicians our data was generated to understand how the 
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phenomenon is affecting their firms’ competitiveness. All of the interviewees had 
more than 10 years of experience working in a related field. A description of sample is 
presented in the Appendix B. However, in many of the cases the companies’ 
confidentiality policies limit our range of actions. 
 
The group of importing companies in PR is relatively small; thus, our stakeholders 
were selected according to their agribusiness activities (Table 20). The first group 
contained fresh-produce importers. Although it consisted of seven companies in a 
market estimated at $230 million per year, three of them accounted for more than 
75% of the produce sales. The second group was associated with the importing of 
grain, raw material and other goods to be used in the animal feed sector. Due to the 
specificity of the topic, the participants were limited to six operational companies and 
another two that currently are not operational. In this group of importing firms, all 
existing operational companies were interviewed as well as representative from two 
firms no longer in the market. 
 
The sector of fertilisers, in which the overall sales may reach over $40 million per 
annum, was not analysed in this research. However, some of the participants were 
related to that agribusiness. Only one company is currently producing and 
manufacturing fertilisers in PR by importing the raw materials. Five other firms are 
importing manufactured products by containers. The effects of cabotage on this 
product could be analysed for the local manufacturers and the local retailers. It would 
certainly have an effect on the cost of production, but lack of data is a limitation.  
 
Initially, the companies were selected according to the public NMR (National 
Merchants Registration) registry on the PR Treasury Department’s official website. We 
should clarify that the data published by the official institutions and included in the 
External Trade Statistic report, although accurate in most respects, do not mention 
the importers’ name. The technique of snowball sampling was also implemented 
(Bryman, 2012). Secondly, to assure that our sample was selected representatively, a 
few consumers (e.g. livestock farmers) and field technicians of the public ministry of 
PR’s Agriculture Department were consulted. Finally, to reconfirm, national importing 
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agribusinesses were asked about the number of competitors in the market and 
segmented by the level of importation. 
 
Table 20: Information of the participating organisations and importing companies   
A. Private sector 
Grain Importers 
Federación de Asociaciones 
Pecuarias de PR 
ADM (Master Mix)* Precision 
Microblenders, Inc.* 
Procesadora de Granos de 
PR/ Molinos del Sur** 
ADM (Nutrimix)* 
 
El Borincano Mill 
GABSO, Inc. Pan American Grain Co, Inc. 
Ardent Mills, Inc./ 
Molinos de PR 
Logistics and Service Providers 
Transmaris, LTC Diversified Marine   
Fresh-Produce Importers 
Hill Brothers  Caribbean Produce Exchange Puerto Rico Supplies 
Fertiliser 
AgroServicios Pan American Fertiliser Cordero’s Dairy Farm 
B. NGOs 
Acción y Reforma Agrícola Asoc. de Agricultores de PR 
Secondary Data 
PR Maritime Alliance 
 
Cámara de Comercio Asoc Productos de PR 
Asoc. de Industriales Asoc. para el Mercadeo de la 
Industria de Alimentos (MIDA) 
 
C. Public Sector   
Governor Chief of Staff Secretary of Agriculture PR Port Authority 
Secondary Data 
Senate of PR, Commission House of Representatives, Commission 
* New consolidation/** currently non-existent. 
 
To ensure consistency and validity, the questions were formulated in relation to the 
purpose of this research. The basic group of questions was constructed using Porter’s 
(1990) conceptual framework but including some elements of visibility in the supply 
chain of Brandon-Jones et al (2014). The types of questions to be asked varied from 
one category of participants to another according to the sector. For example, logistics 
managers were asked about the level of complexity in management and other services 
required. They were also asked about the external services or firms contracted 
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through the chain between the origin of goods and the goods (grain or fresh-produce) 
importer and their intercommunication during trade. On the other hand, accountants 
were asked about the costs of freight and other costs that they consider to have an 
impact on the product at the end of the supply chain. Nevertheless, it is important to 
clarify that not all companies have the same level of complexity or management 
structure; thus, it was expected that the division of responsibilities would differ 
between companies. Two maritime service providers were included in the study due 
to their vital intervention in the chain. The researcher included them to consider 
specific types of services that are directly related to maritime transportation and 
logistics.  
 
Representatives from the most important non-governmental organisations and public 
ministries were interviewed. The participants in this category presented their 
perspective, experiences and/or knowledge about innovative strategies used by other 
producers, their opinion about the implications of the US Cabotage Act for market 
competitiveness, public or social initiatives and/or worries about it. Flexibility in using 
semi-structured interviews gave the participants the freedom to talk about the subject 
in detail and offering room to probe beneath the surface for explanations and 
clarification as and when they were deemed necessary. 
 
The participants’ responses contributed to ascertaining the extent to which the 
Cabotage Act, as an NTM on maritime transportation, affects the agribusiness sector. 
Their interviews generated rich information about the operational challenges to be 
faced. At the end, this research developed a new perspective based on three 
dimensions: external, internal and cultural. These dimensions were framed by the 
vulnerability to trade, the managers’ perception of business competitiveness, the level 
of supply chain complexities and the strategies implemented to deal with maritime 
transportation costs. 
 
5.4.1 Supply chain culture and capabilities 
To ensure that all the relevant supply chain culture, assets and capabilities data were 
collected from the sample population, methodological triangulation was applied in the 
form of: a) document analysis, participant observations, direct observations and 
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interviews, with a particular focus on extracting tacit knowledge through the analysis 
of the operational activities; and b) data analysis by: time, space and participants were 
taken into account during coding. The process of designing and applying the 
methodology and data triangulation is documented (in Spanish) for the benefit of 
future researchers on this topic. 
 
 
5.5.0 Data collection, generation and analysis  
These tasks relied on multiple sources of evidence analysed in a triangulated fashion 
and on predetermined competitiveness’ schemes that enabled the monitoring of the 
data collection and analysis in a methodological manner. The researched topic 
presents a scenario including multiple variables of interest; therefore, it required 
multiple sources of evidence. To ensure an understanding of all the elements in the 
present scenario, an initial understanding of the phenomenon was considered crucial 
to the research objectives. 
 
5.5.1 Generation and analysis 
To generate rich quantitative and qualitative data for this research, secondary sources 
and semi-structured interviews constituted the instruments for the primary data 
collection. Firstly, a profile of PR’s livestock sector was developed through the 
framework of the basic goals of sustainability (UNSDSN, 2014). Consumption analysis, 
national production and farmland availability for the livestock sector were assessed as 
the base for the following analysis. Secondly, Porter’s competitiveness framework was 
used as a conceptual framework to gain a better understanding of the factors related 
to the internal agribusiness competitiveness through the dimension of an external 
NTM. In this context Porter’s framework was considered to assess the impact of 
formulation on the competitive advantages of land, location, natural resources, 
infrastructure and activities. To analyse the creation of competitive advantages arising 
from formulating an integrated supply chain, Briguglio’s vulnerability conceptual 
framework for SIDSs’ economies was taken into account to determine the level of 
dependence on strategic imports. Thirdly, the current prices of grain in the domestic 
market were investigated at the end of the chain as well as at the origin using 
international market data as the reference point. Fourthly, the level of openness to 
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trade in grains was considered using secondary data from the External Trade Statistics 
and USDA reports to identify the origins and restrictions, respectively. Similarly, the 
level of consumption and remoteness of those goods was considered (Korinek & 
Sourdin, 2009a, 2009b) in the evaluation of comparable costs. In addition, the 
researcher considered how the importers deal with changes in costs due to volatility 
in the grain’s value. Finally, the role of the Government and non-governmental 
organisations was considered. The cost of mooring in a port, fees related to handling, 
insurance and inspections and other national regulations imposed by local or federal 
agencies were explored.  
 
The conceptual frameworks and diagrams were used to assemble a visual 
representation of the agribusiness activities, infrastructure and supply chain flow. For 
the quantitative data analysis, Microsoft Excel software was employed to generate 
descriptive statistics involving numbers, percentages, tables and figures. 
Consequently, this research methodology attempted to explain the complexity of the 
formulated phenomenon by studying it from more than one viewpoint (Silverman, 
2011).  
 
It is important to highlight that during the analysis the researcher took into account a 
few technical aspects specific to PR’s market. Firstly, seasonal imports could be 
irregular and negatively affected by factors that were not considered in this research. 
Secondly, as agricultural goods they could be affected by other technical 
considerations also classified as NTMs, restraining the options to import and therefore 
affecting the costs of trade but not necessarily associated with the Cabotage Act. 
Thirdly, the decline in the national level of animal farms and the human population 
will naturally reduce the level of consumption; hence, a reduction could change the 
type of transport, causing differences in costs. To support the arguments concerning 
the validity of the conceptual method designed for analysing real-world scenarios, the 
research methodology implemented intensive analysis of the participants and the 
impact of the supply chain strategy.  
 
Porter’s (1990) framework was used in our exploratory study of supply chain 
competitiveness in this sector. As mentioned, the semi-structured questions were 
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constructed following its design but also including the topics of market 
interconnectivity (Latruffe, 2010). The relationship between importers and suppliers 
at the global level was investigated to evaluate their supply chain visibility level 
(Brandon-Jones et al, 2014) during the importation process. Some systematic points in 
De Martino and Morvillo (2008) were used to identify key factors of port 
competitiveness that exert an impact on the supply chain network.  
 
During the fieldwork we ensured the use of the same language and protocol with 
everyone. The data collection was entirely executed in PR and the interviews 
conducted in Spanish. Although we had an interview schedule and previously planned 
list of topics, the participants were invited to add other items to the interview agenda. 
This would offer more engagement of the participants. The goal was to make it simple 
for the interviewer to learn more about interviewees’ perceptions, logistics and 
strategies for dealing with the cabotage challenges in their supply chain as part of 
their business. Our aim was to develop a flexible instrument to give the participants 
the freedom to talk in detail about the subject and allow for clarification. The 
interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. They generated information about the 
operational challenges of competitiveness and vulnerabilities in their firms as well as 
the national food security plans.   
 
After every interview the researcher transcribed and became familiar with the data 
collected and reflected through writing memos during the entire project as part of the 
process.  This was followed by a process of coding, which involved organising the data 
into patterns and then creating thematic networks based on the conceptual 
framework previously discussed. Categorical coding was applied to sort the findings 
into formulated concepts and areas of decisions (internal or external to the firm). 
Once the thematic networks had been created, the data were integrated and 
interpreted. The last stage of our analysis involved a coherent integration of 
qualitative data and quantitative data as a whole. This method enabled the study to 
collect and evaluate the operational activities simultaneously and then apply 
individual operational activities to the formulation criteria.  
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The flexibility given to individual participants in the process of collecting and 
evaluating field data resulted in a greater contribution than expected in a relatively 
shorter period of time than anticipated. These steps represented the starting point in 
the methodology design, at which the formulation criteria were determined by 
identifying areas of the agribusiness strategy that provide insights into the NTMs’ 
effects on the supply chain activities. The second step was to link the formulation 
criteria hierarchically92 by referring to the criteria of infrastructure limits on their 
supply chain. Finally, the third step was to relate these aspects to competitiveness.  
 
5.5.2 Sample segmentation 
Careful consideration was applied to cover people from multiple levels of the 
importing companies. Only some of the interview participants were predetermined in 
the initial selection and the rest were chosen based on the development of the 
research (Table 21). The multiple levels consisted of:  
 Level A interviewees who influence the agribusiness, international trade and 
food supply chain strategy (presidents, owners, CEOs or senior directors); 
 Level B interviewees who are supervised by level A (directors, managers or 
controllers) and contribute to the strategy formulation indirectly; 
 Level C interviewees who are members of the public ministry or NGOs related 
to the agribusiness sector.  
 
Table 21: Participant segmentation 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with levels A and B covering functions 
such as logistics, purchasing, marketing/sales, infrastructure, discharging efficiency 
and quality assurance across fifteen firms. Although using semi-structured questions, 
                                                          
92 In relation to the raw material and it volumens.  
Level A Level B Level C
1. Company Owner (3) 1. VP Controller (1) 1. Public Ministry (3)
2. Principal Shareholder (1) 2. Senior Purchasing Manager (1) 2. NGO Representative (2)
3. Executive President (1) 3. Purchasing Technician (3) 3. Logistic Provider (2)
4. Chief Exec. Officer (CEO) (1) 4. General Sales Manager (3)
5. General Manager (3)
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a different approach was used for level C interviewees. The participants were three 
members of the public ministry, two managers of third-party maritime companies and 
two representatives of NGOs. Inquiries were made about public policy, national 
strategic plans, institutional opinions, personal experiences and/or services provided. 
 
Initially our sampling guidelines were to perform at least two interviews per firm, 
amounting ten qualitative interviews of which 50% would represent level A while the 
remainder would be from level B. However, during the fieldwork we discovered that in 
the grain sector the topic is only managed by the level A participants and in only one 
company level B interviewees have some knowledge about this kind of process. 
Therefore, the number of participants by company was in 90% of them limited to level 
A interviewees (Table 22). 
 
Table 22: Codex of participants by sector and level 
 
Legend: The first letter is the level; Co#=firm. Level C requires some specificity, hence the numbers.  
 
 
Recognising that the sample was small, the researcher decided to interview the vast 
majority of the companies recognised in PR as importing agribusinesses for the period 
between 2000 and 2015. Face-to-face interviews took place between December 2014 
and February 2015. Due to the fact that one of the participants selected through 
purposive sampling was living in the USA, this interview was conducted via Skype. 
Theoretical saturation was reached after the fifth interview. All the participants 
approved audio taping and transcription, which produced a total of 26 hours and over 
200 pages of transcripts. 
 
Business
ACo1            ACo5  BCo1             BCo5  C3Co3            C2N1
ACo3            ACo6  BCo2             BCo6
ACo4            ACo8                        BCo7
ACo9            ACo10  B1Co9           B2Co9  C2N2,             C1P3
 BCo10           BCo11  
ACo11          ACo13  BCo6             BCo12  C2N1              
ACo14
AC3Co15      C1P1              C2N1
AC3Co16  C1P2              C2N2
Maritime Services 
Participants
Grain
Fresh Produce
Fertilisers
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5.5.3 Interview structure 
The majority of the participants were previously invited by letter one month before 
the call to confirm the interview. The date and venue for the interview were selected 
by each participant. Two days prior to the interview the participant information sheet 
was delivered (Appendix C) and it was ‘face to face’ discussed with each interviewee 
before the interview. They had no restrictions on time to respond to the semi-
structured questions designed in the instrument. Each interview was organised 
approximately in the following manner: introduction 2 minutes, pre-structured 
questions 25 minutes and open questions 30 minutes, semi-open questions 15 
minutes and focused questions 5 minutes. The times given were only used as 
guidelines and if the interviews were rich for example in the open questions content, 
the timings were changed to allow more time for the open questions. The technique 
of interview applied was, ‘what and how or why’, which consist of every time 
interviewee was asked ‘what’ the next question that followed would be started with 
‘how or why’.  
 
Generally, the introduction was used as part of the interviews to request permission 
to record the interview and to answer any questions that the interviewee might have, 
such as questions regarding the confidentiality of the recordings.  In the introduction 
and/or as pre-structured questions, placement inquiries were asked. For instance: 
‘Could you describe your present role within the company?’; ‘What is the level of 
involvement in designing the business strategy?’ and/or ‘Could you please tell me 
about your academic background or years of experience in the business?’ After the 
placement questions the interview continued with the next stage. The main reason for 
asking open questions was to find out about the tacit aspect of the interviewees’ 
experiences or opinion regarding the US Cabotage Act and its effects on their business 
or Puerto Rico’s market. It is important to highlight that the questions were structured 
in a way that would relate to the interviewee’s job role while attempting to gain 
knowledge about the tacit supply chain strategy. Additionally, some subjects focused 
on exploring the environmental implications and requirements to validate the supply 
chain impact; logistics; multi-modal transportation; the effects and influence on the 
sustainability of competitive commerce of the agribusiness strategy; and the 
relationships between individual agribusinesses and the formulation of an integrated 
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supply chain strategy to deal with the cost to trade. Furthermore, the potential for 
overcoming or identifying other implicit barriers or inefficiencies associated with the 
US Cabotage Act was explored in the interviews. Finally, the context of the interviews 
was structured to ensure the maximum benefit of it.  
 
5.5.4 Measurement of variables 
Questions were designed to explore the Cabotage Act’s effects on the agribusiness 
supply chain. Through semi-structured open questions, we explored the operational 
activities, the integration into the supply chain, business importing logistics and other 
secondary activities related to operational processes or independent variables 
associated with maritime transportation.  
 
The semi-structured questions facilitated comparative research as different 
respondents answered the same common questions, although there was scope to 
probe and explore the specific responses provided by individuals (Radanliev, 2014). 
The flexibility of the semi-structured interviews allowed individual interviewees to 
relate the issues to their own values, beliefs, language and to organise these around 
their own ideological frameworks or knowledge (Wengraf, 2001). 
 
The variables used in the research study emerged from the critical summary of the 
existing literature. The semi-structured question instrument is summarised in 
Appendix D. The semi-structured questions were carefully designed to reflect each of 
the themes in the research’s conceptual framework and its relationship with the 
research aim and objectives. To reduce ‘cognitive dissonance’, the instrument was 
designed to balance strategy and operational firms’ activities than on participants’ 
beliefs of the phenomenon. It was helpful to identify the internal factors that may 
affect the supply chain. Furthermore, it was considered crucial to limit the information 
regarding to the phenomenon in order to collect the participants’ experiences. 
 
To address the topic of how the interview questions related to the aim and objectives 
of the study and to ensure that the questions were suitable for drawing appropriate 
conclusions, a number of pilot interviews were conducted prior to the actual 
interviews to assess whether the translated questions were appropriate and could be 
202 
 
understood. The pilot interviews involved five Spanish speakers’ colleagues related to 
the agribusiness sector and/or some experience of the supply chain. The assessment 
of the translation process was carried out to assess whether the translation retained 
the original intended meaning. Their comments led to slight amendments to the 
wording of some questions so that they were more comprehensible to the 
respondents.  
 
 
5.6.0 Quantitative estimation analyses 
Feedstuff formulations are dynamic and varied among the animal feed mills; however, 
their major differences are in their micro-mineral mixing, which is the secret formula 
registered by each manufacturing firm. Consequently, the cost analyses are based on 
proportions of one macro ingredient for dairy cattle, poultry and hogs.  
 
Dairy 
To estimate the total volume (MT) per ingredient imported, a basic formulation of 
70% maize was considered. The consumption average was estimated per cow in 
production, considering the average volume of feedstuff consumed (9 kg per day per 
unit). It was assumed that in PR a dairy cow under production consumes around 1 MT 
of feedstuff every 3.8 months. This will depend on many factors, such as the number 
of units in production, pasture availability, the season of the year and so on. Due to 
the lack of space and the climatic conditions in PR, the use of feedstuff is relatively 
larger than in nations with less intensive systems of production. The current number 
of units in production is estimated to be 90,000 cows93. 
 
CC(j)= (BFj * Kτ) * (DMj*X*PF) 
 
The equation contains the cost of cabotage (CC); ingredient % in dairy bovine 
formulation (BF); total consumption per cow per year in metric tonnes (Kτ); domestic 
imports per ingredient per year (DMj); over-cost’s coefficient in domestic (X) in USD; 
PF=per farm; and j = ingredient. 
  
                                                          
93
 Data provided by PR’s Extensionist Dairy Man.   
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Hogs 
To estimate the total volume (MT) per ingredient imported, a formulation of 65% 
maize was considered. More than 70% of swine producers in PR limit their production 
cycle to 125 lbs (57 kg) per unit. The average is 2 cycles per year, but they could 
converge in some points of the production, particularly between autumn and winter. 
The total consumption per unit per cycle of 185 days was estimated to be 0.21 MT 
(206 kg). The number of hog farmers and current annual production in PR was 
estimated using non-official fieldwork data provided by the professionals of the 
Department of Agriculture and the Agricultural Extension Service of PR. The current 
number of units in production is unknown; thus, the base of 55,000 hogs was the 
estimation for 2013.  
CC(j)= (HFj * Kτ) * (DMj*X*PF) 
 
The equation contains the cost of cabotage (CC); ingredient % in hog formulation (HF); 
total consumption per unit per cycle in metric tonnes (Kτ); domestic imports per 
ingredient per year (DMj); over-cost’s coefficient  in domestic (X) in USD; per farm 
(PF); and j = ingredient. 
 
Poultry 
To estimate the total volume (MT) per ingredient imported, a formulation of 65% 
maize was considered. The average consumption per step in a production cycle 
(starter – 14 days; growing – 21 days; finishing – 7 days) of 42 days was estimated. 
Additionally, non-official field data were provided by the professionals of the 
Agricultural Extension Service to update the number of poultry farmers in PR. Their 
current number is 58 with 30,000 units per production cycle and 4 others with cycles 
of 100,000 units. 
CC(jz)= (FFj * Kτ) * (DMj*X*PF) 
 
The equation contains the cost of cabotage (CC); ingredient % in flock formulation 
(FF); total flock consumption per cycle in metric tonnes (Kτ); domestic imports per 
ingredient per year (DMj); overcost’s coefficient in domestic (X) in USD; number of 
flocks served per farm per year (PF); j = ingredient; and z= farmer. 
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5.7.0 Anticipated challenges 
Although this topic may have profound political connotations in Puerto Rico (Santiago, 
2012), many of the participants were openly explicit about their opinion. They showed 
a genuine interest in clarifying misconceptions of the phenomenon, and only a few 
were not available to participate in the research. Limitations to the access to non-
biased information were expected. Furthermore, the literature comments that one 
weakness noticed in applying interviews for data collection is that they produce 
outcomes that are affected by what the participant considers to be required or what 
the participant thinks the interviewer wants to hear (Silverman, 2011). This motivated 
an interview design with a focus on activities, aimed at gathering feasible strategic 
concepts from participants instead of the desired outcomes from the supply chain 
strategy. Based on this, the combination of research methods was advantageous in 
the appreciation of the population’s perspective (Hall, 2013). Although triangulation 
added complexity to the analysis, this exploratory research was challenging and 
involved the risk of overcoming partial views as a complete scenario (Silverman, 
2011).  
 
Some restrictions to access to quality official data were expected. Similarly, the 
corporate strategies for competitiveness could be a particularly confidential topic due 
to the limited group of grain importers on the island. Access to the dockyards was 
restricted in 90% of the cases; thus, it is possible that there were more infrastructure 
limitations than reported.  
 
Frankel (2002) argues that comparing freight rates between similar trades in the 
Caribbean and the US is difficult if not impossible. He posits that the volume of trade 
on these routes is not comparable to Puerto Rico’s level, because it is at least four 
times larger than all the other Caribbean countries combined. Furthermore, trade in 
the region only operates between PR and a limited number of US mainland ports; 
thus, the freight rates and other costs are significantly higher than for any other 
country.  
 
Perishable raw material trade requires particular technical considerations and its 
management could imply extra costs. In addition, the freight rates are affected by the 
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capacity balance (demand/supply ratio), besides southbound rates being dramatically 
different from northbound rates; therefore, a very specific analysis has to be 
executed.  
 
Prior to December 2014, only four companies in PR were involved in the whole 
domestic maritime goods trade. However, during our fieldwork the number of 
maritime providers was reduced. The oligopolistic structures in the maritime sector 
restrict the access to information, but also the oligopolistic structures in the grain 
sector limiting our analysis too. Although the filing of contract terms was introduced 
by the US Federal Maritime Commission in 1993, establishing that subscribers (to the 
service) can gain access to file rates, currently the data filed do not provide enough 
information about negotiated rates to allow a real cost analysis. In addition, the 
confidential relationship between providers and clients may limit our study.  
 
Finally, the amount of time required to generate and analyse data was a limitation for 
the understanding of the whole phenomenon. In addition, the distance between the 
UK and PR affected the time spent on fieldwork. Ultimately, the tight budget, limited 
sample available and lack of updated official data in publications about the maritime 
logistics for the food supply chain in the Commonwealth may have compromised our 
research. 
 
 
5.8.0 Ethical issues 
Although this project is fundamentally sustained by the analysis of secondary data and 
harmlessness was anticipated, the interview phase required informed consent from 
the participants. Due to the political connotations of the topic as well as the level of 
corporate confidentiality, the study may provoke concerns. During the process the 
participants were constantly informed about our neutrality with the intention to 
collect valuable data to demonstrate the issues relating to the topic with the highest 
possible level of confidentiality (Appendix E). Furthermore, the researcher informed 
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the interviewees of his address and availability for clarification, research purpose, 
methods and intended possible uses of the information collected94. 
 
Companies were invited and informed about our research interest. The participants 
received a brief explaining the research aims, objectives and methods by regular mail.  
The receipt of the letter was confirmed and the interviews were coordinated by phone 
and email. After the first introductory meeting with the official manager(s) and their 
agreement to be part of the research, they selected the participants for the interview. 
The meetings were held no less than three days after the phone confirmation to give 
the interviewees enough time to reflect before making a decision to join the study. A 
written informed consent form was developed. Before signing the form, the 
participants received sufficient information about the study to facilitate the process of 
informed decision making on whether or not to participate in the research.  
 
During the interview the participants’ informed consent was reconfirmed from the 
beginning. Our neutrality and intentions were constantly reaffirmed. Similarly, the 
participants were informed verbally of their ethical rights, the risks and the benefits 
involved. The data previously collected for the literature review gave us the 
opportunity to enter into a dialogue that may represent positive information that was 
not previously planned between the interviewer and the interviewees. The researcher 
highlighted the reasons for selecting the interviewees for the research and provided 
details about what will happen to the data collected. Prior to the interview, the same 
procedure was followed to obtain informed consent from the NGO staff. 
 
As part of the induction and informed consent process the participants were 
reassured that they may withdraw from the interview at any moment with no 
penalties. They were free from any harm and coercion, as all possible measures were 
taken to retain a sense of dignity and worth for everyone involved in the research 
(Economy and Social Research Council, 2012; Oliver, 2010). All the interviewees were 
informed that participation was voluntary and their decision on whether or not to 
take part in the project was totally free.  
 
                                                          
94 Previously reviewed and authorised by the University of Bradford Reseach Ethics Board, file #EC1819 
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The semi-structured interviews were tape recorded, using the same language and 
protocol with everyone. To minimise the potential intimidation that tape recording 
may invoke for a few people, we adopted a relaxed ambiance to ensure an easy 
interview. The respondents could freely decide to decline to answer any question or 
discuss any topic. To ensure that the interviewees had absolute control over the 
process, they were able to pause or stop the recording machine at any time during the 
session. Finally, the interviews were transcribed.  
 
The anonymity of the respondents was respected. No participant was named or 
otherwise identified in publications or any publicly disseminated material. The 
participants were informed about the reasons for deciding to tape record the 
interview, the mechanism to be used to preserve the recording and how long the 
recordings would be stored. Similarly, the procedure for the destruction of the tapes 
was related. Once all the data have been transcribed and analysed and the thesis has 
been approved, the tapes and backup copies will be destroyed within six months.  
 
5.9.0 Conclusion 
The research was designed to study the effects of an external non-tariff measure on 
the agribusiness sector of a small island developing state. Secondary data were 
collected from multiple sources to present a multidimensional profile of the 
phenomenon’s impact on the supply chain activities in the context of the sector under 
study.  
 
The research was designed with the aim of exploring the relationship between the 
business supply chain strategies and the effects of cabotage on the interviewees’ 
firms. The study applied qualitative methods through content analysis of case study 
research as well as quantitative methods through comparison cost analysis in 
feedstuff formulations. Primary data were generated, coded and analysed through 
semi-structured questions using the method of grounded theory. This research was a 
harmless project and indubitably no one suffered from the methods implemented. 
The procedure of data collection and its contribution is unique in the study of this 
phenomenon so far. In the following chapter the data is analysed and discussed.   
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CHAPTER VI 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
6.0.0 Introduction 
The increase in population, average income, the urbanisation (densification) process, 
the increasing demand for animal products as a result of policies to improve nutrition 
and technical and scientific developments seem to be challenging but also promising 
for the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the reduction in the availability of land 
and the increase consumer demands95 will be determinant factors of the food 
industry’s development during the next decades. Qualitative and nutritional criteria 
are used for their purchase and segregation in feed mills by the use of more complex 
technological and data analysis to allow immediate reports for decision making. 
Therefore, the cost of grain and produce will be affected.  
 
A supply chain analysis is the result of the evolution of innovation and coordination 
affected by internal and external factors of the firm in relation to efficiency (Saad et al, 
2002). Therefore to identify those factors that contribute to or limit competitiveness, 
it is useful to decompose the supply chain to study its interactions (Ferrantino, 2012a). 
The aggregated data applied to formulate our theoretical view were collected from 
primary and secondary sources. A supply chain analysis is formulated to explore how 
the US Cabotage Act – as an external NTM – is affecting the participant business in the 
study.  
  
Through applying content and discourse analysis to the primary data collected and 
linking them with other secondary data, the interrelated factors affecting the supply 
chain of the traditional agribusiness importers are explored (Appendix F). As a result, 
the following pages present a description of three business structures linked to 
maritime transportation: PR’s port infrastructure, the grain mill importing sector and 
the fresh-produce importing sector.  
 
                                                          
95
 In this case we are referred to more food safety challenges, a lower environmental impact, fair trade products and better animal welfare 
conditions (Penz & Bruno, 2011). 
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This descriptive analysis considers different dimensions (sectoral, systemic and non-
economic) associated (directly or indirectly) with the US Cabotage Act. Other 
determinants of competitiveness influenced by the firms and beyond them are 
included. Building on the context of this study in Chapter 2, the cases analyses 
presented in Chapter 3 and the theoretical framework in Chapter 4, this study derives 
a new approach to investigating the effect of the maritime cabotage policy as an 
external NTM on the supply chain in PR’s agrifood sector. 
 
 
6.1.0 Outlining PR’s national ports system, infrastructure and trade 
Puerto Rico has eleven official ports96 (Table 23) registered under the PR Ports 
Authority (PRPA), which is governed by a board of directors headed by an executive 
director. Theoretically, the PRPA owns, operates and manages all the sea and air 
facilities for cargo and cruises (passengers) in the PR’s archipelago. Regarding its 
maritime facilities, the majority are in the port of San Juan. Other public ports across 
the nation of PR, although under its jurisdiction, were delegated to public—private 
partnership (Ponce) and/or municipalised (Mayaguez).  
 
For more than a decade, PRPA has acted more like a real-estate corporation than a 
port-planning manager (C1P2). Various agencies of the US Federal Government are 
related to PRPA, such as the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Army Corp 
of Engineers and particularly the US Coast Guard. As a result, the PRPA’s planning 
programmes and some decisions have a direct relationship with them (C1P1). Some 
grants and technical assistance are provided annually by them and other agencies of 
the US Federal Government. PRPA investments have commonly been focused on the 
airport infrastructure rather than the maritime ports, but the agency is facing serious 
financial problems and currently is undergoing a debt restructurating process. 
Nevertheless, in total PRPA has around 7 kilometres of berthing, including 34 
dockyards and over 40 berths. PRPA owns 10 hectares of storage and 14 hectares of 
open space, but in the Port of San Juan only 5 hectares of space for loading/unloading 
cargo are available. Although currently not in service, it has dry-dock facility located 
between Pier 15 and Pier 16. A variety of services to the shipping industry, such as 
                                                          
96 Two of these ports, Arecibo and Yabucoa, are not included in the table of references. So far, their use has been limited to oil imports.  
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tugs, pilotage, fuel delivery, water supply, provisions, customs, water supply and 
vessel maintenance are available, but they are provided by private companies. Since 
the ‘Navieras de Puerto Rico’ was sold in 1995 due to considerable losses (estimated 
at $350 million), the Government of PR does not have a cargo fleet. It is believed that 
many of the Navieras’ old fleet and containers are still in use by maritime firms that 
serve PR’s market (ACo9). 
 
Table 23: PR’s ports and their general yield in 2013 
 
Extracted from: US Department of Commerce (2014). Notes: 1. Ponce and Mayaguez are delegated 
ports. 2. Port's Yield is referring to the percentage of the MT total that is transported through a 
particular port.  
 
San Juan is the main port of PR, but Ponce (in the south) has the deepest draught (15 
m in 3 dockyards and a road) and is the most recently redesigned. The cargo port of 
San Juan has a relatively tight entrance, and exiting might require a harbour pilot. 
During the hurricane season, although in a certain sense protected, its entrance 
demands some attention from the US Coast Guard.  
 
The port of San Juan is the only port in the north of the main island that is naturally 
protected from the strength of the Atlantic Sea. It is believed to have been in service 
since the sixteenth century. The San Juan Bay was created by a geological formation in 
a horseshoe form. It is the biggest area of the San Juan Port divided into 26 piers 
(dockyards). In the cargo section (Pto. Nuevo) the majority of them are rented by 
PRPA to private companies and a few others are private. In the other section of the 
port (Old San Juan and Isla Grande) PRPR has a few other dockyards for mixed 
purposes. Around 10 have passenger facilities and 5 are fitted to receive big cruises 
(over 3,000 tourists per ship) (Fig.34). In total the port has 6 ‘roads’ (navigation lanes 
Ports
City Exports Imports Total Exp. Yield Imp. Yield Total Yield
San Juan 836.2 5486.3 6322.5 13.2% 87% 48.61%
Guayanilla 15.6 3600.3 3615.9 0.4% 100% 27.80%
Humacao 8.1 1311.6 1319.7 0.6% 99% 10.15%
Jobos 0 1390.1 1390.1 0.0% 100% 10.69%
Ponce* 72.2 140.1 212.3 34.0% 66% 1.63%
Mayaguez 25.3 94.3 119.6 21.2% 79% 0.92%
Fajardo 0 14.2 14.2 0.0% 100% 0.11%
Guánica 0 2.5 2.5 0.0% 100% 0.02%
Aguadilla* 9.3 0.2 9.5 97.9% 2% 0.07%
Total (MT) 966.7          12,039.6   13,006.3    
By: Metric Tons
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or channels) but only 2 in the cargo section of the horseshoe bay. The draught of the 
roads is between 8 and 13 metres, but for the Puerto Nuevo Canal the road from the 
entrance is around 13 metres constantly. Of the cargo terminals of the port of San 
Juan, 5 are located in the Puerto Nuevo district and 3 are located between the 
municipalities of Guaynabo and Cataño.  
 
Figure 34: Top view of San Juan Bay 
 
Source: Google Earth (2015). 
 
The port of San Juan offers a total of 4.6 hectares of space for loading/unloading 
cargo. All of these facilities are rented to private companies (C1P2). Between 1999 and 
2009 the Port of San Juan appears to be the most efficient of all Latin American ports 
in container management (Fig.35). Various maritime companies offer the main 
services in the area and all of the domestic companies operate under Jones Act. 
Currently the biggest coastal areas are rented by Crowley and Sea Star Lines. It is 
understood that overall around 16 maritime (domestic and foreign) service 
providers97 operate in PR (Anaya-Oviedo, 2012). However, the vast majority of the 
infrastructure and terminal operations are carried out by domestic firms. 
 
For more than a century, the US maritime firm Crowley has been one of the biggest in 
the US, serving the domestic market of PR (approximately 38%98) for more than 50 
years and having over 200 employees. In the US it is a huge maritime firm providing 
services from the most basic logistics to naval design and building. Currently its 
operation in PR (in 31 ha) is based on roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) vessels, but in 2014 it 
reported the acquisition of new ships for 2016 and 2017. Crowley also manages 53–
                                                          
97
 Private firms dedicated to any activity related to the shipping process of importing and exporting, such as terminal operators, maritime lines, 
docking or vessel repairs or mechanics, stevedoring, port logistics distribution, docking support and so on.  
98 The percentages were mentioned during the interviews. No quantitative data to sustain them were provided or analysed. However, similar 
approximations are presented in Szakonyi (2014) and Comas (2009). 
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foot containers in which shippers can load more cargo allowing carriers to reduce 
their total container moves by about one-third (Szakonyi, 2014). Two brand-new LNG 
ships with capacity for 900 containers will be part of its fleet to serve PR’s market. 
Additionally, Crowley will invest approximately $45 million in a new maritime cargo 
terminal (Isla Grande) as part of a long-term contract lent agreement with the PRPA 
(Sin Comillas, 2015a). Since the claims for cabotage liberalisation in PR have become 
stonger, the firm started an aggressive investment plan and terminal modernisation. 
In 2015 it conducted a total renovation and draught of the dockyard and acquired 
three new cranes for containers, power stations for refrigerated containers, new 
generation of designed containers and ISO tanks, and equipment to manage 
containers on the ground. In addition, a new logistics yard design for easy trucking 
access is planned to start in 2016.  
 
Figure 35: Port efficiency in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Extracted from: Morales-Sarriera et al (2013). 
 
 
Sea Star is a domestic line operated by TOTE Maritime since 1975. Operations for PR 
are based in Jacksonville, Florida, and carry approximately between 25% and 32% of 
all PR’s domestic cargoes (as of 2014). Whilst Sea Star has previously concentrated on 
domestic cargoes, they recently acquired the firm Tropical Shipping exclusively 
dedicated to international trade (TOTE Service, 2014). In addition, between late 2015 
and mid-2016, two new LNG high-tech ships will be added to its fleet. So far, Sea Star 
Lines is the only paperless terminal operator company in PR. Many of its procedures 
to track, trace and pick up containers are digitalised or performed by a scanning 
system. As part of its transformation, it is expected that in 2017 they will invest 
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between $10 and $20 million in its terminal to become more modern with a full 
containers tracking system (CTS), chassis, drivers, buyers and other security devices 
(C1P2).  
 
The third-biggest area of (30 ha), was administered by Horizon, but, during this 
research, the firm decided to close operations and PRPA was undergoing the process 
of selecting a new operator. Horizon was a mixed company, attending to 
approximately 35% of the international and 30% of the domestic carriers to/from PR 
(C1P2). All of the fresh-produce importing companies’ interviewees had contracts with 
them (ACo9; BCo10; BCo11). For Szakonyi (2014), the exit of Horizon Lines from this 
trade route would give the Jones Act carriers some much-needed stability, allowing 
the remaining carriers to raise the rates at their will. As presented in the previous 
chapter, three of its former executives were declared guilty in a US Justice 
Department antitrust investigation (US Department of Justice, 2014). Additionally, 
over the last several years, Horizon has been facing massive debts and was badly 
affected by launching a trans-Pacific service (Szakonyi, 2014).  
 
Another domestic company that operates in PR is Trailer Bridge, based in Jacksonville, 
but, in comparison with the companies mentioned earlier, it has limited space, 
managing around 15% of all PR’s domestic trade (C1P2). It is more focused on lift-
on/lift-off (LO–LO) and RO–RO vessels but also manages highly diversified containers 
(20’, 40’, 45’ and 53’ long) (Szakonyi, 2014). Trailer Bridge is not a contractor of the 
PRPA, but it is in partnership with the maritime firm International Shipping (Inter-
Ship), which is a native company that is more dedicated to international trade and 
stevedoring but has a long-term contract with the PRPA. Therefore, it provides an 
example of a partnership between two relatively small maritime service providers, 
one based in Jacksonville and the other based in San Juan, offering global access to PR.  
 
Unlike PR, Alaska and Hawaii have only two main operators, TOTE (Sea Star in PR) and 
Matson, and Matson and Pasha, respectively. The recent shutting down of Horizon not 
only affected PR’s business but also caused it to sell their Alaska and Hawaii services 
to other Jones Act carriers. The new configuration in these markets reduced 
competition and strengthened the players (Fig.36). For instance, Matson bought 
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Horizon’s Alaska service and competes with TOTE. In Hawaii the firm Pasha, which 
operates RO–RO tonnage in this market, acquired Horizon’s Hawaii operation to 
compete with Matson (Szakonyi, 2014). 
 
Figure 36: Current US coastal shipping routes  
 
Source: Alameda and Valentín (2012:p.51). 
 
These ‘terminal (ports) operators’, which are also maritime transportation companies, 
principally manage US-flagged vessels and provide different services to them and 
some other lines in partnership. These companies are highly specialised in container 
management. The list of the domestic fleet available contains the only vessels allowed 
to provide services between mainland US ports and the offshore territories (Table 24).  
 
Table 24: Jones Act, US-flag privately owned merchants domestic fleet (2006—2014) 
 
 
Note: The number of tankers at the same time has decreased from 56 to 44 but with a similar dwt. 
Extracted from: HIS (2015). Grt=gross tonne; dwt=dead weight in tonne. 
Years No. Grt Dwt No. Grt Dwt No. Grt Dwt
2014 24 667 715 3 73 107 7 14 11
2013 26 706 758 3 73 107 7 14 11
2012 26 706 758 3 73 107 7 14 11
2011 26 706 758 4 91 137 7 14 11
2010 26 706 758 4 91 137 7 14 11
2009 27 725 779 4 91 137 9 53 73
2008 28 743 796 4 91 137 9 67 94
2007 27 731 783 4 91 137 8 66 93
2006 28 764 825 4 91 137 8 66 93
Containers Dry Bulk General Cargo
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Focusing on international cargoes, the firm Luis Ayala-Colón SCs. is an experimented 
local operator but limited in space (C1P2). It also provides stevedoring services to 
international carriers as well as some domestic ones.  
 
Although all of these companies are recruiters of local talent, only Horizon and Ayala-
Colón boards were/are in the majority local investors. The maritime firm Island 
Stevedoring is a small, local company dedicated to carrying construction materials, 
such as wood and pipes, paper, less than a container’s load (LCL) and cars (C1P2). 
Many international lines of transport, such as Maersk, Norton Lilly International, 
Oceanic General Agency, Henríquez & Assoc and Pérez & Cia use PR’s ports (Noticel, 
2015; B1Co9); however, the majority of them have service agreements with the 
maritime service providers mentioned above (C1P1). Therefore, international 
companies have no similar infrastructure or investment in PR’s ports. Among other 
reasons, the majority of imports to PR are domestic and the costs of initiation in this 
business are very high. As a result, partnerships with the operators mentioned above 
seem to be an acceptable business model for them (C1P2). 
 
Fresh produce are transported, regularly using container ships and once in the yard 
other equipment is required. Although limited, it can also be carried in general design 
vessels, but this is a challenge: in addition to the limited space and good balance for 
containers’ stackability, there is the power connection for reefers. Consequently, the 
use of ships (RO–RO) is more common to transport fresh produce containers (ACo9). 
Grain traded in domestic journeys is commonly transported in dry-bulk vessels or 
barge carriers due to its capability to travel inland (across rivers). In PR these cargoes 
are directly managed by the importing grain company rather than some of the ‘port 
service providers’ or ‘terminal operators’ (ACo3). 
 
Since 2006 PR’s positive trade balance with the US has been between $25.3 and $28.2 
billion per year (PRPB, 2015). In 2012 the port of San Juan, PR was ranked 79 in 
container traffic in the list of the top 100 world ports. The cargo facilities allow for 
more than 50,000 m² of space for loading and unloading cargo. At the US level it is 
currently classified by the US MarAd as 13th of the 38 US ports in total volume (MT) 
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transported. In the value of goods imported from the US, the port of San Juan is 
classified 17th of 38 ($11.7 billion in 2012) and 19th of 38 in the value of goods 
exported to the US ($4.4 billion in 2012). The majority of goods (food and grains) 
imported to PR are carried by San Juan, which, in contrast to the rest of the Caribbean 
nations, shows the highest total values of goods from the US, followed by the 
Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago (Table 25). 
 
Table 25: Contrasting the US trades in the Caribbean (2013)    
 
Extracted from: US Department of Commerce Census Bureau; US Merchandise Trade, 2013. 
 
According to the US Department of Commerce, in the years from 2011 to 2013, the 
goods imported to PR by food manufacturers from the US were worth between 
$160.2 and $203.4 million. Furthermore, for agriculture and livestock, the value of 
imports to PR was between $69.2 and $107 million. On the other hand, PR’s Planning 
Board estimates the value of the entire food and agricultural goods imported to PR in 
2012 to be $3.92 billion, which represents around 4% of all of PR’s importations (Table 
26). Approximately 95% of the agriculture (livestock and food) goods imported to PR is 
produced by 15 countries, but the vast majority is from NAFTA members. However, a 
higher percentage is carried in domestic trade from the US, which is estimated to have 
been worth $3.09 billion in 2012. 
 
Having accessed the bay of San Juan, its first section in the municipality of Guaynabo is 
dedicated to the national mills. The biggest one in this section is Molinos de Puerto 
Rico, then Pan American Grain, and the smallest is Nutrimix (ADM-Caribe). They 
import grains and store and process them for humans and animals. All of them have 
contracts with multinational grain exporters or some partnerships with US exporters 
transporting grains to San Juan (ACo1; BCo2; ACo3; ACo6). 
Country Exp. to US Imp. from US Total Exp. to US Imp. from US Total
Trinidad and Tobago 907.3 15116.3 16023.6 1,795.80$  6,420.40$       8,216.30$   
Puerto Rico 966.7 12039.6 13006.3 4325.20 11678.60 16003.80
Jamaica 2274.5 5773.7 8048.1 1762.40 356.00 2118.40
Dominican Rep. 5163.1 849.5 6012.6 6379.00 3424.70 9803.70
Bahamas 2719.8 2829.6 5549.4 3223.00 538.50 3761.50
Dominica 4934.3 0.3 4934.6 65.60 0.90 66.50
Haiti 911.3 108.5 1019.8 1121.40 831.50 1952.90
Million USDMetric Tons (MT)
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Table 26: Value in port of agriculture, livestock and food imported to Puerto Rico 
 
Source: Data 2012, extracted from PRPB (2015). 
 
Next to the national mill section in the Port of San Juan but in the municipality of 
Cataño a section is dedicated to molasses to serve Bacardí and in Puerto Nuevo the 
pipe for fructose cargoes to supply Able Sales and a few other food manufacturing 
companies. Finally, the rest of this area is for container operations, particularly 
managing full container loads (FCLs) and some less than a container load (LCL) (C1P2). 
In the Isla Grande section, the PRPA has agreements with some companies with a low 
volume of cargo. For instance, piers 13 to 16 are the communal cargo section, which is 
basically fully maintained by the PRPA. It could be said that it is dedicated to ‘los 
goleteros’,99 which are between six and nine firms dedicated to trade and exports 
from PR to the US and the UK Virgin Islands. They trade particularly some agricultural 
and food produce and construction materials, but in general they are operations for 
LCL and pallets.  
 
The Port of America in Ponce is situated in a region with greater access to crop 
farmers and is highly prepared for trans-shipment with a relatively new (less than 
decade old) design, but so far its facilities have not been suitable for transporting grain 
and fresh produce. It is believed that after its conceptualisation this Port was aborted 
because of a lack of population density rather than space or facilities (ACo6). It should 
be highlighted that almost one-third of PR’s population lives in the metropolitan area 
of San Juan; hence, the shorter the distance between the port and the importers’ 
businesses, the lower the cost of logistics. For instance, the distance between the Port 
of Ponce and the Río Piedras metropolitan region of San Juan is almost 120 km (1.5 
                                                          
99
 It is also named ‘gondoleros’. 
Total imported 3,915,613,976.00$  
Total imported from the US only 3,085,298,073.00$  
% of the agriculture and food value in respect of whole 
PR's imports 4.34%
% of agriculture and food imported from the US 79%
% of the agriculture and food value from the US in 
respect of while US goods imported by PR 10.40%
From the NAFTA countries 84%
From the CAFTA-RD countries 5.50%
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hours) whereas the distance between the Port of San Juan and the same region is 18 
km (24 min).   
 
The PRPA has a very limited dockyard operation in Arecibo in the northern region. Due 
to the sea climatic conditions, lack of maintenance, a limited draught of 6 metres and 
restricted operations from 6:00 to 18:00, it is planned to close permanently (C1P2). On 
the west coast, some raw materials for agribusinesses and pharmaceuticals are 
received at Guánica and Mayaguez. However, in both municipalities the cargo 
dockyards used for agribusiness importers are private, which means that they are 
totally administered by their owners. Guánica’s bay is operationally limited by its 
natural draught (9 m at the entrance and 6.5 m at the dockyards). In the past two 
agribusiness importers, Pro-Granos and Ochoa Fertilizer, had operations there.  
 
Since Star Kits (tuna can) shut down its factory in Mayaguez, the regional port has had 
a comparatively insignificant operation, but now its activity is basically nil. A recent 
report states that the Holland Group, the private terminal operator that managed the 
port, has filed for bankruptcy. The president of this firm is also the owner of Pan 
American Grain (Sin Comillas, 2015b). As a result, the firm Caribbean Ferries with 
bases in the Mayaguez Port, operating (RO–RO) journeys between PR and the 
Dominican Republic decided to move its operations to San Juan, which is further in 
distance from Mayaguez. Currently, it is carrying not only passengers but also more 
than 100 containers per trip, many of which are LCLs and FCLs of food products (C1P2). 
However, due to the fact that it is a multiuse vessel, it is relatively limited in 
transporting produce specifically due to its logistics requirements for discharging 
(B1Co9).   
 
In the main port of San Juan (in the north), the relationship is mixed, because one of 
the three agribusiness grain importers has its own dockyard. Regarding the docking 
places of the other two grain firms, although the PRPA is the landlord, these are lent 
to them in a (very) long-term contract. It is estimated that PR may have more than 30 
private cargo dockyards, none of which pays fees to the PRPA and the majority of 
which are linked to an industrial business, but the data to validate this was not 
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available (C1P2). In these cases, the ports’ (dockyards and piers) owners have all the 
responsibility to provide the public authorities with their related ‘facility plan’.  
 
Due to the limitations in public investment funds, PRPA’s investment plan is currently 
based on a kind of public-private partnership. Allegedly, PRPA is promoting the 
terminals’ modernisation by its current operators using some formulas, fixing rent 
fees in the long term but according to the investment. However, the draughts 
represent a limitation. 
 
PR’s bays are federalised; thus, the US Federal Government controls them. As a result, 
investments in this direction should be authorised by the US Army Corps of Engineers 
and various other federal agencies. Its main lane in the port of San Juan is limited to 
12.2 m (40’) in depth. Authorisation of maintenance extraction procedures in the bay 
is relatively easy to undertake, but authorisation for major dreadging extractions 
(almost 7.5 metres) is very unlikely if not impossible to obtain (C1P2). Additionally, the 
cost for the extraction procedures would imply a huge expense for the ELA. The cost 
of renovating every pier and dockyard in the port should also be included because the 
majority of them were designed in the 1940s for different conditions and 
requirements. In comparison with South America, according to Wilmsmeier and 
Sánchez (2015), between 2012 and 2014, the average draught on the west coast 
(WCSA) is 13 m (43’), on the east coast (ECSA) it is 13.2 m (43.3’) and on the north 
coast (NCSA) it is 11.5 m (37.7’).  The maximum draught in these regions in 2014 is on 
the WCSA, with 15.2 m (50’), followed by the ECSA with 14.5 m (47.6’), and the NCSA 
is the last with 13.5 m (44.3’).    
 
Another weakness of PR’s port system is that its maritime infrastructure is basically 
owned by domestic (US) firms; thus, foreign direct investment in the maritime 
infrastructure is practically non-existent. The lack of services to repair vessels is 
another disadvantage. So far, the majority of the tugboats, barges, ferries, ships and 
other commercial and public vessels are repaired abroad. The Dominican Republic and 
a few small islands in the Caribbean or the south of the US are the most common 
places, but for Jones Act vessels, their repairs are limited to US territories. For decades 
PR’s market has had no interest in provide this kind of services (C1P1), but vessel 
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maintenance programmes are lucrative, reduce the number calling for services and 
promote other ramifications for logistics (Burns, 2015). 
 
Contrasting PR’s ports with two new ports in development, the Mariel Port in Cuba 
and the port of Haina in the Dominican Republic, the interviewees believed that, 
whilst these two seem to be deeper, their basic infrastructure is still outdated in 
comparison with that of PR. It was also suggested that, for contrasting the local 
complexities with these maritime services, high-volume management of containers is 
required, which is not currently available in Cuba or in the Dominican Republic. So far, 
both markets have not had the volume of imports to justify it and their number of 
local service providers is very limited. In addition, it was highlighted that achieving 
more volume in a relatively short time will requires a very large amount of capital 
investment and innovation in their terminals as well as access (roads), technology for 
fast communication and a stable power and fuel supply. Therefore, according to the 
participants, Cuba, Jamaica and in some factors the Dominican Republic seem not to 
be competitors of PR for at least one more decade (C1P1; C1P2; ACo3; ACo6).   
 
The lack of stability in the PRPA’s direction is an internal (PR) issue that was presented 
as one of the causes of the loss of regional competitiveness. Between 2008 and 2015, 
the PRPA had six executive directors (C1P2). Certainly, the high turnover of managers 
may affect negatively long-term planning actions, investments and clear direction to 
improve logistics, optimise facilities and establish a culture of efficiency.  
 
In summary, unlike many port authorities in the world, the PRPA is a landlord but 
demonstrates a realtor’s behaviour. Port managers’ firms signed long-terms 
agreements (over 10 years) according to the direct investments proposed by them. 
The rate of rent will depend on the area of interest, from very exclusive areas to low-
cost preferential areas. Maintenance is provided by PRPA but in exclusive areas it is 
provided by private firms. In both scenarios equipment and cranes should be provided 
by the renter. Buildings, yards and roads will depend on the area but are regularly 
provided by the renters too. Whilst so far in the Caribbean region PR seems to have 
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the most advanced port infrastructure, its ports are principally limited by draught 100 
and thus not prepared for third-generation vessels (Post-Panamax).  
 
Most of these maritime firms offer an ‘all-inclusive service’ mainly through 
subcontactors. The majority of them gather in their terminal specialised service 
providers such as stevedoring, fuel, chassis and road transporting to handle a variety 
of products.  
 
A Caribbean regional ports relationship has not been officially promoted or sustained 
by PRPA, but on a private level some Puerto Ricans have been participating in regional 
maritime organisations, such as Caribbean Shipping. In general, the port services in PR 
could be considered fully privatised and the public port activities are focused on 
collecting rent and port fees, gathering and sharing data with other agencies and 
some basic maintenance of facilities (C1P1; C1P2).  
 
6.1.1 PR’s basic cost of shipping 
According to the Maritime Alliance of Puerto Rico (Estudios Técnicos, 2013), 25% of 
the operational cost of a vessel under the Jones Act is the cost of fuel (Fig.37). 
However, terminal and port fees, stevedoring cost and extra equipment requirements 
represent 45% of the cost of the transportation services.  
 
Figure 37: Percentage of operational cost by categories for Jones Act vessels in PR 
 
Source: Maritime Alliance (2013, in Estudios Técnicos, 2013).  
                                                          
100
 Except for the Port of Ponce. 
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The terminal and port charges structure is similar to that of other ports in the US 
Atlantic and Caribbean. They include ‘wharfage’ fee (associated with the cargo), the 
‘docked’ fee, which is the charge for docking, and the ‘harbour dues’, which confer the 
right to use PR’s public bay ports. In addition, after docking, the late charges imposed 
by PRPA regularly start at 48 hours for domestic vessels but 48–72 hours later for 
international ones. All these charges are imposed by PRPA and the PR’s Department of 
Treasury in PRPA ports. In terms of cost, the heaviest fee is the ‘wharfages’, then 
‘docking’ and finally ‘harbour dues’ (C1P2). After the September 11 attacks, new 
frameworks to strengthened entry regulations were required by the Home Land 
Security. As a result, checkpoint protocols were established, increasing the number of 
containers to check. Due to the lack of personnel in PRPA was hired a company to scan 
containers and to carry out the process. Since then, the security fee (security enhance) 
has been imposed. This fee relates to the weight of cargo, but whilst the cost starts at 
$4.00 per MT, the whole fee will never be more than $69.00 per container. However, 
the terminal and port fees are higher in San Juan than in the other municipalities. 
 
The ‘tugboat’101 cost is one of the highest that is not specifically described in the list. 
Costs are between $2,000 and $2,500 per hour of service. Cruise ships are not 
particularly dependent on this service, but this is not the case for cargo vessels. Some 
cargo ships require two tugboats. Although various interviewees said that the number 
of these service providers in PR is sufficient and quality is comparable to US standards, 
the costs are not competitive in comparison with the Caribbean region operators 
(ACo5; C1P2). However, no evidence was provided to sustain this argument.  
 
Managing containers demands the use of agents that in some cases are the same 
maritime service providers, a conglomerate or independent agents. The majority of 
them are in partnership with PRPA, but their service rates are established in the open 
market (C1P1; C1P2). Some of them determine rates based on the volume of 
containers, a long-term business relationship and the complexity of goods being 
imported (hazard class and number). It should be noted that this service is not 
properly part of the cabotage cost. However, the majority of the firms’ participants in 
                                                          
101 A small and powerful boat used for towing larger boats and ships, especially in harbours. 
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this research include it as part of their maritime service costs. Commonly, they 
justified this by saying that the cost for that service is relatively insignificant in 
contrast to the value of goods imported. It is similar with the inspection fees and the 
cargo insurances. For instance, the range of costs of broker services may vary by the 
volume or number of containers and complexity, but it could be between $150 and 
$1,000 per unit of commodities (BCo5; B1Co9; BCo11).  
 
According to Szakonyi (2014), the southbound rates of transport from Jacksonville to 
San Juan are between $2,600 and $3,400 per twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU), with 
dry-box prices on the lower side and reefers priced higher. Although not specifically 
clear, these TEU rates probably imply a higher cost to trade forty-foot equivalent unit 
(FEU) containers. Furthermore, he affirms that northbound rates on the same route 
are between $500 and $700 per TEU. He suggests that the export cost per dry 
container from PR to Jacksonville is basically non-existent, due to the fact that the 
vessel’s operational costs and drayage to Florida might be equivalent. As a result, 
maritime transportation providers should develop a logistic to guarantee the full 
return of containers and the worst-case scenario is with no less than 25% FCL; 
otherwise, operational costs will become more expensive or unsustainable (C1P2; 
Burns, 2015). It is believed that currently the costs on PR northbound domestic routes 
are lower than that percentage. Szakonyi (2014), although recognising that PR’s 
market is far more crowded than that of Alaska and Hawaii, highlights that a reduction 
in containers has occurred in the domestic imports (Fig.38).  
 
Figure 38: Percentage of change in the US container trade with PR (2008—2013) 
 
Extracted from: Szakonyi (2014). 
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The data provided by Szakonyi (2014) support a reduction in container volumes 
between 2008 and 2013. According to him, a reduction of almost 12% could be 
estimated in the total number of domestic containers imported to PR. As presented in 
chapter two, this could be associated with PR’s economic depression. Nevertheless, 
the data on the value of imports, particularly for agriculture and food produce from 
the US, show a clear pattern of increase in foods and some reduction in the group of 
agriculture (Fig.39). On the other hand, PR in comparison with other SIDSs shows the 
second–lowest value by imports per capita, with Jamaica at the bottom of the list and 
Hong Kong at the top (Table 27).  
 
Figure 39: Agriculture and food produce imports to PR (2008—2013) in million USD 
 
Source: PRPB (2015). 
 
 
Table 27: Agriculture and food product imports between 2011 and 2013 by population  
 
Data extracted from: WTO (2013) and *PRPB (2015) data 2013.                      
Notes: 1. Hong Kong and Singapore are food manufacturing exporters. 2. Although the data from the 
WTO and the PRPB could be collected using different methodologies, the data of PR highlights that food 
imports are greater than agricultural produce in comparison with the rest of the SIDSs. 3. The data 
value of the columns 2011, 2012, 2013 and Total Average is expressed in million (M) USD.  
 
  
Ratio
Agri. Prod Food Agri. Prod Food Agri. Prod Food Import/pc/pY
Singapore 13,756.2 12,937.4 13,952.7 12,558.2 14,305.2 12,937.4 26,815.7 5,200,000 5,156.87$        
Hong Kong 24,230.8 21,299.3 25,003 22,087.3 29,830.9 24,374.0 48,941.8 7,500,000 6,525.57$        
Jamaica 1,128.3 1,076.6 1,132.1 1,091.8 1,060.9 1,031.9 2,173.9 2,700,000 805.14$            
Ireland 8,938.9 8,480.8 9,075.1 8,625.9 9,901.7 9,449.5 18,157.3 4,500,000 4,034.96$        
Puerto Rico* 539.6           3,178.4       532.2 3,383.4 548.5 3,316.9 3,833.0 3,600,000 1,064.72$        
Mauritius 1,250.6 1,096.2 1,355.0 1,240.0 1,306.3 1,189.2 2,479.1 1,300,000 1,907.00$        
Bahrain 1,129.5 1,058.4 1,138.3 1,066.7 1,274.1 1,193.9 2,287.0 1,400,000 1,633.55$        
Cyprus 1,391.5 1,326.7 1,293.8 1,239.1 1,291.5 1,243.9 2,595.5 1,172,000 2,214.59$        
Population 
2012
Total Average 
M $USD
201320122011Data in Million 
$USD
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Horizon was highly associated with fresh-produce importers in PR and its closing 
apparently involved various factors. The reduction in the general number of 
containers transported would have been a major consideration in their business 
decision. As a result of Horizon’s crisis the other two strong firms (Sea Star and 
Crowley) and the limited one (Trailer Bridge) made adjustments, increasing their fleet 
to serve PR’s market. During that period of crisis102, the number of containers without 
transport to PR was estimated to be 400 units per week. It should be considered that 
this uncommon event occurred in the high season (Christmas); thus, it is expected that 
in a regular season the number of stranded containers would be less than half (C1P2).  
 
It should be noted that, after Horizon’s closing announcement, other maritime firms, 
such as Trailer Bridge and Sea Star, added one new vessel each to their PR’s fleet. 
Nonetheless, the domestic routes available lacked transport, particularly from the 
northeast coast of the US. In addition, the transport added was not suitable for 
reefers, affecting the fresh-produce importers more (ACo9). Crowley and Sea Star 
announced new ships to serve PR’s market will not be active until late 2016 and 2017, 
more than a year after the crisis.  
 
6.1.2 Time and basic procedures for docking 
Twenty-four hours before its departure from the last port before arriving in PR, the 
vessel captain should send a report to its agent in PR. Once the cargo is posted to 
arrive, which means it is in the territorial area of PR, the agent coordinate the whole 
process through the US and PR agencies. At this time the protocols of US Control and 
Border Protection (CBP) and US Customs are activated.  
 
Having conceded the authorisation to dock and prior to its arrival in the bay, the 
captain sends the information on the cargoes onboard to the agent in PR by email. 
Once that report is received by the PR and US agencies, the manifesto and the vessel 
information are verified to assign the dockyard and estimate the number of days 
required for unloading. Then the agent completes the legal documentation and 
detailed information on the goods (container rates, tariff, inspections, etc.), and 
                                                          
102
 Between November 2014 and March 2015.  
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simultaneously coordinates the inspections, registrations and other protocols 
according to the goods imported.  
 
For international cargoes the intervention of a broker will be required. Around 22 
brokers are recognised and authorised by the US federal agencies to provide services 
in PR (Anaya-Oviedo, 2012). Unlike domestics, for foreign vesses are required the 
authorisations of the US Customs, CBP, USDA and in some cases Home Land Security 
and a few other agencies (Health Department). In the majority of these processes, the 
Government of PR has no jurisdiction (C1P1; C1P2; ACCo14).  
 
Once they are in the dockyard, the agent103 in charge hires a stevedoring service 
provider and tracks the containers, the inspection process and fees until the 
containers arrive with their importing owner. When a container (domestic or foreign) 
is theoretically approved to be received, it is scanned in an automatic process. Many 
containers’ importers in PR have agreements with the maritime firms (previously 
mentioned) with a package in which the service providers carry out all the tasks and 
the importing business saves time on these procedures.104  
 
For domestic cargoes these protocols are relatively fast or unnecessary, because they 
are considered to have been inspected or to be from a safe place; therefore, once the 
containers have been unloaded, the importers may receive the cargo in as little as two 
hours (BCo10). To contrast this average time with other SIDSs’ similar processes, PR’s 
protocols seem to take longer than those of the Mauritius Islands, according to their 
official data, the average time being between 30 and 60 minutes (World Bank, 2015).  
 
Normally, for international cargoes these processes may take between 24 and 48 
labour hours after the docking (C1P2, ACo13, BCo10). It is believed that the ratio of 
containers’ volume per year, domestic: international, in PR is 70:30; hence, it is clearly 
a predominantly domestic (US) market.  
 
                                                          
103
 In PR this service could be offered by a private registered person, a conglomerate, third-party container contractors or the maritime service 
provider (terminal operator).  
104 Anaya-Oviedo (2012) reports that 35% of the brokers in PR consider the protocols and procedures required by the US federal agencies at ports to 
be between regular and inefficient. Furthermore, 60% of them consider the local (PR) import procedures and fees to be oppressive. 
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A digital process to identify, track and trace containers during the stevedoring process, 
as well as assigning chassis, tracking and measuring the whole process until the 
container is exported from its origin to its arrival, is not widely used in PR.105 Although 
the process could be considered to be quite dynamic, the process of digitalisation is 
apparently limited in comparison with other SIDSs markets, such as Singapore and 
Hong Kong. However, it should be highlighted that, unlike airports, it seems that 
seaports have the disadvantage of relatively low traffic of people and thus fewer funds 
to improve areas, logistics and efficiency in processes. Seaports lack priority unless a 
union declares a lockout and/or during a climatic phenomenon or a humanitarian 
crisis (C1P2). 
 
6.1.3 Environmental issues in PR’s ports  
Whilst SIDSs may have a minum responsibility for the global warming effects, they are 
affected disproportionately (Briguglio et al, 2006). The climate change effects seem to 
be one issue that was poorly recognised or at least considered by the participants in 
this research. The participants said little about the environmental effects caused by 
ports or how they might be affected by global warming. Only the Secretary of 
Agriculture highlighted the importance of the topic. 
 
Due to the very nature of their locations, ports are naturally highly vulnerable to 
climate effects. Some of the climate change impacts are the rise of the sea level and 
the intensive hurricanes. Both can cause heavy flooding of ports and disruption of 
their operations. In 2000 Hurricane George caused serious damage and destruction to 
practically all the basic port facilities and terminals, also blocking the main entrance of 
the port of San Juan, devastating PR’s economy for months.  
 
Many of the current port terminals in PR are outdated, and the best ones have not 
been modernised in decades. This is particularly obvious in the private terminals of 
the grain-importing firms. For instance, the majority of dockyards and terminals in the 
ports of San Juan106 and Mayaguez are not far from the sea level. Raising the sea level 
                                                          
105 Anaya-Oviedo (2012) reports that 36% of the brokers in PR consider the use of the technology in this process to be below the regular level (4/7).  
106 Puerto Nuevo section. 
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by more than a metre would be enough to affect the ordinary activities of some 
operations (C1P3).  
 
Although the information was not provided, we assume that, due to the fact that the 
majority of the port activities in PR are privatised, some of the climatic initiatives 
associated with clean air programmes and emission controls imposed on them by 
some other local and federal agencies are not necessarily related to the PRPA. For 
instance, the control of air pollutants, such as sulphur and nitrogen oxides, produced 
by the fuel (bunker C) combustion, the risk of oil discharge, particulate matter 
produced by the vessels and/or fugitive dust during the grain-unloading process are 
issues that are highly associated with the environmental control. Besides, the sanitary 
discharges and objectionable odours usually associated with ports’ activities also have 
impacts on the environmental conditions. Nonetheless, apparently little effort has 
been made to adapt PR’s cargo ports and its infrastructure to the impacts of global 
warming.  
 
During the spring season in the north of PR, the Atlantic Ocean is well known for its 
strong tides. Although the San Juan Bay provides natural protection for the port of San 
Juan, this natural factor might reduce its traffic dramatically. To reduce the risk of 
stranding in the bay entrance, the US Coast Guard might limit its access or close it for 
24 to 72 hours (C1P3).  
 
An increase in the annual rainfall or at least in the precipitation rates may have effects 
on the logistics to manage containers and grain cargoes. For example, grains are 
unloaded under an open sky; thus, an increase in the frequency of heavy rain periods 
would bring more delays in the process and with it the demurrage fees. On the 
container side, the area and its electrical devices in the case of refrigeration should be 
considered for protection from stormwater effects.  
 
The ports of both San Juan and Mayaguez are substantially limited in space to grow 
and in storage areas. Areas for storing containers are practically non-existent in 
Mayaguez. San Juan is a highly populated port city where urban growth takes priority 
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and has a great influence on the limited space available.107 This will represent more 
challenges to adapting the facilities near to the population and working with the local 
contexts, which will probably affect the insurance cost. Ponce’s port, on the other 
hand, is spacious and ready for containers and investments, but, having been designed 
for trans-shipment operations, it is a ‘white elephant’ and has been underdeveloped 
since inauguration (C1P3; C1P1). 
 
6.1.4 Cabotage: PR’s public ministries and NGOs 
The opinions of the public ministers and NGOs’ leaders about the US Cabotage Act’s 
effects on the Puerto Rican economy, whilst contradictory, are interesting and should 
be taken into account. At the time of this research, the topic was not new to them, 
because it has been under discussion for a while, particularly since mid-2012. For 
some participants, it was clearly associated with the topic of a ‘permanent union’ 
between PR and the US. For others, it is a demonstration of considerable 
discrimination against PR’s development from the US Federal Government, limiting 
PR’s right to develop and trade (López-León, 2015; Collazo, 2012).  
 
The public servants interviewed in this research were not totally convinced of the 
negative effects of the US Cabotage Act on PR’s market. However, all of them 
identified some factors that might be considered important in the case of a future 
amendment of the Act. 
 
In the case of the NGOs participants, they said that its organisations have approved 
manifestos against cabotage. One of the leaders said that ‘the Cabotage Act is an 
abusive restriction to the rights of nation’s development’ (C2N1). It was also suggested 
that a reduction in the maritime transportation firms will be more inconvenient for 
the SME importers than for the high-volume importers, because the latter can 
negotiate other rates. The following example of costs was used by one of the 
participants. He said that a 40% reduction in the current cost of the domestic 
transportation would reduce the basic cost of farming.   
 
                                                          
107 Anaya-Oviedo (2012) reports that 80% of the maritime service providers consider that the inland access to the terminals and port facilities in San 
Juan is poorly maintained and/or underdeveloped, and 40% of them believe that the sea roads of the San Juan Port are underdeveloped. Similarly, 
50% of them have the same opinion about the lack of cranes and equipment in terminals.  
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A 100 pound (45.4 kg) bag of fertiliser in the US is around $3.50, but in 
PR due to the freight cost it is between $0.10 and $0.14 per 50 pounds 
(22.7 kg) over the original cost. As a result, the importer is paying 
around $0.22 extra just for bringing the produce from the US. It means 
that the basic price of 100 pounds (45.4 kg) of this fertiliser will start at 
$3.72. However, the importer should add its expenses and profit, 
almost 9% of the cost ($0.37); therefore, the consumer will be paying 
easily $4.10. Certainly, this is not a big deal for a casual consumer, but 
the $0.60 means money for a regular farmer.108 (C2N1)  
 
Another leader said that his predecessor commissioned a formal study in 2013 to 
participate in the US GAO interviews held that year in PR (C2N2). However, the 
mentioned study or evidence of the participation in that event was not included in the 
official report of the US GAO. Additionally, the commissioned study was not published 
in any official journal in PR, it was not in the organisational archives and the author 
was not available to talk about its findings or methods.   
 
One participant (C1P1) said that, once a restricted market has been liberalised, 
commonly it promotes competition and an eventual reduction in prices. 
Consequently, a relaxation in cabotage could potentiate more openness in PR’s 
domestic trade. However, the interviewee exposed these concerns: ‘how helpful it 
would be for PR’s economy? Or, what criteria PR should have for it to be beneficial for 
all? Or in what ways does the current framework fails in promoting competitiveness? 
These are questions that no one has answered so far’. In addition, due to the fact that 
PR could be considered a mature and highly demanding market, the issues of quality 
standards and precision in deliveries are factors that need more study (C1P1). 
 
In the current government administration, it is a common belief that the Jones Act has 
been a limitation to the success of the Port of Ponce. In anecdotal evidence the 
minister reported that one concern presented by some foreign investors interested in 
producing value-added goods for the US market was precisely the restriction in 
shipping. Other participants also said that the local labour framework, the unions and 
                                                          
108 Although fertilisation is a relatively routine practice and its volume depends on the soil conditions and crop requirements, in tropical soils the use 
of 2,800 kg per acre is considered to be a very basic measure. The extra cost only in transport will represent $616 (USD) per acre over the cost of the 
product.  
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its collective agreements protected by law have created layers of hidden costs 
affecting business environment.  
 
It was said that ‘the official public policy of ELA is doing the best efforts to make a 
simple exemption for tankers of LNG carriers’ (C1P1). It is believed that in this niche 
the number of tankers available in the US is below 10 for the whole nation. Besides, 
currently it is not affected by unions and/or special labour agreements. Additionally, a 
reduction in the transportation rates of fuel is seen by PR’s authorities as a ‘win–win’ 
situation. More LNG transporters in the market may reduce the current rates, 
benefiting PR’s economy. For the LNG providers in the US, this would be positive too, 
because this fuel is regularly imported from Trinidad and Tobago at higher prices. So 
far, the higher costs of conducting business in PR are more associated with fuel 
(electricity power and transportation) than with labour costs. Therefore, some cost 
reductions in fuel and a focus on optimising the logistics would be positive for 
businesses and PR’s economy (C1P1).  
 
Another factor that might be considered to be mixed – external and internal – is the 
self-limitation of the native businesses to look abroad to domestic markets. Greater 
international exposure could be beneficial for the local business. In this sense, all the 
public ministry participants considered that the cultural exposure to the US market 
affects PR’s consumers’ behaviour and what they want from the market (C1P1; C2P1; 
C3P1). It might push the national businesses to sell products based on the demand 
rather than searching for market diversity or uniqueness. Thus, ‘if is trendy in the US it 
should be in PR too’ (C1P1).  
 
Some cultural factors associated with the topic should be taken into account. For 
instance, the legal and fiscal framework shared by the US and PR brings some kind of 
confidence to business (C1P1; C2P1; C3P1). ‘It in some sense minimises some of the 
uncertainties commonly associated with the risk of commerce with less frequent 
markets’ (C1P1). This aspect might be significant for SME firms. A trade partnership 
with a multinational company or between two transnational firms is not the same as 
between two SME local corporations. For instance, their volumes of trade might be 
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not enough to persuade and/or to obtain preferential treatment on the side of their 
international suppliers (C1P1). 
 
Other elements associated with the Cabotage Act’s effects on PR’s agribusiness were 
proposed by some participants. Although not directly associated with costs, in the 
sense of competitive or anti-competitive advantages they are also important because 
they might represent some indirect expenses (C3P1). The Cabotage Act’s elimination 
could affect indirectly some of these elements (punctuality, infrastructure and 
corruption issues in maritime services) that so far have not been taken into account. 
For example, regarding punctuality, all of the public ministry participants agreed that 
‘terminal domestic operators’ in PR have a very high score. However, according to one 
of them, this may not be the case with the international maritime services (C3P1).  
 
Certainly, liberalisation should bring some changes to competition and the cost of 
trade might be lower. It is likely that the cost of importing raw materials would be 
lower, as well as the rates for transporting manufactured food. The latter scenario 
may need more analysis, particularly from the perspective of the current limited 
national food production. Currently, the native food manufacturing in PR is practically 
non-existent, and around 65% of products are imported from the US. The remaining 
percentage is imported from countries to which the US Cabotage Act does not apply. 
Therefore, a reduction in the cost of the domestic transportation should also reduce 
the cost of domestic imports made under a similar SPS framework to PR.  
 
The negative effects of this would be on the local producers. They 
would have to reduce their prices to compete with the domestic 
imports in unfair conditions and lack of volume. In that sense, a 
relaxation in the Cabotage Act on the manufactured goods would be 
beneficial for the importers and supermarkets, but it might be a hard 
punch for the native agriculture rather than a benefit. However, if it is 
about price competition, currently the native producers are highly 
affected by the produce from the Dominican Republic that has a similar 
productive season and lower cost to produce than PR. (C3P1) 
 
 
One of the participants was of the opinion that the US Cabotage Act in general terms 
is not a problem for PR’s market. He said that ‘considering that in the last 30 years no 
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foreign company has proposed a serious direct investment for PR’s maritime terminals 
or had a real interest in developing one; hence, protecting those who are investing 
locally should be justified’. However, also said that in some areas it might be 
necessary some changes. For instance, the following activities should be liberalised for 
the local benefit (C1P2):  
 1. Port bay maintenance, such as dredging and researching;  
 2. The requirement of US tankers to carry fuel (oil and LNG);  
3. Specific activities such as the building and maintenance of floating wind 
turbines for power generation.  
 
Regarding a general consideration of what should be liberalised in the Act to the 
benefit of all its participants, the shipbuilding restriction was highlighted. According to 
various interviewees, the decision to build a vessel should be a corporate and not a 
government decision when it is well known that a very limited number of vessels is 
built in the US due to the high cost of production. Logically, this over-cost of 
shipbuilding has an impact on the cost of trade and it will be paid for by the 
consumers eventually.  
 
As an anecdotal experience, early in the 2000s we were looking for a 
firm to do dredging to improve the ‘road’ and do maintenance. The 
domestic firms quoted around $5.00 per cubic yard, but a Belgium firm 
quoted $3.00 with a very high standard of references. However, we 
cannot contract them because of the flagging limitations. As a result, 
the cost of that task resulted in several million dollars over what it 
would have been with the Belgians. (C1P2)  
 
 
6.2.0 Fresh produce importers 
PR’s fresh-produce wholesalers’ imports supply vegetables, fruits and roots to 
processors, supermarkets, hotels, local businesses and some exports to the small 
islands abroad. Their imports are highly perishable and their purchasing orders, whilst 
forecasted, should be accurate to avoid overstocking products. In this sector ‘safety 
stock’ levels are not a regular practice. They are highly regulated businesses, 
particularly affected by the SPS frameworks. In their case the local (PR), domestic (US) 
and some foreign regulations to trade may apply. These agribusinesses are over 95% 
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dependent on maritime services provided by external corporations. Besides, factors 
such as inland transportation and seasonality are influential in their logistics and its 
costs. All of the firms are situated relatively near to the port of San Juan. Although 
geographically gathered, they do not act as an integrated cluster, no cooperation 
being reported among them, and their rivalry is considered to be high.  
 
Generally, their businesses are based on meticulous management of refrigerated 
containers, as well as produce carried in regular tanks, such as roots, coconuts and 
other less perishable produce. They purchase and import according to certain 
specifications. Having arrived in the port, they may collect, reinspect, sort, package or 
repackage and distribute the produce to their retailers. Their competition is based 
more on price per unit than on uniqueness. Their products are not branded or well 
known by the people but for their clients. Only one local firm (Co11) is completely 
diversified (produce, beverages and personal care) and recently started an innovation 
programme and food manufacturing. 
 
The key for success and permanency in this agribusiness is based on 
freshness, but its biggest challenge is its perishability. The other skills or 
challenges are similar to the rest of businesses. (ACo9) 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, seven firms are recognised as fresh produce importers. It 
is estimated that together they represent around $230 million in sales per year, but 
around 80% of it is sold by three of them (Table 28).  
 
Table 28: Participant firms of the PR’s fresh produce sector  
 
* Approximately $40 MM is in fresh produce sales. ** Estimated.       
(D)=domestic; (F)=foreign; MC=maritime contractor; 3PC=third-party contractor. 
 
Localisation Annual 
Income
Containers Containers 
Annual Vol.
Produce 
from US
Type of 
Deal
Produce Main 
Origins
In 
Operation
Family 
Co.
N/C/W/E/S (MM/USD) Produce
Other fresh 
produce
Manufactured    
Products
(D)(F) Units FEU %**
Most Popular 
Countries
Years
10 North $102 X X (D)(F) 2,600 70% MC & 3PC
US/Costa Rica/             
Dom. Rep./Peru
55 X
9 North $55 X (D)(F) 1,100 90% MC
US/Dom. Rep./             
Nicaragua/Colombia
53
X
11 North $500* X X X (D)(F) 4,000 95% MC & 3PC
US/Costa Rica/            
Dom. Rep./Panama/           
Europe
3
Company
Business Diversification
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6.2.1 Outlining the logistics and sea transportation cost dimension 
In this sector the purchasing process is relatively dynamic. It is highly dependent on 
the products’ availability (production) and seasonality. For these PR agribusinesses, 
Jacksonville (Florida, US) is their most important port, from which they receive more 
than 60% of their entire goods. All of the participants admitted that is not uncommon 
for them to buy produce, particularly green leaves109, in California (US). These goods 
are transported inland (by truck between 4 and 6 days) to be consolidated (if 
necessary) in Florida and then moved in a new container to the port of Jacksonville, 
from which they will be exported to PR. It is estimated that this trip is around 2,600 
miles or in time it is between 36 and 48 hours. Certainly, this involves higher costs and 
logistic challenges associated with the road risks. Journeys from farm products from 
Florida, Georgia and North Carolina although shorter, the time is between 8 and 36 
hours. This brings certain flexibility, particularly to managing tomatoes, citric fruits, 
peaches, sweet potatoes and others. Commonly for PR’s importers, their port’s cut-off 
time is Friday at 15:00 to be received in San Juan after three to five days of sea transit. 
The days required for loading and transit will depend on the company, type of vessel 
and space availability.   
 
In comparison with domestic produce, the transit time of Latin American produce, 
particularly from Central and South America, is less accurate, especially regarding its 
port arrivals. These vessels regularly arrive on Thursday (B2Co9; BCo10). In the case of 
products from the Dominican Republic, in comparison with others, the transit time is 
relatively short.  
 
It should be clarified that in both services (domestic and foreign), factors beyond the 
control of the maritime lines may occur. For instance, variables associated with the 
season (e.g. high tide or hurricanes) could affect one route more than the other, but a 
similar situation could occur if the conditions were reversed. However, it should be 
highlighted that, differently from the domestic produce, for the foreign imports a 
specific inspection protocol of the USDA has to be followed, which implies delays on 
delivery (BCo10). Generally, the delays are due to the high-traffic containers that 
                                                          
109 Such as lettuce (spp.), broccoli, spinach, cabbage, kale, celery, carrots, some vegetables and strawberries.  
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should be checked by the federal (US) and local (PR) inspectors and not during 
unloading.  
 
Contracting maritime services 
A contract between the importing firms and the domestic maritime service provider is 
negotiated annually. The process estimates the cost of both sides, analysing the 
previous experience of trade by routes. Consequently, the importing firm guarantees a 
number of containers to be transported by the selected service provider at a fixed 
rate. According to all of the participants, the fuel charge factor is variable and very 
notable when the costs of fuel are rising. However, few or no changes per container 
rate are granted by the domestic firm when the fuel price is low or below the 
estimation (ACo10; BCo11).  
 
The maritime service providers distribute their volume to carry according to the 
number of contractors but with a year ahead. The number of containers is the basis of 
negotiation: the higher the number of containers estimated to be imported in a year, 
the lower the fixed rate to negotiate will be. The participants stated that they 
distribute their containers among the maritime providers available in the market to 
guarantee access at any time in the worst-case scenario (ACo9; BCo10; BCo11). 
Apparently, these contracts are not a ‘straightjacket’ for the importers, because they 
regularly fix an easily manageable number of containers (BCo10). However, those 
without a contract would face the risk of space availability and pay the rate on the 
market, which will easily be hundreds of dollars per container over a fixed agreement. 
Similarly, the maritime providers every year could require higher volumes and/or 
changes in rates, but it is part of a very dynamic process of negotiation.  
 
In the case of the foreign maritime service providers, the process is quite different. 
Regularly, foreign producers have their own agreements with the maritime 
transporters, and for this reason the importers purchase the goods in the form of 
CIFs.110 Under that kind of contract, sellers perform the product collection, packaging, 
consolidation, booking of the vessel, inspection at the exporting port, shipment and 
                                                          
110 The acronym means cost, insurance and freight. It is a trade term requiring the seller to arrange for the carriage of goods by sea to a port of 
destination and provide the buyer with the documents necessary to obtain the goods from the carrier. 
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travel until it arrives at the importers’ port (San Juan). Practically, the whole process is 
undertaken by the sellers, and they send to the buyers a tracking schedule and the 
expected time of arrival (ETA) in PR’s territorial waters by email (BCo10). Although this 
is the most common process for foreign imports, one of the participants posits that it 
is not much different than for the domestic maritime providers. It will depend on the 
volume, which in PR’s market is relatively low from outside the US (B1Co9). One 
particular service that foreign maritime providers include in their rates is the delivery 
type ‘door to port: port to door’, which is not commonly accessible with domestic 
imports (BCo10). Contrasting the two processes, all of the participants agreed that the 
foreign services are relatively less complex for them but involve some timing 
inaccuracies (ACo9; BCo10; BCo11). 
 
Secondary services 
Consolidation service providers are another echelon, particularly for LCL shipments. 
Certainly, LCL shipping can cost considerably more than FCL shipping, but for 
perishable materials such as fruits and vegetables it is not uncommon to fill containers 
with one type of produce but from different cooperatives of producers and/or regions 
(counties or states). Similarly, some products could be transported together in pallets 
by segmenting the containers (mixed containers). It is believed that LCL cargo 
shipments have increased because companies are skittish about buying some 
products in volume or because their capacity is limited. 
 
Smaller shipments can sometimes be the most cost-effective choice for certain 
combinations of goods, order size and market needs. Some maritime service providers 
may offer this option to reduce costs, such as consolidation close to the sourcing 
points. Other consolidation companies in partnership with different maritime lines are 
strategically situated in areas in which their goods are picked up from multiple 
suppliers along a corridor to create a consolidated container. The distances to the 
nearest port111 and the volume of products to manage might result in a lower cost 
than transporting the goods inland all the way to the port area than paying 
subsequently for consolidation services and the same at the destination. However, it 
                                                          
111 The distance could be varied but in minutes is generally between 10 and 25 minutes from their port terminals.  
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will add more procedures and risks, such as extra handling (damaging produce and 
robbery), more SPS protocols to follow, extra care with inspections (mixing deliveries) 
and shipping documentation, besides the extra time provoked by stops before arrival 
at the destination port. These pre-shipping services are additional costs.  
 
For the participants these consolidation services, associated with the maritime 
providers, are highly recognised by the domestic lines but rarely by the Latin American 
lines (ACo9; B2Co9; BCo10; BCo11). They consider that, due to the high volume of 
products shipped through Jacksonville,112 the possibility of mixing containers is higher 
than that in foreign lines. Nevertheless, one of the interviewees said that the number 
of consolidators in Jacksonville has significantly reduced over the last decade. Thus, 
the consolidation process there is not as easy as it was before, and in the future it is 
likely to be under the control of the maritime providers too. It is believed that the 
majority of these companies in Jacksonville were family businesses that decided to 
close their operations due to the lack of a succession line and the competition with 
the services provided by some maritime firms (BCo10).   
 
The participants recognised that this consolidation service could be considered as a 
benefit associated with the domestic rather than the international trade (Latin 
American services). However, once asked, all of them expressed curiosity to know why 
this kind of service has not being identified by their firms and/or their contractors. The 
limitations in logistics’ sophistication and greater integration in the process would 
probably be an opportunity for the Latin American suppliers.  
 
A service like this could be very useful in ports highly associated with 
multiple agricultural products, such as ‘Limon Port’ in Costa Rica. 
(BCo10)  
 
Third-party container contractors (3PCs) 
Another echelon in the supply chain is the third-party container services (3PCs). Only 
two of the participant firms have this service and both expressed satisfaction with it. 
                                                          
112 Port of Jacksonville, Florida, US. According to MIDA (2015), around 93% of the food imported to PR is exported from this port.  
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Similar comments were made by another participant who was not linked to this sector 
of fresh produce (ACo13). In PR this kind of service is provided by various companies. 
 
These intermediaries, commonly in domestic but also in foreign providers, offer 
different services associated with containers’ consolidation. For instance, produce and 
processed food from places abroad are imported in very high volumes for the US 
market. Some consolidators in partnership with local importers have added the needs 
of PR to the US market list. As a result, the domestic imports to PR could have their 
real origins in some foreign place and by trans-shipment in the US were consolidated 
for the market of PR (C1P3).       
 
Well, we have been importing clementines from South Africa and garlic 
from Spain, but normally they are coming via Jacksonville. (BCo10) 
 
Perhaps the most interesting service provided by the 3PCs is the space on a cargo 
vessel. They are in partnership with the maritime companies, contracting a high 
volume of containers per month. The 3PCs, having negotiated their rates, include their 
particular services and offer an all-inclusive service but at an equal or slightly higher 
rate in comparison with the rates that the maritime transporter firms offer in the 
market. Sometimes the 3PCs’ rates are very attractive, even below the rates of the 
maritime firms and perhaps the basis previously negotiated and contracted between 
an importer and its maritime providers. In addition, a pre-agreement annual contract 
is not necessarily required with them, which allows flexibility. They also offer other 
consolidation services, such as container management and receiving, and other 
inspection fees are included.  
 
Probably all of these services might add $150 per container over the 
basic costs, but their services represent saving in the cost of 
management that otherwise the importer should hide and manage in-
house. (BCo10)  
 
6.2.2 Domestic vs. foreign  
All of the participants affirmed that the best rates per distance are offered by the 
foreign maritime service providers. One of them highlighted that, evaluating their 
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cost-effectiveness, these firms offer much more competitive prices per MT 
transported. Perhaps ‘prima facie’ their prices would seem higher, but taking into 
account the factors of distance and the services included as part of their quote, the 
differences in rates are in favour of the foreign firms (ACo9; BCo10). On the contrary, 
domestic services, such as inland carriers, consolidation and management, vessel 
booking and so on, are charged in addition to the maritime cargo services. Generally, 
these services are offered by different suppliers. Eventually, all of these elements 
associated with transport will have an effect on the price of the product.  
 
To contrast the maritime services, various factors were presented to the participants 
to identify the differences between domestic and foreign companies. These factors 
were punctuality, intercommunication, product or container management and 
cultural issues (Table 29).  
 
Table 29: Importers’ perception of the Latin American exporters 
 
Note: SPS=Sanitary and phytosanitary policies; HQ= high quality. 
 
 
Regarding delays or inaccuracies in the delivery schedules or ETA, the participants 
affirmed that it would depend on the maritime firms. Some lines are much more 
punctual than others, but interviewees categorised the foreign maritime firms as the 
group with the most frequent occurrence of unpunctuality. However, since Horizon’s 
closure the domestic transport is showing more problems.  
 
Since Horizon’s closing the delays in the domestics increased 
substantially. Horizon’s was well known for its faster ships, challenging 
the other two firms. Now, I suspect that without that challenge and 
being only two firms, ‘slow-steaming practices113 and the lay-up114 are 
adding more difficulties to our logistics. (ACo9) 
 
                                                          
113 Intentional reduction of speed to save money on fuel. 
114 Practice of mooring until its cargo capacity is full, highly affected by supply and demand. 
Packaging Product Handling
On Trade 
(Distrust)
Technical
SPS 
Regulations
Political 
Stability
Language 
Issues
Phone/Fax Online
10 HQ HQ HQ Low Medium High Low Low Low Very High
9 HQ Good Good Low Medium Very High Low Low High Medium
11 Medium Good Medium Low Medium High Low Low Medium High
13 Medium Low Good Medium Very High Very High Low Low Medium Medium
Firm
Quality IntercommunicationInsecurity 
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Nevertheless, various participants recognised that, considering distance, the 
environmental factors and the number of port deliveries between the origin and the 
port of San Juan are elements that should be taken into account, because generally 
they are beyond the control of the transporters. Besides, it was said that, except for 
mechanical issues, once a ship has announced a delay, many other vessels are delayed 
too, generally due to the same inconvenience or a result of it (BCo10).  
 
Well ... to me Evergreen is not like Dole. Dole is like a Swiss clock; its 
failures are a few. But to me, Maersk is the worst of all. Moreover, if 
they have an inspection in Panamá, its delay could easily be for more 
than five days, losing its trans-shipment connection to San Juan. 
Honestly, according to my experience with Latin American [Center and 
South America] imports, to me the best from there are APL (American 
Presidents Line), Hapag-Lloyd and Dole. In that order and no more. 
(B2Co9) 
 
 
Concerning the intercommunication issues, which are those associated with 
identifying problems in shipping or tracking containers, all of the participants said that 
the domestic firms are more diligent or at least it is easier to obtain information from 
their website or by email. Apparently, domestic firms are more client oriented about 
informing issues on board that may cause delays or other problems that would be 
managed in advance if the importer was informed. One of the participants said that a 
reason to hire a 3PC was precisely to reduce logistical uncertainties due to the lack of 
communication of the foreign maritime firm contracted by its produce supplier in 
Latin America (BCo11). Undeniably, decades of business relationship between the US 
container system and PR’s importers are the basis for this. Traditional local 
agribusiness importers are more familiar with the online service for tracking 
containers from the domestic maritime firms than with any other (new) system from 
abroad.  
 
Having more than a decade in this business, I should say that in around 
10% to 12% of the foreign shipping (with different lines) I have 
intercommunication issues related to container tracking or problems on 
board. In the domestic firms this could be around 2% of their services 
to me. (BCo10) 
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In general, the fresh-produce importers’ participants have higher expectations of the 
foreign products imported. They said that basically their Latin American providers 
accomplish or exceed their requirements for produce packaging and other qualitative 
elements.  
 
The local producer and our Latin American suppliers learned how to 
work according to our market requirements; hence, their products are 
similar to or better than those from the US. Contrasting product by 
product, packaging, appearance and management, I should say that 
currently their differences are insignificant. (ACo9) 
 
 
This sector is also affected by many other NTMs, such as SPS restrictions, labelling and 
packaging, that sometimes limit the ratio of action. However, cultural or business 
traditions may create self-restrictions with a large operational effect or an impact on 
competitiveness.  
  
Currently, many of the traditionally US produce types are now 
harvested by Latin America’s (Central and South) providers, carrots for 
example. Although we buy them from Latin America, particularly when 
the prices are preposterously high in the US, I should admit that it is 
more for the climate conditions than for the prices. (B2Co9) 
 
 
Since 1997 containers have faced some management restrictions in the US by the Safe 
Container Act. The gross cargo weight (gcw) is one of them and it varies according to 
the container size. This regulation is relatively common in many developed countries 
and in some LDCs too. For instance, in the US the limits are lower (40’ max gcw 20 MT) 
than in Mexico (40’ max gcw 21 MT), Canada (40’ max gcw 21.8 MT), the UK (40’ max 
gcw 26 MT) and Japan (40’ max gcw 30 MT). However, currently the gcw factor is less 
strict for shipping containers from the Dominican Republic, and it seems that they are 
managing heavier containers than those from the US.    
 
Sometimes the shipping containers received from the Dominican 
Republic are outdated, corroded, ugly and heavily maltreated. Many of 
the products that we import from them are wrapped in pallets; thus, 
some products are on the [containers’] floor. Their weight restrictions 
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are relaxed, which is positive to me once the product arrives well and 
according to my quality requirements. (B2Co9) 
 
 
Clearly, PR’s importers are not restricted to importing products only from the US 
market; thus, the market could be considered to be an open market. However, for 
importing food and agricultural products, other NTMs have to be taken into account. 
Consequently, the application of all the US regulations to food, labelling, canning and 
so forth on PR’s market reduces the number of places to trade. Furthermore, whilst 
for the domestic imports the inspection protocols at the port are practically non-
existent, for the foreign imports they are complex. The delay in trucking a container 
will depend on the arrival time of the ship and the number of containers queuing. It is 
not unusual for foreign arrivals between 15:00 and 17:00 to schedule an inspection 
time 24 hours later. For instance, once the containers have been discharged from the 
ship and the process of container recognition begun, consisting of inspection, 
fumigation and other red-tape procedures, they are normally completed in 12 to 72 
labour hours.115 
 
In my professional experience dealing with the elements of quality, 
produce management and packaging, I have not noticed big differences 
between foreign and domestic produce. However, the SPS inspections 
and port complexities on imports from abroad are the major obstacle 
to looking more to Central and South American suppliers. (B1Co9) 
 
 
6.2.3 Firms’ strategies to deal with the cost of sea transport 
To deal with an increase in their costs, businesses commonly transfer these costs to 
their buyer. In open food markets, this is a more complex process due to strong 
competition. To deal with the change in costs, companies should develop strategies to 
survive the rivalry, especially if their options to trade are limited.  
 
One of the respondents said that the firm had decided to apply some ideas from 
Toyota’s ‘lean manufacturing theory’ (BCo10). It forecasted negative effects on 
consumers’ purchasing power but also the risk of their firm losing market positioning. 
Implementing some ideas to apply the theory, they made some cuts to optimise 
                                                          
115 The working hours of the port inspectors of the USDA and the PRDA differ by season and are fewer than those of the private service providers.  
244 
 
procedures as well as its protocols for purchasing food (ACo10). According to the 
firm’s participants, these changes are helping them to reduce its internal costs. 
However, little was said about a wider search for providers.  
 
One dimension that is not directly associated with the Cabotage Act but that 
influences the cost of trade is the years of business partnerships between importers 
and suppliers. Purchasing teams are focused in the same companies that traditionally 
were trading without seeking competitors. Certainly, this is not negative point at all 
when it is part of a dynamic market analysis but it might be when purchasing decisions 
are taken without an ample analysis of providers. The firms interviewed are based on 
‘high reliability’ of their suppliers; thus, searching for new providers is undertaken 
sporadically. Therefore, although the rates for transporting inland are higher than the 
sea freight rates,116 a business partnership extending over years has a higher 
probability of trade than searching for options abroad and in better conditions. 
 
You are making me reflect hard about it. I have to admit that with some 
frequency we begin the searching process to eventually supply a client, 
but at the end of the day my purchasing team selects the same provider 
that traditionally supplies us. We are always doing the same. Although 
it is ‘better the devil you know’, we are in a comfort zone. Lack of doing 
different things and trying to search for options at least to identify 
other possible providers. (BCo10)  
  
 
Negotiating the maritime cost in advance is one of the most frequent 
recommendations mentioned by the participants. In this market having a tight and 
frequent business relationship with these service providers seems to be vital to 
achieve fair deals. Whilst it seems to be relatively easy for those with high volumes, 
this is not necessarily the case for the smaller firms. The lack of competitiveness in the 
maritime service providers affects their costs, more dramatically after Horizon 
dropped out of PR’s market. Currently, all of the importers are limited to two 
domestic maritime service providers, and logically the most profitable importers for 
the maritime firms would be their first natural choice.  
                                                          
116  An anecdotal example was the case of purchasing green leaves from California and transporting them to Jacksonville. The inland rate is over 
$6,000 and the sea rate from Jacksonville to San Juan (PR) is around $4,000. Consequently, a container of 900 cartons of lettuce is almost $10 per 
box over the produce price as a result of the cost of transport (BCo10). 
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The maritime market needs more service providers because currently 
the fresh-produce importers are choosing between a single, faster, 
limited-space company (Sea Star) and a firm with space in a slow vessel 
(Crowley). Both scenarios limit our businesses. I am of the belief that 
having more ways for transporting imports or having faster ships to 
trade, the local businesses would be much better and our consumers 
too. (B2Co9)  
 
6.2.4 Cabotage: What did the fresh produce importers say about it? 
All of the participant firms in this category expressed their disagreement with the 
application of the US Cabotage Act to PR’s market. Their most common argument was 
based on the over-cost added to their imports. A few of them argued that the lack of 
competition of maritime transporters in PR is the most problematic issue, but a bigger 
problem is the lack of vessels that are properly prepared for reefers. According to 
them, both scenarios are having serious effects on their businesses, increasing the 
cost for the consumers.  
 
The US Cabotage Act is a straightjacket that limits my business, 
restricting my logistics and resources and affecting my wishes of 
produce to import or what I cannot due to its cost. Liberalising these 
transporting resources that are not currently allowed in this market, I 
would have more flexibility to do more in my business and for my 
clients. (ACo9)  
 
 
An example of how this cabotage may restrict the supply chain logistics in this 
economic sector is some produce from New York. One of the most frequent suppliers 
of potatoes in PR has its origins in the port of Halifax in Canada, which also carries 
other supplies to some of the British Caribbean Islands. Consequently, to optimise the 
shipping and reduce the inefficiencies and time, one possible option could be to stop 
in NY to collect some products for PR. However, this is not allowed by the US 
Cabotage Act; as a result, the importer should schedule a US-flagged vessel to obtain 
these products or transport them by inland trucking to the Jacksonville Port, which has 
more frequent trips to San Juan.   
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The cabotage limitation for the use of foreign vessels affects my logistic 
optimisation and as a result the price to do business and my produce on 
the shelf. (BCo11) 
 
Due to the complexities provoked by Horizon’s shutdown, one of the firms’ 
participants was focused on finding space on a ship to carry imported products from 
Jacksonville. The firm has an annual sales volume of over $50 million, but its volume of 
containers is the smallest in comparison with the other two participants. In this case 
the firm was informed that, due to the lack of shipping spaces, its schedule for 
importing and receiving logistics should be booked no less than two and a half weeks 
in advance. Clearly, for non-perishable materials such as furniture or equipments, this 
is not necessarily a problem, but it is a complex issue for fresh products and some 
processed food.  
 
Although relatively insignificant in comparison with the current scenario in 
Jacksonville’s port, various agribusinesses spoke about a distortion of imports two 
years ago with a foreign maritime provider. They said that at that time DOLE decided 
to cancel its weekly route between San Juan (PR) and Guayaquil (Ecuador). That 
decision affected the supplies of several produce very popular in the traditional 
cuisine of PR. The biggest impact of the distortion was experienced more in the 
countryside, particularly by rural families, traditional cafeterias or restaurants. 
Fortunately, months later another foreign maritime line adopted the route twice a 
month. However, the process was slow, the trips were limited and the prices were 
higher due to the reduction of the market volume.  
 
The factor of dependency that PR has on other markets to sustain its more basic 
needs for food is certainly more dramatic when the service of transportation is totally 
privatised and the market is relatively limited in its ability to adopt counterbalance 
measures. On the other hand, the forms of purchasing in this importing sector of PR 
followed the US season of production, which means that when the US market lacks 
some produce, its importers look abroad117. As a result, except for some roots or 
tanniers (so far not produced in the US), the fresh-produce importers have their 
                                                          
117
 Particularly to the Latin American markets but it is fundamentally lead by seasonality. 
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itinerary of purchasing starting and ending with the US production. For instance, for 
green leaves, their main suppliers are the west coast of the US, then in mid-autumn 
Mexico, then in the spring the southeast coast of Canada and then California until the 
next cycle. For fruits, the cycle begins on the (US) west coast then moves to the south 
coast until winter, when Peru and eventually Chile become the suppliers until late 
spring, when they return to California. These systematic forms of trading follow the US 
market due to the fact that, from the perspective of volume, they can buy at lower 
prices in comparison with PR. As a result, the US purchasers and consolidation firms, 
in partnership with PR’s importers, may supply foreign products in accordance with 
the restrictions of SPS measures applicable at relatively competitive prices for their 
standards. Inevitably, the domestic maritime service providers have to be contracted 
to carry these supplies by the mainland to PR.  
 
Due to the fact that perfect substitution is not always possible in this 
business, the Cabotage Act is a given constraint on this market. We 
have to deal with it, hence reducing the time and many of our 
efficiencies. (ACo10)  
 
 
The markets of produce have small margins for profit, but on the contrary fruits and 
vegetables are not subsidised as grains are in the US system. To ship them, although 
dry-bulk vessels require high volumes, the grain systems of transport are simpler and 
more diversified than those for transporting produce. Many additional variables over 
the price of the commodity affect produces’ cost, such as the cost of its management, 
refrigerated containers, transportation (inland and ocean), logistics and regulatory 
frameworks. Additionally, the elements of relatively low volume, little competition in 
the market (lack of production) and low availability of domestic maritime transporters 
cause the price of the affected goods, such as fruits and vegetables, to rise 
disproportionately.  
 
It is like a tax to preserve inefficiency but in a category of products that, 
according to the international health organisations, should be more 
consumed by the people. (ACo10) 
 
Another dimension was presented by the expected new ships with higher capacities 
that in a year will be incorporated into PR’s market. Undeniably, new and efficient 
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vessels to transport reefers are highly necessary. The pace of the international 
maritime providers in the last decade was moving in a similar direction to become 
more efficient (Burns, 2015). However, sustainability patterns in PR’s businesses are 
not well known; thus, business decision making tends to consider limited scenarios of 
almost five years without much analysis of the underlying elements. Therefore, if the 
PR’s economy sitiation are taken into account – a reduction in population and 
exportation; the relatively high cost of energy; and the reduction in the annual family 
expenses at the supermarket level118 – how will the (four) new ships exclusively for 
PR’s route be cost-effective for the current domestic119 maritime providers?   
 
6.2.5 Differences in container costs  
The cost of trade (exports and imports) has a significant relationship with nations’ 
competitiveness (Sardy & Fetscherin, 2009). SIDSs regularly show a cost of their 
shipping trade that is 2% over the average global cost (Penello-Rial, 2014). As a result, 
a cost comparison of containers should consider various elements in addition to the 
distance between the points of origin and delivery.  
 
The number of containers or the volume of trade is an influential variable on rate 
negotiations, but differences in maritime service providers and the market season are 
also factors to consider. Regarding the last two variables (providers and seasons), few 
data was generated from our interviews, but it was suggested that PR’s market has 
low- and high-seasonal transit. During November and January (high-season), the risk 
of stranding due to the lack of space in a vessel is elevated for those without contract 
agreements.  
 
The data concerning the domestic maritime transportation rates were relatively 
limited. It was generated through interviews and presented below (Table 30). It should 
be mentioned that the majority of the participating firms were reluctant to show their 
official annual contracts fixing the prices of containers. Nevertheless, the differences 
in price are noticeable among importing companies (Co), more specifically in trade 
from Jacksonville. 
                                                          
118
 MIDA (2014) estimates a reduction of 14% less than in 2013. 
119
 The price of Crowley and Sea Star new LNG ships (two each) for PR’ was estimated to be over $200 million per ship.  
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Table 30: Price (USD) per FEU120 refrigerated containers and distance (n.m.) from the 
port of origin to the port of San Juan, PR 
 
Note: 12th of December - 10th of February. 
* Inland to Jacksonville.  
** 45 foot NOT refrigerated container from Haina Port. The rate varies by volume; the first is 7 
containers vs. 1 container, respectively.  
*** The price for 45-foot containers is $300 higher. 
 
The differences are highly associated with the number of containers imported 
annually by the firm from this particular place. For instance, Co 11 reports 4,000 
containers per year; on the contrary, the column ‘Other’ shows the prices of 2 
companies with fewer than 12 containers (FEU reefer). Furthermore, the differences 
between Latin American containers and US ones are notable, as well as the 
differences in the costs of transport between non-refrigerated containers and reefers. 
These variables are not considered in various publications (Alameda & Valentín, 2014; 
Cruz et al, 2014; Herrero et al, 2001), particularly the differences in the sizes (45’ and 
52’), usage and costs of containers that are available in the domestic market but not 
commonly abroad. 
 
The Transpacific Stabilization Agreement’s (TSA) official website121 was consulted as a 
comparison exercise of FEU prices in relation to distances (Table 31). Since 1989 its 
activities have included recommending minimum voluntary contract rates for 
containers between the North or Southeast Asian ports and the West or East and the 
Gulf Coast of the US. Although the prices available are for regular FEUs (not reefers) 
and regular deliveries (not-intermodal), they could be considered useful for 
highlighting the differences in cost per nautical mile (n.m.). However, as it was 
previously mentioned, lower volumes of trade, trade imbalances, cargo vessel unit 
                                                          
120 Forty-foot equivalent unit.  
 
121 http://www.tsacarriers.org. 
Origin
Distance 
(n.m.)
Days Co 9 Co 10 Co 11 Other
Jacksonville, US 1333 4 5,350 4,500 4,000 6,300***
California, US * 9 N/P 9,000 10,500
Miami, US 1057 3.5 N/P N/P N/P 6,688
Philadelphia, US * 8 7,000 N/P N/P
Sto. Domingo, DR 300 0.7 2,200 2,300 2,250 1,057—1,250**
Pto. Limón, CR 1342 3.5 2,800—3,300 N/P 2,500
Nicaragua 1500 3.5 —5.5 2,400—3,300 N/P 2,300
Colombia 3,450
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inefficiencies, outdated infrastructures and the lack of competition among the 
maritime service providers are elements that will empirically lead to higher freight 
costs (Penello-Rial, 2014).  
 
Table 31: Comparative suggested (sj) prices per regular FEU from Asia to the US 
 
Extracted from: Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (2015), for January 2015. 
 
The comparative cost exercise for containers, although not in similar conditions, 
certainly shows substantial differences by distances, days of shipping and 
management. These variation factors are not always clear. Korinek and Sourdin 
(2009b) report that the rates of shipping between Dubai and Singapore (approx. 3,900 
n.m., 17 days at 10 knots) are around $300.00. In contrast, from Brazil (Port Termisa) 
to the US (Jacksonville) (approx. 4,200 n.m., 18 days at 10 knots), the rate reported is 
$2,849. Castro-Gonzáles et al (2013), using a quantitative competitiveness analysis, 
state that PR’s cost per container ($1,250) transported is higher than that of Costa 
Rica ($1,190) and much higher than that of Singapore ($456). Although the type of 
container used in their analysis is not mentioned, we suspect that the data are for 
regular TEUs, commonly used for non-perishable goods. Considering Szakonyi’s (2014) 
rate ($2,600) for a non-reefer TEU from Jacksonville to San Juan (1,333 n.m.) it is clear 
that it is cheaper to move a similar container from the Port of Busan in South Korea to 
the Port of San Francisco, California in the US (almost 4,500 n.m.).  
 
 
6.3.0 Grain sector 
Some aspects of the grain market are relatively predictable, particularly the need for 
large amounts of grain for feeding in livestock production markets. However, many 
other aspects of this market are extremely volatile and complex (King, 2014).  
 
  
Ports of Origin Delivery Ports
 Distance 
(n.m.) 
Days
Min. (USD) 
Price(sj)
US West Coast > 4,500 >11 2,000$          
US East Coast > 11,000 > 30 3,800$          
US Gulf Coast > 9,500 >25 3,800$          
US West Coast >   6,000 >14 2,150$          
US East Coast > 11,000 > 32 3,950$          
US Gulf Coast > 10,000 >28 3,950$          
North Asia
Southeast Asia
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6.3.1 Outlining the logistics and sea transportation cost dimension 
 
PR’s animal feed mill sector currently consists of eight firms (Fig.40), but three of them 
were recently consolidated. Altogether they represent around $250 million in sales 
per year. Their domestic and foreign imports could be estimated to be approximately 
$130 million and $35 million, respectively, per year.122 None of the grain firms of PR 
have a logistics division or internal personnel dedicated to or specialised in optimising 
the freight cost. In all of them the grain-importing process is led and authorised by the 
manager or CEO. The sea transportation is supplied by external providers. None of the 
firms have vessels as part of their inventory, but one has a long-term agreement with 
a domestic maritime firm, providing a barge for use twice or more per month.  
 
Figure 40: Geographical distribution of the animal feed mill firms in PR 
 
 
Transportation services are not provided by the maritime terminal operators 
previously mentioned with based in San Juan Port. Transporting dry-bulk materials 
require different management from transporting containers. Grain imports in PR are 
carried in barges and charter ships, all of them directly contracted by the grain 
importers. All of the firms have external (outside PR) agreements with grain exporters 
and/or business advisory services based in the US. The descriptions of all of the 
importing firms, sea infrastructures, storage capacities and basic activities are 
gathered in Table 32. 
  
                                                          
122 The data available about PR’s external trade as an animal feed data segment show lower values due to the fact that they consider as cereals 
some particular grains that are frequently used in animal feed mills; hence, they are not classified in their section. 
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Table 32: Grain importers sector in Puerto Rico
Business Diversification
M
aritime Insfrastructure
Containers
M
ain Grains' 
Origins
*. This company is not a grain importer but liquid for animal feed enrichments. Highly valuable for grain importers and livestock supplements. 
∆. Chemist company to produce animal feed pre-mix of vitamins and minerals. 
‡. This company is not in operation, since 2006. Actually, it is in a bankcrupcy litigation process. 
** Rate is 13,541 gal/hrs but was converted into M
T (approx). 
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Three of the participant firms have no access to the sea; thus, they are totally 
dependent on other importers to operate their animal feed mill. Three of the firms are 
established in the port of San Juan and two others in Mayaguez Port. Guanica’s mill, 
which is currently closed, was administered by two different firms; therefore, the 
experiences and opinions of one participant per company were included in this 
research project.  
 
Two firms are not factually grain importers but raw material importers for animal feed 
production. In this research these two importers are considered to be 
‘complementary companies’. One of them imports liquids and the other vitamins and 
minerals. Both are vital echelons in the elaboration process of the feedstuff. Certainly, 
these two firms are not directly affected by the volatile international cost of grain, but 
they are importers and are also affected by the cost of maritime transport.  
 
The process begins once the grain has been harvested and farmers transport it to on-
farm storage, end-users or commercial grain facilities. The majority of the producers 
in the US move their product to other end-users (feed mills or processors) or 
commercial grain-handling facilities, such as local grain elevators, inland sub-terminal 
or river elevators, and port elevators. The Mississippi River is an inland transportation 
gateway in the US; hence, the production in the ‘Corn Belt’ is carried to the Gulf of 
Louisiana (NOLA), which is common for PR’s importers (ACo3; ACo5). Whilst grain is 
considered to be a storable commodity that is produced every year, the futures prices 
for several delivery months may represent challenges affected by many variables. Due 
to the tropical condition of PR’s weather, the capacity to store grain is regularly 
limited to a period of three to four months once received (BCo2; ACo3). 
 
6.3.2 Basic supply chain of grains imported by PR’s animal feed mills  
Inland elevators or river sub-terminals collect grains in quantities suitable for loading 
onto unit trains and/or barge tows for further transport. These elevators act more as 
collectors, usually receiving the majority of their corn from producers and smaller 
elevators. They are strategically located to transport bulk grain by unit trains or 
barges. They provide some services, such as drying, cleaning, blending, storing and 
merchandising grain; thus, an extra fee should be added by the echelon. River 
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elevators and the larger inland sub-terminals supply most of the corn destined for 
export markets (US Grain Council, 2013) (Fig.41). 
 
Figure 41: Flow diagram of grain imports in PR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the cost of grain, the barge has its rates for this journey. They are very 
dynamic and may change weekly. The rates could vary by the origin city of the grain, 
the number of stops of the carrier, fuel, volume, weather conditions, storage costs, 
local conditions, supply and demand and a few other factors. These factors are named 
the ‘basis’, because they are the difference between the current local cash price and 
the futures price of the contract with the closest delivery month (Hofstrand, 2009). 
Additionally, it is believed that elevators that handle feed grains on the Atlantic US 
south coast have some kind of draught or vessel size restriction (US Grain Council, 
2013). 
 
The local and Chicago World Trade (CWT) cash price differs by transportation costs, so 
the basis patterns may vary by geographical factors from one area to another. For 
instance, in the first week of November (2015), the southbound basis rates are 
estimated to be between $205 and $430 (Table 33). The surcharge fees by tonne 
carried are between $6 and $26, and the fuel charge should be included (USDA-AMS, 
2015). Additionally, once into the ocean, the vessel will impose a rate per day of the 
Grain Producers  
(Directly from field and/or farm storage) 
River 
Elevator 
Local  
Elevator 
Inland 
Elevator 
Port 
Elevator 
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journey. Upon receiving the vessel, the charterer becomes the de facto party 
responsible for giving the ship orders, providing fuel and livelihood and paying any 
fees to unload the material, including port and canal fees, local taxes, wharfage and 
dockage charges, and employees.  
 
Table 33: Barge rates for major grain shipping points in the US that supply PR’s market 
Weekly barge freight rates: southbound only 
 
* Rate-percentage of 1976 tariff benchmark index (1976=100%). 
** 4 week moving average; tonne=2,000 pounds; missing data due to winter closure. 
Source: USDA-AMS (2015). 
 
 
 
The maritime transport cost makes up a substantial share of the value of trade goods. 
Korinek and Sourdin (2009b) estimate that on average the cost of shipping is around 
5% of the imported value in manufactured goods, 11% in agricultural goods and 24% 
in industrial raw materials (OECD, 2014). The International Grain Council’s Grain 
Freight Index (GFI) was hovering near 4,800 in mid-November, a rise from around 
4,000 points a year earlier, reflected in the prices on key routes (King, 2014). For 
instance, in November 2012, the average cost of shipping heavy grain from the US 
Gulf to the EU was approximately $18 per MT. A year later the price had risen to $24 
per MT. From the US Gulf to Japan, the cost for transporting a similar commodity was 
$51 per MT, which, in comparison with the year before, represented an increase of $4 
per MT (King, 2014). 
 
Corn’s quality changes during transport in much the same manner as it changes during 
storage. The causes of these changes include moisture variability, moisture migration 
due to temperature differences, high humidity, air temperatures variation, and biotic 
contamination. However, there are some factors that affect grain transportation that 
Twin Cities
Mid-
Mississippi
Lower 
Illinois 
River
St. Louis Cincinnati
Lower 
Ohio
Cairo-
Memphis
Rate* 11/10/2015 388 328 313 230 300 300 205
11/3/2015 417 365 362 265 350 350 222
$/tonne 11/10/2015 24.02 17.45 14.52 9.18 14.07 12.12 6.44
11/3/2015 25.81 19.42 16.80 10.57 16.42 14.14 6.97
Last year -40 -55 -59 -66 -59 -59 -62
3-year avg.** -38 -51 -54 -63 -56 -56 -64
Rate* December - - 330 235 295 295 198
February - - 340 235 270 270 198
 Current week % change form the same week:
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make quality control during transport more difficult than in fixed storage facilities. 
First, there are a few modes of transport equipped with aeration, and, as a result, 
corrective actions for heating and moisture migration cannot be taken during 
transportation. Another factor is the accumulation of fine material (spout lines) near 
the centre when loading barges and ocean vessels. The third factor is seawater 
dropping into the hatch or wet containers (US Grain Council, 2013). 
 
The lack of a dockyard infrastructure and draught may limit PR’s grain importers’ firms 
to vessels no more than 7 metres in depth. For instance, grain cargo ships with 25,000 
tonnes or more (7.50 m) will be problematic in their facilities. However, this is not a 
problem for the river barges commonly used by the grain producers in the US, but 
they are limited in capacity (between 12,000 and 18,000 tonness) (C3Co3).     
 
6.3.3 Market 
The total storage capacity of all animal feed grain-importing PR’s firms is around 2 
million MT per year. It is believed that the current market is consuming around a 
quarter of that volume (ACo3). As a result, the firms are technically working below 
their capacity.  
 
The data shows a reduction in the domestic raw material imported, which is 
substituted by foreign commodities. In 2013 the volume (MT) of foreign raw material 
(cereals) imported to PR exceeded that of domestic cereal by 40,000 MT (Fig.42). The 
data on PR’s external trade do not show a clear pattern between a low price – on 
average – per volume and an increase in the frequency of foreign imports. For 
instance, for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, the frequency of domestic imports of 
grain (maize) was reduced by more than 20% in comparison with 2010 and 2014 
(Table 34), but the average price per MT of foreign grain was not necessarily lower in 
comparison with the domestic price. Why then did the importers select the foreign 
grain at a higher price per MT than the domestic grain?  
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Figure 42: Imported grain volume (in MT): domestic (D) vs. foreign (F) 
  
Extracted from: PRPB (2015); segmented by cereals and feedstuff raw materials. 
 
 
Table 34: Comparative analysis by cost (USD) and volume of maize imports to PR: 
domestic vs. foreign 
 
Extracted from: PR’s External Trade, IndexMundi and USDA.          
* A few basis costs are not included as in the foreign costs.  
MT=metric tonne; D=domestic; F=foreign; Av=average; CWT=Chicago World Trade, USD. 
 
 
Plenty of factors, internal or external to the importer firm, could be considered, 
particularly those related to the quality of grain as well as issues concerning the 
transportation cost. Allegedly, the cost of the domestic product versus the foreign one 
should not include other expenses associated with shipping. Although it could be 
logical to think that the value of the commodity would not take the transportation 
cost into consideration, two of the participants categorically affirmed that, on the 
contrary, this is the case for foreign imports (ACo3; ACo6). They posited that the price 
per MT reported by the foreign exporters include all the transportation services until 
delivery, and that is not the case for the domestic suppliers. Following their 
experience, they estimated that overall, although varying monthly, the domestic 
transportation cost is between $8 and $30 per MT higher that the foreign cost. In the 
Yr
Frequency 
D vs. F
Value D
Vol. (MT)    
D
Value F
Vol. (MT)   
F
Av. $/MT 
D*
Av. $/MT   
F
Av $/Yr 
CWT*
2010 72% 25,557,532.00$      140,979.0  17,154,219.00$      70,955.8    181.29$      241.76$      186.01$      
2011 57% 29,928,008.00$      100,613.0  40,176,055.00$      125,428.7  297.46$      320.31$      291.78$      
2012 48% 15,665,837.00$      56,684.0    44,189,881.00$      133,699.9  276.37$      330.52$      298.41$      
2013 36% 5,855,835.00$        21,808.0    46,591,539.00$      189,918.6  268.52$      254.71$      258.96$      
2014p 75% 21,643,912.00$      99,027.0    6,959,029.00$        31,832.1    218.57$      218.62$      212.04$      
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low-cost scenario, their decision to import is based more on quality than on price 
(ACo3). Quantitative data to support their argument was not provided. However, 
considering the mentioned over-cost ($8.00) for domestic sea transport of maize 
(only), the cost for agribusinesses was estimated per year per sector. The analysis 
below is only theoretical, because the percentage of maize may change by 
formulation and phase of production. The same applies to the volume of consumption 
per animal per day used. Therefore, the exercise below is based on theoretical 
estimations to show the impact of cabotage.123  
 
The suggested over-cost was considered to estimate the effects on the cost by unit of 
production. Variables such as the average volume of feedstuff consumed by a dairy 
cow (9 kg per day), the proportion of maize (70%) in a basic formulation in PR and the 
percentage of domestic imports of maize per year were considered (Table 35).  
 
Table 35: Over-cost of transportation ($8.00) per maize (MT) for PR’s dairy farmers 
 
* The formula used is basically 70% of maize. Unit is a cow in production.  
 
 
A similar analysis was developed for the poultry sector (Table 36). It considered the 
average volume of feedstuff consumed by day per flock (9 MT), the mode in the 
number of annual flocks per farm (4) and the average proportion of maize (65%) in the 
feed formulation for poultry most commonly used in PR. For the swine producers, the 
analysis considered the consumption (1.2 kg) per day over 6.5 months and the 
percentage (65%) of maize in a basic formulation (Table 37).  
  
                                                          
123 In 2015 the Dairy Farmers’ Association commissioned a technical report to validate the nutritional facts in the commercial feedstuff produced by 
PR’s animal feed mills. The report shows serious inconsistencies in the commercial formulations that were provided by them and were bought by 
farmers. 
100—199 
units
200—299 
units
300—350 
units
2010 72% 15.12$          90000 1,360,800.00$     2,260.44$      3,764.88$      4,914.00$      
2011 57% 11.97$          90000 1,077,300.00$     1,789.52$      2,980.53$      3,890.25$      
2012 48% 10.08$          90000 907,200.00$         1,506.96$      2,509.92$      3,276.00$      
2013 36% 7.56$            90000 680,400.00$         1,130.22$      1,882.44$      2,457.00$      
2014 75% 15.75$          90000 1,417,500.00$     2,354.63$      3,921.75$      5,118.75$      
Farms
Year
% Domestic 
origin/yr
Cost per 
unit/yr
Fixed No. 
units 2012
Total cost for the 
sector
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Table 36: Over-cost of transportation ($8.00) per maize (MT) for PR’s poultry farmers 
 
* Five flocks per year. 
 
 
Table 37: Over-cost of transportation ($8.00) per maize (MT) for PR’s hog farmers 
 
C= cycle of production. In PR is between 125-200 days. 
 
These analyses only considered the over-cost of maize as a heavy grain. Soy meal, corn 
gluten, fishmeal and wheatmeal are also common ingredients used in feedstuff 
formulations in PR, and many of them are imported. However, the data available on 
these other ingredients are mixed with data on other products, not accurately 
classified or, in the case of corn gluten, the percentages in the formulations are 
relatively smaller. In addition, some of the ingredients or by-products used in 
formulations124 are produced in PR and the data are not available. These limits the 
theoretical estimation of cabotage’s cost in a feed formulation analysis. 
 
The USDA-NASS (2015) estimates that PR’s dairy sector farmers spend around $80 
million on animal feed annually. For the poultry sector, the cost estimation for 
feedstuff is $11.2 million. The last number includes the egg sector. In the hog sector, 
the annual expenses for feedstuff are estimated to be $4.1 million. Based on the 
participants’ estimation of the domestic over-cost ($8.00 MT) for transport, it is 
estimated that in 2010 PR’s dairy farmers paid around $1.36 million for that over-cost 
in the domestic transportation of maize. For the sectors of poultry and pig farmers, 
that cost is estimated to be $196,131 and $42,588 respectively. 
                                                          
124
 This is the case of wheat mesh and the premixed micronutrients’ formulation.  
Year
% domestic 
origin/yr
Units per 
farm cycle
Cost per 
farm/yr
Total cost for 
the sector
2010 72% 30,000 2,801.87$   196,131.14$  
2011 57% 30,000 2,218.15$   155,270.49$  
2012 48% 30,000 1,867.92$   130,754.09$  
2013 36% 30,000 1,400.94$   98,065.57$    
2014* 75% 30,000 3,648.27$   255,379.09$  
100—199 200—299 300—350 400—499
2010 72% 0.77$          55,000 42,588.00$        255.53$        425.88$        596.23$        766.58$        
2011 57% 0.61$          55,000 33,715.50$        202.29$        337.16$        472.02$        606.88$        
2012 48% 0.52$          55,000 28,392.00$        170.35$        283.92$        397.49$        511.06$        
2013 36% 0.39$          55,000 21,294.00$        127.76$        212.94$        298.12$        383.29$        
2014 75% 0.81$          55,000 44,362.50$        266.18$        443.63$        621.08$        798.53$        
Year
% domestic 
origin/yr
Cost per 
unit/C
Fixed No. 
units 2013
Total cost for 
the sector
Units per farm 
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6.3.4 Domestic vs. foreign vessels 
Due to the frequent trading (8 to 15 journeys/year/firm) between PR’s grain importers 
and US grain producers (exporters), the crews and technicians know the protocols and 
infrastructure challenges of PR well. For the participants these are routine processes. 
For example, the firm Moran from Louisiana has years of experience sailing to PR; as a 
result, it accesses San Juan Bay almost without any help.  
 
The barges Caroline and Virginia regularly arrive in our dockyard 
without any issues. For us it is a very easy process, but that is not the 
case with the foreign. (C3Co3)  
 
 
Foreign grain cargo ships received in PR from South America, Canada or Europe, for 
example, need much more assistance because it is not a frequent route for them. 
Unlike the containers’ terminal, the private infrastructure of the grain-importing firms 
seems to be outdated. Furthermore, the process to unload grain in PR regularly 
requires the lifting of two bobcats on the ship hatch, and this is something that is 
commonly an issue for foreign cargoes. Additionally, brokers as intermediaries are 
required throughout the whole process. Sometimes the broker leads the process of 
docking, but in other cases the importer should impose its will to facilitate labour and 
logistics, particularly for shared cargoes. Aparently the communication between 
parties seems to be more straightforward with the domestic than with the foreign 
crews.  
 
Due to the limits of PR’s animal feed market, grain importers share vessels and 
commodities to reduce their cost of transportation or to take advantage of bigger 
volumes in the commodity for a better price (ACo1; BCo2; ACo3). Although 
negotiations and accords between the local grain importers seem not to be complex, 
the logistics and shipping coordination require precision and operational agreements 
(C3Co3). 
 
The grain-importing firms have a direct relationship with equipment, ships and their 
crew and many other processes related to their goods. To learn more about their 
experiences with mariners’ professionalism and ship maintenance, various questions 
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were formulated. Both elements are regularly presented by supporters of the US 
Cabotage Act as one of the limitations for foreign providers.  
 
None of the interviewees identified problems or negative experiences with the crew 
of a foreign maritime provider. On the contrary, the majority of the participants 
highlighted their professionalism, particularly that of the ship leaders. Regarding the 
ship maintenance, various participants said that the foreign ships that generally arrive 
in PR show a level of maintenance and sophistication that is higher than that of the 
domestic fleet (BCo2; ACCo16). The conditions of the domestic fleet were seriously 
criticised by many of the interviewees.  
 
The foreign ships arriving seem new: very well maintained. I suppose 
that rules for them are different from for the domestic fleet, because 
many of those foreign ships are the latest thing. (ACo6) 
 
My experience with foreign crews is that they are very skilled, they 
are people with ... Just as an example, in the last foreign ship arrival 
that I had the captain was a veteran, an ex-commander of a Russian 
nuclear submarine. What if both vessels would require the most 
highly trained personnel? We were talking frankly for a while. 
(ACCo15)  
 
 
For contrasting services, other factors were presented and described to the 
participants to particularise the differences between domestic and foreign maritime 
services. These factors were punctuality, intercommunication, product management 
and cultural issues (Table 38).  
 
Table 38: Grain importers’ perception of the Latin American exports  
 
SPS= sanitary and phytosanitary regulations; HQ= high quality. 
  
Packaging Product Handling On Trade 
(Distrust)
Technical
SPS 
Regulations
Political 
Stability
Language 
Issues
Phone/Fax Online
1 N/A Medium Very High Very High High High Low
2 N/A HQ Good Low Medium Very High Low Very High Very High Medium
3 N/A HQ Good Very High Very High Very High Medium Very High High High
5 N/A Medium Very High Very High Very High Very High High Very High
8 N/A Good Very High High Low Very High High High High
Firm
Quality Insecurity Intercommunication
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The element of punctuality is relatively less important for the importers due to the 
fact that they are in charge of their own logistics. The protocols of importing are 
executed by a broker. However, it is precisely in the logistics that purchases from Latin 
America require more time than from the US. The distance is an important element to 
consider, but the volume required for cost-effective exporting is also influential. It is 
not unusual for ships travelling from South America to PR to share with other 
countries; therefore, the number of port stops could be an inconvenience if the 
importers’ inventory levels are low (BCo2). Additionally, the ships’ hatches could be 
opened on the way or shared with other firms abroad, affecting the grain humidity 
level or the volume of grain that should be received by subsequent importers (ACo3).   
 
Regarding the product quality and its management, the importing firms highlighted 
differences in relation to the grains’ nutritional energy content, which in foreign grains 
is normally lower than in domestic grains, but these patterns are changing. A 
particular situation occurs for the soymeal by-product, which apparently also affects 
its palatability (ACo1). However, concerning the variables of grain cleanness in bulk, 
dust content, heat damage and the ratio of alien elements in the dry bulk carried in 
the ship’s hold, it seems that the domestic firms are at a disadvantage, with almost 
10% over the average in the Latin American ‘flip-corn’ grain (ACo5).   
 
On the topic of cultural issues, the interviewees showed some aversion to negotiating 
with Latin American grain providers versus from the US. One element that was notably 
and frequently mentioned by the participants was distrust in the Latin American 
carriers and providers. Many of them said that dry-bulk cargoes from South America 
are less accurate in their weight management, affecting the importers (ACo3; BCo5; 
BCo7). Although the use of surveyors is an extended practice in this business, some of 
the participants suggested that the process is corrupt. It is in that play of conversions 
and weights than the importers should pay more attention to the details.  
 
When I was working in the Philippines, soymeal cargoes from South 
America were automatically undervalued by $15.00 per MT in 
comparison with the rate of the US soymeal. The difference was 
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purely the dry-bulk yield in the ship. They knew that the South 
American soymeal weights were lower. (ACo1) 
 
Tariffs are another issue associated with cultural or market differences. In this case 
the toll imposed by the US on some Latin American products, grain for instance, has 
been variable and complex to manage for decades. Although the tariff protocols are 
currently much more stable than a decade ago, some of the interviewees’ previous 
negative business experiences have made them reluctant to purchase in the region 
again.  
 
Curiously, language seems to be another challenging factor for more than one, 
particularly during the purchasing process with some Latin American suppliers. 
Although the majority of the countries in the region are Spanish speakers, such as PR, 
the use of regionalism and descriptions appears not to be as expected (BCo2). As a 
result of inconveniences during the negotiations provoked by those differences, two 
firms had personnel dedicated only to trading with the Latin American grain providers.  
 
6.3.5 Variables that affect the cost of shipping grain 
Procedures 
The importing procedures for grains are relatively simpler than those for containers, 
but a failure in them could be extremely costly for the importer. Once the vessel is in 
territorial waters and the vessel inspection of the US Coast Guard has been 
completed, some other documents are sent to the broker digitally. In the dockyards 
the documentation process is relatively simple but not yet paperless. For 50% of the 
participant firms, part of the receiving process is still dependent on handwritten 
copies.  
 
Before the grain-unloading process, the USDA inspection is a standard procedure. 
However, this specific step might be the most risky and most expensive one if it fails 
(ACo3). Once the grain is in the firm dockyard and the inspection has failed or the 
product has not been approved by the US agencies, the importer cannot unload the 
grain; if it has been unloaded, it should be collected in a separate silo and eventually 
disposed of by incineration. As anecdotal evidence, one firm experienced this with 
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some grain from Argentina. The cost of shipping was over a million dollars. To mitigate 
the economic loss, the grain was accepted for sale in the Dominican Republic but at a 
very low price (ACo3). In addition, the firm’s grain inventory was below its safety stock 
level; thus, it had to buy grain from the local importers at a higher price than on the 
international market.  
 
Infrastructure 
Only one of the participant firms (ACo6) showed a relatively new infrastructure. In the 
last five years, this firm was the only one to have invested in new machinery, 
renovating its dockyard, adding new equipment and removing sediment to gain a 
deeper draught. Practically, it had developed a new terminal with highly efficient 
equipment to discharge quickly and receive bigger ships (C2Co3; ACo6; BCo6). In 
contrast with the other participating companies, this native grain-importing firm 
seems to be highly diversified.  
 
The port terminals of the other three native grain importers were considered to be 
outdated by the interviewees. Their ‘breasting dolphins’ are wood and some 
dockyards are fragile and poorly designed. Their elevators and/or mechanic belts have 
a capacity under 400 MT/hr; thus, it takes almost 72 hours to discharge less than 
8,000 MT of maize. Others, although using a different system for discharging, require 
almost 5 days to unload volumes below 16,000 MT (BCo5) and have limited draught 
and highly sedimented dockyards. We were told that some of the firms had planned 
renovations to increase their terminal, but, in the soil test prior to dredging, heavy 
metals were found, so the terminal modernisation was postponed until other options 
could be considered (ACo6). In general, all the grain firm participants recognised the 
needs to dredge and modernise their terminals to reduce their inefficiencies. 
However, a few of them said that, due to the cost and current situation of the sector, 
they are not focusing on these tasks. Besides, ‘we have always done it this way’ (ACo1; 
BCo2; C3Co3; ACo3; BCo5). 
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Technology 
The automation process and technology investment to promote efficiency in handling 
dry-bulk products enables logistic agility, reducing the costs. The discharge stations, 
mobile cranes and conveyor systems should be designed and upgraded considering 
the benefits of the reduction in the cost of demurrage and many other labour 
restrictions with a cost impact (Burns, 2015). Some of the participants were of the 
opinion that, although they can improve more, in the last fifteen years the native grain 
importers have become more efficient. They recognised the importance of technology 
to achieve efficiency savings particularly in this process. Furthermore, they admitted 
that the increasing demurrage fees imposed by the transportation providers pushed 
them to react and look for options. Asking for advice and seeing how others in the 
sector are dealing with the issue were factors that finally led them to execute the 
investment (ACo3; ACo5). However, due to the relatively low frequency125 of grain 
imports the discharging equipment may risk being underutilised, causing a higher cost 
of maintenance for its operation but also minimising its corrosion due to climatic 
conditions. 
 
Demurrage 
Late fees will apply after the grace period in the agreement. After this the demurrage 
fees may be applied per hour (ACo3). We were informed that currently late fees are 
less common than they were 5 years ago due to the investments made in equipment. 
However, demurrage fees may increase the cost of grain for the echelons until it is 
served by the port terminal on the sea vessel that will carry it to the importer(s) (US 
Grain Council, 2013). 
 
Freight rates are also affected by the time of unloading. The faster the receiving 
processes, the lower the rates (ACo1). For efficient unloading of grain, some 
continuous ship-unloading systems, such as a vertical chain, pneumatics and belt 
conveyer, are globally employed. They are complex, sophisticated technology and 
highly energy dependent, costly and specific to the area of application. Unloading a 
ship with 9,000 MT takes more than 3 days for several of the grain importers in PR. 
However, maritime companies estimate the average time of unloading according to 
                                                          
125
 Between 6 and 12 days per month/firm. 
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their own experiences and needs. As a result, the mooring time is considered in their 
shipping rates but also in their demurrage (ACo1). Ship demurrage could be by day or 
by hour ($2,000/hr or more). It is believed that the penalty fees are higher in the 
domestic shipping companies than in the foreign ones.  
 
The mechanism of demurrage could certainly be a way to promote efficiency, but to 
achieve it investments in equipment are required. Besides, the effectiveness in the 
unloading management should be constantly reviewed and adjustments made. 
 
The ISO tanks rule 
One of the participant firms told us that the US Cabotage Act affects it dramatically. Its 
imports are in a liquid form highly used in the grain-mixing process and as 
supplementary meals by large animal producers. Annually, it manages approximately 
6,500 MT of foreign products and 975 MT of domestic products. Five years ago the 
small domestic tanker that serves PR was transferred to another more lucrative route 
in the US.  
 
Since 1989 it has been in business in a kind of exclusive relationship because of the 
particularities of its operations. Originally, the small domestic tanker carried products 
imported from the US as well as PR’s sugar cane by-products exported to the US. Once 
the PR’s sugar cane production seized the exports of its derivatives too, hence the 
vessel was arriving full from southbound but was limited northbound. Since then no 
other small domestic tankers have been available for this route. 
 
In addition, since 2007 the US regulations on transporting liquids without a sea tanker 
require the use of ISO tank containers (ACo8). The volume capacity transported by 
containers is dramatically inferior to that of the small sea tanker, but the firm has no 
alternatives because so far the product has not been formulated by other companies 
abroad. The cost impact on this agribusiness is significant, from $50.00 to $135.00 (per 
short tonne), which is an increase of almost 270%. Besides, the ISO tanks arrive in the 
San Juan Port; thus, they should be transported 200 km (2.5 hrs) inland to the factory, 
adding more costs. 
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When we were using small sea tankers simultaneously we were 
importing domestic by-products and those from abroad. The domestic 
freight rate by volume was always $15.00 per MT over the foreign rate, 
even though in the last the distances were regularly higher. (ACo8) 
 
 
 
6.4.0 Competitiveness     
As mentioned in a previous chapter, competitiveness as a system refers to the analysis 
of productivity as a phenomenon with impacts on different levels: meta, macro, meso 
and micro (Rojas & Sepúlveda, 1999). Many variables associated with the US Cabotage 
Act’s effects on PR’s agribusiness competitiveness have been discussed through these 
chapters. Some external and other internal elements have been presented to 
demonstrate the intrinsic complexities of that external NTM as well as some of its 
costs transferred through the agribusinesses’ supply chain.  
 
Competitiveness, for both groups explored, is based on lower prices rather than 
uniqueness. However, only one firm per studied sector shows diversification, 
innovation programmes and investment in technology. In the grain sector, two of the 
firms have the highest storage capacity and only one has a barge in an exclusive 
maritime contract. These actions may not be considered to be the most economical, 
but they show a high volume of imports to be very useful in negotiating rates (BCo11) 
however just one of them is investing in equipment to save time in the unloading 
process (ACo6). Regarding their infrastructure, the same two (one per sector) more 
diverse firms have the newest facilities, one with very efficient and ample refrigerated 
storage and the other with a modern dockyard and highly efficient mechanical 
equipment for very fast grain discharge.  
 
6.4.1 Agribusiness cluster 
Unlike the fresh produce importers, PR’s grain sector might be considered as a low-
price cluster, which is distributor-oriented. In general this sector has low levels of 
innovation and consists of medium agribusinesses with more than 30 employees each. 
The cluster of grain-importing firms is practically dominated by two firms but three 
firms have the market control specifically in the animal feed mill sector.  
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All of the firms in the grain-importing sector show certain levels of cooperation, 
particularly sharing raw material. The two complementary firms associated with the 
sector have a kind of symbiotic partnership with all of the five animal feed mill 
producers.  
 
With some frequency the grain importers share grains (ACo1), shipping and freight 
costs (ACo3). The major reasons for this are based on the sea transportation 
challenges, reducing the logistics cost and accessing greater volumes (ACo5; ACo3; 
BCo2). It was said that their level of cooperation is focused on finding the best price 
for a bushel of grain in the market, but to achieve this a high volume to import is 
required (BCo1). Individually, due to their market limitations, they could not 
accomplish it without compromising the firm’s cash flow. In addition, the tropical 
weather and other climatic conditions have effects on the grain storage increasing the 
risk of loss.  
 
Another example of clustering behaviour among the grain importers was observed in 
those with an operational station in San Juan Port. Occasionally sharing a ship of 
grains, they organise the discharging logistics simultaneously or at least minimise the 
mooring distance to reduce some expenses (C3Co3). The animal feed producers 
outside this geographical section are unable to manage this kind of optimisation. It 
was said that very open communication exists among them.  
  
A particular example of partnership was identified between two grain importers, one 
of which is an animal feed mill and the other is not. Their relationship is founded on a 
mid-term partnership in which one acts as a wholesaler heavy grains supplier to the 
other one (BCo2). According to them the cost of grain per MT is not significantly 
higher than it would be if they had to carry out all the procedures and risks directly in 
the US market of NOLA (ACo5).  
 
The two animal feed mill firms without port access are totally dependent on the three 
main importers of heavy grain, and for some kinds of grains a fourth importing firm is 
involved (BCo7). Nevertheless, it is clear that these two totally dependent operations 
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have the primary objective of providing feedstuff in bulk to farms in regions that are 
relatively distanced from the main firms (ACo4).  
 
The production of all of these companies, although they have their brand identity, is 
limited in differentiation, image and development. Their uniqueness is based on their 
formulations and their level of optimisation to produce at a lower cost. The long-term 
alliances with farmers, in some cases lasting for more than a decade, were recognised. 
However, those alliances should not necessarily be associated with the product quality 
or its price per volume but with other marginal benefits that are not considered in this 
exploratory research.  
 
6.4.2 Agribusinesses’ interconnectivity 
One of the arguments associated with cabotage presented was the limitation of PR to 
negotiate abroad and how this NTM restricts PR’s globalisation (Fig.43). An important 
variable associated with competitiveness is the capacity for interconnection between 
markets. Due to the fact that PR is represented by the US internationally and is not 
politically recognised as a sovereign country, this factor of interconnection in relation 
to cabotage needs some analysis. 
 
Interconnectivity in competitiveness refers to how well connected with other 
businesses or partners abroad a particular market or company is. The concept of self-
sufficiency in food is no longer synonymous with food security but is also associated 
with a high level of market interconnections. Through a better interconnectivity of 
markets and more distribution channels for trade, the access to food has been 
potentiated (Slone et al, 2010). As previously mentioned, market proximity, 
infrastructure and new technology raise more opportunities to trade. Some 
interviewees also believed that this capacity is related to the number of transporter 
service providers and their openness to receiving products or services from a variety 
of origins.   
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Figure 43: Should PR’s economy be more integrated with the US economy or more 
globalised? 
 
 
According to the External Trade Report (PRPB, 2015), the number of origin countries 
(68) from which PR’s market imports food products (2012) valued more than $10,000 
(year/each) is considerably diverse. Furthermore, the access of PR to the US market 
could be considered so far to be one of PR’s competitive advantages (Estudios 
Técnicos, 2013). However, as was revealed in this research, the variety of origins does 
not imply shipping directly from those regions but from Jacksonville. The variety of 
products that otherwise would be very difficult to import, due to the size limitations of 
PR’s market, could be attributed to its access to the huge US importer market.  
 
All of the participant firms have agreements with foreign suppliers and almost a fifth 
of their annual imports originate from abroad. The available public data do not report 
the consolidation port before PR’s arrival; as a result, it could be speculative to 
categorise PR’s market as highly interconnected. The volumes of foreign goods 
unloaded in US ports to be fractionated and consolidated for exporting, versus those 
that are trans-shipped and completely exported to PR, are uncertain. Nevertheless, 
the limited number of maritime providers under the Jones Act in PR, the non-
existence of a national service to counterbalance that limitation in private services and 
the lack of foreign investments in this sector are factors that may affect PR’s 
interconnectivity. Consequently, the capacity of the local firms to reduce their costs by 
optimising their logistics with their US suppliers is compromised. 
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6.4.3 Rivalry, oligopolistic structures and collusion 
The work of regulators should be to promote access and restrict the ability of 
incumbent firms to exercise market power to the detriment of rivals and ultimately 
consumers (Banda et al, 2015). Consequently, their actions should be based on 
supporting sustainable firm competitiveness.  
 
The legislative historical records since the mid-1990s show that PR’s Government has 
not been an active promoter of rivalry in the maritime sector. Instead, through 
legislation and administrative agreements, it has empowered some private interests 
to obtain or retain artificial advantages over their rivals or future investors (Abbott & 
Singham, 2013). Admittedly, improving the attractiveness of a limited market in which 
the companies are required to make large investments is a hard and challenging task.  
 
Potential entrance seems not to be in the panorama. More efforts are needed in 
searching for options, innovation in rules, public management stability and the 
execution of long-term investments according to a real planning programme. To 
achieve these, transparency and the availability of data (Ferrantino, 2012b), are vitals 
to promote interest in participating and competing among international firms 
(Venturini & Boccaletti, 1998). On the contrary, a small group of suppliers in an 
oligopolistic structure could provoke an increase in trading costs and eventually in 
products and high levels of inefficiencies and reduce the purchasing power of 
consumers. Monopolistic or oligopolistic structures could emerge with impacts on 
some dimensions of firms’ or the nation’s competitiveness.    
 
Arguably, the two agribusiness sectors under study could also be considered as 
oligopolistic structures, particularly the group of grain importers. As mentioned, only 
two of the group have the best market position, diversification and infrastructure, but 
regarding animal feed mills there is only one firm with it. In the fresh-produce sector, 
although a lack of cooperation among them, three firms have the control of over 80% 
of the market, but only two are better positioned.  
 
  
272 
 
PR’s access to the domestic market by sea is controlled by two big maritime firms that 
transport more than 60% of the food imported to PR. They have high fixed costs, 
competing by a small margin income in a recessionary economy with a decreasing 
population, but they are investing in new equipment with capacity that is twice the 
current needs (ACo10). The ‘lazy monopoly’ of PR’s electric power company should be 
added to the equation cost. Consequently, the challenges provoked by these two 
natural oligopolistic structures as external costs should be summed with the basic 
price of commodities and the internal cost of the agribusiness sectors. Clearly those 
structural limitations in collusion may affect the firm’s, market’s and/or nation’s 
competitiveness.  
 
6.4.4 What are the climate warming effects on the agribusiness supply chain? 
The climate change, market openness and domestic efficiency are factors to be 
considered in the analysis of the agrifood supply chain competitiveness (Gorton et al, 
2013). The global warming effects are showing impacts on America’s agricultural 
production. While in 2015 the cost of food showed reductions in Europe, the effects of 
several natural disasters in Latin America reduced126 its production, causing food 
imports and the price of food to rocket. Additionally, the particular geographical 
location and topological features of SIDSs make them susceptible to the impacts of 
natural hazards and climate change (Penello-Rial, 2014). Similarly, as previously 
mentioned, one of the infrastructures that is most threatened by the global warming 
effects is port infrastructures (Burns, 2015). All of these expected scenarios may 
increase countries’ level of vulnerability and food scarcity, particularly in SIDSs 
(Mimura et al, 2007). Therefore, increases in the cost of food, the risk of insurance 
appraisals on maritime transportation are important considerations in their importing 
supply chain and business competitiveness.  
 
The group of fresh-produce importers is more conscious of it due to the relative 
frequency of trucking issues, inland rates and delays during their processes of 
purchasing. Similarly, the lack of space in the domestic cargo ship is pushing them 
hard to evaluate their supply chain dynamically. For the grain importers, the climate 
change effects on their logistics seem to be less complex than those of the prior 
                                                          
126
 The export reduction is estimated to be $1,000 million but $11 billion for the region’s total loss in agricultural crops  (FAO, 2015). 
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sector. We are of the opinion that this could be due to the storage capacity and less 
perishability in comparison with fresh produce.  
  
6.4.5 Experiences with the unions 
By law Puerto Ricans have the right to unionise, and, despite their particularities, this 
applies to the public and the private sector (C1P1). As a result, in the maritime sector 
for instance, the unions established ‘closed shops’, situations in which employers can 
only employ members of the union. Besides, the payment rates per hour according to 
work shifts and the number of people required to accomplish a task are determined 
by the union or at least in agreement with it (C1P2; ACCo15). The combination of these 
requirements established by protocols imposed by the international, federal or state 
agencies and those associated with the Jones Act make this a more complex issue. For 
instance, crew safety and occupational inspections, besides the union demands, are 
factors that may result in more costs. These costs, whilst covered by maritime firms, 
logically will be part of the price for service that consumers will pay. 
 
In PR, similarly to the US, three types of unions associated with the maritime sector 
could be identified. Although they have different names, they are often in agreement 
with others in the US or local authorised representative chapters of them. The ‘Unión 
de Tronquistas’ (Local 901) is traditionally associated with the domestic maritime firm 
Crowley in PR and the US. Other unions in PR are the International Longshoremen 
Association (ILA), which has two local chapters, the 1575 and the 1375. The union 
chapter 1575 in PR was traditionally associated with Horizon and the 1375 was more 
related to stevedoring, chassis and crane workers (C1P2). However, their efficiency 
depends on the region and municipalities. For instance, it is a common belief among 
maritime firms that, although the union workers in San Juan have the highest rates of 
all, in comparison with Ponce’s union workers, they are more efficient by far (C1P2; 
ACCo16; ACo6).  
 
The union ILA 1740 is the most common in PR’s San Juan port grain mill section (BCo2; 
ACo6). According to the data generated, the unions establish the number of labourers 
per job. For instance, to download a barge of grain, the minimum number of labourers 
will vary by the stage. Initially, four union members are the minimum required. They 
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are the machinery operators, two on the bobcats inside the hatch and the other two 
as assistants at the top outside the hatch, switching every hour. This number of 
players in the team might be considered reasonable and very appropriate for the 
working conditions and risks (ACCo15). However, once at the bottom of the hatch, the 
cleaning crew should be increased to seven, consisting of six assistants and the 
foreman, and that team could be considered to be excessive and inefficient (ACo3). 
Regarding the employment cost127 per union member, in the third work shift (night) of 
eight hours, the foreman, for instance, may cost his contractors around $400 and the 
others around $200 each. The union also receives a piece of this for its services to its 
members. On the other hand, the first work shift (morning at 7 a.m.) of eight hours is 
the cheapest of all because the union requires a team of five. The major difference in 
the cost per work shift is that during the day one hour is paid double but at night two, 
based on eight hours. The union established that payments have to be made at the 
end of the job, only in cash – never by check or transfers – and with the foreman as a 
witness (ACCo15; ACCo16).  
 
On the contrary, the employment cost of similar skilled labour from the countryside, 
at $18 per hour128 and $28 for the foreman, represents savings of $7 and $12 per 
hour/person, respectively, to the unions’ rates (C3Co3). Furthermore, various 
interviewees said that, over the costs of the union’s labourers, it is common to hire a 
supervisor of the union foreman, because otherwise the level of efficiency would be 
lower (ACCo15; ACCo16). Interestingly, it was said that some of those supervisors are 
also members of the union but working independently, outside the union’s working 
restrictions (C3Co3).  
 
On the container side, not only the maritime unions but also the trucking unions may 
influence the cost of trade. Whilst not related to the definition of cabotage used in 
this research, its effects seem to be included by the importing firms as part of their 
costs of transportation. Since 2005 trucking unions in PR have had relatively frequent 
effects on delays of the normal flow of imports. Changes in their tariff or distance 
rates for carrying containers have an impact on the cost of goods. 
                                                          
127 Wages and legal benefits. 
128 This may represent a wage of $80 (USD) per person per day (8 hrs), which is $24 over the minimum wage. The other $8 (USD) is to cover benefits 
and employment costs.  
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It is said that in PR the majority of the importing companies agree to the union rates 
and their particularities. However, the hidden reasons for this are firstly to avoid 
delays in loading goods and secondly the sense of threat of the possibility that 
members of the union may affect their business negatively. As a result, not much is 
known about illegalities or extortion in these processes (C1P1; ACCo15). Two anecdotic 
experiences of the interviewees might be supportive of these arguments.129  
 
 1. Years ago, a union employee unloading an expensive speed car irresponsibly 
drove it as if it was in a competition in the car yard. He crashed the car into a 
container, so hard that it was a total loss. Looking at the security cameras, the 
maritime terminal operator and the importing firm claimed for the damage and 
destitution of the employee. However, the union assumed his legal representation 
and damages but also denied any disciplinary actions against him until the case was 
presented in court (C3Co3).  
  
 2. The experience was during the process of negotiation of competitive rates 
with PR’s seafarers’ union. Due to the negative response of the union leaders, the 
(private) firm decided to enforce changes, bringing workers from the countryside at 
rates lower than the union but higher than the national basic salary (ACo3). The result 
of the experiment was much positive than the firm’s expectations and significantly 
more profitable for both sides. However, the union started demonstrations in the firm 
buildings and at the manager’s house. Actions to delay the arrivals were executed 
through sabotaging equipment and other damage to the property. Besides, members 
of the union threatened the firm director, a few of the business employees, the 
personnel of the third party subcontracted for loading and later on the firm’s business 
partners. Consequently, scared by all this, the firm’s General Manager relented and 
agreed to the union’s demands (C3Co3). Since then an external contractor hired by the 
firm is charged with dealing with the unions (ACo3).  
                                                          
129  Previous experiences of aggression were historically associated with these unions, Jimmy Hoffa being one of its most notorious leaders in the US. 
Press reporters in PR show some similar situations. One is a tragic case in 1967 in which an important leader of the Union de  Tronquistas was 
murdered and tortured by one of its members. In the mid-1980s another union leader died in a strange accident during an inspection of one of the 
maritime firms. In the late 1980s three members of that union were accused and convicted of one of the biggest fire catastrophes in modern PR’s 
history – Du Pont Plaza (Torres-Gotay, 2001). In 2011 the current president of the Union de Tronquistas in PR was accused of attempted murder, 
violations of the arms law and criminal property damage during a demonstration against the food-importing company B. Fernandez, CO (Primera 
Hora, 2011). 
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6.5.0 Is this external NTM a threat to PR’s food vulnerability? 
The majority of the participants in both sectors agreed on classifying the US Cabotage 
Act as a threat to PR’s agribusinesses supply chain (Table 39). The main reasons 
concerned the high cost, lack of ships and lack of competition among sea firms. 
However, a threat to food security may arise through higher prices – making food 
unaffordable for many – or through food scarcity at any price – as a result of political, 
economic and mechanical issues (Hubbard & Hubbard, 2013:p.142). Bearing in mind 
that this research was founded on the sustainable development theory, this 
penultimate section aims to summarise the effects of cabotage segmented into the 
main concepts of availability and accessibility that may define food vulnerability. 
 
Table 39: Is the US Cabotage Act detrimental to PR’s agribusinesses? 
 
P4 and N3 were not interviewees but their opinion was obtained from secondary data.  
 
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social 
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. 
(FAO, 2010)   
 
High cost
Lack of 
compet. 
among sea 
firms 
High 
salaries
Maritime 
unions
Logistic 
restriction
Limit us to 
trade 
globaly
Lack of 
ships
10 X X X X X
9 X X X X X
11 X X X X
1 X X X X X X
7 X X
2 X X
4 X X X
3 X X X X X
5 X X X X X
6 X X X X X X
8 X X X X X X
13 X X X X X X
N1 X X X X
N2 X X X X X
N3 X X X X X X
P3 X X
P1 X X X X X
P2 X
P4 X X X X X X
15 X X X X X X
16 X X X X X
WHY?
YES NO
NOT 
SURE
FIRMS
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Affordability 
 1. Risk costs by distance. The variables of distance between ports, flagging and 
the number of incidents and calls are considered in their rates. The insurance costs 
should be added to the cost of trade. Short sea routes may limit price increases, even 
with high import dependence (Vivideconomics, 2010:p.49). 
 2. The Horizon shutdown reduced the number of routes available between PR 
and the US by 30%. The lack of volume to sustain their operations was one of the 
limitations to attracting more sea providers.  
 3. Unexpected charges and higher costs due to unanticipated changes in 
logistics and/or fuel volatility. Countries with grain import shares above 60% 
experience price increases above 0.3% for every 10% of increase in the cost of fuel 
(Korinek & Sourdin, 2009b). Nevertheless, an inverse correlation exists between the 
size of vessels and the cost impact of fuel. Container freight rates are considerably less 
linked to bunker prices than for the grain dry-bulk ships (Vivideconomics, 2010:p.49). 
However, these data for grain are based on vessels of Panamax size and not barges.  
 4. Once Horizon closed, PR’s public opinion targeted the two main sea 
providers, accusing them of affecting PR’s market. Unexpectedly, both firms 
announced an increase in their fleet number to serve PR’s domestic routes for 
containers (Noticel, 2015). Were those vessels planned before the tragedies that 
affected PR’s market? Is the deprived market of PR able to pay for them? 
 5. The supply and demand cost because of agricultural products’ scarcity. The 
importing of maize from Brazil was initiated in 2013; the initial cost seemed to be 
high, but after a few changes in logistics it became viable. However, due to the 2014 
drought, the US maize production was highly affected; consequently, the Brazilian 
markets doubled the price of the commodity that was previously bought. 
 6. The labour cost imposed by union rates. The maritime unions may influence 
the cost of trade in the process, at the port and in trucking levels. Whilst not related to 
the definition of cabotage used in this research, the importing firms considered this 
cost as part of their costs of transportation. 
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 7. Technology and port automated systems may increase efficiency (De Pillis, 
2015). 
 
Accessibility 
 1. It is estimated than over 85% of the food required to sustain PR’s market is 
imported (Comas, 2009).  
 2. Climatic conditions: the drought and production scarcity affect the suppliers 
of the traditional markets from which PR purchased. Consequently, PR’s buyers’ 
logistics were reformulated to suit new providers, but a month later the draught 
effects appeared there too (C1P3). A similar scenario would occur with unexpected 
freezing temperatures or hail.  
 3. Between 20 and 25 cargo vessels arrive in PR’s ports weekly. Although many 
are from abroad, the most frequent arrivals are domestic. In the case of grain imports, 
the infrastructure is suitable for US barges but limited for ships from abroad.  
 
 4. Cargo ships can lose containers falling overboard into the sea. Before it sank 
‘El Faro’ transported 391 containers to PR, 27 of them fresh fruits and vegetables, 20 
poultry, 2 cheese and 9 fresh beverages. Other food containers were carried but they 
were not considered perishable. The market of PR showed some scarcity in products 
for almost a week (MIDA, 2015).  
 5. After the tragedy of the ‘El Faro’ sinking, it was reported that 8 vessels are 
dedicated to PR’s market weekly. Only one of them is a ship; the other seven are a 
general vessel type but very limited for transporting reefers. The base of them is 
Jacksonville, Florida (Noticel, 2015).   
 6. The design of vessels is usually wide but not so deep; thus, in the open sea, 
their speed is under 18 knots. As a result, their arrivals are later than those of regular 
ships, with serious effects on perishable materials (ACo10).  
 7. Disputes between unions and maritime providers have provoked serious 
interruptions to the economy of the coastal states in the US (DePillis, 2015). 
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 8. Theoretically, during a war, the US Department of Defence may take any of 
the vessels under the Jones Act agreement for its exclusive use. Invoking the national 
security, the fleet available to serve PR’s market would be reduced to serve those 
purposes.  
 
 
6.6.0 Conclusion 
All of these elements associated with the domestic importing of produce will have 
effects on the price of goods. In Appendix H a SWOT analysis summarise the findings. 
Certainly not all of them are directly related to the US Cabotage Act, but they are the 
price of the market association between PR and the US. Furthermore, the sea 
transportation restrictions and their complex structures and layers of service costs 
developed through the years make it difficult to estimate the real cost of that NTM to 
the agribusiness sector. A general analysis could underestimate the implications of the 
Act in some areas but overestimate them in others. As previously presented, the 
inland cost could have a dramatic effect on the cost of imports and this is a decision 
that the importer has to taking into account in its logistics costs.  
 
The following chapter summarises the findings from this thesis and includes a section 
on contributions. Additionally, limitations and future research avenues are presented. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK  
 
7.0.0 Introduction 
As presented, the development of PR was immersed in a historical structure of 
dependency, in which the government intervention produced inefficiencies and a 
large economy (the US but previously Spain) had control over PR’s growth. To 
guarantee this, customs control, cabotage and other regulatory frameworks in favour 
of the US corporations were established without promoting a real sustainable 
economy.  
 
Many US interventions were made in different forms but to benefit the US 
corporations, rather than promote PR’s native capital. Eventually, its economic 
(dependent, modernised, neo-liberal) model collapsed. Now, the ‘US Jewel of the 
Caribbean’ seems to be an inefficient, uncompetitive and expensive place, highly 
controlled by US multinationals and experiencing a high level of brain drain (out-
migrants to the US). Its depressed economy over almost a decade and over 12% 
sustained unemployment in a restricted trade framework limits the possibilities of 
participating actively in the global economy and other forms of production in a world 
that is changing significantly in favour of those more flexible markets. Real sustainable 
investments have not occurred in PR, and it is possible that the most important 
reasons for this are the costs of shipping and energy. 
 
This study has explored the effects of an external non-tariff measure on the agrifood 
supply chain in a small island developing nation. The research stance, and different 
variables associated to the study were defined (Chapter 1). Puerto Rico’s scenario, as a 
small island, was contextualised and the maritime cabotage identified as the 
phenomenon under our study (Chapter 2). Through a literature review the dimensions 
of the phenomenon were exposed. Various international scenarios were contrasted 
with the domestic experience and the findings were formulated into some business 
structures affected by the regulation (Chapter 3). Using competitiveness as a 
theoretical framework (Chapter 4), the objectives of the thesis (1.5) were explored, 
particularised and discussed. The process involved investigating a group of 
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agribusinesses, public servants and non-government organisations to determine their 
experiences and opinions about the US Cabotage Act’s effects on the competitiveness 
of agribusinesses (Chapter 5). Finally analyses of cost per distance (n.m) of imports by 
containers (FEU), a theoretical cost analysis exercise of livestock formulation and an 
analysis of the factors that affect agribusinesses’ competitiveness indirectly associated 
with the Cabotage Act were presented (Chapter 6).  
 
To achieve the objectives, the literature was critically reviewed to highlight the supply 
chain criteria and factors that are more significant for agribusinesses in PR. Factors 
that affect competitiveness such as: internal and external, inter-organisational and 
cooperative behaviours, rivalry and oligopolistic structures among the sample were 
discussed. 
  
This chapter presents the final conclusions and remarks of the research. It begins by 
reviewing the theoretical purpose and the implications of the theoretical framework 
used. In addition, the thesis research questions are answered in the following sections 
and it was incorporated the methodology proposed for the OECD to evaluate 
anticompetitive measures. Finally, the contribution of this research is exposed and its 
strengths and limitations discussed. The chapter finalises the thesis with 
recommendations for future research and some concluding comments. 
 
7.1.0 Key findings and contribution to theory about the research problem 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the effects of an external non-tariff measure in 
maritime transportation on PR’s agribusiness competitiveness. Furthermore, it aimed 
to clarify and quantify if possible how the factors associated with the US Cabotage Act 
could affect the food supply chain in a small island developing nation such as PR. 
Consequently, areas of opportunity in the supply chain competitiveness of the sectors 
under exploration were identified and various dimensions of the phenomenon were 
highlighted.  
 
The research explored two importing sectors of native agribusiness (grain and fresh 
produce) composed of 12 firms. They were selected on the basis of the 
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representativeness of the agribusinesses under analysis and the practical feasibility of 
accessing the companies. The only step in common in their supply chains is their 
dependence on maritime transportation for trade. Consequently, the cabotage 
requirements have direct and indirect effects early on in their agribusiness supply 
chain activities.  
 
To understand the views of the agribusiness groups related to their supply chain 
strategy, data generated from primary information was collected through interviews. 
The analysis in this study was supported by empirical data collected through the 
research and was based on contributions of knowledge and academic advancement. 
The research methodology was grounded in the literature and represents a process of 
reconceptualising and field testing findings from methods used by other authors 
related to competitiveness and supply chain studies. The following sections (7.1.1 & 
7.1.2), summarise the assessments and angles previously mentioned in Chapter 4 and 
in 5, the research questions are answered.  
 
7.1.1 What are the effects of US Cabotage for the PR’s agribusinesses supply chain? 
This exploratory research identifies and reflects into different elements that reveal 
and categorize the US Cabotage Act as an anti-competitive measure for PR’s 
agribusinesses. In order to follow a systematic form to answer the question, the 
OECD’s (2011) qualitative analysis to identify and classify NTM effects on 
competitiveness was applied:  
 
 1. Could the non-tariff measure limit the number or range of suppliers? 
   
Although the NTM named the Cabotage Act is not unique to the US, its 
multidimensional effects make it the one with the highest level of restrictiveness. It 
prohibits the use of foreign vessels to engage in commerce between ports of the US. It 
is covered in section no. 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (46 USC 883) and is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Jones Act’. The Act was also initially related to the 
offshore US territories. The law requires all domestic maritime cargoes transported by 
water between two domestic ports to be carried by a crew with no fewer than 75% of 
US citizens. This applies to owners, operators, builders and repairers. Rare exceptions 
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to the Cabotage Act have been identified in recent history. In addition, there are 
several federal regulations of the domestic marine activities that are linked to 
cabotage. There is also the US Safe Container Act (46 USC 80501-80509) and its 
amendments. Clearly, the main objective is the complete regulation of the maritime 
transportation in all the US (mainland and territories) ports. Consequently, 85% of the 
total dwt of the US market is foreign flagged. A very limited number of domestic 
flagged vessels to carry grain, containers (regular and reefers) and tankers are 
available in the US to supply its own market. Principally, this is a consequence of the 
cost of building and operation, which is estimated to be almost twice the cost at the 
international level. 
 
The current number of domestic maritime service providers in PR is limited to three 
firms, but two of them carry more than 85% of the market trade. Since January 2015, 
eight domestic vessels have been available to supply PR’s market. Two of them were 
suited to reefers, but due to the sinking of ‘El Faro’ only one is currently available. 
Since Horizon’s closure, the distortion in the container management has been 
seriously aggravated. Hundreds of containers for PR’s market are stranded weekly in 
the US ports. Jacksonville (US) is the main point of departure to supply PR’s market 
with more than 90% of the food produce imported from the US. The inland costs for 
trucking from California (West Coast) or New York (East Coast) to Jacksonville Port are 
excessive, but available options are scarce. In the grain sector, only one domestic 
barge is available to service the importers, whilst there is a limit to the volume 
suitable for the current infrastructure.  
 
In summary, the US Cabotage Act limits the range of suppliers and affects the supply 
chain of PR’s agribusinesses based on imports from the US.  
 
 2. Is this limitation reducing the ability of suppliers to compete? 
 
The US Cabotage Act itself reduces the number of domestic maritime service 
providers in the US and its offshore territories of Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and Puerto 
Rico. The investment costs in this particular business are considerably high. Due to 
their operational fixed costs, profit margins are significantly dependent on the 
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volume; hence, firms will be more interested in markets with a greater potential for 
making profits.  
 
In the case of PR, due to its dependency on imports from the US market and with a 
market pattern relatively similar to that of the US, a limitation on its forms of 
transport affects its logistics costs. For instance, the purchasing system to buy fresh 
produce adopted from the US and the lack of ample promotion of international 
business led the market to look first to the US then abroad. Consequently, a restriction 
on the main transportation to supply a market without any inland connection among 
suppliers affects the importers’ capacity. In addition, this restriction is stronger when 
an oligopolistic form of business reduces the number of service providers as a result of 
the administrative structures created by the cabotage regulation (NTM). However, 
PR’s agribusiness importers, despite having options to import from abroad, are limited 
because in addition to cabotage they have to comply with other factors that affect 
their decisional process to purchase, for instance the US sanitary and phytosanitary 
restrictions, the US weight limits on containers, the lack of volume in their market and 
the lack of consolidation services from abroad. 
 
 3. Is there a limitation on customers’ choices and the information available to 
them? 
 
The collection of data on cargoes in metric tonnes and their value of purchase is 
generally a combined activity between several agencies and state servants posted in 
domestic ports. However, the rates of freight and the costs of trade are in the open 
market and thus are not under the control of or gathered by any agency. By law they 
are considered to be protected as the right of a business relationship between the 
importer and the service provider. Industrial importers may consider the negotiation 
of rates as part of their competitive advantage, thus sensitive or a corporate privilege. 
Consequently, the freight agreements are protected by the level of confidentiality 
between the transporter and the importer. Therefore, the data on the costs 
associated with freight are not published but are under the control of the private 
maritime transportation service providers. This information allows the shippers to 
allocate specific routes among themselves at predetermined rates.  
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In PR these data are highly segmented through different agencies (municipal, state 
and federal) affecting the data gathering for analysis. Additionally, none of the 
agencies associated with commerce in PR have route analysts to reduce imbalances in 
trade and/or optimise options to engage in business abroad. As a result, the 
customers (importers) are limited to options and information to negotiate better rates 
to their benefit.  
 
 4. How does the Cabotage Act affect PR’s food affordability, availability and 
quality? 
 
The most frequent journeys are made by domestic vessels. Currently, only one ship of 
the fleet is suitable for fresh food containers and/or reefers, but it has very limited 
space. The vulnerability of PR’s market was highlighted by the closure of Horizon in 
December 2015.  
  
It is estimated that over 85% of PR’s food is imported, over 65% of it from the US. 
More than 90% of the food imported from the US comes from the port of Jacksonville. 
This port is greatly affected by similar climatic phenomena to PR, during the same 
seasons. Occasionally, similar climatic phenomena with effects on PR have impacts on 
the Jacksonville region. Therefore, PR experiences a double-jeopardy scenario, 
because its imports come from a place with similar seasonality risks.  
 
‘The greater the distances, the higher the risks of trade’. Perishable goods lose their 
freshness and reduce their nutritional value. Inland long-distance trucking increases 
the cost and the risks of transport. An example of how this cabotage restricts the 
supply chain logistics is that the prohibition of a Canadian ship carrying supplies from 
New York to some of the Caribbean British Islands cannot be optimised to supplies PR.  
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7.1.2 What challenges and opportunities does the Cabotage policy present for the 
competitiveness of the Puerto Rico’s agricultural sector? 
 
Liberalisation should produce more providers. This would result in some changes in 
competition and the cost of trade might be lower. The cost of importing raw materials 
would be lower because of the reduction in the rates of transport. A reduction in the 
grain freight rates would be beneficial for the livestock producers due to the fact that 
animal feed is their main operational cost.   
 
The Cabotage Act itself is not currently a serious limitation for the agribusinesses’ 
importer sector and on the contrary could be considered as an opportunity for them. 
Due to the fact that the US market is a huge producer of manufactured food and 
grains, the extra cost and limitations imposed by the Cabotage Act increase the cost of 
products imported from the US, which could be seen as a benefit for PR’s agrifood 
producers. It is said that currently the most dramatic and unfair competition for the 
local farmers is the high level of imports from abroad produced under a low-cost 
regulatory framework. However, in this exploratory research, it was revealed that 
some food produce from these markets are imported to PR but via the US.  
 
For the side of livestock farmers grains at low cost is clearly benefitial, but for the side 
of the majority of the grain importers would be problematic to produce and compete 
with the cost of the US imports without the cost of cabotage. Under the current 
infrastructure of its terminals, the high cost of energy in PR in comparison with the US 
is an important variable to compete by price (Allen & Peñalosa, 2015; Gutiérrez & 
Ruiz, 2015). Dangerously, a reduction in the number of grain importers in PR could 
induce greater dependency on the US market. However, major investments in the 
port terminals’ infrastructure, greater efficiency through technology, automating the 
unloading process and manufacturers’ product diversification would be the key to 
competitiveness.  
 
Ports have been experimenting with automated systems that allow them to stack 
containers higher and wider, increasing the volume that can flow through to ground 
transportation. According to a study by the Port of Los Angeles, those systems can 
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also reduce manpower between 40% and 50% (DePillis, 2015). However, the 
challenges to this are the unions.  
 
According to Gorton and colleagues (2013:p.39), two major groups of determinants of 
competitiveness, identified as endogenous (internal) and external (external), may 
affect the supply chain structures. In general, both are considered extensively by 
agricultural studies, but the interactions between them have received relatively little 
attention, particularly in the agrifood sector. Indeed, several factors that are directly 
or indirectly associated with the external NTM were identified as elements that may 
affect the competitiveness of the participating firms: 
 
External factors: 
 1. The lack of foreign maritime terminal operators. Although it is 
understandable that the majority of the maritime firms are domestic, the annual 
foreign trade volume of PR’s market should be attractive enough to allow foreign 
investments in ports. It is estimated that around 10 foreign vessels arrive in PR’s ports 
weekly. However, several of these transporting lines have agreements with the 
domestic terminal operators.  
 
 2. The trade imbalance affecting the volume northbound then increasing the 
southbound rates. As a result of the elimination of the 936 Act, many manufacturing 
companies ceased their operations in PR; thus, the volume of exports is falling. To 
manage the differences in cost, the sea transporter firms considered their cost basis in 
the volume of trade. A low northbound cost should promote exports to the USA, but 
the cost of shipping from the US to PR is practically twice the cost paid for shipping 
from PR to the US.   
 
 3. Foreign imports are affected by SPS regulations, relatively long protocols for 
the containers’ inspection and a lack of accurate services. However, the lack of 
digitalisation in the process and the complexities involved in tracking containers are 
variables that were frequently mentioned to describe the foreign as well as the 
domestic services. Besides, some other inefficiencies in docking, unloading and 
stevedoring are noticeable, in contrast to Mauritius, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
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 4. For the last decade PR’s population has been falling, but it has had an 
increasing proportion of pensioners. Furthermore, the economy recession is affecting 
the purchasing power of the residents. The general number of domestic containers is 
declining but not in the food sector and to compensate for this reduction, maritime 
firms might increase their current rates of transport. 
  
 5. The age (over 30) of the fleet that the maritime sector has to supply the 
market of PR adds more inefficiency due to the cost of fuel, lower speed rates and a 
high level of carbon emissions. 
 
 6. Regarding the emissions and environmental controls associated with 
maritime transportation the US administrative agencies plays an important role that it 
would be hard to enforced by PR’s government. While the United Nations (IMO) is 
taking more actions on the maritime service providers to enforce maritime regulatory 
structures at the international level, a network of administrative structures for each 
country is necessary. The PRPA is not economically strong, technically prepared or 
designed to act in that direction. In addition, the economic power and influences of 
the shipping sector are well known. Therefore, a liberalised cabotage framework 
should not imply a relaxation of the rules for the emissions’ controls or the 
environmental responsibilities for sea business. 
 
Internal factors: 
 1. Ports’ (terminals’) infrastructure limits the commerce of raw material. 
Draught limitations, a relatively low number of cranes, relatively inefficient equipment 
for grain unloading and outdated dockyards, especially in private grain importers, are 
more suited to US vessels and barges than to international ships. This may not be the 
case for containers terminal operators in PR.  
 
 2. PR’s fresh food importers and grain importers are highly focused on the US 
market rather than the Caribbean and Central and South American suppliers with 
rates for transport and produce that are more attractive than those in the US. In 
addition, although the inland rates for trucking in the US might be significantly higher 
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than the sea rates, in general, fresh produce importers prefer to pay the price than to 
search for other options. 
 
 3. Cultural self-restriction was noticed, and particularly the grain sector shows 
a high level of mistrust in foreign commodities. Besides, the lack of qualified and 
experienced technicians in grain commodities at the international level and the lack of 
local services for grain market forecasting place limitations on the decision making. 
Therefore, purchasing and transporting decisions are highly influenced by the opinion 
of those external advisors based in the US. PR’s grain-importing firms have developed 
some kind of dependency on these services.  
 
 4. The lack of analysis of the cost of transport. Particularly in the grain sector, a 
few animal feed mills buy CIF priced per metric tonne without consciously evaluating 
the cost per service included. For instance, $218 per MT of maize, although it could be 
considered a fair price, if it were segmented the cost of transport could be identified 
to improve their business analysis. However, the real cost of sea transport is unknown 
to them. 
 
The synthesised knowledge applied to this exploratory research concluded that many 
dimensions associated with the Cabotage Act are integrated into the operational stage 
earlier in the supply chain. Certainly, it has effects on the agribusinesses’ 
competitiveness and although some of the participants have implemented strategies 
to reduce this impact, in general, the costs of the Cabotage dimensions are 
transferred to consumers. 
 
The assets, logistics capabilities, transportation infrastructure, skills and culture are 
vital variables that should be considered for a true evaluation of the NTM 
phenomenon. Setting up ambitious, actionable objectives without considering these 
resources may result in the formulation of the desired vision and purpose but they will 
be far from identifying areas of opportunity.  
 
 
  
290 
 
7.2.0 Contribution of the phenomenon analysis 
This thesis represents the first attempt to gauge the effect of an external NTM on the 
competitiveness of the agribusiness supply chain in PR. Previous publications use 
different classical theoretical approaches to evaluate the topic by estimating the 
welfare cost through econometric models without taking into account the 
particularities between sectors. This is the first time that this issue is considered in 
academic research exploring the agrifood supply chain. In addition, the scope used to 
analyse the effects of this phenomenon on the consumers of the agribusinesses’ raw 
materials is distinctive. 
 
To evaluate levels of competitiveness, particularly those aspects associated with 
efficiency of the agribusiness supply chain, it is necessary analise the institutional 
environment, organisational structures and their level of development, innovation or 
diversification and the trade capacity. This exploratory analysis using interviews shows 
how the infrastructure limitations, the mixed regulatory frameworks and the lack of 
public centralised data are elements that aggravate the effects of cabotage.   
 
PR’s Government is blind to the collection and analysis of data (Krueger et al, 2015). 
Valuable information would be helpful to evaluate PR’s real cost of imports to 
businesses. It would facilitate the identification and digitalisation of protocols, routes 
optimisation for trade and seek new business opportunities.  
 
The findings provide information for the actors in the grain sector, livestock producers 
and produce importers, and on the main actors’ position earlier in the supply chain, 
some of its structures and the development of the chain in general in relation to 
cabotage. A special contribution can be found in the NTM analysis of maritime 
transportation, specifically on SIDSs and other island territories that are affected by 
trading policies imposed by developed countries or large economies. It should be 
admitted that this kind of NTM was designed for developed countries, massive 
markets and highly populated nations, diluting its real costs among them without 
significant effects.  
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[The developed countries] ... can sustain and afford the luxury of their 
inefficiencies. However, the LDCs cannot if they want to sustain growth. 
(Stiglitz, 2000:p.453) 
 
 
This research could be considered supportive of the current claims for the relaxation 
of the Cabotage Act on PR’s market, such as that for the US Virgin Island and a few 
others. A comprehensive programme that allows PR a more flexible business political 
framework could reduce some of the inequitable disadvantages imposed by the 
current political status (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2014). However, in the 
case of complete cabotage liberalisation we are of the believed that the importing 
sectors explored (grain importers, animal feed mills and fresh-produce importers) 
would be more focused on conducting business with the US than abroad. The lack of 
private investments in the port terminal infrastructure is currently one limiting factor 
in the capacity to import from abroad. A complete relaxation of cabotage would avoid 
the urgent need for infrastructure transformation and for innovative actions to 
achieve greater efficiency in the global market. The current suitability for importing 
from US providers undermines the search for more global business interactions. 
 
The idea of liberalising cabotage for the fuel sector only, although not analysed in this 
thesis, seems to be interesting in relation to this issue. Certainly, it would be 
particularly limited to the use of tankers, of which there are so far very few in the US 
fleet. Nevertheless, it would be beneficial for all the economic sectors and citizens in 
general, particularly if it is at lower costs than the imports from Trinidad y Tobago.   
 
It is a fact that the nation’s economy has not experienced the effects of sea 
liberalisation because it has been continuously imposed for almost nine decades. 
Regarding an increase in PR’s food vulnerability associated with the NTM itself, it is 
unlikely to correlate with a direct effect. However, when the maritime cabotage is 
analysed by its interaction with other NTMs or its resultant factors and dimensions, it 
is possible to support the assertion that some distortions of the food supply chain 
vulnerabilities may limit the access to food. On the other hand, the continuous 
reduction in the local farming and the increasing dependency on food imports – the 
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majority from only one domestic port – are issues that should be analysed extensively 
in a scenario of total liberalisation. The lack of food production with restrictive 
conditions for imports may raise the cost of food with effects on well-being.  
 
7.2.1 Contribution to theory, method and practice 
This thesis may contribute to theory by applying an international qualitiative method 
for evaluating and classifying an external non-tariff measure’s effect on an SIDS: 
  
 1. In the literature accessed, the US Cabotage Act is not assessed using OECD 
frameworks to classify a NTM. PR’s political framework and it lack of participation at 
international forums such as OECD, limit the cross-analysis and the scenarios to 
compare. Whilst Cabotage Act effects are on domestic trade only, it operates as an 
external anti-competitive NTM limiting PR’s interest in developing sustainable 
agribusiness production. The combination of these two aspects (anti-competitive NTM 
and PR’s agribusinesses) is not considered in the previous literature studied. 
 
 
7.3.0 Recommendations  
Through the design, the data gathering and their analysis, many other topics and ideas 
were generated for further research.  
 
 1. Differences among sectors, lack of similarities in its supply chain protocols 
and/or the process of applying the method will commonly result with silent areas not 
considered during our data collection. These factors could be added to the conceptual 
diagram (4.4). Additionally, a model to explore firms’ behaviour might be considered.  
 
 2. A supply chain is commonly representative of a number of participants 
(companies or individuals) that are involved in the inbound and outbound or ‘up and 
downstream’ movements of products and services from the point of origin to the 
customer (Mentzer et al, 2001:p.4). In this case it seems that two oligopolistic 
(maritime transportation and energy) structures are affecting another oligopoly 
structure (grain importers). Exploring cabotage and evaluating the level of collusion 
between those structures was an angle that was poorly developed in this project.  
293 
 
 
 3. It was mentioned that in the grain sector the importers have similar port 
terminal structures with a relatively low level of efficiency. An evaluative field design 
would be a useful observational instrument to contrast their strengths and 
weaknesses during their unloading process. 
 
 4. The quantitative cost estimation of the sea transport on different feedstuff 
formulations was not accomplished due to the lack of specific codifications in the 
public reports. This analysis would have been an interesting theoretical exercise to 
evaluate the cost of a complete formulation with the aim of estimating the costs for 
the farmers more accurately. 
 
 5. The effects of the Cabotage Act on the fertiliser sector were occasionally 
mentioned in this thesis but an exploration of it was not considered in this research. 
The case for the meat importers’ sector was excluded too. Similarly, it happened with 
the sector of services related to agribusiness trades. Probably, the first two 
agribusiness sectors (fertiliser and meet) could be considered by the conceptual 
diagram, but, the sector of services may require a particular view due to its 
regulations and challenges. However, all the three sectors are worthy of more studies.  
 
 6. This research was more focused in exploring the current operational 
activities that might be affected by the US cabotage Act in the agribusinesses. 
However, we are of the opinion that the tangible and intangible capabilities such as: 
technology or infrastructure, and customers’ feedback integration or reputation 
respectively, needs to be more explored to evaluate change opportunities. Besides, 
agribusinesses’ routines and its interactions are angles that could be more deeply 
explored to assess their strategic opportunities. These could be studied through a 
dynamic capabilities framework (Teece, 1997). 
 
7.3.1 Limitations 
 1. Although an exploratory research, the mixed method designed was 
convergent. To reinforce the qualitative analysis the GTM was introduced to generate 
data in a systematic form. However, a quantitative phase to validate the data 
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generated by the semi-structured instrument is absent. As a result, the research 
methodology may lead to ambivalence in generalising the findings based on 
participants’ bias views. 
 
 2. Another challenge was the uncertainties when taken out of the context of 
the agrifood sector particularly between two different forms of supply chain (grain 
and produce importers). Besides, the size of the industries increases the possibility of 
bias and distortions in the findings.  
 
 The topic required interviewing executives, managers and some of the 
responders can be quite reserved in offering critiques or talking about their own firms’ 
weaknesses. This is particularly important, moreover when the researcher is faced 
with the responders’ avoidance of criticism and controversy or to collect sensitive data 
useful to identify inefficiencies in their operational routines. 
 
 3. The paucity of quantitative data at the government level, as well as the 
limitation of access to private sector data, affects the evaluation of this anti-
competitive measure dramatically.  
 
 For instance, due to the lack of data the analysis presented in this thesis is not 
consider the nominal rate of assistance for PR’s agribusinesses and it may affects the 
net analysis of costs. The nominal rate of assistance for the US130 was not considered 
applicable due to the assumption that PR’s market requires a different analysis.  
 
 Statistics about the specific commercial trade, and details of containerisation 
accountability, tracking and tracing are not public information. It is also believed that 
the majority of the maritime companies on the island do not have the capacity to offer 
clear and reliable information to their consumers. Thus, it seems that the island food 
security is in the hands of the maritime transporter companies. 
 
 4. Although the research instrument were designed to validate the 
participants’ views through questions of their firms’ operationals’ activities and the 
                                                          
130
 Anderson and Nelgen (2013) said that the nominal rate of assistance to the US agriculture between between 2007—2010 was estimated in 10%. 
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majority of them expressed high interest of the topic, cognitive dissonance occured. In 
situations where an individual must choose between two incompatible beliefs or 
actions its justification were taking into account in our analysis. However, it may 
introduce the researcher’s bias views.  
 
 5. The framework contributes to and enriches the existing literature and 
provides background for further academic research in this subject. However, this 
research involved a single case study (PR) applied to the agribusiness importers’ 
sector. Therefore the proposed conceptual framework may not be suitable for other 
sectors and the findings would need to be delimited through further research. 
 6. Due to the small number of firms, there were variables that could not be 
kept constant, thus it is possible that the agribusinesses’ supply chain differences have 
affected the study.  
 7. The plethora of variables that are related to the Cabotage Act as an NTM 
that may affect the agribusiness competitiveness was the biggest challenge to 
selecting and analysing the phenomenon and its dimensions. The risks that this entails 
are inappropriate data disaggregation and the underestimation of factors. 
 
 8. Spanish was the language used in the interviews; thus, some regional 
statements have the risk of mistranslation. 
 
7.4.0 Avenues for further research 
 1. The Government of Puerto Rico does not have an executive plan to promote 
the optimisation of commercial sea routes as is happening for airlines and cruise lines. 
Through a cross-analysis of commercial sea routes, more possibilities to trade with 
other Latin American countries could be identified, helping in planning and 
profitability. How much is PR’s importing from abroad but through the US? 
 
 2. Why not operate satellite farms? The fresh-produce importers’ sector could 
create a supply base of small farmers and increase the local production volume. 
Importers have the control of the supply chain; thus, they could incorporate satellite 
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farms into their chains to produce high-value perishable produce. It could bring them 
more control of production, high quality, reduced time and risk in transit, freshness 
and the possibility to pursue niche markets rather than operating on the basis of low 
price–low production cost. 
 
 3. Why not develop a regional partnership for grain importers? It seems that 
the biggest issue is confidence between companies facing similar environmental 
conditions. This requires a high level of intercommunication in the supply chain, but 
the grain volumes from abroad could be managed at lower rates in a partnership.  
 
 4. This research integrated different approaches to combining socio-economic, 
environmental and management aspects to evaluate the effects of a regulatory 
framework for agribusiness to improve sustainable competitiveness. A similar exercise 
could be designed to evaluate other regulations for food that have been imposed 
under scientific criteria but without considering whether they are worth the cost. 
Inevitably, some existing policies are more likely than others unnecessarily negatively. 
Therefore, future research studies may take this first stance for competition 
assessment to evaluate the plethora of regulations that directly affect the traditional 
agricultural sector. 
 
 5. Although this thesis and the framework used contribute to the existing 
literature, providing a more academic background for further academic research on 
this subject, other participants in the agrifood supply chain could be affected by anti-
competitive measures that they do not necessarily recognise or identify.  
 
 
7.5.0 Final remarks 
This chapter provided the final critical analysis of the research. The research questions 
and objectives were also revisited along with the main contributions from the 
conceptual framework, and the resulting conceptual systems were discussed. 
Limitations and recommendations for further research were also identified. 
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9.0.0 Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Research design flowchart 
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Appendix B: Sample description 
 
Academic Background 
  Assoc. Degree or less 8% 
  Bachelor degree 58% 
  Postgraduate degree 33% 
  
    Gender 
   Male 92% 
  Female 8% 
  
    Experience (year in the same institution) 
 
 
Sector In rel. to the whole sample 
Private 100% 79% > 10 yrs. 
ONG 100% 8% > 10 yrs. 
Public 67% 8% < 10 yrs 
 
37% 4% > 10 yrs. 
 
All the participants were in full-time employment as an owner, CEO, general 
managers, division or technical or purchase managers. Although these variables were 
not considered on this thesis, the sample gender shows the highest disparity. This may 
creates a situation where the study may be generalized and/or applied to both gender 
but lack of equality. Similarly participants may, unintentionally, ignore evidence if it 
conflicts with their social identities or beliefs, which the gender could be a bias’ factor.  
On the other hand, the interviewees of this research were identified by the sample 
firms according to their own corporative level of responsibility. It may sustain a 
gender-fair sampling process. However, even though that the instrument of interview 
and its process were identical across conditions, both genders could have bias views 
and it would be taking into account on future studies.   
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Appendix C: Participant information sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research study conducted by the Bradford 
Centre for International Development (BCID) at University of Bradford, United 
Kingdom. Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you 
for reading this! 
Who will conduct the research? 
   William Suárez II Gomez, PhD student at BCID, University of Bradford, UK.  
Title of the Research:  
Cabotage: The effect of an external non-tariff measure on the competitiveness of 
agribusiness in Puerto Rico  
What is the aim of the research? 
To explore, clarify and quantify if possible, the effects of the US Cabotage Act as an 
external NTM on the PR’s livestock sector and if possible, areas of opportunity in the 
supply chain competitiveness. 
Why have I been chosen? 
We chose you to participate in this study because you are a manager of logistic and 
accountancy in an agribusiness highly dependent of the maritime transportation. Your 
professional experiences, knowledge and opinion, is vital for us to accomplish the aim 
of this research.  
What risk and/or benefits I will have? 
No risk is previewed because the process is totally harmless and flexible. Respondents 
can decline to answer any question or topic and will have absolute control over 
process when they can pause or stop the recording machine any time during the 
audio-recording session. It will be strictly voluntary and won't receive any financial 
benefit in return. However, at the end of the project, participants’ entities will receive 
a digital report summary of the research results but no other tangible object. 
What would I be asked to do if I took part? 
If you agree to take part, we will ask you to answer some questions. The discussions 
should take between 45 and 90 minutes.  
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What happens to the data collected? 
All the information you give us will be confidential and used only for the purpose of 
this study. Once all the data have been transcribed, analysed and the thesis be 
approved the tapes and backup copies will be destroyed six month after. 
 
How is confidentiality maintained? 
The information given will not be made available to anyone not directly involved with 
the study. This is to protect the privacy of participants. However, names of the 
participants will/can be written on the study materials, that is including the interview 
guides. The interview guides will be kept by the researchers and nobody else will be 
allowed access to them. Anonymity may also be offered on request. 
 
What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you will 
be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself. 
 
Will the outcomes of the research be published? 
The outcome of the research will be submitted as a part of a doctoral research and 
published in an eventual thesis and other publications.  
 
Contact for further information in PR 
William Suarez II Gomez 
Email: agrowillie@yahoo.com  
 
Research Supervisors: 
Dr. David J. Potts   email:  d.j.potts@bradford.ac.uk                    
Dr. Hossein Jalilian  email: h.jalilian@bradford.ac.uk 
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Appendix D: Proposal of semi-structured interview questions 
 
Participants: Representative of the importer’s company  
1. Does the Cabotage Transportation (CT) is used by your company? Does your 
company use Foreign Transportation companies (FFC)? How frequent is the use of CT 
vs. FTC by your company? 
2. Does the logistic services provided by CT is different than FTC? Which of those 
potentiate more your access to a wide variety of services in benefit of your business? 
Which one offer you more access to a wide variety of markets? 
3. How would you describe the management style of your organization to deal with 
the Maritime Transportation Cost? What strategies does your organization use to 
compete in this market? How does your organization mitigate the maritime cost to be 
competitive in the market? 
4. How often do you interact with transportation and logistics suppliers? How would 
you describe your suppliers’ services for your company success? Where are your 
suppliers located? How would you describe your corporative relationship with your 
foreign vs domestic suppliers? Could you please describe how often are the supply 
chain revisions in your company to improve the intercommunication with your 
suppliers? 
5. How dependent is/are your organization(s) from the maritime transportation? Is 
the linkage with suppliers and customers exploited, according to the firm’s value 
chain? Could you please describe the company’s searching process to get more access 
to international suppliers?  
6. Does your organization outsource? What criteria does your organization use in 
terms of making sourcing decisions? Where and what aspects of production do you 
outsource? ¿How useful for your company are the services of the CTC vs. FCC? 
7. Your company maintain high stocks to offer speedy delivery to your customers? 
How the cost of inventory is manage in relation to the fleet cost? Does your 
organization have designed logistic protocols to deal with the cost and being efficient 
in this process? Could you describe it? 
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Appendix E: Consent form 
Research Title:  
CABOTAGE: THE EFFECTS OF AN EXTERNAL NON-TARIFF MEASURE ON THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF AGRIBUSINESS IN PUERTO RICO 
Aim of the Research: To explore, clarify and quantify if possible, the effects of the US 
Cabotage Act as an external NTM on the PR’s livestock sector and if possible, areas 
of opportunity in the supply chain competitiveness. 
  
Name of Main Researcher: William Suarez II Gomez 
Supervisors:  Dr. David J. Potts and Dr. Hossein Jalilian.  
 
I have read and understood the attached information sheet giving details of the 
research project. I have had the opportunity to ask the researcher questions that I 
had about the project and my involvement in it and understand my role in the 
project. 
My decision to consent is entirely voluntary and I understand that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. I understand that data gathered in 
this project will be for research purposes. 
I understand that my name will not be used in the report, and that every effort will be 
made to protect my confidentiality. 
 
Participant’s name (capitals)…………………………………….Date…………………… 
Participant’s signature…………………………………..………...Date…………………... 
Participant’s email ………………………………………………….. 
Researcher’s Signature:…………………………………..………Date…………………… 
 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through University’s 
Research Ethics Board (file # EC1819) 
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Appendix H: Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of 
cabotage in PR’s agribusinesses 
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Appendix I: Output of the ground topics generated by group of participants  
 Issues gathered by factors associated to TRANSPORT-SERVICE-PRODUCT 
GRAIN SECTOR 
 Government/Policy    (PR and/or US) 
1. Regulations as limitation to explore trade with effects in buyers decision making 
 
BCo1 (66,178,272,274,300,333) 
 
ACo3 (134,493,154,156,463) 
 
C3Co2 (221,316,324,269,320) 
 
ACo8 (165,232, 288,290) 
   2. Labour regulations 
 
 
ACo1 (159,161,166,170) 
 
BCo1 (212, 313,338) 
 
ACo3 (486,504,506) 
 
C3Co2 (72,76,80,86,91,98,102,107,109,157,163,276) 
 
ACo4 (96,133,153,225,248) 
 
ACo5 (505,541,177,558, 582,591) 
 
BCo5 (273,337, 42,129,137,240,256) 
   Environment  
1. Climate change or season conditions (Effects on products accessibility for buyers) 
 
ACo1  (192,200,241) 
 
BCo5 (182,281) 
 
ACo6 (134,180,182,186,363) 
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External     
1. Supporting industries and diversity of service  
 
BCo2 (171,178,196,276) 
 
ACo3 (83,87,94,120,188) 
 
BCo5 (191,193,377) 
   2. Quality of service 
 
 
BCo2 (165,202,252) 
 
ACo3 (146,174,321,358,369) 
 
ACo4 (131,141,149,172,178, 208) 
   3. Transportation availability and rates/volume 
 
ACo1 (50,65,111, 269) 
 
BCo2 (81,87,91,133,140,168,310,565) 
 
ACo3 (89,107,111, 132,215,277,306,310,423, 520) 
 
ACo5 (126,137,139,211,277,471) 
 
BCo5 (69,85,104, 108,351) 
   Internal   
1. Agribusiness logistics and supply chain strategies (in relation to the maritime 
transport) 
 
BCo2 (95,107,120,150,153,163, 256, 314, 334, 433, 542) 
 
ACo3 (138,143,202, 204,228,241,243,260,388, 438, 445,601) 
 
BCo5 (68,131,141, 188,209, 265,271, 292,299, 354) 
 
ACo8 (58,81,102, 114,120, 130,177, 222,331,366) 
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2. Business Interconnectivity  
 
BCo2 (35,222,367,401) 
 
ACo3 (248,286, 303,319) 
 
ACo5 (72,166,185,201,301, 307,410) 
   3. Rivalry/Cluster 
 
 
BCo2 (344, 354,418) 
 
ACo3 (85,164,230,288,397, 447) 
 
ACo5 (102,114, 116,118, 222,267, 271) 
 
ACo6 (209,212, 307,313) 
   Infrastructure  
1. Hard infrastructure (docking, port-terminal, equipment efficiency, vessels, etc) 
 
ACo3 (400,469,502, 509,544,556,575) 
 
C3Co2 (42,45,52,56, 61,150,187, 191,201,206) 
 
ACo6 (73,75,78,88, 91,96,102,110,175,184,199,201,230,290) 
   2. Soft infrastructure (technicians, advisors, internal structure diversity, R&D, legal 
corporate status, etc.)  
 
ACo5 (112,313,315) 
 
ACo8 (278,282,286) 
   Distrust   
1. Technical issues in quality and volumes (quantity measures) 
 
Buyers preferences by market stability 
 
ACo1 (210,217,219,224) 
 
BCo2 (283,289,316,405) 
 
ACo3 (148,154,160,168,206) 
 
C3Co2 (172,184,287) 
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FRESH PRODUCE SECTOR 
Government/Policy    (PR and/or US) 
1. Regulations as limitation to explore trade with effects in buyers decision making 
 
B1Co9 (28,43,93) 
 
B2Co9 (68,71,84) 
 
ACo10 (245,261, 265,267, 280) 
   2. Labour regulations 
 
ACo10 (263) 
   Environment  
1. Climate change or season conditions (Effects on products accessibility for buyers) 
 
BCo10 (110,115,118,290) 
   External   
1. Supporting industries and diversity of service  
 
ACo9 (76,78,80,143,162,172) 
 
BCo10 (72,75,77,94, 140,165,181) 
 
BCo11 (90,154,218,220,222,233) 
   2. Quality of service 
 
 
B1Co9 (28,46,48, 129) 
 
B2Co9 (45,47,50, 53,61) 
 
BCo11 (92,392,523,525) 
   3. Transportation availability and rates/volume 
 
B2Co9 (20,27,29, 31,36,41) 
 
BCo10 (50,52,54,97,161,254,256,258) 
 
BCo11 (105,107,116,162,168,172,209,328,370) 
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Internal     
1. Agribusiness logistics and supply chain strategies (in relation to the maritime 
transport) 
 
ACo10 (30,63,79,115, 128,130,148, 150,153, 191,220, 225,250) 
 
BCo10 (41,61,86,88, 104,106,125, 153,243, 248,299,330) 
 
BCo11 (54,56,77,79,87,179,273,277, 298,333) 
   2. Business Interconnectivity  
 
BCo10 (25, 45, 59,184,187,191, 204,234) 
 
BCo11 (47,51,128,139,291,417,424,432,437) 
   3. Rivalry/Cluster 
 
 
ACo10 (89,91,110,208,286) 
 
BCo11 (194,250,365) 
   Infrastructure  
1. Hard infrastructure (docking, port-terminal, equipment efficiency, vessels, etc) 
 
ACo10 (100,102,104, 108,259) 
   2. Soft infrastructure (technicians, advisors, internal structure diversity, R&D, legal 
corporate status, etc.)  
 
BCo10 (131,212,219,265) 
 
BCo11 (257,306,390,419,498) 
   Distrust   
1. Technical issues in quality and volumes (quantity measures) 
 
Buyers preferences by market stability 
 
BCo11 (97,378,486) 
 
